

## **SUBMISSIONS FOR THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2016**

This document publicly releases copies of submissions received as part of public consultation for the *Defence White Paper 2016*.

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- protect information where the making available of the information would be likely unreasonably to prejudice the commercial position of the person who supplied or who is the subject of the information (section 9(2)(b))
- protect information which is subject to an obligation of confidence, where the making available of the information would be likely to prejudice the supply of similar information or information from the same source, and it is in the public interest that subject information should continue to be supplied (section 9(2)(ba)(i)).

# Submission Form

Please send your submission to: **Defence White Paper 2015, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 12703, WELLINGTON, 6144**

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**Deadline for submissions:** To ensure views expressed through the consultation process can be considered in the Review, a deadline of 22 June 2015 has been established for receipt of formal submissions.

Released under the Official Information Act 7082

## Contact details \* = Mandatory

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Mailing address:	
Contact telephone number:	
Email address:	

## Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?	<p>1. RESOURCE PROTECTION</p> <p>2. INSTABILITY OF NEAR PACIFIC ISLAND NEIGHBOURS</p> <p>3. ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES ON NEAR PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES</p> <p>4. CYBER AND ELECTRONIC SABOTAGE</p>
2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?	<p>INSTABILITY WITHIN NEIGHBOURING STATES MAY RESULT IN THE FRACTURING AND UNDERMINING OF CURRENT TRADE RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERESTS. THEREFORE CONTINUED DEFENCE FORCE INTEROPERABILITY AND THE DEVELOPING OF HARMONIOUS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES IS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE</p>
3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?	<p>1. INTEROPERABILITY TO ENSURE CREDIBLE PROJECTION OF DEFENCE FORCE CAPABILITIES</p> <p>2. RESOURCE PROTECTION IN NZ'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE</p> <p>3. PROSECUTION OF POACHING VESSELS, COMPANIES AND CREWS</p> <p>4. MONITORING AND COUNTERING FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND MILITARY BASES BEING ESTABLISHED IN OUR NEAR PACIFIC ISLAND NEIGHBOURS' TERRITORIES</p>

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

DEPLETION OF ENDANGERED FISH STOCKS THROUGH THE INABILITY TO MANAGE, CONTROL AND PROTECT THIS NATURAL RESOURCE. CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES INCLUDING SEA LEVEL RISES. POLLUTION FROM DEEP SEA/ANTARCTIC DRILLING

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

1. MAINTAINING A TRAINED AND FULLY RESOURCED DEFENCE FORCE TO PROVIDE THE RESULTS ITS TASKED WITH
2. DEFENCE FORCE INTEROPERABILITY WITH ALLIES
3. U.N. PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

BY INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROJECTS  
- EG. ENGINEERING SERVICES AND HUMANITARIAN AID PROJECTS - EG. MEDICAL SERVICES

BY COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, EG. POLICE

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

1. EVACUATION ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING SEARCH & RESCUE
2. ASSISTANCE WITH EMERGENCY SHELTER
3. MEDICAL SERVICES/ASSISTANCE
4. ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE/SERVICES
5. SECURITY PATROLS

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

SUPPORT YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

1. SUSTAINING CAPACITY
2. SEA, LAND, AIR SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES
3. CREDIBLE COMBAT CAPABILITIES
4. I. C. T. EXPERTISE
5. INTEROPERABILITY WITHIN DEFENCE FORCES & GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

Please be aware that all submissions are subject to the Official Information Act 1982. Please set out clearly in your submission if you have any objection to the release of any information in the submission. In particular, please indicate which part, or parts, you consider should be withheld, together with your reasons for withholding the information.

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<p>1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NOT ENOUGH BORDER CONTROLS</li> <li>- INADEQUATE AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF BORDERS</li> <li>- POOR SYSTEMS TO IDENTIFY IMMIGRANTS WITH CRIMINAL OR SUBVERSIVE INTENT.</li> <li>- POOR INTERNAL SECURITY OF GROUPS WITH CRIMINAL OR SUBVERSIVE INTENT.</li> </ul>
<p>2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- POPULATION PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE COUNTRIES</li> <li>- OUTSIDE COUNTRIES IMPOSING PRESSURE ON OUR ON SHORE AND OFFSHORE RESOURCES IN 200 MILE LIMITS</li> <li>- POLITICAL PRESSURE ON OUR GOVERNMENT AND ITS AUTONOMY</li> </ul>
<p>3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- OFF SHORE SEA AND AIR SURVEILLANCE</li> <li>- ASSISTING CIVIL DEFENCE WHEN LARGE SCALE NATURAL DISASTERS OCCUR</li> <li>- CONTINUE WITH COOPERATION WITH AUST. AND USA TRAINING FOR SPECIAL COMBAT ROLES.</li> </ul>

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

- SEA/AIR/SATELLITE/SPACE SURVEILLANCE IN N.Z. TERRITORIES.
- ELECTRONIC, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL UNDERCOVER THREATS.

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

- 1ST. HELICOPTER/DRONE/SATELLITE SURVEILLANCE
- 2ND AIR/SEA/LAND BORDER SECURITY CONTROLS FOR UNDERCOVER FINANCIAL/DRUG/MONETARY / PERSONAL CRIMINAL INTENT.

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

- INTEGRATE WITH APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT SERVICES EQ SIS, CIVIL DEFENCE, BORDER SECURITY, POLICE.
- INTEGRATE WITH INTER-GOVERNMENT COMBAT SERVICES WITH AUSTRALIA, USA, INDONESIA.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

- PROVIDE TRAINING/ADVICE AND EMERGENCY HELP TO LOCAL AGENCIES SUCH AS CIVIL DEFENCE, POLICE, REGIONAL COUNCILS.

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

- RE-INTRODUCE A FORM OF COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING TO 18 YEAR OLDS
- IN-SCHOOL EDUCATION AND MILITARY TRAINING METHODS IN 7TH FORM ONLY.

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

- SPECIALIST TRAINING FOR TECHNICAL STAFF AND CREW ON HELICOPTER AND COMBAT AIRCRAFT THROUGH MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AUSTRALIA AND USA.
- SPECIALIST HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING SURVEILLANCE SQUADRONS

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

Loss of effective sovereignty over our huge economic zone.  
 Economic imperialist activity in the Sth Pacific bringing foreign military bases closer.

2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

The growth of refugee numbers and the pressure this will place on the economies of Western countries. We need to protect our surrounding e.g. better even if it costs more and reduces our influence in the middle East.

3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

Continue to protect victimised minorities abroad esp in the Asia-Pacific area.  
 Demonstrate our support for multi-racial activity on the ground.

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

The biggest danger is government apathy and parsimony. We should use modern monitoring techniques and actively police these areas.  
Cooperate with Australia in Sthn Ocean.

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

A tricky question. USA and Australia are more gung-ho than is good for them and us. They need us independent. Our softer approach is the right one.

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

At home, during disasters the D.F. can provide valuable logistic support eg. transport, civil engineering, medical. This should be done in support of police and welfare agencies.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

See # 6 above

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

Military training as an alternative to incarceration for those who could contribute.  
I do not support C.M.T. Incentives beat coercion.

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

Satellite monitoring of our E.Z. and genuine ocean patrol vessels to make our E.Z. really ours. Don't penny pinch this.  
We must support government strategy over dealing with refugees - assuming there will be one.

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### NZ Defence Policy

**Background:** In the New Zealand International Review of May/June 2015, Gerry Brownlee, the Minister of Defence, briefly discussed the impending Defence White Paper alongside an advertisement inviting New Zealanders to 'have their say.' Here is mine.

Basically, I would argue, along the same lines as the late Malcolm Fraser, in his article published in the NZ International Review of March/April 2015. He argued, that the Australian (and by implication, the New Zealand) governments, need to make a U-turn away from a seemingly, ever deeper commitment to the Western (read USA) alliance, or what Mr Brownlee refers to as 'the current rules-based system.'

**Question 1:** What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

- a.) The breakdown of the international 'rules-based' system due to the rules not being observed by the major players.
- b.) New Zealand, being dragged into wars which are none of its business and which are often conducted in breach of international law. (Machiavelli well-advised his Prince, that a weak nation, unless faced with the direst existential threat, should never ally itself with a major power. Weak nations, such as New Zealand, tend to have few enemies, while major powers, such as the USA, inevitably have many. The major power, as the price for its 'protection,' expects its allies to adopt its enemies as their own. Now, instead of having just a few enemies, the small nation has many! However, should the minor power face a threat, there is no sanction that it can enforce to ensure the major power's assistance. If it doesn't suit the major power's national interest, irrespective of any treaty or understanding, it will ignore the plight of the lesser ally. On the other hand, if it does suit the major power's national interest to come to the rescue, it would do so, irrespective of whether or not there was a prior alliance in existence. What was true of medieval Italy, remains true of today's 'rules-based' system.)



c.) New Zealand having its economy primarily dependent on one partner, China, while its defence posture is one of alliance to our prime trading partner's increasingly belligerent military competitor, the USA. This is a conflicted policy that is bound to lead to grief.

d.) New Zealand being unprepared for the disruptions that climate change, apparently, unable to be adequately addressed by the present 'rules based system,' will impose upon it. (Starting to make itself felt within the next 10-20 years?)

e.) New Zealand's government being too late to recognise the threats inherent in its current defence posture and the urgent need to re-direct New Zealand away from the western alliance and into neutrality.

f.) Always in the background, is the danger of 'black swan' events in the form of a sudden and total breakdown in the world economic order, and/or its supply of fossil fuels, or of a nuclear disaster, whether accidental or intentional. Total economic breakdown does not seem that improbable given the soaring debt to GDP ratios of many countries in the EU, Japan and then the USA. Panic can set in at any moment. This situation implies not getting further into debt on unnecessary defence expenditure.

g.) A failure to recognise that New Zealand's best defence lies not in military expenditure, but in rigorous diplomatic action in defence of and towards the further development of, international law. (The government's down-grading of the diplomatic service over the past few years and its recent performance on the UN Security Council, where it failed to condemn the Saudi assault on the Yemen, thus being seen to condone international criminality, are both moves in the wrong direction.)

**Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

These are some of the key aspects of the international environment that are subject to rapid change:

- a.) The continued and accelerating expansion of 'silk road' China; its burgeoning alliance with Russia and the USA's increasing preoccupation with containing it.
- b.) Huge economic implications of the growth of the economies of such as Brazil, Indonesia, India and Iran. The future development and increasing coordination of the SCO, which will soon involve more than half of humanity.
- c.) The potential for the use of Chinese economic power to either take over the Bretton Woods institutions, or side-line them.
- d.) The weakening of the European Union and its increasing independence from American foreign policy. (This latter trend to increase rapidly, should MH17 prove to have been brought down by a Ukrainian fighter aircraft. The JIT's findings are due in July - but reportedly, subject to a Ukrainian veto.)
- e.) After its failures in Libya and Afghanistan, NATO will almost certainly never again deploy outside Europe and the Mediterranean. Unless New Zealand envisions fighting another

European war at some future date, its armed forces can, to all extents and purposes, ignore considerations of NATO inter-operability.

- f.) As the USA pivots its resources towards the attempted destabilisation of Russia and the arduous containment of China, its Middle Eastern policy is undergoing dramatic change. No longer dependent on Middle East oil supplies and having, (from the point of view of Israel and that of its allies in the American establishment, 'successfully') set in train the Balkanisation of the Middle East, the region is to be left, armed to the teeth with American weaponry, to find its own 'balance of power.' With Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran being invited to partake in a Mexican stand-off, and acute water shortages looming, the Middle East will become a hotbed of failed states and resentful sectarian terrorism – and ground zero for a not inconceivable nuclear war.
- g.) Consequent upon f.) above, there is a strong possibility of a major interruption in supplies of fossil fuels.
- h.) The continued failure to amend the constitution of the UN, will result in the continuation of the global community's failure to effectively combat climate change. Consequently, over the next few decades, the world will become increasingly dangerous and anarchic.

NZ's future long-term security needs would be better met by subsidising the move away from fossil fuel dependence, than on military intervention in conflict zones, which are not existentially critical. As the world fills with refugees from states failing due to climate change, to the proxy resource wars being waged by the great powers and to poverty trapped population growth, unrestrained by a growing wealth factor, NZ's defence forces should be deployed for home defence.

Neutrality, combined with universal national service, along the Swiss model, would seem the sensible option. Given its contiguous land frontiers, the Swiss defence forces are structured to fight conventional wars. New Zealand's would need only to be structured to demonstrate to a potential sea-invasion force that, should its vessels survive NZ's initial conventional missile defence, the casualties it would subsequently suffer in a prolonged guerrilla war, would be intolerably high.

**Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

To advance New Zealand's interests abroad, a key policy has to be that its defence forces avoid gratuitously making enemies. Other than refraining from spying on other nations at the behest of the United States, an activity, which many potentially friendly nations regard as hostile to their interests, one of the best ways to avoid making enemies is to ensure that armed New Zealanders are not sent overseas to kill citizens of other nations. Nor should New Zealand's defence forces be used to increase the lethality of participants in local civil wars. With the exception of uniformed UN peace-keeping missions, laws should be enacted making it impossible for armed New Zealand defence personnel to be deployed in other states – other than to receive (and not give) training. Even with UN missions, great caution should be exercised regarding the nature of the mission in question. The UN, as at present constituted, seems quite capable of authorising wars of aggression, as it did in the case of Libya.

As with Switzerland, other than on humanitarian missions, New Zealand defence forces should be deployed exclusively within New Zealand's territorial area of responsibility as listed in question 4.

As a rider to the above, long-range naval missions, such as patrolling the Straits of Hormuz, or containing piracy off the Somalian coast, represent a misuse of limited resources and an ever present risk of involvement in more serious conflicts that do not require our involvement. No doubt, a case could be made for collaboration with Australia and Indonesia in the protection of sea-lanes heading south from Singapore. However, why should NZ, with its puny military budget and a negligible indigenous mercantile marine, take responsibility for the protection of shipping in distant seas to which other nations, with far more at stake and far greater military resources, are already committed and to whose capabilities, New Zealand's feeble contribution will not make any noticeable difference? Weigh risk (just one suicidal Somali fishing boat could sink half of New Zealand's navy) v. benefit (training alongside larger navies to prepare for involvement in their distant wars.)

**Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

Assuming that a prudently governed New Zealand avoids being dragged into overseas wars of others' instigation, and setting aside black swan events, for which forward planning is nigh impossible, rapid climate change has to be the major challenge. Terrorism is only a challenge if the government insists on pandering to its 'natural allies' and participating in Islam's civil war. Given its low population and its wealth of natural resources, New Zealand's food security should be guaranteed, despite the first two or three degrees of global warming. That is provided that a displaced population of Australia, further forward in the climate change firing-line than New Zealanders, doesn't insist on its right to clamber on board and share our rations!

The major problems will come later – maybe in two or three decades' time. At this point two major events have the possibility of impacting our shores. The first is massive flows of refugees from equatorial regions, displaced by climate change and resource wars. Some of these flotillas of refugees might arrive from failing states in the form of fully equipped and armed, naval expeditionary forces.

The other challenge will come, when the Antarctic ice cap melts and the big lolly-scramble for its resources starts among the, by then, resource starved and powerful nations of the Northern Hemisphere. Under these circumstances, New Zealand would be ill-advised to follow Australia in trying to keep hold of its territorial stake in Antarctica. Both New Zealand and Australia would simply get smashed aside in any such attempt. Instead, there should be a tidy living to be made as a transport café and service centre, supplying the hostile fleets of would be exploiters, as they head down that way. (This is of course, conditional upon our defence arrangements being sufficient to impress the travellers that New Zealand would not be worth the hassle of an attempted occupation.)

**Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

Priority one should be to ensure the security of New Zealand and those for whose protection it is directly responsible. After that is done to the best of its abilities, New Zealand can best contribute to global peace and security on the diplomatic front - by standing up for changes in the UN constitution and the rule of international law under all circumstances. In the present, anarchic system of fully-sovereign independent states, in which the individual players' alliances and policies are in a constant state of flux, New Zealand should avoid the mistake of believing in the permanence of friendships. The government should look after New Zealand's national interest and not be gulled into prioritising those of other nations such as Australia, or, as it just has been, of the USA and UK in Iraq.

We can do nothing to help Australia other than offering sound advice (which, almost certainly will go unheeded) while it pursues its current foreign policy of aggravating its Islamic neighbours and abandoning its sovereignty to the Pentagon. Australia and New Zealand might be able to cooperate in guarding their mutual sea space, in shared training facilities and in making arrangements for their citizens to seamlessly serve in the other's armed forces, but in little else.

Only if Australian foreign and defence policies undergo a significant reappraisal should there be room for additional military cooperation.

The fact is that if Australia manages, through a misguided foreign policy, to so aggravate Indonesia and/or other Asian nations, that it gets itself invaded, such a war would be highly likely to spill-over onto New Zealand shores. Under such circumstances, at current levels of manpower and funding, there is no way that New Zealand should risk committing its scant forces to Australia's defence. As things stand, Australian foreign policy seems based on a belief that it can risk affronting other nations with impunity, as the USA will always be there to come to its defence. New Zealand should hope that Australia's gamble pays off - but should itself, refrain from making a similar gamble.

**Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

After the Ministry's own first line responders, New Zealand's defence forces should have the role of being the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management's second resort in civil emergencies.

In their military role, the defence forces should be responsible for training the citizens to protect themselves and to survive, both against foreign invaders and during any breakdown of the civil infrastructure that is currently relied upon. They should be readied to protect the immediate territory and the exclusive economic zone and other dependencies to the extent that in so doing, the security of the whole is not jeopardised.

**Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

First resort – both in remedial action and in universal on-going training and preparation of the citizenry.

**Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

Administering universal national service and ensuring that participants regard it as an activity worthy of their attention. A major function will be to ensure that New Zealand's youth enters adulthood physically fit and, thereafter well set up to lead healthy adult lives.

**Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

Not in order of priority:

- a.) To be able to respond to natural disasters both at home and overseas.
- b.) To offer the government the option to deploy peace-keeping/observer personnel on UN secondment overseas, should it so wish.
- c.) To be able to provide basic and advanced infantry training for the whole nation in conducting guerrilla warfare, with procurement and stockpiling of equipment to match.
- d.) To be able to maintain and conduct advanced aerial reconnaissance and fisheries protection functions. The defence force does not need AFVs, nor does it need frigates for the defence of other nations' aircraft-carriers against submarines. What it will need, when the developing global crisis justifies it, is both land and sea-based surface-to-surface missiles and patrol vessels equipped with up-to-date armaments, including possibly, mine-laying capabilities.
- e.) Maintain a GCSB capacity for New Zealand's own intelligence and cyber defence purposes and alongside it, (a MFAT responsibility?) a foreign, office-based, intelligence service capable of monitoring and analysing the vast array of information openly available on the Internet.

For instance, someone in government could, and such a service would, have warned the Prime Minister that his recent trade mission to Saudi Arabia was going to coincide with his hosts being fully preoccupied both by a Royal Family reshuffle and an aerial assault on their neighbour. More seriously, before making its decision to commit troops to the war against ISIS in Iraq, one cannot help feeling that the government was blissfully ignorant of the extent to which the USA had been responsible for setting up the ISIS enemy, just how conflicted were its interests and how little the US, Turkey and the other Arab states were committed to the conflict against it.

**In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.**

- a.) Forward planning requires crystal-ball gazing and is at best a hit and miss business. The world's leading non-governmental, crystal-ball gazing operation, devoting itself entirely to questions of international relations and 'defense,' is Stratfor. <https://www.stratfor.com/>

Every five years, Stratfor issues a forecast for the coming decade. The most recent such forecast was issued in February of this year. Its contents are summarised in this blog. <http://www.khakispecs.com/?p=699>

Subsequently, I wrote a commentary on the Stratfor forecast

<http://www.khakispecs.com/?p=734> which, if my arguments are valid, should dissuade any would be policy-maker from accepting Stratfor's forecast as gospel.

The realisation of the Stratfor vision of the USA's triumph in the current competition for global dominance, is by no means certain. Far more likely is the emergence of a multi-polar world. Those who have risked all by joining the USA in its bid for 'full spectrum global dominance,' may well find that they, for no gain, have lumbered themselves with a future burden of ill-will from other powerful global players.

- b.) There needs to be some agreed procedure for arriving at a national consensus, before New Zealand armed forces are committed to warlike operations outside the zone of primary responsibility detailed in Question 4 above. The case of the recent entry into the Iraqi civil war is a case in point.

There were a total of 4,753,229 Constituency and Party votes cast in the 2014 general election. 2,257,755 (47%) of these were cast for the ACT and National parties. The other parties opposed the deployment. Furthermore, while some of the voters for the other parties might well have been in favour of deployment, one can assume that many of those, who voted for National, were not.

Immediately prior to the election, the leader of the National Party announced that the option to enter into the Middle East war was not on the table. Then, within a week or two of its re-election, it became clear from announcements made in Washington and from PR prepping of NZ public opinion, that the new National government fully intended to enter the war. Given the lack of any developments in the ISIS situation on the ground in the interim, it is not improbable that this intention was known to senior members of the National cabinet at the time of the Prime Minister's pre-election announcement of neutrality. Many voters would have been misled into giving their vote to National in the belief that their vote could not lead to their country's joining the USA and the UK in their feeble attempt to mop up the mess of their own creation.

There was certainly no popular mandate for this deployment. New Zealand troops have been inserted into a potentially lethal situation with no clear indication that they have the support of the majority of their fellow countrymen. This is not a situation which is fair to the personnel involved. Constitutional procedures should be established to ensure it doesn't happen in the future.

**Footnote.** In the hope of establishing some credibility for the ideas advanced above, I attach a brief bio.

I passed out from the RMA Sandhurst in December 1961. I subsequently served eight years in the British Infantry of which, the final two years were spent in the Middle East. After a friendly course on the technical aspects of gathering HUMINT, I attended an Arabic language course prior to secondment to the Trucial Oman Scouts. From there I was given a small team of Arab assistants and stationed as a Desert Intelligence Officer in the Sultanate of Muscat & Oman. I was tasked with monitoring local tribal politics and particularly, with the protection of BP's new pipeline from sundry groups of ill-wishers. On finishing my service with the Army, I took a degree in Politics & International Relations and with my wife, established a business in York, training diplomats and businessmen. Many of our clients came from the Middle East (including senior personnel from the Iraqi Ministry of Information and the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Petroleum.) After ten years of too much international travel, we sold up the business and decided to emigrate to New Zealand. Together with our three young children, we arrived in NZ in 1985, as one of the first entrants under Aussie Malcolm's Entrepreneurial Entry Scheme.

Having (proudly) taken New Zealand citizenship, I kept myself to myself, concentrating on the establishment of a business in Blenheim, until the Coalition of the Willing invaded Iraq in 2003. I was already familiar with Iraqi politics, my initial briefing having been obtained direct from King Faisal II's former Foreign Minister, with whom, when in my teens, I had dined on a regular basis and whose son was, and has remained, a close friend. After the overthrow of King Faisal, I had followed the activities of the subsequent dictators of Iraq with informed curiosity. By the time we ended up with post-First Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, it was apparent to me (as it must have been to any reasonably well-informed observer) that the claims by western powers that Saddam possessed, and intended to use, nuclear and biological weapons, were pure fabrications, made for the purpose of mongering a war that advanced the interests of both Israel and the major oil companies.

I was more than relieved when Helen Clarke, despite the contrary urgings of the National Party and the mainstream media, managed to distance New Zealand from the Coalition of the Willing's egregious breach of international law. Since then I have paid close attention to the emerging disaster in the Middle East. I have written several articles, published in the NZ International Review dealing with NZ defence matters. Last year, prompted by anxiety over the future of four grand-children, all under the age of three and of the generation that will reap the whirlwind sown by the current policies of the Western Alliance, I started a blog at [www.khakispecs.com](http://www.khakispecs.com) Looking through past postings, I realise that this blog will already have dealt with many of the nine questions put forward by Mr Brownlee in his request for submissions from the public.

3<sup>rd</sup> June 2015

Defence White Paper 2015  
Ministry of Defence  
PO Box 12703  
WELLINGTON 6144

Defence White Paper 2015 Submission: Covering Letter

It is important that the structure of the questions asked on the white paper submission form not be allowed to obscure generalised assessment of our defence needs.

In particular, it would be foolish to assume that no threat exists just because we cannot presently identify where it might come from. We are not looking at coal-scuttle helmets appearing over the horizon; but rather appreciating factors that could eventually encourage a threat to form. On a much more generalised basis: threats will arise when nations with exhausted resources of food, water, energy, and living space find our part of the world has relative plenty and not much will to defend it. At this time we will need what were always known in the past as "forces in being." Well equipped and trained forces cannot be whistled up after a crisis has developed. An air force without an air combat capability is actually an "air farce." We cannot defend anything with helicopters. The first principle of war is: "Selection and maintenance of the aim." If the aim is to defend our sovereignty, then we had better make a lot of changes.

Nor should we take a negative stance that we have no hope of defending ourselves against belligerents because of their superior size. What we must aim to do is to make it not worth their while to put capital ships and other assets at risk by invading our nation. We had this balance right in the past given our small, efficient, well equipped and trained services, in a situation of oceanic isolation.

The pacification of Defence by Clark and Burton has not been reversed by the National Government. As a consequence, it is unlikely that currently serving officers will have the experience and outlook to get back to re-establishing strike capabilities without outside advice. A huge amount of money has been spent on unsuitable equipment. One would have to suspect that this was a pacifist stratagem to disarm our once fighting forces.

Enclosure:

1. Defence White Paper submission.
2. Supplementary pages. To 1.



# Submission Form

Please send your submission to: **Defence White Paper 2015, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 12703, WELLINGTON, 6144**

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## Contact details \* = Mandatory

*Name:	
Group (if applicable):	
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Contact telephone number:	
Email address:	

## Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

<p>1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future? The major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security are, mostly, potential threats and need not identify any particular nation as belligerent. These will arise when have-nots look to nations like ours to make up their resource deficits; particularly in relation to food and water supplies.</p>
<p>2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force? See attachment. Answers numbered to match those of the Key Questions.</p>
<p>3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad? See attachment. Answers numbered to match those of the Key Questions.</p>

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?  
Without an air strike capability, New Zealand cannot enforce sovereignty over her economic zones and meet her island nation responsibilities. It was strike action... See attachment. Answers have been numbered to match those of the Key Questions.

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?  
The Government should prioritise the Defence Force's efforts so that we can defend New Zealand's sovereign interests first; and secondly contribute to joint security efforts on our trading routes (sea lines of communication). We cannot defend infrastructural assets without an air strike capability.

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?  
The Defence Forces need to be tri-service and sovereign and not be seen as emergency services to dash to the aid of foreign belligerents. Securing our trading interests should be the absolute limit of our involvement with other nations.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?  
See attachment. Answers numbered to match those of the Key Questions.

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?  
The forces can play a valuable role in training youth in disciplines and professions as long as Treasury does not squeeze the service budgets. Any national service schemes need to be fully funded.

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?  
See attachment. Answers have been numbered to match those of the Key Questions.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

Please be aware that all submissions are subject to the Official Information Act 1982. Please set out clearly in your submission if you have any objection to the release of any information in the submission. In particular, please indicate which part, or parts, you consider should be withheld, together with your reasons for withholding the information.

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## Defence Review Submission Form

1. The major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security are, mostly, potential threats and need not identify any particular nation as belligerent. These will arise when have-nots look to nations like ours to make up their resource deficits; particularly in relation to food and water supplies.
2. I believe that New Zealand should dissociate herself from the military actions by the USA/British coalition in Iraq. No matter how evil Saddam Hussein was, the invasion was trumped up; and their failure both to restore destroyed infrastructure, and to protect Iraqi cultural and academic treasures has inspired intense resentment. From this resentment arises hatred of the west to the detriment of our own security. Those two powers should have to put things right on their own. By getting involved, we share their guilt, while gratifying the arms sales efforts of their military-industrial complexes.
3. We should, instead be restoring the RNZAF and RNZN strike capability befitting our role as a maritime nation. With modest military capabilities that we had before the Clark/Burton pacifist sabotage, our Tasman/Pacific "moats" provided reasonable barriers to any invasion forces that might arrive. As for protecting our sea lines of communication: that is where a coordinated allied effort would be appropriate. We should dispose of expensive assets such as the NZLAV fleet and the NH90 helicopters when (inevitably) it has been proven that they do not square with New Zealand's reassessed Defence roles.
4. Without an air strike capability, New Zealand cannot enforce sovereignty over her economic zones and meet her island nation responsibilities. It was strike action by RNZAF Skyhawk aircraft that made the arrest of a Taiwanese fishing boat possible after it had outrun an RNZN fisheries patrol vessel many years ago. The RNZN then made the arrest and the foreign vessel was forfeited to the Crown. Highly skilled and expensively trained RNZAF strike pilots were gifted to Commonwealth air forces when the Strike Wing was disbanded. Our strike aircraft were held ready in Singapore at the time of landing ANZAC troops in East Timor (in case the Indonesians threatened the deployment. RAAF aircraft were similarly at the ready.
5. The Government should prioritise the Defence Force's efforts so that we can defend New Zealand's sovereign interests first; and secondly contribute to joint security efforts on our trading routes (sea lines of communication). We cannot defend infrastructural assets without an air strike capability.
6. The Defence Forces need to be tri-service and sovereign and not be seen as emergency services to dash to the aid of foreign belligerents. Securing our trading interests should be the absolute limit of our involvement with other nations.
7. The Defence Forces will show sufficient resilience to meet unforeseen events and natural disasters if they are small and well equipped as they were in the 1960s through to the 80s. One glaring deficiency would be the lack of tracked vehicles. Despite protestations to the contrary, the NZLAVs are not amphibious and they have to go out in pairs because they keep on

getting stuck in the mud (just like Defence policy). Most of them are in storage. This was a very expensive purchase and better options were available at a fraction of the cost.

8. The forces can play a valuable role in training youth in disciplines and professions as long as Treasury does not squeeze the service budgets. Any national service schemes need to be fully funded.
9. RNZAF aircraft for: strike, maritime surveillance/ASW, transport, training aircraft, and utility rotary wing (if funding stretches this far). RNZN: suitable fighting ships (could be diesel submarines, although this would probably be resisted by the admirals), support ships, and patrol vessels. NZ Army: SAS, tracked LAVs, proven, suitable off-road vehicles, artillery, support vehicles. All three services need reliable, robust side arms and adequate ammunition; repair facilities, staff colleges, and technical training schools.

#### Additional Comment

It would seem that the New Zealand Armed forces have acquired a large number of additional staffers, including those officers of one and two star ranking. The increases have been inversely proportional to the number of troops and equipment at the "sharp end." Britain has noticed this anomaly in her own forces and is cutting several hundred generals. I am sure that we should do the same. I can only think that, during times of destructive reductions in Defence strike capability; these promotions were aimed at suppressing protest.

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1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

*RISE of Beligerent China  
A stand off between China & others around  
China together with weakening US may see  
INDONESIA move on to Australia. Japan took advantage of Europeans to take*

2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

*Nuclear IRAN  
GLOBAL Financial Strife  
WEAK NATO - Weakening USA financially & eventually militarily.*

3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

*\* Navy maintain current role.  
To complement Australia Navy. Need to build more vessels  
\* Army - re build to Brigade Co strength with  
Sustainable Reserve to maintain Bde Co in the  
Field to be part of an ANZAC Division  
\* Our own close support in the air would be  
Nice to have*

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

*Difficult to see any? Apart from a major war.*

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5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

*\* Meet with the Australians to plan the priorities.*

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6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

*Ask the Government to double the Defence Budget. Make Defence a priority instead of WELFARE or PENSIONS*

---

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

*Defence role surely is Defence of the Nation. Prepare for that role and Defence will be able to help in a 'Civil Defence' role early when asked for help.*

---

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

*None at all - Members of the Defence Force will develop as a by product of service.*

---

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

*Needs to be able to seamlessly operate with our allies Australia & USA. Particularly Australia.*

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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### Key Questions

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1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?
No really major threats at present; however we must be prepared.
2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?
Wider international connections, a wider world with several hot spots although not directly threatening NZ - ISIS a possible hidden threat.
3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?
Basically as set out in the White Paper. My main concern is a replacement for the Hercules. The Globemaster, which has been mentioned, is not a viable option. We must look for a wider range of options, smaller & more versatile effectively mirroring the Hercules but more modern. There seem to be a number of possible options around worth looking at, at a more modest cost too.

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22 May 2015

Defence White Paper 2015  
Ministry of Defence  
PO Box 12703  
Wellington 6144

To Whom It May Concern,

Please find enclosed my responses to questions asked by you of the public as part of the consultation process for the Defence White Paper 2015.

The responses are entirely my own. I have not consulted or conferred with anybody or any agency in their writing. In constructing them I note that it would have been useful if you provided a definition of 'security' in a defence context. – beyond your gift perhaps.

Nevertheless, I wish you well with the 2015 White Paper and note that it is a timely and appropriate continuation of long held intent.

Yours faithfully,

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Question One.

*What are the major threats or challenges to NZ's security now and in the future?*

In the absence of definition, if we take security to mean our ability as a nation to conduct ourselves in a manner that allows us to exist and prosper without threat or fear of disruption or adversity on our 'lawful occasions', perhaps that is a start.

Such is our geostrategic position in the world; we are unlikely to be invaded by a foreign power. New Zealand, the Realm States and the Ross Dependency are significantly distant for any potential aggressor who would find it logistically difficult to support and sustain a military or naval presence. Nevertheless, security within our territorial sea and the sea approaches to our ports is quite fundamental to our national interest. Similarly, order and regularity in the economic use of our EEZ and those of the Realm States and the Ross Dependency must be guarded against from both those who use it legitimately and those who would attempt to access it illegally. It follows that any direct threat to New Zealand is more than likely to be maritime in nature.

In a global sense, any threat to international sea lines of communication must be of concern to New Zealand. The right to unimpeded access to sea lines of communication is largely taken for granted. Nevertheless, this right to 'open trade routes' is and must be highly valued by countries like New Zealand in particular, who need to engage in a global trading environment. History is replete with examples of states which challenge maritime borders and free access to important sea lines of communication and maritime chokepoints. Half of the world's shipping passes through South East Asian sea lines of communication.

Contemporary threats to sea lines of communication are typically far from New Zealand's shores. Examples are piracy off Somalia and the west coast of Africa, and tensions in the South China Sea's Spratly Islands.

Nevertheless, history tells us that threats to sea lines of communication closer to home cannot be discounted. A German submarine was actually off our coast for a time during World War Two. Our ports and approaches were effectively mined in both World Wars. A contemporary belligerent

country could easily mine our ports and approaches – the ‘*Rainbow Warrior*’ experience springs to mind. These days, in a period of heightened tension or war, the presence of conventional or nuclear attack submarine(s) in our seaward approaches would quickly affect our ability to access sea lines of communication.

With characteristics of stealth, endurance, range and potency, submarines pose a threat which requires a disproportionate effort to counter. They are able to seriously threaten commercial trade in sea lines of communication. It is evident that there has been considerable investment in submarines of European origin by regional East and South East Asian navies in recent times. For example, Indonesia has a programme to purchase 10 Russian Kilo Class conventional submarines.

Further from home threats to international order by non-state actors or ‘rogue’ states cannot be discounted. ‘Terrorism’ as a tactic often employed by these groups is not new. We need only recall the act of terrorism that was the assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince in 1914 that precipitated the First World War. Perhaps modern technology allows us to counter terrorism more effectively but terrorism will remain a feature of threat to world order.

The aftermath of political vacuum and subsequent upheaval in the Middle East following the ‘Arab Spring’ experience has precipitated a new chapter in non-state actor threats. Prospects for early installation of democratic based administrations in Arab countries are not good and nor should they be expected. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen Jordan and the Gulf States only became countries based on Arab tribal and hereditary family lines in 1922. Instability will continue to be endemic in the Middle East.

Where it is in our interest to demonstrate our status as a ‘good global citizen’ we might perceive conditions and circumstances to be sufficiently threatening to our national interest to warrant a military response. Response in these circumstances would only be in the context of coalition with like-minded friends and ally (Australia), and with United Nations sanction.

## *Question Two*

*What changes in the international environment, including relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?*

The world entered a period of unipolar power distribution in the aftermath of the Cold War with the United States dominant. While this unipolarity continues today, it is increasingly under pressure as China becomes economically and, in turn, militarily more powerful. It follows that the world is moving again to a bipolar, United States and China existence but the significant presence and growth of secondary powers such as India, Russia and Europe cannot be ignored. There is no answer yet to the question of where the secondary powers might 'sit' in an ideological sense, although a broad difference is that some of these have a commonly strong democratic tradition and others do not. Tensions between these powers, Russia and Europe, China and India exist and will continue to grow.

The new bipolar 'battlefield' is rapidly shaping up to be in the Western Pacific/East Asia region and the 'battle space' is in the maritime areas between the major population centres of the region. Current territorial disputes in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan and in the sea area north of Japan - all with potential threat to sea lines of communication - are the beginnings of growing bipolar tension. Throw into this mix the close US/Japan/Philippines relationship, the historical unpopularity of Japan in the region, the existence of the rogue state of North Korea, and the United States intention to base 60% of its navy in the Western Pacific. The potential for a 'touch point' becomes increasingly likely.

The Middle East will continue to be an area of instability. Outcomes of the so called 'Arab Spring' have not been conducive to a stable and secure region. Continued political instability and the absence of credible and legitimate leadership have seen the emergence of another raft of non-state actors, ISIS/ISIL being the most prominent. Non-state actors are likely to continue to wax and wane depending on personalities and circumstances. It will take time but the region will eventually become ethnically and religiously defined by Shiite, Sunni and Kurd groupings, much the same as

the former Yugoslavia fragmented on ethnic lines. This is many years off though and the road to it will not be smooth. In the interim, the prospect of Israel being targeted by any one of these groupings is always possible but currently none, including Hamas and ISIS, have the means to do this effectively. Iran could come to threaten Israel but it will likely have too much to contemplate in Iraq, Syria and the Gulf states in the medium term.

Closer to home, the prospect for real instability in the Pacific region, other than endemic political instability and corruption, is largely a function of economic issues and climate change. Migration of people from islands severely affected by climate change in particular is likely over the next twenty to thirty years. Cyclones and tsunamis will continue to wreak havoc from time to time and Pacific Island countries will always be in need of relief and aid. Fiji will likely seek some form of regional leadership on the back of its position, size, relative economic prosperity and new found legitimacy. Fiji may well rival with the other populous and relatively prosperous Pacific island country that is Papua New Guinea.

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### *Question Three*

*What are the roles that the New Zealand Defence Force should perform to keep NZ secure and advance our interests abroad?*

The current policy settings where the Government 'would consider the possible use of military force' need review.

- Can we be assured of Australia to assist in response to a direct threat to New Zealand? Is there similar provision in Australia's 'policy settings'? Is there any appetite in Australia for a formal alliance, or is our relationship of alliance an assumption on the basis of shared history and geographical proximity? It has been apparent that Australia places more value on its relationship with the United States than that of its near neighbour, New Zealand.
- The Pacific Island Forum has 16 member states, a number of observers (including Tokelau - a Realm State) and a further number of 'participants'. It has a limited security mandate. It is far too broad a gathering to identify in military response 'policy settings'.
- The Five Power Defence Arrangement is a regional construct with a strong post-colonial and Cold War legacy. It is something of an anachronism in the current geostrategic environment where it has struggled and will continue to struggle to find its way. Note it is an Arrangement and not an Agreement and only one of its members, Australia, would we consider an ally. Our engagement in South East Asia should be much broader based and certainly it should include Indonesia.
- Military interventions 'requested or mandated by the United Nations, especially in support of the Asia Pacific' or 'at the request of another government' are quite valid policy settings for the use of military force and are all that is necessary.

Constabulary presence in the New Zealand, Realm State and Ross Dependency territorial seas and EEZs is a sole, non-discretionary New Zealand Government responsibility. Our Defence Force should be configured accordingly with ships and aircraft with optimal capabilities and endurance to be effective over the distances and extremes of weather

and sea conditions in our sea area. We also need the Defence Force to be capable of defending our ports and harbours against attack by mines and some ability to defend regional sea lines of communication, particularly against submarines.

In the Pacific, it is likely that the NZDF will be involved similarly in assistance in maritime constabulary roles, including Search and Rescue. At the lower end of military roles – defence diplomacy - the NZDF is a welcome contributor to capacity and capability building amongst police and defence forces, noting that only Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea have defence forces. It is unlikely that the NZDF will be required to lodge an 800 strong contingent of troops in an island country and support it for up to a three year period. Pacific countries have periods of political instability but total breakdowns of law and order for extended periods are rare. A RAMSI type commitment and presence would more likely be required.

The NZDF will continue to be a significant contributor to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises and operations. It should be well understood that this should not be seen as a core role or responsibility, but rather one available as a residual defence capability. The NZDF's role in such operations should be limited to response or 'triage' operations and not lengthy or extensive recovery operations. Some institutional capacity building activity in the context of Defence Exercises is a valid peacetime use of the NZDF

As the maritime dimension in the Western Pacific 'battle space' grows in intensity and complexity ie. moves on from the current territorial focus, the NZDF should be prepared to join with allied and friendly naval and air forces where patrol, surveillance, presence and even sea denial operations might be called for. This calls for 'high end' combat capability where our contributing forces must be able both to adequately defend themselves and contribute to mission specific military objectives. We should not offer our forces where they are a liability to a task force or task group commander.

We should be prepared to join with international coalitions in the world's trouble spots where and when it is in our interest to do so or when world order is threatened. This may become more frequent in the Middle East as countries move towards some sort of political and ethnic equilibrium. It



should normally be entered into with the sanction of a United Nations mandate.

In summary, the NZDF's roles extend from defence diplomacy through to constabulary tasks through to military tasks. The Government's obligations for defence are mandatory the closer they are to home and discretionary the further they are from home, where political judgment defines the national interest

#### *Question Four*

*What are the emerging challenges that NZ is likely to face in its immediate territory, including the EEZ, continental shelf and territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?*

The main challenge will be that presented by the increasing economic exploitation of our vast EEZ sea areas. As the Pacific tuna fishery declines we can expect a lot more interest in our EEZ and the Southern Ocean. We have ample and legitimate capacity to create policy and legislate for this development so that the exploitation is as sustainable as it can be and the benefits accrue to New Zealand accordingly. Economic exploitation of our sea areas will not be carried out solely by NZ companies and resources – there will be partnerships with other countries and multinational companies as there are now. It should be expected that there will be competition for the resources in our sea areas.

In the context of growing exploitation, the integrity and security of our EEZ sea areas must be a sharply focused element of our national interest. We must have the capability to conduct effective surveillance, monitoring, patrol and interdiction of vessels and platforms in our sea areas in order that our policies with respect to its economic exploitation can be effective

It is possible that New Zealand will become a destination for illegal immigration – the so called 'boat people' issue Australia has faced for some time and which clearly is a growing international issue. While our geographic isolation mitigates this risk, it is not inconceivable that attempts will be made to reach New Zealand by South East Asian based people smuggling enterprises.

In the South Pacific, including the Realm States, the prospects for the currently lucrative tuna fishery can only be described as bleak. Poor management, over fishing and illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing will be its death knell, if it has not sounded already. Regrettably, the experience of the North Atlantic cod fishery is being repeated. Nevertheless, the capabilities we should have to provide for the security of the New Zealand EEZ should be available for the same functions in Realm State and Ross Dependency EEZ's.

In the Pacific there is huge potential for active, peacetime use of defence assets and capabilities under the banner of 'humanitarian assistance'. If this can be extended to national infrastructure in the context of defence exercises and operations, much use could be made, for example, of the Littoral (Inshore) Warfare Support capabilities, including hydrographic survey and clearance diving. There is a massive amount of work to be done in surveying to update aged navigation charts which, when available could open up remote islands for easier access and subsequent growth and prosperity.

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### *Question Five*

*How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring NZ is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally, Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?*

The Defence Force's efforts can be prioritised against 'concentric circles of interest' with NZ, the Realm States and the Ross Dependency in the centre as a priority; supporting the security and stability of our friends and partners in the Pacific especially as the next priority, and international peace and security the third priority. It follows that defence force engagement and deployments are more discretionary in the outer circles.

Our commitment to Australia as an ally is probably not negotiable although we should not expect this commitment to be reciprocated in all circumstances. Australia's close alliance with the United States and its status as a 'middle power' are major points of difference which dilute the 'alliance' relationship with New Zealand.

The further the circle, the more likely the Defence Force will deploy in partnership or coalition with other like-minded nations.

NZDF capabilities need not be exclusive to each of these priorities, but rather should be able to be deployed across them as circumstances dictate. Furthermore, given that size (and not capability) of the NZDF is always a limiting factor, questions of readiness and sustainability in terms of response time, time 'on task' and ability to sustain deployments should be well articulated and understood politically, and across the Government.

*Question Six*

*How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all of Government effort to protect and advance the nation's interest?*

At the strategic and political level, the key is one of inclusiveness in Government processes and practices where the NZDF is able to contribute to policy development and also to indicate and advise where, when and what it is able to contribute. Ultimately, the NZDF is an instrument of New Zealand's foreign policy. It should be understood accordingly.

The NZDF has much in the way of capability and 'moving parts' to bring effect to security and foreign policy, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the operational level, the all of Government portal to the NZDF should be through what is currently the National Maritime Coordination Centre. This agency should be renamed and established to enable the NZDF to engage in a broader interaction with other Government Departments.

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*Question Seven*

*What is the NZDF's role in contributing to NZ's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?*

In the NZDF the nation has at its disposal a disciplined, equipped, skilled, experienced and deployable body of men and women, trained and largely conditioned to perform *in extremis* in demanding scenarios. The NZDF should be a key element of 'national resilience' in unforeseen events or natural disasters.

In such circumstances, the NZDF should be used as the first response or 'triage' element for local security, water, food, temporary shelter and medical delivery; handing over to other Government Departments and NGOs as the recovery phase is entered. It should be allowed to recover and reconstitute after a triage operation so that it can be adequately prepared for the next 'unforeseen event'.

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*Question Eight*

*What should the Defence Force's role be in the development of NZ's youth?*

It is not clear that the current 'Youth Development' programme has been hugely successful. Six weeks of 'boot camp' experience is simply not enough to bring about behavioral and cultural change in the nation's recalcitrant troubled youth. While a few may benefit from it, such schemes are merely a band aid for deeper social issues.

Recruitment and retention are enduring challenges for the NZDF which, frankly, does not need to comprise an exclusive gathering of rocket scientists. The NZDF should be permitted to 'throw its doors open' to recruit NZ youth to its ranks on, say, three year fixed term engagements. Those suitable and willing for NZDF careers can be offered extended contracts at the end of their three years.

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### *Question Nine*

*What capabilities does the NZDF need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?*

Current policy for defence capabilities rightly notes a requirement for capabilities that fulfill 'credible combat roles'. This is fundamental to any defence force and is the ultimate extension of foreign policy.

Thereafter, however, the current policy is dominated by a focus on a requirement for ground force projection; the ability to move a ground force from New Zealand and sustain it once it is there. In the context of increased focus on the security of our own and Realm State EEZ's, the unfolding tension in the Western Pacific where we might conceivably become engaged, and threats to sea lines of communication; this policy is in need of review, being far too narrow in concept.

Key criteria in capability selection should be:

- Fitness for purpose assessment
- 'Up front' capital cost
- Time to procure
- Personnel and training cost
- Deployability beyond NZ, including readiness for deployment and sustainability once deployed – these are critical questions which have not been well addressed in recent Defence acquisitions of helicopters and vehicles, in particular.
- Through life support costs.
- Depreciation cost

Footnote: The NZDF currently accounts for 1% of the country's GDP generated by a population of just over four million people. This compares to Australia, a country of 22 million people but where the ADF accounts for 2% of GDP. The NZDF, frankly, runs on a shoe string budget. It should be acknowledged that in terms of value for money, the Government and people of New Zealand get a very good deal, if not one where the NZDF is able to meet all of its operational challenges in the timely manner the public might expect.

The five big annual 'spends' for the NZDF are:

- Operating costs
- Personnel costs
- Capital costs
- Depreciation, and
- Capital Charge

In the context of 1% of GDP, the Capital Charge component is difficult to understand or indeed, justify where the Government secures a financial return on capital investments which generate zero financial return. It is a financial tyranny which should be reviewed.

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## Defence White Paper 2015

### 1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

- Political, economic and community instability within multiple island nations north of New Zealand in an arc from Papua New Guinea, Solomon's, Fiji to Tonga.
- Ethnic and religious tension within Indonesia and (perhaps) Malaysia.
- Tension in North Asia – Korean peninsula, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea.
- Tension involving the Pacific superpowers of China and the USA / Japan.
- Impact of general world instability:
  - China / India / Pakistan
  - Middle east - Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
  - North Africa
  - Europe – Russia

### 2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the defence Force?

**Change:** Greater influence sought by China as a world power and the reaction to this by the USA.

#### Implications for the defence force

Greater requirement to effectively contribute to potential "high end" conflict between extensive and sophisticated military forces.

**Change:** Greater influence of “fundamental religious” movements in the governance of nations – North Africa, Middle East, Indian subcontinent and potentially South East Asia.

Implications for the defence force

Capacity to urgently evacuate nationals from areas of danger, ongoing participation in coalitions to train and develop local military forces, as part of coalitions deployment of “special forces”, combat teams and reconstruction teams.

**Change:** Greater influence of “nationalistic” movements in the governance of Russia, Japan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia.

Implications for the defence force

Greater requirement to effectively contribute to potential “high end” conflict between extensive and sophisticated military forces.

**Change:** Significant investment in advanced military capacity & equipment by Australia, our key friend, as well as by nations across Asia in general.

Implications for the defence force

If New Zealand forces are to effectively contribute and be able to be relied upon, they will require consistent training, doctrine and equipment to allow them to work alongside our key allies.

**3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

- Our forces should be respected for their:
  - fighting capabilities
  - professionalism and quality
  - ability to contribute

4. **What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross dependency?**

- Small scale terrorism activity – killings, hostages, bombs.
- Illegal fishing.
- Boat people / economic refugees via more organised people traffickers. May see a move to use of aircraft.
- Illegal deep sea mining.

5. **How should the Government prioritise the defence efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

- Top priority, the effective contribution to collective security of our friends and partners
- Second priority, the security of New Zealand

6. **How should the defence force operate as part of the all of government effort to protect and advance the nations interests?**

- While the first requirement when procuring equipment and services is to ensure they are fit for purpose, a secondary requirement should be to enhance the nation's economic, innovation & technical capacity.

**7. What is the Defence Force role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

Key role concerns response, immediately after an event rather than long term recovery

- Transport & logistics
  - air transport & reconnaissance - aircraft & helicopter
  - naval transport
  - land transport – trucks & vehicles
- Skilled people
  - medical, engineering etc
  - security
- Equipment & stores
  - Emergency food / water / medical / accommodation

**8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

- Being visible, modelling good behaviour and raising expectations.
- Opportunity for employment and associated training & development.
- Both Cadet Forces and bases that support reserve forces do not reflect current distribution of the New Zealand population – especially our youth population. A specific effort should focus upon Otahuhu, Mangere, Papatoetoe, Otara and Manurewa where 10% of all our nations children reside.

**9. What capability does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

- Maintain an ability to deploy land, naval and air “expeditionary forces”. This implies that:
  - Our training, equipment and communications should ensure New Zealand forces can effectively operate within and alongside forces of key allies and friends.

- Our equipment should not be orphans but of a type that is fully interoperable with key allies and friends and which can be maintained and serviced in a consistent manner.
- Given uncertainty we should maintain a balanced capability that will enable New Zealand forces to build enhanced capabilities over a relatively short period when they are required. This includes creating capacity to build and maintain skills associated with:
  - Air combat, in particular maritime strike and ground attack
  - Armour, in particular tanks
  - Medium artillery (155mm) / counter battery fire
  - Naval mine warfare
- That said, we should be expert in a few specific capabilities both because they are core “building blocks” upon which other capabilities can be based but also because they are the most likely to be required given both current assessments and our situation. These capabilities are:
  - Light infantry and associated artillery, targeting and reconnaissance, battlefield transport (including helicopters), logistics and support.
  - Special Forces
  - Anti submarine - long range aircraft, ship-borne helicopter and naval vessels.
  - Transport, strategic and tactical – both air and naval.
  - Surveillance, in particular long distance and maritime orientated.
- In terms of “size”, key capacity changes should include:
  - Maintenance of three “regular” infantry battalions, thus enabling the long term deployment of one “battalion” combat team for extended periods and the “brigade” combat team for a short period.
  - Maintenance of three high end “frigates”, thus enabling the long term deployment of one to work alongside our allies.
  - Deployment of unpiloted aerial vehicles (UAV) with strike and air to ground attack capabilities.

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15 June 2015

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp  
Defence White Paper Advisory Panel  
Ministry of Defence  
PO Box 12703  
Wellington, 6144

Dear Dr Mapp,

### Submission to Defence Review

Attached is a submission recommending that New Zealand:

1. Mirror Australia's recognition that our geography requires a maritime strategy.
2. Re-focus force structure and defence capability procurement to meet threats to our sovereignty, and credibly to assist in meeting the greater challenges of common defence of Australasia and of our interests beyond Australasia.
3. Recognise that secondary tasks such as peace operations can be met from within the proposed force structure.

The attached piece identifies phases in New Zealand defence policy, compares Australian and New Zealand declared defence policy, looks at defence (in particular RNZAF) outcomes to the present day, and includes comments on our relationship with Australia, on our maritime environment, and in protecting our interests farther afield.

The attachment has been carefully discussed and refined to reflect the views and broad experience of participants from the Brevet Club of Wellington. We believe it is timely for New Zealand defence policy to be redirected towards a maritime strategy. As airmen we have a natural bias towards the "air" side of the equation. However, we believe RNZN, NZ Army, and RNZAF would all benefit in having the recommendations we have brought to the table embedded into defence policy.



## Submission to Defence White Paper Advisory Panel

"There are certain political goods, of which three are specifically important: national independence, security and a well-ordered constitution" (1)

The introductory quote dates from the 15<sup>th</sup> century. It had its origin from the time of republican Greece and Roman times. The statement is valid today and will endure into the distant future. It underpins the views expressed below.

### Phases in New Zealand Defence Policy

New Zealand's defence policy seems to have gone through three distinct phases:

- Colonial and early years as a Dominion: As a part of arguably the greatest empire in history, New Zealand was embedded within the umbrella of imperial defence, guaranteed by the Royal Navy. Thus our involvement in the Boer War, the Great War and entry into World War 2. Essentially, defence based on sending expeditionary forces to distant theatres of war in support of Empire.
- The Second World War and its aftermath. The fall of Singapore, and realization of the limits of British naval power, led to a gradual realignment towards the United States. Whilst Great Britain remained a power "East of Suez" our post-war defence contributions were as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, with commitments to the Near East and then the Far East. With British entry into the European Common Market and withdrawal from the Far East, collective security within the ANZUS alliance became the centrepiece of our defence policy. Essentially, defence was based on sending expeditionary forces to distant theatres of war in support of collective security obligations, in return for national defence guarantees from alliance partners.
- Anti-nuclear policy, and separation from collective security arrangements. Underpinned by statements of a "benign strategic environment". Defence capabilities focussed on support of United Nations and peacekeeping. Essentially, disposal of offensive and most defensive armaments, and no requirement for national defence against armed attacks.

### New Zealand and Australian Comparisons

At this point I think it appropriate to compare snapshots of New Zealand and Australian declared defence policy and armed forces tasks to implement each policy. I have expanded on the Australian part, as important elements of their policy seem not to have been taken on board in New Zealand.

New Zealand Defence Policy and NZDF tasks to implement policy  
(Wikipedia)

New Zealand considers its own national defence needs to be modest, due to its geographical isolation and benign relationships with neighbours.

New Zealand's armed forces have three defence policy objectives:

- to defend New Zealand against low-level threats;
- to contribute to regional security;
- to play a part in global security efforts.

Australian Defence Policy and ADF tasks to implement policy (Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith "Australian Defence: Challenges for the New Government")

- Past 40 years defence policy in Australia has in effect been bipartisan
- Although the Coalition will be producing a new White Paper, the core of the previous Labor administration's 2013 Defence White Paper is a useful reference point
- It stated: "The highest priority ADF task is to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia without having to rely on the combat or combat support forces of another country. Australia's defence policy is founded on the principle of self-reliance in deterring or defeating armed attacks on Australia, within the context of our Alliance with the United States and our cooperation with regional partners.
- It then stated: "the tasks for the ADF, in priority order, are: first, to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia; second, to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste; third, to contribute to military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region; and fourth, to contribute to military contingencies in support of global security." The text makes it clear that the ADF will be structured around the first two tasks, "on the understanding that the resulting force structure provides capabilities that can meet other needs". (2)
- The 2013 Defence White Paper makes it clear that Australia's geography requires a maritime strategy for deterring and defeating attacks against Australia and contributing to the security of its immediate neighbourhood and the wider region. Note that maritime means not just the sea, but the sea and the air above it.

#### **Defence Outcomes to the Present**

It is interesting to note that the primary NZ defence policy objective is to defend New Zealand against low-level threats. This is unchanged from the 1978 Defence White Paper's principal policy objective. (3)

However circumstances have changed dramatically since then. In 1978 the assumption was that any threat beyond the "low-level" would involve our alliance partners. That review recognised (perhaps for the first time) the maritime nature of our strategic environs and as a result our force structure was steered towards a maritime capability to deal with threats into the South Pacific.

The anti-nuclear policy and removal from collective security arrangements meant that beyond the "low-level" New Zealand had no effective defence protection. Thus the "benign strategic environment" arose and this did away with any need for concern about higher-level threats. It also effectively did away with the need for concern about low-level threats too, so NZ maritime capabilities could safely be run down or disbanded. The principle was retained, probably because "low-level" could now be loosely defined as - no military threat but some ability to police our EEZ for illegal incursions. Essentially a police or coastguard function.

Although Australia remains solidly committed to collective security within the ANZUS alliance, it has never assumed that its national defence capabilities should be reduced to dealing with low-level threats to its sovereignty. Its principal policy objective has for the past 40 years been, and is, "to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia".

Judging from recent political comments, the benign strategic environment is no more. However, NZ capability to project air and sea combat power is low, and ability to monitor sub-surface activity in our maritime environs and the island chain to our north seems to have gone. Our capability was always limited, but with regular exercising with, and support and commitment from our larger alliance partners, it was credible.

RNZAF, with the exception of its P3 Orion long-range maritime patrol squadron, is essentially a provider of logistic air transport for the NZ Army. This is reflected in the acquisition of helicopters to replace the Iroquois fleet. The NH90 purchased goes far beyond the previous Iroquois capability. It is by definition an advanced medium lift helicopter, and not air-portable by C130. The P3 Orion itself is nearing the end of its operational life, and serious consideration should be given to its replacement by an aircraft with as a minimum, its size, range and endurance features.

Also mooted is a replacement of the very capable, but very old tactical airlifter (C130H Hercules) with a strategic airlift capability (C17 Globemaster?) at great expense not in keeping with any historical or possible future needs. Another contender is the A400M Atlas, but this aircraft has been plagued by delays, pan-European priorities, cost over-runs and concerns about quality control during manufacture. It is also not compatible with RAAF airlift assets. NZ Defence strategic needs could be usefully met at minimal risk and cost (as in the past) by charter or allied strategic airlift. To contemplate committing a very small number of C17 type strategic airlifters in a tactical combat role is so high-risk as to be fanciful.

And in the meantime an ability to provide realistic tactical airlift from New Zealand in support of combat operations, particularly into the island chain to our north would disappear with the departure of the C130.

A consequence of creating in our minds a benign strategic environment, and concentrating on a defence force focussed on peace operations in far

away places led inexorably to abandonment or running down of our air force and naval fighting elements.

*Here is the nub of the problem; our historical DNA leads us into sending expeditionary land elements to distant lands, either as part of an empire, as part of collective security, within a coalition, or in response to UN peacekeeping needs. This then leads to a force structure and funding allocation that bear no resemblance to the defence of New Zealand and its territories.*

### **Our Relationship with Australia and our Maritime Environment**

In the view of this author, Australia was and is our greatest geographical protection from any threat from the north and west. Any threat to Australia is also an existential threat to New Zealand. It is our responsibility, within constraints of finance and technical skill, to ensure we bear our share of the burden of defence of Australasia, and within that context to provide for the defence of New Zealand to the best of our ability. Forces structured to meet this task can then be made available if necessary for other subordinate tasks such as peace operations in foreign lands. Our oceanic environment, and our strategic interests in maintaining robust surveillance/response throughout that environment means that a maritime strategy is called for in setting defence policy. Also if New Zealand persists without national air combat capability into the future, serious thought should be given to negotiating a minimum sized, but permanent deployment of RAAF fighter assets, say one flight, based at Ohakea. This would in itself sharpen up all three services as they come to grips with realistic air capability in their bailiwick.

### **Beyond Australasia**

To go back to basics, many New Zealanders express attitudes to defence policy by asking who is likely to attack us? It is a question that must be answered, and the most obvious answer is "nobody". But this is an unsatisfactory answer – just as the question is an unsatisfactory question.

The question itself invokes the strategic truths that our shores are protected by the world's largest moat, and because of our positioning and our small size we do not present a worthwhile target to anybody. Many would envy these advantages. But what we found it necessary to do in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, and then into the "benign strategic environment" of the 21<sup>st</sup> belies comfortable assumptions about the protective moat. We went to war or warlike risk in various forms in far-flung places not to protect our own shores or those of Australia from invaders, but to protect our interests. Little has changed in that regard. We have been in Afghanistan, East Timor, Bosnia, Somalia, the Gulf waters, Iraq and elsewhere not because any of them will invade us but because it is in our interests to be there. Inevitably, this means that although we must ensure our forces are capable of operating effectively in our own region in the first instance, they must also be capable of operations in more testing conditions farther afield.

Some elements of our existing force structure contain unresolved contradictions, or are difficult to make sense of because these two requirements can pull in opposite directions. (4)

The arguments outlined above are not unique. RNZRSA has said that "Our armed forces should .... be shaped, sized and equipped for the defence of New Zealand in keeping with the geography of our region, which is characterised in the main by distance and by ocean. Forces shaped sensibly in such a way would also be flexibly capable of use anywhere for our defence in an allied context, though always according to sovereign mandate." (5)

### **Conclusion**

New Zealand's historical solution to "defence of the realm" has been to provide expeditionary elements within the ambit of larger allied formations, and to receive assurances of national defence assistance from larger allied partners. Thus national defence capabilities were of secondary importance.

Collective security guarantees were withdrawn following the implementation of the anti-nuclear legislation, but this was acceptable so long as a "benign strategic environment" existed. Maritime surveillance and combat capabilities to counter threats to New Zealand were allowed to run down or be disbanded.

Australia has long recognised that its geography requires a maritime strategy. Although committed to collective security within the ANZUS alliance, its principal policy objective is "to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia".

New Zealand is by default, protected against hostilities by its geographical location to the south and east of Australia. However any threat to Australia is an existential threat to New Zealand. It follows that we have a responsibility to bear our share of the burden of defence of Australasia.

With national defence priorities becoming more important, a maritime strategy is required, along with a force structure to meet threats to our sovereignty, and to bear our share of the burden of defence of Australasia, and of our interests beyond.

### **Recommendations**

1. Mirror Australia's recognition that our geography requires a maritime strategy
2. Re-focus force structure and defence capability procurement to meet threats to our sovereignty, and credibly to assist in meeting the greater challenges of common defence of Australasia and of our interests beyond Australasia.
3. Recognise that secondary tasks such as peace operations can be met from within the proposed force structure.

Notes: 1. Bertrand Russell. A History of Western Philosophy p509 (from his synthesis of Machiavelli's doctrine)

2. This is an important point, force structure and capability is determined against the highest priority tasks. The resulting capability is then useful in meeting the other tasks in priority order

3. The 1978 Defence White Paper, although crafted in an environment of NZ armed forces trained and equipped for collective security operations, had at its heart a still relevant analysis of New Zealand's strategic place in the world. It placed us in an oceanic environment, with Australia as our closest powerful neighbour and enduring ally. That review stated that our armed forces should reflect the realities of this environment, but recognised the practical limitations in setting up a force structure beyond that to deal with low level threats (a phrase that continues in Defence assessments to the present day). To deal with any greater threats the 1978 review included the objective "to work towards an enhanced combined defence capability with Australia, including defence supply". This latter objective is still relevant in 2015

4. We posit on the one hand that our forces must principally be shaped for the relatively stable strategic conditions of our immediate neighbourhood. Yet on the other hand we also borrow from some requirements that arise from farther afield where strategic conditions are significantly less stable, even hostile. We therefore provide the Army with air defence artillery; and rightly so, notwithstanding that its relevance within our own region is limited. Much the same could be said of equipping naval ASW helicopters with surplus air-to-surface missiles. Yet we do not allow that a case for prudent air combat power to help protect both land and naval forces farther afield might also be justified on the same basis.

5. The equations involved here cannot be modified by wishful thinking. We live in an ocean of vast size, which we must cross to go anywhere. Yet our future will be decided not by what happens in our region, but by the behaviour of others in the rest of the world outside the South Pacific. Happily, if we can cope with the moat appropriately, we will cope with wider calls. If we fail to take into account the great spatial character of our region, which is mostly sea and air, we will fall short of requirements in the wider field in defence of our interests.

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## Submission Form

Please send your submission to: Defence White Paper 2015, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 12703, WELLINGTON, 6144

You can also make your views known by submitting written comments either using the online submission form on the Ministry of Defence website at <http://www.defence.govt.nz>, or by uploading or emailing completed submission forms to DWP15@defence.govt.nz

**Deadline for submissions:** To ensure views expressed through the consultation process can be considered in the Review, a deadline of 22 June 2015 has been established for receipt of formal submissions.

### Contact details \* = Mandatory

*Name:	
Group (if applicable):	
Mailing address:	
Contact telephone number:	
Email address:	

### Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

<p>1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?</p> <p>THERE ARE NO CURRENT THREATS, HOWEVER THIS CAN CHANGE RAPIDLY AND IT MUST BE NOTED THAT NO COUNTRY IN MODERN HISTORY HAS EVER FORGOTTEN A THREAT IN TIME TO FULLY REARM TO MEET THAT THREAT. THIS MEANS THAT A REASONABLE BASIC LEVEL OF DEFENCE NEEDS TO BE MAINTAINED</p>
<p>2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?</p> <p>1. THE RAPID RISE OF FUNDAMENTALIST ARMIES. WHILE THE CURRENT ONES ARE MUSLEM, THIS MAY NOT BE TRUE IN THE FUTURE  2. CHINA'S EXPANSION INTO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND TOWARDS OTHER ASIAN STATES  3. RUSSIA AGRSSION IN EUROPE</p>
<p>3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?</p> <p>BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR NZ DEFENCE ARE TO DETECT ANY UNWANTED INCURSIONS INTO OUR AREA (SEA &amp; AIRBORNE) AND HAVE THE ABILITY TO CONTROL OR ELIMINATE THESE AS NECESSARY</p>



4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

THE ABILITY TO DETECT AND CONTROL OR ELIMINATE UNWANTED INCURSIONS INTO THIS AREA WHETHER THEY ARE ECONOMIC OR OF AMILITARY NATURE

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

THE FIRST PRIORITY MUST FIRST OF ALL TO ENSURE OUR SOVEREIGNTY, IT MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT IF A SIGNIFICANT THREAT EVOLVED LOCALLY IT WOULD ALSO INVOLVE AUSTRALIA, MEANING THAT WE WOULD NEED INITIALLY LOOK AFTER OUR OWN SECURITY AS THEY WOULD BE BUSY

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

THE DEFENCE FORCE SHOULD MAINTAIN FOCUS ON THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF ANY DEFENCE FORCE BUT WHEN THIS FUNCTION IS NOT REQUIRED MAY BE USED ~~IN~~ AS A PART OF OTHER DEPARTMENTS TO FORWARD THE NATIONS INTEREST'S

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

THE DEFENCE FORCE WHEN NOT REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION OF PROTECTING NZ HAS BOTH EQUIPMENT AND PERSONEL WELL SUITED TO HELP IN UNFORESEEN EVENTS AND ~~SHOULD~~ SHOULD BE USED AS SUTCH. HOWEVER THE FIRST PRIORITY MUST NOT BE LOST SIGHT OF

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

WHERE IT HAS THE EXPERTIES THIS CAN BE USED; HOWEVER THEY SHOULD NEVER BE EXPECTED TO BE A PRIMARY PROVIDER OR CONTROLLER OF YOUTH DEVELOPMENT

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

THE DEFENCE FORCES PRIMARY CAPABILITIES MUST BE TO DETECT ANY UNWANTED INCURSIONS INTO OUR AREA AND BE ABLE TO CONTROL OR DESTROY THE ABOVE, WHETHER WETHER THEY ARE AIRBOURNE OR SEA OTHER CAPABILITIES SHOULD INCLUDE THE ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE WIDER AREA

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

Please be aware that all submissions are subject to the Official Information Act 1982. Please set out clearly in your submission if you have any objection to the release of any information in the submission. In particular, please indicate which part, or parts, you consider should be withheld, together with your reasons for withholding the information.

## EXTRA SUBMISSION COMMENTS

Our Defence Forces as currently structured leave us very vulnerable to attack by a rouge organisation or state. This is because we have little primary defence ability.

For example a rouge organisation could simply fly into a major airport on civilian airliners and take it over. This would enable them to continue to fly in more personnel and using captured transport (airports have large numbers of cars, trucks and busses available) takeover the local port. This would enable them to rapidly expand in personnel and equipment and there is little we could do to stop them. It must also be remembered that long haul modern airliners have ranges in excess of 10,000 km, making our area of concern very large. There are other ways that unsophisticated organisations could take advantage of our lack of primary defence abilities.

So we need a basic ability to detect and stop incursions, both air and sea, into our area.

1. Due to the lack of likely threat by sophisticated nations (if this happened it would likely be beyond us) the need to detect only needs to cover significant areas. Sea approaches can be covered by Orions and the navy. Air approaches could be covered by Primary Radar at vulnerable area's e.g. Auckland, Ohakea-Wellington and Christchurch.
2. The containment or destruction of a threat does not need to involve highly sophisticated systems as the likely threats would not be highly sophisticated. The basic ability to stop an aircraft or ship and to contain any ground threat should this fail is what is needed.
3. Other roles that the defence forces carry out e.g. Peace keeping, disaster relief, training assistance etc, must be secondary to the primary role. It must be noted that no country in modern times has ever foreseen a threat in time to fully rearm to meet the threat. The idea that you don't have to have a reasonable ability to defend yourself when there is no current threat, has when put to the test had a 100% failure rate.

It has often been said that defence should be arranged to cover for the most likely use. This is wrong and it should be set up to cover for what is going to hurt us most. It is like insurance you don't insure your house to cover a broken window, (most likely) but to cover the destruction of the house by fire or earthquake lease likely but most damaging.

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*Name:
Group (if applicable):
Mailing address:
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## Key Questions

*Submissions ATTACHED*

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?
2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?
3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

9.6.2015.

2015 Defence White Paper: Submissions

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this very important part of New Zealand Government policy.

It is my view that political games and false economies have played havoc with our defence capabilities for at least twenty years, and sadly I think it unlikely to be any different this time. The fact is that a defence force that functions will cost money, and we have spent too little for too long. During the Clark regime vast amounts were spent on the wrong things, which is at least as bad as not spending at all. It is my sincere hope that this government will look seriously at the defence of this country and take the necessary steps, both in terms of capability and alliances, that will ensure that this country can be defended against threats to its security - including those ignored for the past few decades as being inconveniently expensive .

Whilst the fashionable threat is that of Islamic extremism, there are still risks of conventional threat requiring either better resources than we have, or better alliances –preferably both. China has no qualms right now, about ignoring the territorial integrity of Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, to name a few. Who will be threatened ten years from now? What is the likelihood of an Indonesian threat to our closest ally, Australia? History shows (eg East Timor) that the need for military presence can happen very quickly. We are invariably short on necessary equipment when this happens. It is not possible to predict and prepare for every eventuality, but we could be a great deal better prepared than we are.

**Navy:**

Underequipped, with minimal fighting capacity. The Project Protector fleet provides us with grey-painted fishing boats whose total collective armament equates approximately to one Mark 9 Spitfire. Repeated underfunding lumbered us with the Charles Upham fiasco, and then Canterbury, a glorified ferry whose shortcomings have had to be expensively fixed. It amazes me that MOD thought that building a naval fleet to “commercial standards” was a good thing. Commercial vessels don’t normally have to deal with combat damage or take the risks inherent even in peacetime military operations. Looking back, the long-drawn 1980’s agony of deciding to replace four frigates, eventually with just two, was an astonishing example of political gamesters and loud pressure groups, none of which cared about national defence.

New Zealand is an island nation depending on sea lanes for 95% of its trade, carried on a limited number of ships. It would not take an enemy long to destroy that trade, be it with submarines or mines. Anti-submarine aircraft and a blue-water naval force with a strong capacity for mine countermeasures and anti-submarine work seems obvious as a solution. Apart from a few half century old Orion aircraft, where is our ability to deal with this threat?

### **Army:**

Liberally equipped with 105 armoured vehicles, most of which were not needed, the army has fared better than the other services in some areas. Transport seems well provided for, but the meanness of the "civilianisation" debacle, and the pennypinching outsourcing of army catering suggests that morale is not a priority. Our troops should eat better than criminals in prison, but many pay to eat off base rather than face the boring and often recycled rubbish provided in the name of saving money. The proposed reliance on reserve forces falters when part time soldiers have to resign their jobs to serve their country in time of need –which has happened, regardless of the Volunteer Protection Act. Again, meanness and carelessness of morale. The merger of reserve units in disregard of their history and localised nature only reinforces this.

### **Air Force**

Air power is the decider in any conventional conflict. We have thrown away our most potent weapon. At the time of disbandment of our strike wing, the Deputy Prime Minister publicly stated that we had survived the Second World War without strike aircraft, so why did we need them now? The reality, of course, was that we had over 1000 strike aircraft in the war, only in those days they were called fighters and bombers. I am left speechless that such a huge and damaging decision could be made on the basis of such ignorance. And no government since has had the nerve to repair the staggering damage our force capability suffered as a result of that flawed and lightly taken decision. New Zealand was ill-served by its elected representatives, and continues to be.

The Clark government spent large sums on unwanted LAV's for the army, and on what may be the world's most expensive helicopters, NH 90's at about \$100,000,000 each. This had two effects: the lumbering of our services with less than useful equipment, and more importantly, an excuse that there was no money left for a strike wing. The entire process was nothing less than shameful, and subsequent governments have changed nothing.

What capacity does our Air Force have to support our troops and ships in combat? None. It appears that our leaders prefer to fund fancy VIP carrying aircraft, when our soldiers have no New Zealand air support in hazardous situations. Ground attack helicopters should be considered if we can't have a Strike Wing, but we seem to be in a PC limbo where combat capability is best not mentioned, and therefore not provided. We have historically sent off troops to war ill-equipped, with consequent unnecessary casualties. The reason is – always – lack of political will to spend money on defence. Our forces should not have to rely on other countries' taxpayers for support we should provide ourselves.

As a taxpayer I want value for money. That means a defence force that has the gear to do the job. It definitely does not mean ripping off our service people or saving money at the cost of capability. Our service personnel deserve better, both in treatment and in having the equipment to deal properly with the threats that come their way. The country deserves better, in having a government that actually meets its prime responsibility, the security of the nation. I don't think we've had one of those since the 1970's.

Will this White Paper change anything?

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# Defence White Paper 2015

(Submission)

Due: 22 June 2015

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Submit to:

**Defence White Paper 2015**

Ministry of Defence

PO Box 12703

WELLINGTON, 6144



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## 0.0 Introduction

**Every citizen should expect their country's government would be confident enough, its various resources dependable enough, its systems resilient enough, to provide for them and their loved ones security in times of trouble. The delivery of this fundamental expectation is defined by a willingness to deploy a prepared, trained and adequately supplied military apparatus<sup>i</sup>**

0.1 Our contribution to regional stability and humanitarian missions is undisputed. East Timor should have been a wake up call for even the deepest sleepers convinced of strategic benignity.<sup>ii</sup>

0.2 Afghanistan has shown our undeniable commitment to international operations and the Global War on Terror, and a willingness to put those of our Defence Forces in harm's way. This has continued with a response to the *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* (ISIL)<sup>iii</sup> threat.

0.3 National preparedness, crisis management, and the aftermath and ongoing trauma sustained as a result of the Christchurch earthquake has shown major short-falls in our ability to handle even a relatively minor environmental disaster.<sup>iv</sup>

0.4 New Zealand's geographical isolation would suggest we have no direct strategic threats to contend with, even in the age of the supersonic jet fighter, submarine or the aircraft carrier, or the global nature of contemporary terrorism.<sup>v</sup> During deployment to East Timor, Indonesian Air Force jets and at least one submarine shadowed that operation.

0.5 In 1985, our country was subjected to an act of terrorism. By order of a friendly nation's government, the *Rainbow Warrior* was bombed by agents of the French military intelligence services in Auckland harbour.

0.6 Our own ground and naval forces no longer have close air support. This critical capacity was terminated directly after the Skyhawks proved to be a vital operational requirement to the East Timor mission.

- 0.7 If a similar scenario were to arise again, we would not be able to provide that regional contribution, thereby assisting directly in the mitigation of hostility by the effective threat of military force. This is the case even though it is fiscally possible for us to remedy this major strategic deficiency.<sup>vi</sup>
- 0.8 Consistent lack of critical equipment, or reliance on out-dated and therefore dangerous equipment has been the hallmark of typical operations for the last twenty years. This includes the requirement to hire such equipment from allies.
- 0.9 Critical manning<sup>vii</sup> is common knowledge, and various incidents have brought to public attention the increasingly dire state of our Defence Forces, while our people in uniform are expected to work under the stresses of increased operational tempo.
- 0.10 With ongoing conflict experience since 1999 to call upon, it has become clear there is a serious lack of ability to gain any ground via so-called "lessons learned".
- 0.11 Catch phrases and buzzwords do not fix a culture of ineptitude, which for the most part is forced upon our NZDF personnel with a combination of over-priced, unproven and lowest bidder equipment, which have been, time after time, after thoughts.
- 0.12 An ongoing lack of accountability placed upon government regards Defence prevents a change of prevailing attitude from one of reactionary to the pro-active.
- 0.13 First and foremost we require a Defence Force able to meet the challenges of a diverse range of contingencies. In the military context this is not only threat detection, but also their interdiction and their destruction as required.
- 0.14 If we are unwilling to fully invest in these measures, wherever weaknesses exist, they are sure to be those exploited by any enemy, known or unknown. It is time that those in uniform are given a fair go, and that the endemic state of "doing more with less" is put to rest.
- 0.15 We may claim to stand up for given principles, but our willingness to act upon them and have the ability to do so is questionable. This is a direct reflection of our global reputation. Our reputation impacts effectiveness in diplomacy, commerce and influence in international policy.

**Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

**1.0 The primary purpose of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is to defend New Zealand, its people, territory and sovereignty, and protectorates regardless of the limitations government policy may put upon it. All other applications of this state apparatus are secondary. It must be properly funded, supplied and informed to do so.**

1.1 The most significant threat to our security and well-being is that the NZDF is not properly funded, supplied and informed to do so. Beyond this primary directive the following areas are deemed major threats and challenges:

- Local Maritime Security
- Sea Lanes, Trading Routes and Regional Responsibilities
- Terrorist Organisations

1.2 Local Maritime Security<sup>viii</sup>

1.3 While much is made of the Gulf of Aden, far more competent and experienced pirates exist closer to home. However, it is not isolated incidents of piracy which are most significant here. An organised terrorist attack on a cruise ship or ferry<sup>ix</sup> could have far more greater cost for New Zealand. Such scenario analysis must include the sabotage of ports, shipping or offshore assets within our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

1.4 Even an event as narrow in geopolitical scope as the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing of 1985 proves this – a terrorist act (act of war) committed by a friendly nation. Shortfalls in maritime counter-terrorism must be addressed.

- 1.5 While the New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) has focus in overseas theatres, and the raising of the Commandos provides domestic security in counter-terrorism scenarios, we require a force purposely designed for the maritime role, which for New Zealand has unique challenges, and far-reaching consequences if not met.
- 1.6 A dedicated, visible and viable force based on the Royal Marines Commando model is required to address directly the very real threats posed, right here at home, to a small, isolated island nation who should not depend on others for its protection, or have to pay for it in the aftermath. This will also seal up a significant policy gap in Defence.
- 1.7 Our lengthy coastline coupled with vast shipping lanes, presents our greatest strategic vulnerability. As seems to be the trend, amalgamating forces, expecting multiple outcomes and adapting existing forces only dilutes capabilities and task focus of these units. Our current Naval Patrol Force (NPF) is unable to effectively manage this tasking.<sup>x</sup>
- 1.8 **Gunboat Option**
- 1.9 Modern warfare does not beguile the concept of small highly mobile vessels covering vast coastlines. Numerous small coastal vessels, supported by cutters (in our case Offshore Patrol Vessel with helicopter support) provides a highly manoeuvrable rapid response force with the capacity to engage illegal fishing vessels, perform coastal Search and Rescue (SAR)<sup>xi</sup>, maritime fire fighting and protection of vital civil shipping.
- 1.10 Direct action military tasks includes being able to engage low flying aircraft with Surface to Air (SAM) missile systems, and countering coastal infiltration, in the role of maritime security and counter terrorism operations.
- 1.11 The gunboat is designed to carry sonar equipment, and can ferry specialists such as medics, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) experts, and provide logistical support in civil emergencies. All these time-critical tasks can be performed at very high speeds.

- 1.12 Such an option requires localised support but is very sustainable when compared to larger displacement vessels. In such scenarios there is strength in numbers enabling large waterways to be secured easily. The nature of this deployment method gives much more mutual support.
- 1.13 The Swedish company of *Dockstavarvet AB* produces the CB90H Combat Boat<sup>xii</sup>, capable of carrying up to 21 people or 4 tons of stores, and being fully laden is able to exceed speeds of 30 knots.
- 1.14 In regards New Zealand sovereignty enforcement tasks, the Navy would have an ability to respond rapidly to fisheries violations, counter sub surface incursions and enjoy an enhanced patrolling capacity thereby being able to reduce the strain of a two frigate fleet, in conjunction with vessels of the Naval Patrol Force.
- 1.15 Taking on surveillance equipment such as Thermal Imagery (TI) and TV cameras will enhance SAR operations. Fully computerised navigation with integrated GPS is provided.
- 1.16 CB90E is an unarmed export model of this vessel, which would allow arming as appropriate rather than taking on any standard fit. Been able to mount weapons from machine guns through to cannon and anti submarine mines such a vessel is able to perform a mired of offensive tasks in the military operational context.
- 1.17 Sea Lanes and Trading Routes
- 1.18 If we were able to be subjected to German raiders during World War One, and the Japanese had money printed for New Zealand in World War Two, and even, for the sake of historical record, we had Armstrong disappearing guns installed for fear of the Russians in the late 1800s, it is odd that there is no telling concern for even the smallest military encounter in our own remote part of the world. Even the suggestion that our shipping lanes might ever be threatened significantly appears relegated to the realms of fantasy.
- 1.19 As it stands, our negligible maritime response, which equates to a Navy and Customs boarding of vessels engaged in illegal fishing<sup>xiii</sup>, posses little concern for even a low key maritime military action at our expense.



- 1.20 A single aircraft of airborne terrorists could create untold devastation upon critical infrastructure and an unarmed civilian population before they were put down.
- 1.21 Extrapolating out our ability to take care of our own affairs clearly displays susceptibility in a regional context. East Timor (now Timor Leste) offers our best reference here, but Bougainville, Vanuatu, Samoa and others all demonstrate our need to be vigilant and capable as a regional power.
- 1.22 Terrorist Organisations
- 1.23 Even compared to little more than a decade ago, the dynamics and perceptions of terrorist organisations and how they function have fundamentally altered. From the days of groups which focused mostly within states, such as *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA), *Hezbollah* or the *Irish Republican Army* (IRA), now, the threat is seen as truly global.
- 1.24 Particularly in regards covert, subversive and unconventional warfare in a rapidly changing and complex geopolitical environment, we can not allow ourselves to be complacent, or exclude any possibilities. It is clear, as the outcome of the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing showed, international law can be flouted, and trade and commerce can come before justice.<sup>xiv</sup>
- 1.25 While the stated goals of *Abu Sayyaf* do not overtly span as far as New Zealand, this Philippines based group has proven capacity and willingness to instil fear, commit to bombings and embark in drug-trafficking. Their ideological leanings are not typically strong enough to offer threat beyond kidnapping, extortion and traditional criminal offence. While links to ISIL are unsubstantiated, they have been linked to Indonesian group *Jemaah Islamiyah*.
- 1.26 Additionally, though claiming to be disbanded, *Laskar Jihad* showed themselves to be active after the Bali bombings. This only demonstrates the subversive and deceptive nature akin to effective warfare.
- 1.27 Adversaries are at their most dangerous when we are least able to not only properly ascertain their capabilities, but their intentions. This group has direct roots in conflict between Muslims and Christians.

- 1.28 ISIL currently has the lime-light. Its reach, financial capacity and offensive potency is only matched by its rapid expansion, and the number of nations which are afflicted by groups claiming its allegiance. While its stated aims do not geographically reach our part of the world, they are fervent in a jihad against Christians, which means, no matter how a given census rates the country on a personal level, New Zealand, and its values are deemed Christian.
- 1.29 It is important to realise that a major strategy of warfare is to exploit weakness, while avoiding the strengths of an enemy. Simply put, from a military capacity point-of-view, New Zealand is considered weaker, for example, than Australia.
- 1.30 New Zealand, for better or worse, has a well-known perception for being a passive, peace-loving nation, its soldiers as being peacekeepers, not warfighters. This includes the notion, frequently mistaken, that an anti-nuclear stance is an anti-military stance.
- 1.31 One must always take the perceptions of an enemy, no matter how ill-grounded they are in reality, into consideration. While many consider our geographical isolation as a benefit, global air and sea travel negate this instantly. Our coastline is vast and our ability to patrol it is currently severely limited.
- 1.32 No matter any group's stated goals, their influence in terms of reach, relationships with individuals, business or governments, like any aspect of warfare, should always be considered fluid, adaptable and evolving.
- 1.33 Splitter groups, rogue operatives and even miscommunication can invoke unexpected outcomes compared to that which we know, and that which we think we know. Therefore it is prudent, not only to ensure good and effective relations with our allies, but also independent and expedient intelligence of our own.
- 1.34 We must be able to assess matters from a national security point-of-view first and foremost, concerning ourselves with our own regional security, and those who wish our assistance, on a case-by-case basis. This must be done without unduly putting at risk our own people, infrastructure and territory as a result.

1.35 Kidnapping, hostage, and ransom scenarios are an integral part of terror network behaviour. New Zealand citizens must be able to count on the calculated and decisive intervention. When systems of diplomacy and negotiations fail, Special Operations Forces must be permitted to intervene. This must be able to be facilitated anywhere around the globe at short notice.

1.36 It is worthwhile considering that events such as the 1998 Auckland power crisis, which lasted five weeks, shows how outdated infrastructure, flawed checks-and-balances and poor management can lead to serious, yet completely avoidable scenarios affecting businesses and livelihoods by our own hand.

*Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?*

**2.0 In relation to Defence, a brief analysis of even modern history will show that the dynamics of organisations, countries and governments, and their relation to each other can change very rapidly. Treaties can easily be broken, alliances fall apart, and supposed friendly parties can be kept in the dark. We are part of a global community<sup>xv</sup> and international organisations which will impact us either directly or indirectly no matter the extent of our involvement in them.**

2.1 The New Zealand Defence Force must be flexible and robust enough in its capabilities and doctrine to cope with the aforementioned potential for change.<sup>xvi</sup> This is exemplified in situational awareness on the international front, as it is expected on battlefield.

- 2.2 The Defence Forces, alongside civilian apparatus, including academic sources, must have cohesive networks to properly interrogate intelligence. While we can coordinate with foreign powers, we must develop and maintain effective systems of our own demonstrating critical self-reliance. The only information you can truly rely on is that which you produce yourself.
- 2.3 As a central partner in this critical component to our nation's well-being in years to come, the New Zealand Defence Force must insist upon a complete and unimpeded Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance system integrated into a networked battlefield.<sup>xvii</sup>
- 2.4 We must build upon those traditional military skills for which we were renowned and not permit it to become a weakness through lack of fiscal investment.
- 2.5 The Joint Task Force concept must impart each relevant asset we have at our disposal, military or civilian and be suitably enhanced as the means become available. We have built an unbelievably complex system upon which our world now functions. This has the direct upshot of being proportionally vulnerable in numerous ways.
- 2.6 That is to say, there are many more ways to corrupt, disrupt or destroy elements of that system; multi-spectrum electronic surveillance systems, logistics and supply, media, banking, road and rail, shipping and air traffic control, all now firmly reliant on Internet and telecommunications networks.
- 2.7 Our primary unchanging interest must be that of our own national security. Secondary is the security of the region in which we are part, and thirdly, our responsibility lies in our efforts regarding security of the larger global community.
- 2.8 The NZDF should be charged with its responsibilities in a framework which imitates the above priorities, aware that ongoing political change and the geopolitical environment has significant influence on what our interests might be in terms of the region and the world at large.
- 2.9 As a result of over-complicating the basics we risk the perilous path of falling into tunnel vision where we consistently believe solutions lie not in our own wits, our own experience, or industry, but in imported technology and throwing money at the problem.

- 2.10 In relation to the Defence Force, as to benefit our national interest, we must re-examine our own military past and understand properly what we have learned.
- 2.11 It is not beyond the realms of possibility that as a nation we will become involved in major conflict or natural disaster impacting us on a scale not seen for many decades. As such, honestly learning from the past, developing techniques and best practices, and being vigilant, based upon as best as possible, our own systems and know-how, is the best way to mitigate the damage done through some unforeseen event. While systems of others may be helpful, they are not always the best solution.
- 2.12 While we should put reasonable efforts into anticipating change, it is more prudent to have the means in place to cope with that change. This means having systems designed around flexibility and adaptability there is the greatest means by which to mitigate potential damage to our infrastructure, logistical networks and communications, and harm to our people.

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**Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

**3.0 In a military context, if we are able to show our allies, trading partners and others that we have a willingness to take care of our own Defence issues confidently and quietly, while assisting those we are able, it will only help to provide confidence in others wishing to deal with us.**

3.1 If we are unable to be seen to take reasonable steps of prevention, preparedness, and action in our own affairs locally and regionally this will have an effect on the confidence of others to work with us. It also impacts our influence in any policy, doctrine or resolutions of which we may be a part or wish to be a part. This therefore reduces or negates our principles and insight being seen to be acted upon.

3.2 This is the core of diplomacy and our ability to advance our interests abroad.<sup>xviii</sup> The New Zealand Defence Force, while subjected to the policy of the day, also therefore has a direct impact on the policy of tomorrow, positively or negatively in these regards, depending on the capabilities and effectiveness allowed them.

3.3 Essential to our security is to ensure we keep pace with the rapidly changing dynamics of the region and those who hold both influence and interest in it. We have seen how, with technological change, shifting geopolitical climates and the resource needs of different states<sup>xix</sup>

*Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?*

- 4.0 New Zealand is an important staging post for operations to Antarctica, the last untapped resource<sup>xx</sup> on the planet. While many would claim to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Madrid Protocol, the environment, and common sense in relation to countering its exploitation, history is the best testament as just how short-lived these measures can be. Taking the example, deeming its inability to predict the future, New Zealand must have reasonable means by which to demonstrate its willingness and ability to enforce the non-exploitation of this territory.**
- 4.1 Our lack of commitment to the protection of our EEZ is well known, which only puts our natural resources at increasing risk as foreign stocks become increasingly depleted, fisheries being the most obvious.
- 4.2 The greatest portion of our trade comes via exposed sea lanes. Reasonable capability to protect these critical routes of trade must be upheld.
- 4.3 Since we lack the air power to do so effectively, we would require and expect friendly nations such as Australia, Malaysia, Singapore or the United States to do so on our behalf, and at very short notice.
- 4.4 Simply by the innate nature of any potential security threat a self-imposed reliance on others is strategically untenable. This tenet is not about working with allies in overseas deployments, it is about our own territorial defence. It is an unacceptable expectation when we are unwilling to put reasonable efforts into these strategic matters ourselves.
- 4.5 We are a significant strategic asset in regards Antarctica. Growing interest in this region regards depleting resources makes security a priority for New Zealand.<sup>xxi</sup>

*Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?*

**5.0 The first decree of the NZDF is the defence of New Zealand, its citizens and its territories. Any efforts beyond this must be done in the support, to the benefit of and within the substance of the intent of this decree. The efforts put into any other edicts must, by-in-large, benefit our own security and well-being.**

5.1 Motives and actions will not always mesh. Undesirable outcomes may result, having either or both direct and indirect effects upon New Zealand. For example, our engaging in the Global War on Terror, or regional stability operations, will not bode well with particular non-state or even state actors, where our objectives, political or trade, fall into opposition.

5.2 Our national values of principle must be our guide, and it becomes increasingly imperative that we not only guard against potential consequences, but also have the capacity to act against them.



**Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

**6.0 The military has the unique disposition of being the only state apparatus which consists of personnel, expertise and assets which undertake a broad range of tasks and therefore is capable of coordinating between them through collective procedures, doctrine and logistical networking.**

6.1 Christchurch, as an example to the nation of our collective vulnerability, exposed inadequacies across multiple agencies.

6.2 Other events, such as flooding in Dunedin, where the city council was reluctant to distribute sandbags, and slow to react to the prevailing circumstances, demonstrates rudimentary inefficiencies at the local level also.

6.3 As a universal nationwide effort, the Defence Force, while being enhanced in its own right, can help to properly address these issues, thereby creating a more cohesive relationship with other departments of government linked to national security in the widest sense.

6.4 While other elements of government are charged with international relations and the NZDF can be and should be part of those efforts, the NZDF must have its focus primarily in national defence-related issues, both of a military and a civil nature.

6.5 We may find ourselves subjected to anything from full scale war to a major natural disaster, a terrorist threat to a major arterial route being blocked due to flooding or minor earthquake.

6.6 Interoperability between agencies is critical and must be the key focus of present and near-future outcomes.

*Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?*

**7.0 Resilience is the capacity to do the job when it matters, for extended periods of time, under stressful circumstances, having been conditioned and properly trained for it. It also includes the practical equipment and systems required to carry out the tasks required to restore our society, under whatever circumstance it was subjected to, back to the norm. This question becomes a moot point if those scenarios for which resilience is required are even considered.**

7.1 We were ill-prepared for two world wars, the second of which was highly visible, including the Spanish Civil War as a test-bed for Blitzkrieg.

7.2 Our once uncontested skills in reconnaissance and small unit patrolling has been whittled away so that we might be used as a "peace keeper-only" force subject more to the regulations of the United Nations rather than to the will of the people of New Zealand through our government.

7.3 While it was commonly expected a major earthquake might hit Wellington, no one was able to predict those which occurred in Christchurch. For a great many people, particularly in the poorer areas affected by the earthquake, the trauma and realities of trying to rebuild their lives remains.

7.4 There has been no collective national effort to build on that aforementioned experience, to learn from it. Yet, for reasons previously stated, at its core, the New Zealand Defence Force is the best institution we have in order to do this.

- 7.5 While we can wait for friendly nations to come to our aid in a larger more crippling scenario, it is not a suitable or fair solution. Advertising campaigns for “getting through” is one thing, but providing a catalyst for encouraging and enabling citizens to be an active part of such a response is another thing entirely. While it might be technically illegal to carry a Swiss Army knife in one's pocket, it is foolish not to.
- 7.6 The Swiss logistics system provides a good example of how these resultant skills and capacities relate to dealing with critical dilemmas. Consisting primarily of Engineer, Hospital, Logistics, Signals and Emergency Response units, the overriding structure means elements are embedded at the lowest operational level possible, regionally.
- 7.7 The above system increases co-ordination and reduces logistical strain, rather than compounding difficulties in acquiring specialist units from elsewhere, as most military forces face when they actually deploy (at home or abroad). Examples include transportation needing mechanical engineers, military police being required for traffic control, or vehicles and aircraft being vital to medical evacuation.
- 7.8 In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army had to cope with the realisation many of their specialists are within the ranks of the National Guard and Reserves. Having to mobilize these forces has made deployments far less effective in their initial stages. In times of war or national crisis the consequences are obvious.
- 7.9 New Zealand had similar issues in relation to East Timor. Many in traditional combat support roles were required to retrain in infantry skills, such as patrolling, in order to take up the slack in personnel shortages and enable effective rotation of personnel.
- 7.10 We can either learn from these experiences or be bound to repeat mistakes or inadequacies in the future, when far more is at stake. This includes being able to maintain an unhindered capacity for at-home emergencies. A key to resolving these issues is trained manpower.

7.11 However, the NZDF has a critical manning problem and retention has been an ongoing issue for sometime, particularly in the sphere of trained and experienced non-commissioned officers.

7.12 In order to deal with the unthinkable, one must be adequately trained and prepared. This is not only a physical thing but also one of tenacity and discipline. These core attributes are key to the military, along with arduous activities at the exclusion of modern convenience.

7.13 Contrary to popular belief, being a player of sport offers little more than window dressing. Teamwork on a football field does not equate to teamwork in earthquake recovery or flood prevention. To be effective, a culture of collective preparedness must be embedded into a society. Without this we find ourselves coping as best we can, making do. This is far from good enough, but it is what we have now.

7.14 Perhaps the better question to ask is, what can every able-bodied adult of military service age contribute to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

**Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

**8.0 While we concern ourselves with the lack of physical activities our children take part in, we ourselves are frequently serving no good example thereby needing campaigns like *Push Play*. This submission strongly asserts the merits in the reinstatement of Compulsory Military Training (CMT), particularly in respect to our youth, in the interests of national preparedness and social unity.**

8.1 Objection to CMT would be voiced far louder than any against free accommodation for violent criminals. Trade training has long since been abolished from our overcrowded prisons. As has the dignity provided by allowing prisoners to grow their own food, along with other measures of self-sufficiency.

8.2 This was clearly a mechanism or, as would be called in the military, a "force enabler" to provide vocation, purpose and the dignity of employment and income on reintegrating into society. All the while, victims continue to fight for basic rights and dignity.

8.3 Consider skills and abilities such as rock climbing, first aid, adventurous training, and SAR exercises. Our people are our building-blocks to a competent, coordinated and thoroughly effective nationwide effort in times of trouble, due to the implementation of national service with a focus aimed at Civil Defence.

8.4 For any organisation to function efficiently there must be structure, order and discipline. This provides the backbone for effective training and procedures, and applies to every part of our civil society. A well defined combined system of civil and military compulsory service and its associated materials and logistics networks would provide the country with a much-enhanced capacity to deal with national emergencies locally and regionally. More people trained, more people confident, more people aware. The alternative is what we have now.

- 8.5 For our young people, increasingly urbanised, with little or no experience of the outdoors, and with an inherited lack of self-reliance and practical life-skills which that implies, there is a societal need to reinforce those things which were once taken for granted in New Zealand.
- 8.6 While on the face of it as a modern, technologically savvy generation expected to live, survive and compete in the twenty-first century, there seems little point in these things, until the lights go out, there is no cell phone coverage or the Internet is down.
- 8.7 Events in Christchurch have offered us insight into what happens when modern convenience is lost. While people are keen to help in hours of need, nothing beats confident, coordinated trained response to emergency.
- 8.8 Not only does the New Zealand Defence Force provide the only complete overarching capacity for delivering such responses in our society, it is able to infuse its collective ethos in our youth, given the means by policy, to deal with unforeseen events and natural disasters.
- 8.9 A nation's values and its ideals should be demonstrated by its Defence Forces. One should mirror the other, and where there is short-fall, one should assist the other. Our warrior pioneering beginnings as a modern nation have been cut away through modern lifestyles not compatible with the rigours of rural or outdoor pursuits. These values must be not just spoken, but acted upon, shown clearly in how we treat each other.
- 8.10 While such a proposal may be seen as economically prohibitive by some, surely as we look at statistics in crime, road tolls, unemployment and apathy in general, it should be considered a pragmatic investment in the future of our nation. Rather than simply saying we are proud to be New Zealanders by supporting the *All Blacks*, or investing millions into the *America's Cup* campaign, we can actually partake in the betterment of our country by active participation.
- 8.11 Unquestionably there are the detractors amongst us who would point the finger at combat trades. The most obvious counter to this is that a fit young infantryman can dig trenches and full sandbags faster than most and has been trained to build structures intent to take the punishment of the battlefield.

- 8.12 Tracking<sup>xxii</sup> is an integral part of reconnaissance but it is also vital to Search and Rescue efforts. The skills of first aid, bushcraft, navigation, fitness, and personal administration are all invaluable, both for the country at large and those individuals involved.
- 8.13 The benefit of adding teamwork, self-discipline and a sense of service to one's country should be obvious.
- 8.14 The greatest majority of skills relating to combat are, in fact, transparent to civilian life. The suggested model enables a solidification of these capabilities and conditioning rather than an ad hoc solution at the moment of crisis. The aim is to promote a homogeneous approach between civil and military institutions.
- 8.15 The concept of 'citizen soldier' is not new. While Territorials can be seen as reserve soldiers with civilian jobs in addition to their military careers, the proposed form of citizen service bridges the gap between traditional military service and civilian life, providing a seamless unity. Rather than a shared military and civilian career, it provides initial physical and practice training and confidence building for New Zealanders, with regular refreshers, in case of national crisis. The national interest becomes a concern for the private citizen.
- 8.16 Paying allowances to those young people who actively enrol to train will empower them with self-worth through financial independence while reinforcing the values of a strong community.

*Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?*

**9.0 If effective means safely within the bounds of calculated risk, then investment in our people, their training, and their most basic equipment comes first. Without that, any other investment, particularly in high-technology stakes, and the application of foreign intelligence networks is foolhardy. It simply invokes a self-induced Fog of War.**

9.1 Strategic, operational and tactical conditions can change rapidly. These changes, from a benign state, to one escalating into that of high threat must be acknowledged. Contingencies must be in place to mitigate the inherent risk. This includes effective policy, adequate training, and the deployment of appropriate equipment in a timely manner.

9.2 The most dangerous condition our Defence Forces can enter into is one where it is bound in political rhetoric or other external influences such as business impinging upon the workings and operational actions of our people in uniform. This includes not being aware that conditions in one environment might jeopardise those in another.

9.3 Regrettably, the issue Individual Weapon, the most fundamental tool of any Service member, is at the heart of this. This is being addressed, yet only after more than a decade of operational experience has forced the issue.

9.4 We have seen the increased use of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) type weapons in use both in conflict zones and as terrorist weapons against civilian targets in urban environments. However, even as new buzz words are created to describe booby traps and guerilla warfare (warfare has always been about attempting to find innovative ways to outsmart your enemy), the very capacities which have been shown to be invaluable in the recent past are cut back or disbanded.



- 9.5 Air Combat capacity provided very well-trained pilots for missions in several wars. Crews and aircraft being on stand-by for East Timor, yet these were disbanded immediately afterwards. The point is, even while these aircraft were not used in war, the skills allowed our pilots to do their jobs with allied aircraft.
- 9.6 Expert skills in Ranger and Assault Pioneer units<sup>xxiii</sup>, gained from experiences in Borneo, Malaya and Vietnam have also been cast aside. Many of these capabilities largely reside in the realms of Special Operations Forces only now. Putting “all your eggs in one basket” has dire consequences known to any battlefield commander.
- 9.7 The tactical drills battle-tested and perfected in Vietnam fade into the past as our modern soldiers must spend increasing amounts of time concerning themselves with the laws of armed conflict to the detriment of practising their chosen trade – that of the Infantryman.
- 9.8 Deployments to East Timor proved to us, if the knowledge and experience of Afghanistan and Iraq has not done so since, that the fundamental skills of the infantryman, which we were once expert, are in more demand than ever before. This, coupled with the erosion of skills such as pioneering can only have a detrimental effect on any future deployments. An infantryman should not, as a professional soldier, expect their job to be done by Special Operations personnel.
- 9.9 The battlefield, whatever the intensity level, is a dangerous and deadly place and it can not in any way be equated with our civil society. International law has its place, but war is defined by the willingness of a combatant to defeat their enemy. This must be done as decisively, as quickly as possible, while sapping the will of the enemies to continue in that fight. We must ensure that our people are permitted to do this when deployed to conflict zones.
- 9.10 It must be stressed that, in involving ourselves in peace-keeping or peace support operations, we gain invaluable experience. Allowing our Defence personnel to be active in conflict zones gives them the confidence they need to work effectively not only in civil emergency situations, but also in high threat combat situations which, for the most part, have not been our broad military experience for some decades. In conjunction with realistic training exercises, these deployments are vital for future military contingencies.

9.11 IW Steyr and the Argument for Effective Calibre

9.12 The Steyr rifle was found to not perform adequately in Afghanistan. This rifle was never battle-proven. It is only used by a handful of nations in any significant quantities. Of those nations, most of their Special Operations Forces have chosen not to use it. The expectations of a tool is that it be fit for the purpose intended. Defence Forces personnel are expected to go into harm's way, not simply use these weapons in training. This policy is therefore fundamentally flawed.

9.13 In Vietnam, New Zealand and Australian infantry and SAS could readily compare the M16 (in the same calibre as the Steyr) and the Self-loading Rifle (SLR), in the larger, more powerful 7.62mm NATO round. There were no "lessons learned", and for political and fiscal reasons outside the control of those who serve, a rifle not suitable for actual combat remains in service.

9.14 This state of the service rifle remains while numerous models of Dedicated Marksman's Rifle are becoming prevalent throughout the world, and private contractors arm themselves with the likes of the DSA Arms series of rifles (various models based off the Austrian SA58 battle rifle) for the same reason: it is capable of effectively incapacitating or killing an enemy combatant, and provides stand-off where the enemy is most frequently lesser trained and armed with AK47 type rifles.

9.15 Stand off is an elementary tactical concept where one weapon system has enough range and effectiveness to be able to act, with relative impunity, over another. This, therefore, is a primary attributer to the reduction of risk, and a key factor in the limiting of potential casualties on the battlefield. Currently, the standard issue individual weapon does not provide this.

9.16 When compared to the ubiquitous AK47 the Steyr is not able to perform sufficiently enough in this regard, or to provide our soldiers with the required lethality. While superior training can be commented on, periods where live fire exercises have not been possible due to budgetary constraints does not bode well for the confidence of any deploying personnel.

- 9.17 Critically, a major design flaw of the Steyr is that it can not be fired “off-handed” properly. That is, due to the “bullpup” layout, if set up for the right-handed shooter, they can not properly take right handed cover, where they should be therefore shooting from their left shoulder.
- 9.18 The ability to fire a personal weapon off-handed is a fundamental soldiering skill in terms of survivability, marksmanship and fieldcraft. Particularly in urban environments, this is vital if a soldier is to be able to use cover correctly, and therefore reduce their exposure to enemy fire.
- 9.19 Potential Replacement Options for the Steyr
- 9.20 Options like the Colt Canada LE901 would permit our NZDF personnel to have an ambidextrous rifle (able to take cover and shoot properly “off-handed”) firing the 7.62mm NATO full powered round, while providing a 5.56mm conversions for recruit training, non-combat personnel who need a solid personal defence weapon capable of defeating body armour.
- 9.21 Having a rifle platform with above noted flexibility also reduces training costs due to the relatively cheaper cost of 5.56mm ammunition. There are several manufacturers of weapons systems which offer these options for these very reasons.
- 9.22 It would be reasonable to assume that other members of the Defence Forces be afforded the same quality of Individual Weapon as permitted those in the ranks of their nation's Special Operations Forces, albeit it be a standard model. The Belgium SCAR H has been part of recent trials. Alongside its 5.56mm counterpart, this may be a solid fit for the NZDF citing the same multi-calibre benefits.

9.23 Operational Experience of the Steyr

9.24 The Steyr rifle, while revolutionary at the time (1977) when adopted by its country of origin, Austria<sup>xxiv</sup>, was never tested in combat. Few countries took it up. Oman<sup>xxv</sup> was one of those countries, and it was soon relegated to rear echelon personnel once it was realised that it lacked the range required. It also did not function particularly well in the desert. Since tribesmen with old Lee Enfield bolt action rifles could hit them with impunity, front line troops soon relinquished their new Steyr rifles in exchange for old G3 7.62mm NATO battle rifles.

9.25 New Zealand Experience and the 5.56mm NATO Round

9.26 We never needed to have our own people experience this in kind decades later in Afghanistan. We had our own experience of Vietnam to call on where both the SLR and M16 were on issue side by side where comparisons could be made.

9.27 That a requirement of any replacement for the Steyr must be chambered in the 5.56mm round not only goes against our own battlefield experience it flies in the face of the "lessons learned". The adoption of the Minimi TR suggests that, while the weapon system was appropriate, suitably reliable and easy to use, it was the performance of the round that suffered in the C9 LSW.

9.28 The Australian Army issued an Army order No.7196-94 which recommended the Steyr not fire more than 90 rounds on automatic, due to likelihood of stoppages. Standard sights integral to the rifle fog up.

9.29 Operational Experience of the 5.56mm NATO Round

9.30 While there are several credible platforms, it is the calibre which is proven, through operational experience, to be less than adequate for the greatest number of tasks. The German Heckler und Koch G36 rifle, while an effective rifle and popular, the Germans have discovered the ammunition it uses to be ineffective in combat.

- 9.31 The British Special Air Service has also denigrated a “shoot to wound” policy which comes from an out-dated Cold War concept underpinned by the adoption of the 5.56mm round by NATO, and aired a desire to move to a larger, more combat effective round.
- 9.32 Engaging in combat means killing the enemy, with greater accuracy, at longer range, with better marksmanship, in any terrain and in any weather, day or night.
- 9.33 With the recent adoption of the Designated Marksman's Rifle (DMW), and the Minimi TR, 7.62mm NATO needs to be re-established as the standard issue ammunition for operational use in conflict zones.
- 9.34 Experience in Afghanistan (and Vietnam decades before) would succinctly support the move to once again standardise rifle ammunition to 7.62mm NATO.

*In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.*

## **10.0 A Plausibly Prepared Defence Force**

- 10.1 It must be pressed home that, in recent times operational experience has to the greatest extent meant engaging with irregular guerilla forces with inferior training, equipment, funding and support. When we are faced with an enemy who is a comparative match in these terms, then we need to be prepared.
- 10.2 At some stage in the future we will inevitably find ourselves under such conditions and if we are not suitably trained, equipped and prepared we will suffer unduly, personally, as a Defence Force, and as a nation.
- 10.3 Both world wars showed these sorts of shortfalls to be true, as did East Timor, as has Afghanistan. There is a distinct possibility this will be also true for operations in Iraq in regards ISIL.
- 10.4 Not having a well-rounded and broad capacity, which can act independently with little or no assistance from outside our own organic Order of Battle, is an untenable doctrine to uphold.

- 10.5 If we cannot reasonably supply our own capacity for Defence of deployed forces then we have no business being deployed. While civil emergency, operations other than war, and other missions in view of diplomatic efforts and upholding our part as a “good global citizen” will more often than not mitigate such levels of sustainment, asset procurement and so forth, it is not prudent to pursue a “peace-keeper only” mentality. This includes negating, through policy, the application of force and skills when we do, in fact have them.
- 10.6 As an example, we have no business deploying infantry into a war zone if they are not permitted to do their job; track down, engage with and kill the enemy. Instantly, under Rules of Engagement (ROE), marred in political rhetoric, we lose capacity not only by ill-equipping our people in uniform but by reducing their capacity to eliminate enemy combatants who later go on to kill civilians, our own people, or our allies.
- 10.7 There now exists an all-too-common mode of pressing Special Operations troops into action to gain notoriety (which they rightly do whatever they can to avoid) through the media.
- 10.8 This exploitation of a critical mission-strategic asset is done when infantry are quite capable of doing the job themselves. Such an approach does not permit the Defence Force to carry out its roles effectively, at its heart, as per a job description. It also induces the flaunting of Special Operations Forces when their employment is better utilised in more specialised roles, at a strategic level within theatre.
- 10.9 Consider retention: a young man who joins the NZ Army, to be an infantryman, does not do so to become a peace-keeper. So, he becomes disheartened, and leaves, with his quality training and a tour under his belt, to join the Australian or British Army. Not an uncommon occurrence for those who are serious about soldiering.

## 11.0 **Notions of Safety**

- 11.1 Russian heavy machine guns are cheaply available in any third world country. These common weapons will easily defeat the light armour of our New Zealand Light Armoured Vehicle (NZLAV). Additional armour is required on these vehicles to reflect typical combat conditions. This not only hampers driving characteristics but incurs undue stress on the chassis.
- 11.2 The British use the Warrior<sup>xxvi</sup>, and are developing future armoured vehicle systems on tracks, based on solid combat experience. The ability of such vehicles to handle the weight of adequate armour is required on the modern battlefield.
- 11.3 When our deployed troops encounter an opposing force with the discipline and coordination required to set an effective ambush, the consequences will not be the sort easily ignored by a public unfamiliar with the real cost of war.
- 11.4 The attack in which Lieutenant Timothy O'Donnell was killed highlights the real cost of successive government culture which forces our people in uniform to needlessly "do more with less".
- 11.5 This should never been the status quo which burdens those who ultimately pay the highest price for service, not only in theatre, but well after the events themselves are concluded and forgotten by the vast majority of the population, and, most particularly, those who sent them in the first place.
- 11.6 Championing a 100 km/h speed of the NZLAV while driving on unstable terrain, in bad weather or under tactical circumstances is inexcusable. Marketing pitches have no place on a muddy battlefield.
- 11.7 While light operational vehicles have their place, it is not on the front lines. Soldiers going out on patrol, in farm utes (Holden Rodeos or Toyota Hilux), having to put personal body armour over doors is unacceptable.
- 11.8 Up-armoured Humvees are not adequate for task in a theatre like Afghanistan, and never were. This country, since the Soviet invasion, has been one of the most mined territories on the planet, well before the acronym IED became common.
- 11.9 That the government was unwilling to supply our troops with dedicated anti-mine trucks, would, in any business sense be considered criminal negligence.

11.10 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles<sup>xxvii</sup> have been around since the Bush Wars in Africa, many decades before the U.S. decided to adopt them. It took a New Zealand private contractor just a month to acquire them for his own company working in Iraq. That the New Zealand government could not make this investment on behalf of our servicemen and women is reprehensible.

## 12.0 Full Spectrum Battlespace

12.1 There is a desire under present policy for a Joint Amphibious Task Force (JATF), which can operate “independently”. This seems gravely optimistic unless only under the most ideal military circumstances.<sup>xxviii</sup>

12.2 Even low intensity conflicts may include potentially hostile air assets, from attack helicopters or light strike fighters. This presents New Zealand, a first world nation, with major challenges in our very limited capacity to deal with such threats. Numerous third world nations can boast an air combat capacity, which is the most significant threat to any naval forces.

12.3 It becomes apparent that the notion of a JATF in New Zealand parlance, is one which has very limited military scope and is primarily designed to aid in humanitarian efforts where no hostilities are present.

12.4 Those informed on military matters, historical or otherwise, consider the JATF as a force intended for military action, not peace-keeping, peace support or civil emergency application. Therefore, without air cover comparable to its deployed scale, there is a major gap in the ability to operate independently.

12.5 It is clear that some elements in regards Rules of Engagement hamper deployed personnel in the implementation of effective tactics, and the weapons systems which might permit them.

12.6 It is unacceptable to have policy, including those imposed by our own government, handicapping our people in uniform while in the execution of their duties. Suitable flexibility must be permitted and made known to all parties under which they operate, including the United Nations.



- 12.7 No Defence personnel should be deployed without a full range of contingencies and tactical options at their disposal, particularly when it is known that specific threats of this type exist in the theatre of operations.
- 12.8 The clearest deficiency of this was made during the deployment of Kiwi Company to Bosnia, where Serbians were clearly in possession of Main Battle Tanks yet there existed no effective anti-armour capacity. It has taken until the acquisition of the Javelin weapon system to address this, literally decades later.
- 12.9 Repeatedly, from Bosnia, to East Timor, to Afghanistan, New Zealand troops have been deployed with inadequate training and preparation, equipment and security, and while casualties have been taken, these have been relatively limited. This has been due to good fortune rather than by design.
- 12.10 Defence policy has whittled away funding, ignored the lessons we ourselves have learned as a nation in the past, and without some serious assessment of these issues, it is only a matter of time when we will pay a much higher price relative to the scale of the deployment in question.
- 13.0 The Case for Close Air Support**
- 13.1 In Vietnam, our pilots flew American aircraft in support of our forces. During Borneo and Malaya, our ground troops were supported by our own pilots. We have lost not only a legacy, but untold experience, knowledge and expertise by the disbandment of the Combat Air Wing.
- 13.2 New Zealand personnel, including those of our Special Operations Forces, have lost the critical resource for Forward Air Controller (FAC) qualification, necessary as a NATO standard, for deployments, including in peace-keeping operations. Frequently, the application of Close Air Support (CAS) is the only reasonable fire support that can be rendered against an enemy position.
- 13.3 Air cover permitted operations in East Timor<sup>xxix</sup> to be undertaken. Without it, ground forces, primarily Australian and New Zealand personnel, would have been subjected to undue risk.

- 13.4 This air cover included our Air Combat capability on standby, which Australia considered 25% of regional air power at the time. Without that they stated they would not have gone in on the ground.
- 13.5 Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975. The severe cost in human life is a matter of public record. The conditions under which we became a major contributor to the Australian-led International Forces East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 were clear. The consequences of not acting under such similar scenarios in the future are equally apparent.
- 13.6 If a similar situation was to occur today, we could not provide that capacity, our reasonable regional contribution, and the outcome of such hostilities as they were, would be on our shoulders. We need to seriously consider contingencies for the future and not ignore the bloody consequences shown to us so clearly in the past.
- 13.7 Plainly put, we are not pulling our weight as an effective regional partner, and, within the broader military context, it is clear ongoing policy does not reflect either our own experiences or those of the larger world.
- 13.8 With an unwillingness to commit adequately in terms of or Gross Domestic Product to provide for key military assets as fundamental as an Air Combat component for our Air Force we undeniably put ourselves at undue risk.
- 13.9 We remain poorly equipped and the mercy of those who might wield military power in an aggressive manner for selfish ends.

#### 14.0 **A Culture of Neglect in Defence Policy, Focus and Spending<sup>xxx</sup>**

- 14.1 Political agendas have negated our ability to properly and assertively assist those in serious need, not just in times of natural disaster, but also under more grievous circumstances. As a nation we have allowed our capacity "to help", to be dictated by excessive fiscal restraint and misguided judgement of what a military is intended to provide its nation, and others in time of need.

- 14.2 This emphasis should be on “thinking smarter”. That has nothing to do with purchasing the most expensive items, the latest technologies (which are out of date before they hit the shelves), or having large numbers of anything. It means having adequate tools to do the job, reasonable capacity for logistical support, and moulding these capabilities, first and foremost to our own needs. This approach is an investment in our people, our nation's security and our collective future.
- 14.3 All deployed equipment must be properly trained on before deployment, otherwise no matter the effectiveness of that weapon, capacity is taken from the personnel deployed. It puts them and their comrades in unnecessary danger.
- 14.4 Courts of Inquiry<sup>xxxi</sup> should not need to be gone through to expose fundamental issues left wanting. The ability to call in CAS, use and maintain critical weapons, being able to perform combat live saving, have adequate communications training or suitable tactics employed.
- 14.5 Political correctness should not be permitted to permeate in the brutally difficult conditions that is the battlefield. A battle is a battle, and not being given the tools to fight, and to be governed under doctrine not permitting the winning of any battle is suicidal at best.
- 14.6 This approach is only compounded by the inability of ongoing governments to provide adequate fiscal support to those who they put in harm's way, and the often dubious spending that does occur with the limited funds made available.
- 14.7 The military is supposed to follow the maxim “expect the unexpected”. It is one of the inherent reasons for a Defence Force to exist. However, successive governments have increasingly reduced our Defence Force's capabilities to deal with the unexpected, should it occur.
- 14.8 This is somewhat like having a Fire Brigade and telling them they are not permitted a water supply. One day, there will be a fire, no matter what you do to prevent it.
- 14.9 It is one thing to be able to detect hostilities, and report on them. It is another thing entirely to be able to do anything about it. In our current state, by-and-large, the New Zealand Defence Force is unable to act on such intelligence in any plausible military context. Ignoring this fact does not make it go away.

## 15.0 Critical Manning

- 15.1 While marketing is a substantial aspect relating to recruitment, no amount of attempting to make the military like a video game or its people like video game characters makes it so. The realities are vastly different from the perception. Keeping your people once you have them, under these conditions is incredibly difficult.
- 15.2 Retention is about expectations and the treatment of your people. Unlike marketing, within the Forces, there is the ability, through a willingness, and given the resources, to enable increased retention.
- 15.3 It is an acknowledged fact that the state military apparatus must compete with the private sector. New Zealand has a reputation for quality training. However, our policies and willingness to enter into combat-orientated operational areas of conflict are also well known.
- 15.4 At times Regular Force infantry companies have been so low in personnel as to barely sustain a platoon. Territorial Force units, now labelled Reserves, have been further downsized, so that two battalions have each been amalgamated into one.
- 15.5 New badges to go with new uniforms does not conceal the fact that manpower is woefully inadequate, so much so that, just from this point alone, to have a re-run of our East Timor experience would have consequences beyond that of embarrassment on the international stage. It is a dangerous predicament to be in, for an institution required to anticipate the future.
- 15.6 Numerous Defence Force personnel, including many highly experienced members, have left the ranks of the armed forces join foreign Defence Forces, and the private sector. It is not only about money, but the desire to fight, to be tested, to be involved in the very thing one trains for.
- 15.7 One does not join the Army, Navy or Air Force for the pay packet, that is clear enough. Via our national consciousness and prevailing outlook Defence policy tends to reflect, by-in-large our view towards armed conflict. This includes our remote geographical location, geopolitics and desire to do our part in maintaining peace where we can, without upsetting anyone.

- 15.8 That said, it is about adapting to these circumstances, as the military is meant to be able to do readily. It should not be about changing techniques in order to cater for outside organisations. If a system is tried, practised and proven, then it makes sense to keep it, while being adaptable.
- 15.9 The New Zealand Defence Force must adapt to limited human resources, rather than allow them to dictate methodologies which do not suit, and are often patterned on the ideal.
- 15.10 The mottoes and slogans of the various components of the NZDF are synonymous with the values they hold. If these values are seen to be disrupted in any way, these organisations lose credibility.
- 15.11 The embodiment of these values must remain, and be seen to remain with the serviceman or woman, or civilian employee for their entire life. Adequate networks must be in place to ensure this. Accountability on the part of the NZDF as a whole, and through government, must be seen to be practised.
- 15.12 Rehabilitation and the affairs of veterans and former Armed Forces personnel must be a primary and ongoing consideration in relation to the reinforcement of Defence Force values.

## 16.0 Effective Tactics

- 16.1 Since basic light infantry tactics are at the heart of any military operation, and their modes and systems extrapolate out in non-combat situations, such as Search and Rescue, humanitarian missions, Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and so forth, it is important to explore how this can accord the demands of critical manning.
- 16.2 Our operational experience in Vietnam, built on from Malaya and Borneo was shown to be highly effective, and according to our allies, a near on perfected technique. This is something we must take on board and not reject due to external pressures.
- 16.3 First and foremost, the NZDF is in place to protect our own people, territory and resources. This infers a light infantry and reconnaissance focus with an enhanced maritime support. This focus has deteriorated and must be restored.

- 16.4 If it is known that a deployed force does not have the manpower to facilitate established doctrine, then smaller patrol numbers need to be adopted. Adequate firepower, communications, and medical aid will be retained, rather than forcing those intended for the larger section to adapt to reduced manpower due to shortages, sickness, casualties or leave.
- 16.5 Aggressive patrolling borne of the proven Fireteam and Fireforce approach using flexible fire and manoeuvre<sup>xxxii</sup> techniques appropriate to the terrain has shown itself time and time again to be highly effective.
- 16.6 It demands command and control, fire support and coordination like any other tactic, but would permit our forces, using the capabilities we have in place to be independent while being highly relevant to our own environment.
- 16.7 If government is unwilling to provide the essential capacities in CAS and FAC, which frequently, by circumstances on the ground, weather, and ROE, are denied or cancelled en-route, then the modern static assault tactics are severely prohibitive.
- 16.8 While we have an impressive history of being renowned bush fighters, as combat trackers, and skilled in the arts of long range reconnaissance, this is rapidly eroding away.<sup>xxxiii</sup> This is happening even in the knowledge that Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)<sup>xxxiv</sup> is a critical aspect to modern warfighting.
- 16.9 The principles of ISR uphold a means to use force in a managed way, which is conducive to New Zealand's image in the desire to promote positive outcomes for all parties while using the least military power (force) as is possible to achieve this.
- 16.10 Rather than retaining, building and securing these core sought after military skills, we increasingly look to others, adapting the "modern" way of thinking, in order to fit in. In warfare, so many things simply do not change, regardless of technology<sup>xxxv</sup>. If we do not have the aptitude to see this our inherited effectiveness will be lost.
- 16.11 While Joint Operations are vital, it does not mean we should allow failed doctrine to dictate our own methods. We should instead be taking the lead in those areas in which we are experts. This includes allowing our soldiers to be soldiers, allowing them to gain the operational experience required of any new generation. If we do not make provision for this we will surely pay for it in the future.

## **17.0 A Credible Defence Force**

- 17.1 The word "credible" is used a great deal in relation to documentation concerning Defence matters. Unfortunately, the value of this in terms of our Defence Force's capabilities changes whenever the government changes office. Until this is fixed in place in a true military context it will continue to do so. Assessments of threat correlate with this credibility.
- 17.2 If our reputation as peace-keepers is our unsurpassed ability to mingle with many different peoples, and show respect for their cultures and history, then the aforementioned abilities must be the combat portion of that. The benefits of quality reconnaissance culminates in calculating, aggressive, highly mobile patrolling techniques wherever and whenever necessary.
- 17.3 While it aids any government of the day in avoiding fiscal and ethical responsibilities in addressing Defence related concerns, general public apathy and lack of engagement and even general knowledge in Defence (primarily because it does not, at present, directly affect them), this does not avoid the adverse consequences of ill-regarded policy.

## **18.0 New Zealand Industry, Independence and Self Reliance**

- 18.1 Day to day, as individuals, as companies, as institutions, we are quite capable of enhancing industry, creating new jobs and providing technical innovation but we need the will to do it. In this way also, the consequences of any emergencies are mitigated to the best of our nation's ability, through its own infrastructure, expertise and products.
- 18.2 It is public knowledge we have high numbers of university graduates in numerous fields going off shore, or remaining here yet not able to impart their skills and knowledge in local industry.
- 18.3 This only puts additional unnecessary strain upon our economy and therefore, our people. Our qualified and skilled young people are crippled by student debt. We are, therefore, not only severely hampering our tradition and potential of self-reliance, but also disenfranchising our future generations.

- 18.4 In the Defence spectrum alone, we insist on purchasing rifles and patrol boats from Australia, light armoured vehicles from Canada, and missile systems and communications equipment and aircraft from the United States, often at inflated prices to the New Zealand taxpayer, as the NZLAV acquisition shows.
- 18.5 Maintaining logistical interoperability with our most likely coalition partners should not forego our own capability to design and manufacture our own technologies, employing our own people while producing innovative products based on our experiences and needs, also available for export.
- 18.6 Project *Kahu* proved just what Kiwis can do if allowed to do so, to the point of envy amongst our friends and allies.
- 18.7 We have a chance to create real, long term, self-sustaining jobs, earn export dollars with foreign versions of our products, while proving to the world we are a capable, innovative and forward-thinking nation. Currently, we are about as far from this concept as is possible.
- 18.8 New Zealand need not envision a major military industrial complex on the horizon – far from it. The familiar ground between the Defence Forces and civil institutions will strengthen all sectors of our communities from health and the environment, to benefits in law enforcement and building up our engineering industries while bolstering education across the board.
- 18.9 This forms into the suggested desire for opportunities for New Zealand industry, in the support of Defence, and other agencies through the skills, talents and innovations of our people. While there are obvious infrastructure requirements, investing in New Zealand talent, expertise, science, and technology should be a birthright for every New Zealander.
- 18.10 As a case in point, for the first time in history, our NZDF personnel wear a uniform which is solely our own, designed and developed under these principles. This identifies us as New Zealanders.
- 18.11 A realistic and valuable starting point for this industrial proposal would be to design a solid, robust and modern combat rifle, which is the primary and essential tool of any service member of our Defence Forces.



- 18.12 Such initiatives have been done before and should not, in any significant way, be discounted in the modern era. A good regional example to consider is Singapore. We would benefit by employing New Zealanders, producing our own products, parts, developing training techniques and local logistical networks of self-reliance required in both times of war and natural disaster.
- 18.13 Any given product may be exported for commercial benefit. We have proven time and time again we are capable of producing significant technologies often surpassing their contemporaries in quality, performance and cost. This will beat any limited logistical benefits in joint operations or exercises many times over when compared to purchasing often over-priced items, or those already proven to be combat ineffective.
- 18.14 Unfortunately, in a country like New Zealand, there is a public stigma attached to producing "Defence" hardware, as if it were "militarising" a nation. A drone might just as well go into a collapsed building after an earthquake as well as survey a terrorist before they are eliminated on the battlefield, yet this perception is part of the reason the defence industry is not in the forefront of our society.
- 18.15 Our industries tend to assist foreign military technological developments more than our own Defence needs. Nanotechnology is a field where we can provide developing technology our own peoples' well-being, the cost, weight and ineffectiveness of modern body armour, for example, and superconductor systems.
- 18.16 The *Snark* Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is a specific example of technology which has both military and civil application. A number of technologies have gone offshore simply because they have not been given the support required, their potential or derivatives left unexplored.
- 18.17 We were once a country of innovators, we are now a country of importers. This needs to be remedied for the benefit of us all.

19.0 Conclusion

19.1 **The New Zealand Defence Force has suffered critical manning for some time. Perhaps most critically, the retention of experienced non-commissioned officers is noteworthy. Levels of training and the capacity to provide that training is at times insufficient and has shown to directly impact deployments.**

**We have no air cover for either our deployed ground forces or our naval assets. Our maritime security, considering our dependency on shipping lanes and our geography, is woefully inadequate.**

**While numerous historical accounts, including those of our own, would clarify otherwise, public perception generally is one which feeds an apathetic approach towards the NZDF by successive governments suggesting a benign strategic environment.**

19.2 We must build on our experiences and strengths, not relegate them to the past only to emulate others for their sakes. We can not bring our expertise to their table at the expense of eroding that expertise over time. Adapting to new operational environments does not always mean change.

19.3 If we insist on making things easy for ourselves, we will only make them that much easier for any potential adversaries. A more complex world means there are far more ways to exploit that which we have, and therefore degrade our potential and reduce our capacity to act swiftly and decisively when the time comes. This includes guarding against how we might assist others today, only to have those good intentions used against us, our allies or our friends tomorrow.

19.4 In amongst the feverish desire to acquire and learn the latest technology associated with modern network-centric warfare and the digitised battlefield, we are at risk of not heeding the past, thereby forgetting the basics, which underpin everything we do in regards Defence.

- 19.5 In a world infinitely more dynamic and complex than ever before, New Zealand has many issues in Defence, national security and disaster preparedness to address. As a nation, collectively, we must make a concerted effort to keep, maintain and reinforce that peace we claim to hold so dear.
- 19.6 If we are willing to advocate so strongly against bullying on the playground, then we must too, on the international stage, advocate against the same behaviours in the larger world. This means taking appropriate action when, wherever and however necessary against any and all perpetrators.
- 19.7 Quite contrary to militarising New Zealand, which would involve the purchase of expensive assets such as main battle tanks, additional frigates or large numbers of advanced fighter aircraft, this approach serves to pursue a solidification of existing capacities, and provide a pathway to a trained population for a multitude of contingencies.
- 19.8 Any standing government has a responsibility to ensure, to the utmost of their abilities, the security of their citizens. Without this, any celebrated achievements in health, education, science, or any other arena is put at risk. Defence policy must reflect this, at home or abroad, in the air, or anywhere at sea, in particular the security of our extensive shipping lanes upon which the greatest majority of our trade is dependent.
- 19.9 Good intentions are no substitute for solid policy and adequate investment in people, logistics and hardware. We only need a brief look at history to appreciate what is at stake.
- 19.10 Getting through is an attitude. With our capital on a fault line you would wonder why things shouldn't be more than a little different. Our own history has provided us with plenty of lessons, but we'd rather reinvent the wheel and feel clever than ensure the axle is properly installed and in good repair.
- 19.11 To think on the future is a personal responsibility. To act on it is a nationwide responsibility, one which should not to be taken lightly. Our children and our grandchildren should not have to pay for our short-sightedness. A little effort today saves a lot of pain tomorrow.

- i "The first responsibility of any government is to promote and protect national interests. Those interests are generally taken to include: national sovereignty and the physical security of the country, its people and territories; the preservation of national institutions and values; and the enhancement of the economic and social-wellbeing of its people." (p.2)  
*Air Force News*, No.60, June 2005
- ii "Another obvious lesson from East Timor is that the world we live in, and particularly the region that is our front yard, is not a benign or stable environment. The end of the Cold War has not created an era of peace and prosperity, and our region of the world is as unstable as any other."  
Crawford, J. and Harper, G. (2001) *Operation East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor 1999-2001*, Auckland: Reed Publishing Ltd. (p.169)
- iii Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – ISIL (p.20)  
**Defence Assessment 2014** Ministry of Defence 2015
- iv As defined by Employment Context EC 1B - Natural and man-made disasters (p.45)  
**New Zealand Defence Force Annual Report 2014**
- v "Extremism, be it religious, nationalist or ideological – tends to increase during times of economic dislocation, and can be exacerbated by poor governance, repression or discrimination against a particular cultural, ethnic or religious group." (p.16)  
**Defence Assessment 2014** Ministry of Defence 2015
- vi *The F16: Capabilities and Costs*  
CSS Strategic Briefing Papers Vol.2 Pt.2 February 2000  
Centre for Strategic Studies (2000)
- vii Navy issues: "The Navy's shortage of experienced personnel in key trades continued to impact the Naval Patrol Force (NPF) in particular." (p.53)  
In relation to Combat Service Support (CSS) in the NZ Army: "Providing support for additional deployed rotations would only have been possible if resources had been redeployed from Army's training establishment. This would have significantly risked Army's training pipeline to the point of failure. [ ... ] However, the effect of personnel attrition on Combat Supply, Maintenance Support and Movements ranks and trades, and shortages in specialist Medical appointments, has seen risk of Army's ability to provide additional rotations for a deployed force." (p.54)  
In relation to the NH90 recently introduced into the Air Force: "The continuing effects of the loss of instructors [ ... ] early in the financial year reduced the availability of crews and aircraft to complete IIS flying hours." (p.55)  
**New Zealand Defence Force Annual Report 2014**
- viii "The requirement for the protection of offshore oil and gas drilling platforms from those seeking to interfere with companies' lawful activities may increase in the future depending on the extent of future drilling. In the medium term, such protection may also be necessary to protect seabed mining activities." (p.28)  
**Defence Assessment 2014** Ministry of Defence 2015
- ix "Shipping officials opined that naval vessels were the focus of terrorist interests, not commercial shipping. And so it seemed until late 2002 when the French-flagged oil tanker VLCC Limburg was viciously attacked in a similar manner as the USS Cole, as she sailed along the southern coast of Yemen. Not only had the terrorists underscored the vulnerability of shipping, they also sent a wake-up call to the industry – everything at sea is now at risk." (pp.152-154)  
Petersen, K. (2005) *Intersec: the Journal of International Security* 'Cruise Ship Security and the Threat of Terrorism' Vol.15, Issue 5.
- x "The IPVs achieved 38% of planned mission availability days and 48% of planned days at sea, delivered by two of the four vessels." This is associated with Outcome 1 (Secure New Zealand). (p.53)  
**New Zealand Defence Force Annual Report 2014**

- xi "Search and rescue is a responsibility undertaken by the NZDF both within New Zealand and in the oceans surrounding the country, in part because there is no other organisations with the equipment and operational skills for much of the work, and in part because of New Zealand's obligations under international treaties, such as the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue [1979]." (p.148)
- Rolfe, J. (1999) *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*, Australia: Allen & Urwin.
- xii Combat Boat CB 90 H
- <http://www.dockstavarvet.se/products/combat-and-patrol-boats/combat-boat-90-h/>
- xiii "Co-operation between government agencies and the commercial fishing industry is a key to long term sustainable management of our fisheries." (p.10)
- Muir, K. (2005) *Navy Today* September 2005 'Patrolling the Fisheries' No. 103
- xiv *Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France)*
- France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal. 30 April 1990
- xv "About 2 billion people, or almost a third of humanity, are presently exposed to the threat of living in countries in danger of failure and vulnerable to the threat of violence and anarchy." (p.427)
- Kegley, C. W. (2007) *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* USA: Thomson Learning Inc.
- xvi "In contrast to peace, conflict is a violent clash between opposing human wills, each group trying to impose their will on the other. [...] warfare is unpredictable, often chaotic, and can change rapidly." (p.xi)
- New Zealand Defence Force Doctrine** (3rd Ed.) New Zealand Defence Force 2012
- xvii Captain Andy Watts, PDNEC, of the RNZAF had this to say on NEC:
- "We have to ensure that when we work with other Defence Forces, and Australia is a key example, we are able to offer not only technical interoperability, but doctrine, tactics, and procedures that ensure our people can exploit NEC as effectively as our coalition partners." (p.12)
- Air Force News*, November 2007, No.87
- xviii "There are foreign and international security policy gains to be had from having armed forces that can contribute to international security efforts." (pp.191-192)
- Rolfe, J. (1999) *The Armed Forces of New Zealand* Australia: Allen & Urwin.
- xix "The region once was described as an "ANZUS lake." Aside from France and at an earlier time Britain, the only external powers with influence and a presence were Australia, and the United States. That too, is changing. Today, in varying degree, positive and negative, the Soviet Union, Libya, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, the PRC, the two Koreas, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Israel, and West Germany are active in the region. [...] In short, the traditional perception of the Pacific islands as a tranquil colonial backwater no longer stands." (p.14)
- Dorrance, J.C. et al. (1990) *The South Pacific: Emerging Security Issues and U.S. Policy* Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
- xx "The trend towards increasing scarcity is likely to worsen over the next 15 years, although its effects will be felt unevenly. The demand for energy, food and water is expected to increase by 50%, 35% and 40% respectively by 2030." (p.13)
- Defence Assessment 2014** Ministry of Defence 2015
- xxi "International interest in Antarctica and its surrounding waters is growing due to its abundant fish stocks and expectations of substantial unexploited mineral resources. A number of countries have publicly expressed an interest in resource extraction in Antarctica. Camps and bases enable access to the region in which they are located and are increasing in number." (p.28)
- Defence Assessment 2014** Ministry of Defence 2015
- xxii Concern for the lapsing of this core military skill for which New Zealand is well-known is expressed. (p.342) It is a significant component of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
- Crosby, R. (2009) *NZSAS The First Fifty Years* New Zealand: Penguin Group.

- xxiii These units are considered “minor engineers to the battalion” and perform duties including fortification construction, obstacle clearance, booby-trapping and mine warfare tasks (consider the contemporary IED threat), clearing of Landing Zones (LZ) for helicopter support, and assault river crossing. As infantry specialists, unlike Engineer units, they operate directly in cohesion with their own infantry battalions. This is vital for time-critical battlefield taskings.
- xxiv Austrian *Jagdkommando* retained their StG58 battle rifles (version of the FN FAL), as during the Cold War, they desired to have an issue weapon which would out perform the Soviet AK47 in both range and penetration. (p.70)
- Cashner, B. (2013) *The FN FAL Battle Rifle*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
- xxv Cashner, B. (2013) *The FN FAL Battle Rifle*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing. (p.39)
- xxvi This vehicle is a tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). No vehicle, weapon or item of equipment completely impervious to damage or fault. However, the issue is that investment must be made in the management of risk.
- New Zealand Defence Force Doctrine** (3rd Ed.) New Zealand Defence Force 2012 (p.35)
- xxvii *General: No deaths in 300 attacks on MRAP* (2007)
- [http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/04/gns\\_mrap\\_070419/](http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/04/gns_mrap_070419/)
- xxviii “The modern emphasis on joint operations not only in New Zealand but elsewhere recognises the point – “three Services, one Force”. We have argued already that successful operations on land with minimum casualties, or even the ability to bring land forces to bear at all, depend greatly upon facilitation by combat air and naval arms.” (p.39)
- Defending New Zealand: A statement by the RNZRSA* (2005)
- xxix Concerns raised as to what the reactions of the Indonesian Army might be, mostly in the Dili area, numbering 11 battalions, when the INTERPET forces began to arrive. p.328
- Crosby, R. (2009) *NZSAS The First Fifty Years New Zealand*: Penguin Group.
- xxx “Because they are most visible, attention is often focused on the major equipment and weaponry. They are often regarded as sufficient evidence of the capability to perform particular tasks. This is not so. The ability to meet a given task is a combination of weaponry, skilled manpower, doctrine, operating stocks, reserves, training equipment, and repair and support facilities.” (p.70)
- The Defence of New Zealand: a policy paper* (1991) GP Print Ltd.
- xxxi **Summary of Court of Inquiry into the death of Lieutenant T. A. O’Donnell, DSD, RNZIR and the wounding of three other persons in Bamyan Province, Afghanistan**, 3 August 2010
- xxxii **New Zealand Defence Force Doctrine** (3rd Ed.) New Zealand Defence Force 2012 (p.41)
- xxxiii “Until the mid-1980s there was some expertise in operations in close (or jungle) country; indeed 1RNZIR was based in Malaysia and Singapore for over twenty years and all infantry soldiers and many others were posted through that battalion. Today, although there are periodical jungle exercises, the deep almost automatic knowledge of jungle operations has been lost without any replacement specialisation.” (p.120)
- Rolfe, J. (1999) *The Armed Force of New Zealand* Australia: Allen & Urwin.
- xxxiv “Delivery of Joint Effect Land Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Project Defence formally established the Land Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) project in December 2005 and since then operational requirements have been developed and circulated for review. The project proposes to equip the Army with an improved land intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability.” (p.47)
- NZDF Annual Report 2005-2006**
- xxxv “[ The ] principle lesson (not always properly learned) remained that the LRDG [ Long Range Desert Patrol ] was an extremely effective raiding force mainly because it was closely bonded to its natural environment. [ ... ] Training, careful selection of men and hi-tech weapons alone cannot be enough to assure success. Local environment always means a lot and is of utmost importance.” (p.89)
- Molinari, A. (2007) *Desert Raiders: Axis and Allied Special Forces 1940-43*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

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16 June, 2015

The Secretary of Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
P O Box 12703  
Molesworth Street  
Wellington 6144

**RE: 2015 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER REVIEW**

Dear Ms Quilter

As an independent analyst on defence policy I addressed a recent defence symposium (21<sup>st</sup> May), hosted by Victoria and Massey Universities. My presentation highlighted the shortcomings of current policy. A full transcript of my speech is enclosed. My 2014 book, on which it was based, is entitled, *Defenceless New Zealand: Correcting New Zealand's Disgraceful Failure to Provide for its Own Defence*. Your ministry should have copies of the first 2013 edition since I delivered copies to senior service staff in that year.

I urge you to take the time to read my paper. You will find that I point to major failings in current policy and outline how a credible and affordable defence might be provided for New Zealand. This week's *Listener* article on defence policy sensationalised my arguments which contain a lot more substance than is revealed in Karl de Fresne's piece.

I'm aware you are almost certainly constrained by political forces beyond your reach, however you are responsible for the oversight of this year's review. It is quite possible that I have something useful to offer that review that goes well beyond current orthodoxy on the subject. Even if a significant policy swing is unlikely I would welcome an opportunity to discuss the issues I raise with your review panel.

I may have come at this issue as an independent but please do not do me the disservice of writing me off as an obsessive maverick. Everything I propose is reasonable, feasible, well researched and accords with well-established military thinking.



# Defence Symposium - May 21st 2015

## Capability and Procurements

Existing defence policy is radically misguided, having been framed by a government that has abandoned its primary responsibility as the NZ people's protector. It has left NZ entirely exposed should future unexpected events trigger the need to defend the country. A responsible government should never leave its people defenceless. Geo-political sovereign risk assessments can never predict the future with any certainty, especially over the extended 25 year period allowed for in the 2010 White Paper.

Reading the latest defence WP led me to write *Defenceless New Zealand: Correcting New Zealand's Disgraceful Failure to Provide for its Own Defence* (2014). I found myself affronted by the White Paper's exaggerated claims and contradictions. On page 10 (also, p.23) it is accepted that the next 25 years are "likely to be more challenging than the 25 years just past." But a few lines later: "New Zealand and its associated states are highly unlikely to face a direct military threat over the next 25 years" (see also, p.26). In the White Paper's foreword Prime Minister John Key talks of a "strong and effective" defence force. This statement is an obvious rhetorical obfuscation. A 'defence' refers to actions taken to deter or ward off an attack. By further definition a defence force is an armed force trained to ward off a military state-on-state attack. Our armed forces are not equipped to meet that challenge. What the Prime Minister really means is a defence force structured to defend the country's regional foreign policy interests. The National Party's Minister of Defence admits the defence forces must "protect New Zealand's territory and citizens, and...contribute meaningfully to regional and international security with partners and friends." It is quite clear from the military's order of battle that achieving those aims is impossible.

As I wrote, the book morphed from a straight policy critique into a deliberate attempt to describe what the armed forces would need to look like if they were to really provide for the defence of NZ. Exposing the gross inadequacy of what *is* had to be contrasted with what *could be*. The government's White Paper claim it is putting defence, deterrence and sovereignty first is mocked by the lack of real defence capability. All we really have is an armed services policy focused on supporting activities that have nothing to do with the actual defence of our national sovereignty.

### The right policy option

No one I can recall, going right back to the post-Vietnam era, has tried to win the argument for a defence force capable of defending our independence. Ideology and poorly conceived arguments about NZ's size, geographic isolation and cost have enabled complacency.

When I studied policy design I was taught good policy design always acknowledges that the status quo is only one option. Other options should be formulated before weighing their relative merits. That never happened. If a full public square debate around options had occurred the option that should have won the day is formulated in the following table. Its elements are accompanied by a supporting explanation:

Table One: The responsible defence policy option

Option elements	The reason why
Make credible N.Z.'s claim to sovereignty and independent nationhood...	International and domestic credibility and respect is only really possible when a country can legitimately lay claim to a determination and ability to independently defend its right to exist.
By building a military capable of deterring or repelling a much larger aggressor state...	Only large states, or a coalition of smaller states, would be capable of the technological reach necessary to attack NZ.

Using asymmetry and a 'modern system' in-depth defence...	These are prime, well-established doctrines for the defence phase of war. In fact, they are the only doctrines likely to work in the modern era.
Within our immediate littoral territory...	On its own NZ cannot hope to take on a larger state unless it does so on its own terms and under conditions advantageous to itself.
Without the need for substantial assistance from allies.	An attack on NZ would not take place in isolation. It has to be assumed geo-political circumstances would render allied assistance unlikely, or very limited.

### Key capability issues

If NZ is ever going to be able to defend its right to independent existence, it must confront five main areas that dictate capability:

- Political will
- Strategic 'siege' preparedness
- Linking required capability to geo-political risks
- Defence force doctrines
- Likely aggressor assumptions

Taken together, three of these areas, the right defence doctrines, a risk-to-capability model and making the right assumptions, provides defence policy design with an essential three-stage logic sequence. Capability requirements become apparent when this sequence is followed. Since all three have been ignored the poor quality of existing policy is not surprising. This policy logic sequence will be explained shortly, once the first two areas in the preceding list have received some attention.

### Political will

In *Defenceless* (p.34) twelve ways the 2010 White Paper cripples any ability to actually defend NZ are tabled. It clearly reduces our defensive plan, in the event of a direct state-on-state attack, to this: assert an unspecified and clearly risible deterrent ability that *might* buy us enough time to run to our allies for help (pp. 16, 37). In effect the NZ government is saying to those allies - spend your money, expend your resources and sacrifice your sons and daughters on our behalf because we don't want to. There is no honour or integrity in what is merely a poorly contrived escape plan. Hiding behind an ill-conceived and unprovable faith in discounted risk is a national disgrace.

New Zealand's defence policy plan is to run to mummy Australia and daddy USA if we get into trouble and they will make everything right for us. This is no more than a straightforward adolescent mindset that leaves government neglecting national claims to real nationhood that were birthed in the ANZAC legacy. In the 1970s it became fashionable to pursue a more independent foreign policy by distancing ourselves from our traditional allies. All it has achieved is to leave NZ completely at the mercy of foreign actors in the event of direct conflict, whether they be aggressors or allies.

No mature nation claiming to be a sovereign independent state can or does take this position. Australia and almost all the western nations, similar in size to NZ, certainly do not. New Zealand is entirely exposed to what Francis Fukuyama calls "strategic surprise".<sup>1</sup> It is in that position because it has completely discounted risk – something no responsible government should ever do. The future, in defence policy terms, should never be subject to future-casting clairvoyance.

<sup>1</sup> F. Fukuyama, editor (2007), *Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics*. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.

Most New Zealanders do not discount risk. They insure their most important possessions against damage and disaster even though they do not expect to use those policies for much more than low to medium-level contingencies. The NZ government is quite different. It prefers to neglect the national insurance inherent in defence spending, thus leaving the whole country exposed over the long term to unacceptable and potentially irreplaceable loss.

Since the 1970s a '*comprehensive theory of the case*' (Fukuyama, 2007) has built up around defence policy, fueled by post-Vietnam ideological angst concerning the military application of American exceptionalism, magnified by the anti-nuclear testing episode. It led to common phenomena in organisations - denial, cognitive bias and group think. Denial usually manifests as a refusal to acknowledge the risks associated with future uncertainties. This is clearly seen in the 2010 White Paper, which acknowledges geo-political uncertainty and tensions but then ignores them. Policy is therefore geared to support armed service functions that have little to do with the real defence of New Zealand. There are, as yet, no indications the 2015 White Paper will be any different.

### **Strategic capability - 'Siege'**

Siege is the obvious and easiest first step an aggressor state would take. It does not require a large force commitment and would be extremely effective against an ill-prepared country like NZ. Withstanding a siege should be NZ's first defence priority but it has been totally neglected.

Imagine this scenario: An enemy declares a no-go exclusion zone around NZ, enforced with aircraft, submarines and surface ships. Land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) are used to write down strategic infrastructure. Under such conditions an ill-prepared NZ would hard pressed to resist capitulating to demands made by the aggressor state.

NZ should be prepared for this possibility and there is a lot that could be done. A short list would include: protecting our strategic assets with a suitable air defence system, 'hardening' each site wherever possible, establishing a strategic air defence militia, becoming more self-sufficient on a sustainability basis in all the important areas and moving the strategic oil reserve to NZ, supplemented with a bio-fuel capacity. The fact that a siege is not considered under current policy is a further indicator that it has been poorly conceived.

### **The three capability logic steps**

The foundation for a responsible and legitimate defence policy should be the three stage logic sequence, listed above. Its main elements are outlined next.

#### **1. Logic step one - the right defence doctrines**

If the argument for the right policy option, described above, had been won the NZDF would be operating under the sort of tactical doctrines dictated by that policy. In *Defenceless* seventeen doctrines that would naturally fall out of that policy option are listed. For the sake of brevity they can be reduced to five key doctrinally worded statements:

- The order of battle (force structure) will permit a strong defence in-depth, using the right capability mix and asymmetry, cumulatively forcing an enemy to engage in over the horizon (OTH) operations and a battle fought on NZ's terms.
- A land force action would represent the decisive counter-attack stage in a phased littoral defensive plan, where littoral is defined as the coast and sea space out to 30 kilometers.
- Defence force training, capability and tactical planning will not suffer from distortions if a defence force expansion beyond RL 1 is triggered (explained in logic step three).
- Defensive tactics will encompass a 'modern system defence'. This entails dispersion, concealment, depth, small unit initiative, a superior air defence, fire suppression and excellent

massed 'all-fires' and maneuver coordination. According to Stephen Biddle, "*Breakthrough is typically impossible against a modern system defence*".<sup>2</sup>

- Force size will be pegged to a risk sensitive assessment model.

## 2. Logic step two - assumptions


It is impossible to develop the right capability without setting it to some assumptions concerning the likely size and nature of a direct or indirect (siege) state-on-state attack on NZ. Without them, capability decisions can only be plucked from mid-air. Assumptions therefore have to be made concerning:

- The effects of a siege on national resilience – NZ's ability to sustain itself over any period of enforced isolation.
  - The size of an aggressor state's amphibious and air assault force.
  - The number of enemy warships and amphibious warfare vessels.
  - The resources and personnel an enemy might deploy in one specific airlift and amphibious attack.<sup>3</sup>
  - Enemy electronic warfare (EW) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capability and likely employment.
  - The size of an aggressor's follow-up force.
  - The likely allied contribution.

## Logic step three – from risk to readiness

There is a complete policy void around linking capability development to the level of geo-political uncertainty. I have sought to rectify this deficiency by designing a prototype risk to readiness mechanism that would significantly reduce NZ's current exposure to 'strategic surprise', by pegging defence force capability to geo-political risk (Figure One). As it stands, current policy assumes the risk of a direct state-on-state conflict can be dismissed while ignoring the risk of siege completely. A much more responsible, publicly transparent and sophisticated approach would be to develop a comprehensive set of multi-sequence risk *indicators* - not *events* – the two are entirely different. Waiting for specific risk events would inevitably lead to a loss of time sensitivity. It takes a lot of time to acquire and become proficient in military technologies.

Figure One: Risk to readiness model



Fifty-eight indicators, divided into six categories, were selected to demonstrate the model's

<sup>2</sup> S. Biddle (2004). *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey.

<sup>3</sup> It is assumed for the purposes of the exercise that an enemy would be able to move 6000 troops at any one time and, given an OTH operation, the enemy would only be able to repeat the exercise every 90 minutes.

operability. When 20% of the indicators present themselves the defence force would be moved to a base-level capability - Readiness Level One (RL 1). The full order of battle, having been pre-determined to meet both the assumptions and the demands of the doctrines would prescribe capability at RL 1. Under the third doctrinal statement all of the military's main elements would be introduced at RL 1. From there no new technologies would be required, only an expansion of what exists. New learning, the time needed to train and gain experience and re-tooling would then be kept to a minimum.

If 50% of the risk indicators arose the NZDF would be moved to RL 2 – intermediate level capability and if 80% of the risk indicators emerged capability would be moved to RL 3, or full defence capability (FDC). At that level the NZ military would be able to either deter a would-be aggressor, or fend off a direct attack – assuming the assumptions were reasonably accurate and the full order of battle permitted the most effective application of the key doctrines. A time contingency is built into the model by assuming it would take a standard five years to move to each readiness level. In reality this 15 year period would probably be canted towards the move to RL 1, given the large procurement and capability gap between the current NZDF Order of Battle and what would be needed for credible defence in-depth.

Interestingly, when the status of the selected indicators was assessed, over 20% were found to be present now. Under this recommended risk indicator model, NZ would be moving to RL 1. The marked absence of any similar process within existing policy suggests there is no attested and formal process for any sort of nuanced response to changes or discernible trends in the geo-political climate. All we are offered are loose euphemisms about challenges and uncertainty.

#### **Key doctrines**

The key doctrines call for a modern system defence within a defence in-depth. If both are performed professionally it is typically very difficult for an attacker to achieve breakthrough, especially when that attacker must mount an inherently difficult amphibious assault.<sup>4</sup> Superiority in numbers and materiel also offer no guarantees of success against an in-depth, modern system defence (Biddle, 2004).

A defence in-depth marshals the bulk of the defender's force in a deep reserve zone, with advanced forward lines of defence that inflict casualties, force the diversion of resources to flank protection, break up command and unit cohesion and reduce forward momentum. If these lines of forward defence are sufficiently 'deep' their combined effect will leave the enemy vulnerable to the decisive counter-attack from the deep reserve zone.

I used Operation GOODWOOD as my working exemplar. This operation was mounted by the British and Canadians to break through the German lines during the 1944 Normandy campaign. Seventy percent of the German force was held in reserve for the counter-attack. The forward defences were unusually deep, spanning some 15-18 kilometres when normal depth in a WW II battle was roughly 3-5 kilometres (Biddle, 2004). Despite a preponderance in numbers, many times the number of tanks and total air superiority the allied attack was repelled, with heavy losses.

#### **A New Zealand defence in depth**

Providing New Zealand is at RL 3 (FDC), the assumptions are largely correct and a modern system defence capability governed order of battle decisions, it is possible, using a mostly conventional approach, to envisage what a NZ littoral defence in-depth might look like. This scenario is presented as an example only and is subject to the caveat that modern technologies may soon render formerly

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<sup>4</sup> The Americans acknowledge amphibious operations are difficult and leave forces extremely vulnerable until a secure on-shore base is secured. Refer to: Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff: *Amphibious Operations: Publication 3-02*.

conventional approaches obsolete. Despite that, if a GOODWOOD styled defence in-depth were transferred into the NZ context, it is possible to envisage possible defensive scenarios. One such scenario, presented as an example, follows (see Figure Two).

*Scenario:* The NZDF would be highly mobile and capable of moving en-masse in a 'swarming defence' anywhere along NZ's coast. The availability of precision-guided anti-ship missiles, long range artillery and an air-strike capability would force the enemy into an OTH position, creating an ideal in-depth defence zone, assumed to be up to 30 kilometres deep. A layered forward defence would cover this zone, consisting of anti-ship, anti-amphibious and anti-air smart munitions, missiles, mines and torpedoes. Delivery systems would include aircraft, artillery, canon, long range mortars and NZ-made unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs). A new class of NZ-made fast attack craft designed to hug the coast would stiffen resistance close in, by either directly confronting in-bound amphibious vehicles and vessels, or enfilading an amphibious advance, forcing the diversion of enemy resources. These craft would be the naval equivalent of an armoured fighting vehicle and attack helicopter rolled into one. They are referred to in *Defenceless* as SECOVs – surf-edge combat vessels. They would be covered from land with 'SKYSHIELD' systems – a mix of anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles protected by a suitable anti-aircraft gun.<sup>5</sup> After formulating this forward defence concept I later discovered the US is working on both UUVs and their version of the SECOV.<sup>6</sup>


The army would constitute the reserve force (constituting 70% of the armed forces) while the Navy and Air Force would provide much of the forward defence. The army's new long range artillery would be capable of reaching out to 60 kilometres with types of boosted munitions. A re-structuring move to much larger infantry battalions for asymmetry and modern system defence reasons would have been instituted. Larger companies, platoons and sections provide more casualty resilience, facilitate independent sub-unit operations, especially when combined with more direct and indirect fire power and increase tactical options. Should an enemy reach the shore, or land around ports or airports, the Army would deliver the decisive counterattack.

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<sup>5</sup> SKYSHIELD is a system developed by a Swiss company, using a combination of tube launched missiles and 35 mm Oerlikon canons.

<sup>6</sup> The M80 Stiletto is an American concept vessel that would be cheap to produce and easily used as the basis for a NZ design and build.

Figure Two: NZ defence in-depth example



**Summary assessment**

If government's current refusal to provide for NZ's defence was turned around, protecting NZ is entirely feasible, providing siege sustainability is actioned, the right assumptions are made, the right doctrines are employed and a risk-to-readiness indicator model is adopted. If these things were done determining capability and procurements would be relatively straightforward. The issue of cost is not within this paper's remit. New Zealand would need to invest more in defence, but not a lot more if it never needed to move beyond RL 1. The real issue around cost is not affordability, but willingness.

**Procurement**

Developing the capability needed to secure NZ's defence along the lines described here would require a substantial shift in equipment priorities. Indicative suggestions concerning major procurements, for the three services, consistent with a modern system in-depth defence, are listed below. For brevity's sake not all the acquisition details contained in *Defenceless* are included. The larger items suggested here are not random selections. They are all supported by internationally recognised best practice, or likely future trends, supported in the literature and by active research.

Table Two: Army procurement recommendations

Recommendations	In-depth rationale	Modern system defence and asymmetry applications
<b>A family of NZ made armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs).</b> Personnel carrier, with remote weapon station (RWS), support weapons and artillery platform, command, medic, forward supply.	Needed for a swarming nationwide defence. Also tailored to the recommended larger infantry section concept and the on-land needs of the air force and navy.	High level protection for casualty reduction. High mobility. Support weapons platforms for high volume suppressing fire. Independent unit attack from dispersed locations. Greater tactical flexibility.

<p><b>Long range gun – a 155mm weapon system</b> See the G6 gun on the South African Rhino vehicle for a working example).</p>	<p>Long range fire against incoming amphibious vessels using the AFV platform for high mobility and protection.</p>	<p>Suppressing and massed defensive/attacking for both forward defence and during the final counter-attack phase in support of independent unit counter-attack operations from dispersed locations. Semi-automated systems for rapid fire by smaller crew numbers. CBRN and blast protection.</p>
<p><b>The right range of personal weapons</b> Return to a 7.62 mm rifle with marksman capability (e.g. TAR-21) and quality support weapons and machine guns; e.g. 60 mm mortar, XM25 50 Cal MG, 40 mm grenade launcher.</p>	<p>Firepower, accuracy and longer range for effective infantry action during the counter-attack phase.</p>	<p>High marksman quality fire (trained for). Greater fire power and weapon system choices for effective independent small unit action. Wider range of tactical options for unit commanders.</p>
<p><b>Direct/indirect support weapons</b> -105 mm AFV guns and missiles for anti-tank defence. -Suppressing fire system (twin 120mm mortar tubes on an AFV platform- see the Swedish AMOS. -Anti-aircraft missiles and gun systems – 35 mm Oerlikon canon using AHEAD ammunition as part of the SKYSHIELD system.</p>	<p>Greater suppressing fires. Wide range of systems, making it difficult for an enemy to counter all of them. The ability to layer defensive fires. More attacking firepower and tactical options in the counter-attack phase.</p>	<p>Greater range of support for a deeper defence. Range of all-fires combinations for co-ordinated force employment. Greater dispersal options to make enemy air superiority and target acquisition very difficult.</p>
<p><b>An armoured capability</b> An armoured version of the AFV, or a standard main battle tank (MBT).</p>	<p>For use in the counter-attack, direct fire role, against similar vehicles.</p>	<p>Ensures NZ troops are supported at the top end of AFV capability. Provides a significant asymmetrical advantage against lighter weight amphibious vehicles in the absence of MBTs during the early stages of an amphibious assault.</p>
<p><b>Vehicle and personal protection</b> Active defence systems (ADS) on AFVs (e.g. Trophy system) and advanced body protection for personnel (e.g. the Dragon Skin system).</p>	<p>Casualty reduction and prevention of AFV destruction from shaped charge munitions.</p>	<p>Protection systems for vehicles and personnel as an asymmetrical advantage to reduce casualties, during sub-unit operations, and vicariously increase NZ advantage in troop and vehicle numbers during an amphibious/air assault.</p>
<p><b>EW, CBRN and reconnaissance systems</b></p>	<p>Essential to reduce casualties and maintaining 'situational awareness' for command and control purposes.</p>	<p>Electronic systems failures while</p>

Table Three: Navy procurement recommendations

Procurements	In-depth rationale	Modern system defence and asymmetry applications
<p><b>A NZ made fast attack craft – the SECOV*</b> Armed with two 35 mm Oerlikon canon and two light short-range missile systems for air defence and surface targets. Also, an interchangeable mission module for a variety of functions, including longer range anti-ship or anti-air missile systems.</p>	<p>A close-to-shore vessel for air defence around ports and anti-amphibious operations. Part of the forward 'layered' lines of defence. Significant numbers of these vessels would force an enemy into OHT operations and the diversion of resources to counter them. Aimed at blunting enemy forward momentum close to shore.</p>	<p>Asymmetrically puts a significant naval force on the water but without the vulnerabilities and costs of larger vessels out at sea. Land and stealth masking effects against radar, IR targeting systems, sea-skimming missiles and torpedoes. Would add significantly to a coordinated 'all-fires' defence while complicating and reducing an enemy's options.</p>
<p><b>NZ made family of UUVs#</b> A mine and torpedo laying vessel and a larger littoral vessel for long-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles.</p>	<p>For forward defence against amphibious operations.</p>	<p>Asymmetry – difficult to detect and able to operate easily within the defence in depth zone. High grade concealment and dispersion. Use of precision guided munitions to write down enemy numbers and break up enemy cohesion/forward momentum.</p>



<b>SECOV cover and resupply</b> – SKYSHIELD units (a mix of longer-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles protected by 35 mm Oerlikon canon. Logistic resupply off beaches and small ports.	A further layer to the forward defences that adds considerable weight and protection to the SECOV inshore zone.	Higher levels of survivability for the SECOVs and more tactical options in air defence and in anti-ship operations – from concealed and dispersed locations. Mobile resupply would enable the SECOVs to remain on station.
<b>Existing OPVs</b> Retain these vessels but retire the IPVs as the SECOV's could perform their role with the addition of a suitable mission module.	Would play little part in a defence in depth – too slow and vulnerable against a modern systems attacker.	Best confined to a secure port, or evacuated to Australia. Only retained for secondary roles associated with low intensity operations and EEZ protection.
<b>Two new multi-role vessels</b> <sup>^</sup> Vessels with full warship capabilities and the ability to carry troops and their vehicles in support of amphibious operations regionally, or internationally (e.g. the Danish Absalom Class).	Might play a minor role in a defence in depth, providing they did not venture into exposed open waters.	Little role to play. Best retained for regional and international security operations in support of our allies.

\*The US Navy is considering a similar vessel with the same characteristics recommended in *Defenceless NZ*.

# The US Navy is developing a range of UUVs. BAE Systems developed Talisman, a military UUV, in little more than a year. The development of NZ UUVs would therefore be able to draw on this research. Battery systems are a major impediment to developing long range UUVs, but this problem should be solved with developments in new battery technologies.

<sup>^</sup> The Canterbury and the two ANZAC frigates should be sold and the proceeds directed to the development of the UUVs and SECOVs.

Table Four: Air force procurement recommendations

Procurements	In-depth rationale	Modern system defence and asymmetry applications
<b>Up-graded air lift capability</b>	Needed for the rapid deployment of forces in a swarming defence, especially if there are multiple attacks across both main islands. A large heavy lift capability would support inter-island or trans-Tasman operations.	Assist with complex plan execution involving dispersed independent operations.  A heavy lift capability would still be needed to meet international peacekeeping operations conducted by our allies.
<b>An air strike wing</b>	An essential element in a layered defence. Would support all forces engaged in forward defence, or the counter-attack phase.	Complicates enemy operations and provides far more tactical flexibility, especially in a coordinated all fires situation. Easy to disperse and hide. Asymmetrically one pilot can play a far more significant role than large numbers of troops.
<b>Long range reconnaissance – UAV (e.g. the Global Hawk)</b>	For theatre-wide surveillance, situational awareness and command and control.	
<b>Strategic air defence units using the SKYSHIELD concept</b> See SECOV cover units for SKYSHIELD description.	Protection for strategic assets under siege conditions and also for added 'weight' to deny an enemy air superiority during direct attack amphibious operations.	

## Conclusion

The 2010 White Paper and no doubt its 2015 replacement, amounts to 'sitting duck policy'. Its existing elements are largely misdirected. No responsible government would leave an entire nation so totally exposed by simply discounting sovereign risk; just as no responsible Kiwi fails to ensure their largest assets, even though they assume it is extremely unlikely they will have to replace them. It is simply not possible to forecast the future over the long period invoked by defence planners. Put all of the elements canvassed here together and we would have an entirely different White Paper - one that

gets past policy adolescence and makes NZ largely invulnerable to any possible future strategic surprise.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

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Contact details \* = Mandatory

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Group (if applicable):	
Mailing address:	
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## Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

Become an international cyber warfare leader

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

Fisheries poaching. Antarctica being plundered

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

Sink poachers commission a navy clean up ship to clean the mess or have boarding parties kill or capture the crew.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

All citizens should serve in the RNZN or NZ Army for a compulsory military training of 12 months and then be a reserve for two years or forfeit their right to vote for 5 years.

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

Parachuting  
Helo snipers  
Strike capable UAVs  
Orbital ~~weapon~~ platforms.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?
① Increasing Radicalism in the world - and our participation in the armed conflict in IRAQ. NZ puts its security at risk by sending our forces there.
2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?
The more we seek trading partnerships with countries that have appalling human rights policies - the more we support their regimes. NZ needs to be more careful
3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?
Return to being independent so we don't have to join in an armed conflicts that will threaten our security. Rather than joining the fighting - assist with peacekeeping, rebuilding infrastructure.

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

I see food security as the biggest issue for NZ.

Reinstate resources to the Coastguard - to protect our fisheries.

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

I feel we need to remain neutral and offer humanitarian support rather than military support.

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

I would support less money into Defence forces and more into other ways to advance the nation's interests, eg. diplomatic efforts & assisting with humanitarian efforts in other countries.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

I would like more money spent on this. But his service could be done by Civil Defense being expanded + the Coastguard. Part need the army to do this.

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

I don't support a role for the Defence Force with youth. The money could be spent on conflict resolution programmes, outdoor education camps, leadership programmes etc for youth.

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

1) Peace keeping force, 2) Civil Defense + Coastguard. NZ should remain neutral. 3) Humanitarian support to countries with crises.  
The Threat to our country militarily is minimal.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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<p>1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?</p> <p>Illegal infiltration of borders e.g. boat people, illegal fishing, drug/arms smuggling  Terrorist infiltration and attacks  Disruption of 'spy' systems  Inadequate defence forces - undermanned + under resourced.</p>
<p>2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?</p> <p>Invasion by another state e.g. Indonesia  Disruption to South East Asian and South Pacific alignments  <del>Current</del> Current defence force would be stretched beyond its capabilities</p>
<p>3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?</p> <p>Peace keeping forces maintained and expanded.</p>



4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

- Encroachment of NZ fishing borders
- Boat people/refugees from international borders.
- Terrorist infiltrations

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

- Secure NZ + surrounding waters and support Australia in the first instance
- Provide support to trading partners if needed
- Maintain a peace keeping force as needed.

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

Assist with building and maintaining good communication and spy networks

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

Aid in training of civilian volunteers.  
Where applicable provide man power + resources.

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

Education programs run by defense personnel in N.Z schools (secondary schools).  
Cadetships in schools  
Introduce compulsory military training by way of Ballot System.

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

Larger army, navy + airforce (Manpower + Equipment)  
Foreign Naval Base, in NZ e.g. USA  
Increase in Naval Fleet to include more armed rapid response vessels for coastal protection

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?
Biosecurity
2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?
That we act purely as a peace and reconstruct organisation - medical assistance etc.
3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?
As for No 2

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

Oil Exploitation, Fishing Poaching  
and the like

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

As in 2.

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

Monitor our borders and  
as in No 2.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

As in 2.

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

Training in Roles to fit with all  
the above

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

We have proven ourselves a  
compassionate and practical people  
able to get on well with others  
build on that for peace

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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## Contact details (\*) Mandatory

*Name:
Group (if applicable):
Mailing address:
Contact telephone number:
Email address:

## Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?	<p>Increased tension in the South China sea.</p> <p>Terrorist activity in the Pacific region.</p> <p>Illegal fishing in NZ Economic zone</p> <p>Piracy.</p>
2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?	<p>Sea lanes under threat threatening exports.</p> <p>Rising tension between Australia &amp; China.</p>
3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?	<p>Build on current capability - More interoperability with Pacific partners, Build on relationships with these partners</p>

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4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

There is an increasing threat to NZ Fisheries with global food demand on the increasing. NZ needs to place more emphasis on the subject.

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

NZ needs to play more of a leading and supporting role in the Pacific

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

Good will visits around the world. Be more involved in humanitarian operations around the world.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

To provide rapid response to any event to bolster emergency services.

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

Maybe taking an active role in NZ secondary schools bringing defence force values into our schools.

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

Provide more capability to the reserves (i.e. NZ LAV's). Improved Air transport. Strategic and tactical. Heavy and medium. Roll on and off capability with options for surveillance ISR capability as well as close air support. off shore patrol capability needs to be increased & OPV not enough

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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Defence White Paper 2015

Thank you for the opportunity to offer a submission.

The consultation paper assumes that we need a defence force. Less clear are the reasons why. There is no military threat, yet the government is focused on strengthening the armed force "growing its combat, combat support and combat service capabilities."

Two threats of concern to the government have been identified: a cyber threat to our information structures, and an increased risk of terrorism from the radicalising effect of the Iraq/Syria conflict. It is hard to see how cyber threats could be addressed by military action, and military action itself tends to foster terrorism.

Although the "core task of the NZDF is to conduct military operations", recent governments have increasingly emphasised the role of the armed forces in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. This is a good trend, though it does call into question the key role of the army. It becomes clear that, with the exception of combat, all the activities of the armed forces could be carried out by civilian agencies.

Are there other risks to NZ security? A major and growing threat involves extreme climatic events - droughts and floods, including the erosion of coast land. Again, non-combat duties are called for.

New Zealand's security could well be put at risk by free trade agreements e.g. under the TPPA, a large corporate company could sue the government over laws enacted for our own health and welfare if these are perceived to threaten its interests. This constitutes perhaps the greatest threat to NZ's sovereignty but, again, is not an issue that can be addressed by our defence force.

Recent overseas deployments of the SAS to Afghanistan to assist the US military had little to do with our own security, and at times raised disturbing human rights concerns including the transfer of prisoners to detention centres where they were at risk of torture.

The high cost of maintaining military capabilities, especially in the stated absence of any military threat, is disproportionate, while areas of need remain in social welfare, health, housing and a living wage.

The question of the role of the Defence Force in the development of New Zealand's youth is difficult. As a community we discourage violence, yet cadet training in schools exposes children to militarism during impressionable years, as normal and acceptable. While the Youth Development Units can play a positive role in teaching teamwork, life skills and self-discipline, it does not seem appropriate for such training to be delivered by a military institution with the use of armed force as its primary role. Militarisation of young persons is also contrary to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to which NZ is a state party.

Carbon neutral policies could well be incorporated into the Defence force. Our foreign policy should aim at preventing armed conflict, with a focus on diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Ultimately, when war is renounced, we need a Civilian Army.

*Thank you for receiving my submission.*

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In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?  <i>See attached submission.</i>
2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?  <i>See Submission.</i>
3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?  <i>See Submission.</i>



4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

See Submission.

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

Capabilities are determined by assessment of strategic environment but ISR is particularly important.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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Question 1. *What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?*

**Background:** In the twentieth century New Zealand's isolated geographic location afforded it security from most geopolitical excesses that bedevilled the world. However, the sustained lack of a direct security threat created and instilled a parsimonious attitude within the community towards funding anything but a nominal level of defence. Ironically, the reverse may prove to be true in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, for geography has positioned New Zealand inconveniently on the cusp of two great oceans – the Pacific and Southern Oceans. Hence isolation and parsimony are two features unlikely to transition easily across the millennium divide.

To the north, within the broader Pacific Oceanic rim there is no shortage of real and perceived traditional (territorial) and non-traditional (climate change) threats to regional, and thus New Zealand's security. While the Southern Ocean and Antarctica currently offer up only inchoate security threats, which today typically take the form of illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing. However, by 2040, if not prior too, security threats are likely to take a more substantive form primarily due to the 'drivers of conflict...' listed in the Defence Assessment 2014 document. This document is not unique in identifying such drivers for a similar lists appear in numerous publications, including in the Ministry of Defence (UK) 2010 report - *Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040*. This report concludes that while a 'scramble for Antarctica' is unlikely, although it is not inconceivable, given that there may be significant competition for energy and marine resources in the Southern Ocean as rising and emerging powers challenge existing exploitation protocols. China, one of at least three nations harvesting Antarctic krill, is seeking a seven-fold increase to its annual catch justifying such an increase by arguing that *The Antarctic is a treasure house for all human beings, and China should go there and share* (lui: Shenli: 2015). As the high value "nutraceutical" industry grows so will the competition between fisher nations and companies for krill, which could present a challenge to the quota system managed under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. Any substantial increase in maritime traffic in the Southern Ocean will heighten security and search and rescue responsibilities.

When it comes to Antarctica's mineral resources, rising and emerging powers are not alone in their attempt to secure future access to the continent's mineral wealth. The central the element of Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (PEPAT) is the

unconditional prohibition of any mining-related activity in Antarctica for a fifty-year period. After this period has expired countries may request a revision of this prohibition. The lack of a permanent ban on mineral activities angered numerous Antarctic Treaty states, but an 'implied' moratorium on mining was all that the United States would agree too. When signing the Protocol in 1991, President George Bush senior was given to comment that the Protocol "addresses our concerns and provides effective protection for Antarctica without foreclosing the options for future generations" (Templeton, M.: 2002). Should commercial quantities of potentially scarce minerals be discovered will any state continue to respect treaty provisions or will such a discovery initiate a 'scramble for Antarctica'?

Antarctica is not immune from security externalities such as climate change that are increasingly prevalent elsewhere in the world. Climate change is exacerbating the worldwide depletion of aquifers, the retreat of glaciers, reduction in snow pack and reduced river flows. Scarcity of water is now severely impacting on food production in many locations around the world. It is not unreasonable to expect that countries affected or likely to be affected by water and/or food scarcity would consider harvesting ice in Antarctic. Such an activity, if it became common with many participants, would change both the environmental and security dynamics in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. Currently ice Harvesting is not prohibited by either the Antarctic Treaty or PEPAT.

Submission: Inherent in any change to the status quo in Antarctica is a real threat to those countries closest to the continent – the 'Gateway Countries'; Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand and South Africa. This group can be expanded to include India, which would be equally affected, would then collectively form what is known as the 'Southern Oceanic Rim States'. No other states have more to gain from the continuation of the status quo in Antarctica or more to lose should the region experience inter-state imbroglios over access to living or non-living resources.

Only countries with suitable technology and adequate finance are likely to exploit Antarctica. The most obvious countries are those either exploiting or assisting in the exploitation of the Arctic, i.e. United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, or members of the European Union. Paradoxically, while these countries have the political or military means to settle

resource or territorial disputes in the Antarctica, their need to ultimately access the continent's resources could prevent this, unless resolving a dispute provides a superior national security alternative. Given this likelihood New Zealand will need to place greater emphasis on being self-reliant in defence of the Southern Ocean and approaches to Antarctica. Prominence should be placed on enhancing sea, air and space capabilities, especially ISR, as military defence of the Ross Sea Dependency is beyond New Zealand's military and financial means.

Although, New Zealand has a long-standing defence relationship with Australia and developing relationship with India, a comprehensive defence co-operation structure amongst all Southern Oceanic Rim States is warranted. While acknowledging this is a group of disparate states each with its own national security agenda, all have a common interest in the security future of Antarctica. Within the region formal grouping of disparate states already exist and may provide a 'blueprint' for any new security community. In the South Atlantic there is a deepening commitment to south-south co-operation across African and Latin American states through membership of the Zone of Peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA). While India, Brazil and South Africa form the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Among the Southern Oceanic Rim States a formal structure could facilitate the sharing of ISR, coordination and cooperation between respective militaries in the patrolling of the Southern Ocean and approached to Antarctica, improved inter-operability and provide access to complementary military capabilities.

Despite the non-military use provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, scientific bases in Antarctica are increasingly used for 'dual-use' research that is useful for military purposes. Several countries are accused of enlarging their bases to facilitate satellite communication and surveillance systems that could have military application. Increasingly the status quo in Antarctica is being side-stepped as states position themselves to prosper from the elimination or diminution of the Treaty in 2048, if not before. Given the lack of universal acceptance as to the legal status of Antarctica, the worldwide pressure on natural resources and the impact of climate change, it would advisable for New Zealand to prepare both the public and military for the likely scramble for Antarctica.

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## Key Questions

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<p>1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?</p> <p>NZ is the biggest threat to NZ - our remoteness gives us a sense of false security - our politicians think we can have defence security for nothing relying all on our allies.</p> <p>CHINA invasion - already underway in quiet peaceful way - stripping us of industry &amp; too dependent on them for trade.</p> <p>MIDDLE EAST Peace - militant Islam fanaticism. ISIS - a loose cannon</p> <p>CLIMATE CHANGE Wild Weather &amp; Droughts affecting Islands, SW Pacific</p>
<p>2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?</p> <p>Industrial rise of CHINA (and INDIA) requiring material from elsewhere</p> <p>Increasing influence of CHINA globally challenging USA</p> <p>Revival of militant RUSSIA - with CHINA - rebuilding building New Naval fleets - imperial expansion (Ukraine, South China Yellow Sea)</p> <p>INEFFECTIVENESS of UN to solve anything - REFUGEES</p> <p>REFUGEES - N Africa Middle East → Europe SE Asia → Aust &amp; NZ?</p>
<p>3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?</p> <p>Defence of homeland NZ &amp; our SW Pacific realm from Antarctica to the equator - depends on our Navy to deploy our army forward.</p> <p>International peace keeping integrated with humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development assistance.</p> <p>Combat exercises with allied Nations particularly Aust-NZ-CAN-UK-USA but maintaining independence as a sovereign Nation</p> <p>DISASTER RELIEF &amp; ODA particularly in our SW Pac realm</p>

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

Management of Fisheries particularly pelagic sgl tuna which swim between Nations - Krill & toothfish in Antarctica. Protecting resources SW Pac  
Rabpostage to CLIMATE CHANGE - wild cyclones with sea level rise affecting NZ part esp. low lying and coast of SW Pacific overall  
REFUGEES seeking to come to NZ. CHINA - RUSSIAN imperialism 10 years +

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

A integrated defence force with multirole equipment which is adaptable to any or all roles to meet any circumstance as it may arise. A army of 4000 + reservists organised into 3 units of 800 rotating 6 months between Home - SW Pac (include exercises allies) and international peacekeeping (Gaza) Navy with sealift 800 + 200 vehicles + 20 helicopters

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

Deploy full time a operational peace keeping force 800 army + Airforce and Navy support (rotating as above) integrated with disaster relief reconstruction after war (Gaza, Syria, future) and Development assistance which is integrated with foreign diplomacy (incl WTO) to develop new opportunity for NZ trade & commerce  
~~Use NZDF + more finance to develop NZ industry - ships & aircraft built in NZ.~~

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

Our civilian civil defence is very resilient & well organised Capacity in NZDF is utilised in events beyond civilian as this may arise. - ability to deal with shipwreck & oil spill is example of civil & environmental defence that NZDF needs to have  
currently NZ has almost no capacity in Navy or Army for coastal defence particular against a raid - sea mines or missiles fired by ships at sea.

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

more focus on high school aged young people with good defence cadet corps which may form a lead in to a career in their defence forces or service as reservists.  
I am 70 yo and was at high school 1950's when all boys had military training "barracks week" and army with 200 rifles, 2 machine guns, 2 Bren 1 3" mortar rifle range and a small shooting range

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

NOW A 800 person force of Army which is deployable anywhere in the world. A 800 person Army interfacing with Aus & USMC amphibious force "Tuplan Shore"  
This requires NZDF to have 800 Army + Airforce sealift with 200 vehicles 20 helicopters  
A RNZAF with 8x equiv airlift C130 - made in NZ (Woodbury) aircraft Royal Sam/Angeal  
All of this is multirole - has combat ability for disaster relief reconstruction ODA  
FUTURE capacity for coastal defence. ISSAM truck mounted arps & missiles in Army (SAM + ASM) Combat Corvettes in Navy - all this multirole, deployable overseas too.  
There is much much more in attachment. More in a illustrated report in prep.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.  
Back 1999 - 2002 I sent 2 illustrated reports to NZDF M of Defence. (later attached)

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I am Not yet ready to send the report I have in preparation which anyway needs to be sent AFTER the public consultation Defense Review 2015  
I WISH TO COME WELLINGTON TO PERSONALLY PRESENT THIS SUBMISSION

29 June 2015

Helene Quilter  
Chief Executive and Secretary of Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
PO Box 12703  
WELLINGTON, 6144

By email: [Helene.Quilter@defence.govt.nz](mailto:Helene.Quilter@defence.govt.nz)

Dear Helene,

### Defence White Paper 2015

Thank you for the opportunity to provide input into the 2015 Defence White Paper.

In an international community committed to the maintenance of human rights and the collective security responsibilities enshrined in the UN Charter New Zealand holds a prominent place as a leader in the development of a diverse, inclusive and democratic society that respects the rule of law, human dignity, equality and freedom. During our membership of the United Nations Security Council New Zealand's reputation further lends credibility to our contribution towards the resolution of major international issues.

The New Zealand Defence Force has been instrumental in demonstrating this country's respect for human rights and the rule of law in its international missions, such as its peacekeeping operations in Bougainville, Timor-Leste, the Solomon Islands and Afghanistan, as well as in its capacity-building efforts in Iraq and its constructive approaches to regional human rights initiatives in East Asia.


The Human Rights Commission (the Commission) is highly appreciative of the fact that the 2010 Defence White Paper highlighted the importance of a rules-based international order based on values sympathetic to New Zealand's own constitutional and legal heritage. In light of this, and in recognition of the Defence Force's proactive respect for human rights and the rule of law, the Commission recommends that the 2015 Defence White Paper would be further strengthened by:

1. Stressing the Defence Force's commitment to these rules and values by using language that underlines the Defence Force's self-identity based on respect for human rights and the rule of law.
2. Emphasising as a core competency and as an integral part of its training, discipline, and professionalism an understanding of, and respect for, human rights and the rule of law.

The Commission believes that explicit reference to these rules and values can only enhance the Defence Force's role in supporting New Zealand's prominent place in the international community as a world leader in human rights protection.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. The Commission would be happy to provide any further information that might assist you in the drafting exercise.

Yours sincerely



David Rutherford  
Chief Commissioner

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Aotearoa New Zealand

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Q1:  
Q2:  
Q3:  
Q4:  
Q5:  
Q6:  
Q7:  
Q8:  
Q9:

Q11: It is my belief that New Zealand must drastically increase its defense spending if we are to continue as an independent free-market democracy. A free democracy blessed with an abundance of natural resources and low population density, in a region characterized by over-population and resource shortages that are already emerging and will likely become more significant in coming years. We must develop both an effective core armed forces (army, navy and air-force) as well as an effective intelligence service and missile defense system, giving both the ability to repel strikes against us and deliver them to our enemies. It goes without saying that we need to put aside the nostalgic 'hippy dreams' of the past and accept we are living in an increasingly unstable region in an increasingly unstable World. Because of this, we must develop nuclear capability of our own. Our current mantra 'America will protect us' is both short-sighted and lacks initiative—we must develop the means to stand on our own two feet, with or without our allies. Developing such military capability from the low levels at present will require an investment of tens of billions of dollars over the coming years and decades. However it is vital we show no hesitation in making this necessary investment. It is, after all, a necessary insurance policy on our future so that our children will be able to enjoy what we have enjoyed. That surely, is beyond financial cost. Fortunately I believe the cost is easily affordable, through exploiting a resource that is presently completely untaxed; immigration. New Zealand is currently experiencing net immigration of over 50,000 people a year. Each of these new arrivals should be charged a 'head tax' of \$200,000 a piece. Every cent should be immediately directed towards military spending. This new tax would raise in excess of ten billion dollars a year—a long way towards making up the current shortfall in defense spending. I am sure each one of these new arrivals who truly wishes to become a citizen of this great nation will agree that \$200,000 is a small price to pay so they and their children may enjoy the rights and freedoms of native born sons and daughters of this land, now and into the future. I am glad this country is currently blessed with a sound National government and a Minister of Defense of demonstrated leadership ability in the Hon. Gerry Brownlee. I trust both will ensure that our national defense, long neglected by successive Labour governments, is finally taken seriously and that the necessary investments are made to safeguard our freedom now and into the uncertainties that lie ahead in the twenty first century.

Q1:a. Pandemics which disable supply and distribution networks within NZ b. Major natural events like earthquakes which disable the mechanisms of government, intelligence and emergency services, reducing vigilance on incursions from overseas. c. Longer term attempts to secure by force or other means access to NZs abundant fresh water, food supply, agricultural products, hydro-electric energy generation capacity, and low population density in relation to other Asia\_Pacific countries. d. Radicalisation of disaffected youth may create 'lone wolf' terrorism attacks. e. Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing in NZ's sovereign waters by other countries desperate for food supply. f. Failed states in our Pacific neighbours create maritime waves of people in small boats seeking refuge in NZ. g. UNLIKELY: Nation state conflict to our near north which draws NZ in. h. HIGHLY LIKELY: Blockading or piracy in NZ's sea lanes of communication with our trading partners.

Q2:a. Increased tensions and interference along sea trading routes greatly affect NZ's export income and imports of critical supplies. b. UNLIKELY: Radicalised individuals or groups attempt attacks on NZ's institutions and people which result in widespread deaths and casualties. c. LIKELY: Building on ABCA relationships draws us into an offshore conflict where we feel we have no capacity for independent policy and decision making. WHICH MEANS THAT: d. A modest RNZN Combat Force (2 x capable frigates), with supply ship support is critical. At least one amphibious support ship is required. e. The Army must be capable of deploying a battalion combined arms task group, with sufficient reserve capacity to scale up to a brigade task group within 3 months and sustain this force for at least 12 months. f. The RNZAF must maintain capability for broad area maritime surveillance with both manned and possibly unmanned assets.

Q3:a. Continue current policies. b. Engage closely with Australia in combined and joint exercises, but retain the right for independent decision making. c. Continue to support the FPDA agreement, but reserve the right to reduce participation if it is heading in undesirable directions. d. Take advantage of US training activities like RIMPAC and selective exercises, but be cautious about the level of commitment expected by the US when they embark on some military action to further their own interests. e. Retain Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Response (HA/DR) capabilities with Navy and Air Force, plus medical teams, to support our South Pacific neighbouring countries.

Q4:a. IUU fishing in the EEZ and Continental Shelf. b. Be vigilant and forthright in actions supporting CCALMR. c. Keep regular maritime and aerial patrols within the EEZ. d. Support UN processes and policies in relation to mineral exploration within the Continental Shelf. e. Make sure that the RNZN maintains capability to patrol in the Ross Sea during the Summer months. f. Consider carefully future maritime patrol capability to ensure sufficient endurance to safely conduct surveillance over the Southern Ocean and Ross Sea.

Q5:a. Work in very closely with Australia, but maintain national policy independence. b. Look for opportunities for synergy in terms of complementary acquisition, sustainment and training with the ADF. c. Ensure NZ's voice is heard in the councils of ABCA and the UN. d. Maintain efforts to sustain the rule of law, but be cautious about open-ended engagements distant from our shores.

Q6:a. Defence is inextricably bound up with foreign affairs and trading relationships. However, it needs to ensure that it continues as a capable, functional, and effective force to the highest levels of directed level of capability. b. NZ's main contributions short-term and ongoing are likely to be in the field of HA/DR where adding civilians to responses (USAR, medical, Police, etc.) will be key to an effective response. c. Remain true to our history where we field a capable military force which is professional and widely recognised by allies and potential adversaries as being formidable. d. Defence is one of NZ's largest training organisations, capable of taking relatively immature teenagers and instilling in them self-discipline, social behaviour, and skills for both the benefit of the Defence Force and the wider community should they leave the NZDF.

Q7:a. Absolutely critical. From immediate surveillance to identify impacts, to providing helicopter/rugged terrain vehicle/maritime access/personnel to affected parts of the country. b. These same capabilities are vital for HA/DR operations with our South Pacific neighbours.

Q8:a. Modest. Defence can work with willing youth to give them an opportunity to make more of themselves, but it is not a social service. b. If the Government felt really worried about the directions that the youth of NZ were taking, it could re-introduce some form of compulsory service for males and females equally which could include defence training, emergency services training, remote environmental projects, medical training, etc.

Q9:a. The current status, organisation, leadership, and assets of the NZDF are good as they are. b. Recent good work on being more conscious of personnel social issues and motivation have been in the right direction. They need to be maintained as well as the consistent effort to develop and maintain NZDF cultural values. c. Timely acquisition of new platforms will be a continuing but necessary drain on the Defence budget. It will be false economy to delay projects, because when assets are required they are needed immediately. (For instance, the NH-90s would have been ideal in Vanuatu after Cyclone Pam but they couldn't be deployed because they don't fit into Hercules aircraft and can only operate from HMNZS CANTERBURY when it is alongside a wharf. THIS IS A SCANDAL.)

Q11: Defence real estate needs to be considered carefully. There might still be too many Defence properties which are maintained for historical reasons rather than today's, or the future's, real requirements. Think carefully about opportunities to build relationships with our Pacific Island neighbours by short-term postings within the NZDF, for training and operational duties, before required return to their own country taking with them the benefit of their experiences.

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Q1:1. Possible threats to shipping lanes that serve New Zealand by terrorist activity such as pirates and possible hostile nations. 2. Environmental disasters such earthquakes, floods and drought. 3. Possible aggression by countries such as Indonesia and China. 4. Defence and surveillance of New Zealand's 200 nm EEZ. 5. Possible threats to New Zealanders and their assets by lone wolf terrorist attacks.

Q2:1. Tension between China and Taiwan over sovereignty issues could draw New Zealand into that conflict. 2 Indonesia is a country that has a very large population and limited land space needed to house and feed it's people. That country could pursue an expansionist policy and confront Australia in order to satisfy the afore mentioned needs. The NZDF will drawn in if Australia is threatened and this country lacks the appropriate assets needed to adequately support it's closest ally and friend. 3. China is building up it's naval forces, in the form of an aircraft carrier force, with the aim of extending its influence to the Eastern Pacific. There could be a very real possibility that China could establish a base in a country, such as Fiji, in order to conduct surveillance missions against Australia and New Zealand. The NZDF would be called upon to defend New Zealand airspace - WITH WHAT! 4. New Zealand has five or six time bombs, in the form of unstable countries such as Fiji, sitting on its door step. 5. Instability in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and the South Pacific that could effect New Zealand's exports and imports of oil and other materials. At present, the NZDF is incapable of coping with any major surface or air threats that could confront this country. The New Zealand Government should be ashamed for what they have done to the NZDF.

Q3:1 Air defence of New Zealand's sovereign airspace. 2 Protect the sea lanes that serve New Zealand. 3 Provide relief and humanitarian assistance to New Zealanders other peoples facing environmental disasters. 4 Defend New Zealand's area of interest such as the Antarctic and the Southern Pacific. 5 Support it's allies.

Q4:1 Dealing with unstable countries such as Fiji and Tonga. 2 Protect the fish stocks within the Ross Dependency and other Antarctic waters. 3 Protect New Zealand's EEZ. 4 Protect the New Zealand population from terrorist threats. 5 Pollution control.

Q5:1 Support C.D.R. with Australia. 2 Pursue military ties with the US. 3 Continue to participate in the Five Power Defence Arrangement. 4 Continue to support the defence forces of Tonga and other small South pacific nations. 5 Participate in the NATO led Anti Piracy operation. 6 Working with the UN would be my lowest priority.

Q6:Provide naval and rotary assets in order to assist other Government departments

Q7:1 REBUILD THE AIR COMBAT FORCE in order to protect New Zealand's air space. 2 Maintain and upgrade the RNZAF's air transport capability in order to provide assistance with environmental disasters. 3 Maintain the Frigate and the patrol force in order to safe guard the sea routes between New Zealand and it's markets.

Q8:continue wit the Limiter Service Volunteer programme.

Q9:1 AIR DEFENCE Capability. Reform the ACF with F16s or the KIA T50 in order to perform the Anti Surface, Air Defence and Close Support roles. 2 Anti Submarine / MPA capability with the armed S2G,the P3 Orion / P8 Poseidon and the C295MPA. 3 Search and Rescue capability with the C295MPA, NH90 and the AW109LUH Helicopters. 4 Intelligence and surveillance gathering capability. 5 Heavy / Medium Lift capability with the C17 / C295 transport aircraft. 6 Retain / maintain a Naval combat capability with three Frigates. 7 Effectively patrol and defend New Zealand's territorial waters with the right Inshore / Offshore vessels. 8 Maintain a ground Defence capability with the appropriate equipment.

Q11:At present, the NZDF is a joke. What we have is a peace keeping force that is poorly armed. In my opinion the main arms of the NZDF are SEA and AIR not the army with the RNZAF and RNZN as it's trucking arms. In WW2, the main threat to New Zealand came from the sea and the air and not from the land. Today, New Zealand's economic survival depends upon getting it's exports to market and to ensure that they do, then we need AIR defence and MARITIME assets that can keep our air and sea lanes open. I've mentioned the

army. Yes, we do need a ground force - one that is combat capable and equipped with the right tools that will enable it to perform it's many and varied duties such as; deterring aggression, disaster relief, counter insurgency, anti terrorism and last of all, peace keeping. I previously mentioned that the army needs the right tools. Acquiring the LAV111 was an incredibly stupid decision - one that has cost, me the tax payer, millions of dollars. This vehicle came at the expense of the F16 and is not able to fight in a major combat zone. It is unable to travel over boggy, muddy terrain such as one would normally find in East Timor. So what use is this piece of junk. In Iraq, the LAV111 / Striker proved totally inadequate and proved to be a death trap for its occupants. So please get the right gear so that our armed force can competently protect us Kiwis. Finally, my heart goes to the men and women of the NZDF who have to use second rate equipment because penny pinching, idiotic, stupid people refuse to provide funds that will enable the NZDF to competently carry out it's tasks.

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Q1: One major threat, above all others: avoiding our responsibility as a global citizen to participate in protecting the security of our friends, and friendly nations, in a world that is increasingly challenged by destructive sectional interests. If we do not stand with our friends, what kind of friendly nation are we?

Q2: New Zealand's interests -- political, social, and economic -- extend around the world. Anything that affects people, nations, and institutions that connect to us, and any changes that affect our relationships, necessarily involve us. We cannot separate ourselves from the global community in which we live. Change that hurts our friends, hurts us. We must respond. Outside the security environment, our economic interests are increasingly challenged by nations that do not respect our economic zone or our environmental practices. These must be defended against; which may mean more offensive tactics against fishing fleets from many nations. Also, as close as we are to Australia, perhaps we have a special responsibility to support them in complex, illegal immigration issues. Just because we are 1500 miles to the East, we aren't 'immune' from what happens in Australia. We should think seriously about our responsibilities in that regard.

Q3: Our Defence Force is very well structured to support New Zealand's interests. But we live in an ocean environment. We have one multi-role vessel to position our forces in the littoral environment. If we are serious about this strategy, perhaps we need to look at additional vessels, additional capability, and greater flexibility, in order to be effective, with our Australian friends, and other allies, should we ever need to deploy offensively, or defensively, in our region. What capability do we really need? What vessels do we need for an amphibious task force? How do we survive the loss of one critical vessel? Will we depend on coalition partners for air cover? These are important questions.

Q4: Fishing by Japan and Spain, and other countries. Climate change, social issues, poverty, education, and opportunity, generally, among our South Pacific neighbours. We have a special interest in Antarctica: do we have the capability to address issues that may emerge that region? Perhaps we do have a policy, but what is our policy for protecting oil and minerals in our zone, and on our shelf? Do we have measures to protect our interests? Do these need to be defended? How do we address these?

Q5: All of the above matter. We have five zones of importance, which extend from New Zealand to the greater Pacific area, and beyond: these will remain important. The Defence Forces are the best resource for Government to consult to develop the right strategies for security, defence, and protection.

Q6: Wrong question. Obviously, the Defence Force should cooperate to work with all New Zealand agencies to protect, advance, and defend the nation's interests. The real question is, how will Government support the Defence Force to achieve the nation's goals for protection, security, and defence?

Q7: Yes, the Defence Force has a role -- through transport, logistics, people power, and organization -- to support disaster relief. We have no alternatives. This capability must be protected. But what are the limitations of that role? At what point does disaster relief trump security and defence? Do you build a defence force for disaster relief? Probably not. How should defence and security issues be balanced with capacity to provide humanitarian relief?

Q8: Creating great, sustaining, fabulous training for jobs in the military, and beyond, in the civilian world, which is what the Defence Forces do brilliantly. But an emphasis should be on retaining well-trained young men and women, which means providing good, sustaining jobs in the Defence Forces, and paying them a salary that matters. The 'moral', social, and motivating power of a career in NZDF is powerful. As a nation, we need to appreciate that, and support the people who respond to that mission with rewards that are meaningful in the real world, commensurate with the work they do to protect our nation.

Q9: We live in an ocean world. Anything we do in a future conflict will involve littoral environments. We have one multi-role vessel with a limited capability, which cannot enter

'disputed territory'; and we have limited resources for air support. Should we think seriously about our 'task force' strategy? Do we need at least two capable vessels, appropriate for the forces we might have to deploy in a disputed zone? Do we need to be sure that we have adequate air cover? If we had to enter disputed territory in our region (not in the Middle East), how prepared would we be? Don't think SAS in Afghanistan. Think New Zealand Forces, in a combined role, in the Pacific, Indonesia, China, Korea ...

Q11: We have exceptional leadership throughout our Defence Forces; a superb Navy, right-sized for our region (with an urgent need for updated vessels in key roles); an Army well-structured and prepared for land warfare (but our infantry battalions, as an entity, unlike SAS or QAMR, are relatively 'untested'); an Air Force that operates within a narrow mission, and very effectively with the Navy. The question is, if deployed in a future conflict -- which will be in a littoral environment and beyond -- how effective would our forces be? SAS and the Navy, in their roles, probably OK. But for the Army (minus QAMR and troops with them in the Middle East) and for the Air Force, what is the answer? It depends on coalition partners and designated roles, of course, but what is the answer? In a combined role, would we act as a task force (whatever that is), as an army, a division, a brigade, or less? Do New Zealanders know what 'forces' and 'capabilities' we actually have, and how these could be applied in a future conflict? Our Defence Force is first class, but if we had to go to war, in our very unstable world, how prepared would we be? Compared with Australia, for example?

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Q1: AS the world has grown smaller in the recent years and New Zealand is less distant from other actors in the international stage the threats to the sovereignty of New Zealand have changed. The most immediate threat to the physical security is posed by international agents. As the recent events in Sydney have demonstrated the threat of domestic terror and should not be underestimated. These threats may change ideologies or political targets in the future so the defence and security establishment should not only focus on Muslim extremists. The other part of sovereignty is the economic wellbeing of the country. New Zealand depends on the safety of shipping routes and the relative stability of the maritime natural resources. Natural resources being clean environment and replenishing fish stocks. HMNZS Wellington had an encounter with illegal fishermen. Although this encounter was in the Australian economic zone we cannot dismiss the possibility of illegal fishing in New Zealand waters.

Q2: Growing influence of China in the region is starting to define a lot of relationships. Chinese Navy and Coast Guard are more actively patrolling various disputed territories as well construct artificial structures. At the immediate examination this has little to do with New Zealand. However this adds to the overall instability and the region and creates an indirect threat to New Zealand. Should there be a conflict between ASEAN nations or China then it would create a humanitarian crisis of a large scale. Refugees will likely look to move to Australia and New Zealand. Defence Force is likely to be looked at for responding in humanitarian or peacekeeping role.

Q3: Maritime patrol is an essential role for the Defence Force. A larger effort should be put into patrolling New Zealand waters and assist to patrol the waters of Australia and the Pacific neighbours. Taking a larger interest in affairs of the Asian nations and their military doctrines and policies is something of utmost importance as we need to assess the risks of major conflicts.

Q4:

Q5:

Q6: GCSB should be brought back into the fold of the Defence Force. The Bureau was originally established as a part of the war effort. During the Cold War the Bureau was changed to a civilian one. However as the threats have changed it is time to move the GCSB back into the Defence Force as most of the threat it is looking at are consistent with the ones of the Defence Force. DoC and MPI are at the forefront of protecting of New Zealand's economic stability through their work in making sure that our environmental protections stay in place. Defence to date has shown a great degree of cooperation with these agencies and should continue to do so.

Q7: One of the lessons that came out of the response to the Christchurch Earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 was that the command and control of the rescue effort on the ground was non-existent. With this in mind it is suggested that Defence Force should expand it's functions as being one of the first agent in charge of response to a natural disaster. Defence Force has skills that perfectly suited to this kind of stressful situations which Police of the Fire Service do not. A combined response framework with the Defence Force at the lead has potential to greatly improve the disaster response in New Zealand.

Q8:

Q9: Larger maritime capability. Both in ships and aviation. As mentioned before patrol as well as deployment outside of New Zealand borders in the naval space is of utmost importance. The Defence Force should consider a wide use of drones to more efficiently cover large areas. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles can be useful in scouting and coordinating ships at sea and forces on land.

Q11: At the moment the Defence Force do not have the highest profile. However as our world changes, the threats evolve and the profile of New Zealand in the region shifts, the Defence Force can become a much bigger aspect of how New Zealand protects it's interest



and makes an impact. The Defence Force is an organization of integrity and purpose. This should be the thrust of effort that New Zealand makes on the world stage.

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Q1: Ongoing religious extremism and terrorist organisations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The threat of cyber warfare. Ongoing tensions between the west and states such as Russia and North Korea. While this is not a direct threat to New Zealand, we may be called into a war with an ally.

Q2: The growth of terrorist organisations such as ISIS following the Arab spring. This means that New Zealand's interests in the middle east (such as the steady supply of oil) are in jeopardy. Also, there is greater threat to New Zealand and New Zealand's allies if ISIS and other extremist organisations are not effectively dealt with. The defence force must be capable of larger deployments to enforce New Zealand's interests with respect to these issues. New Zealand should be prepared for the possibility of a new war. The growing tensions between the West and Russia are resulting in a Cold War scenario. Trade sanctions appear to be having an effect, but with worsening relations, one cannot rule out the possibility of an international conflict, likely to involve New Zealand.

Q3: Capability for large overseas deployment - especially to the middle east. Disaster and emergency relief, both in New Zealand and overseas. Capability to defend New Zealand in the event of a war. Ability to prevent cyber attacks against large New Zealand corporations and government institutions. Surveillance capabilities to ensure that enforcement of our exclusive economic zone is possible.

Q4: Violations of our exclusive economic zone for the purposes of illegal activities (such as fishing without a permit). Cyber attacks on major New Zealand companies and government institutions. Direct defence of New Zealand in the event of a war.

Q5: New Zealand needs to do more globally. New Zealand can better meet its interests by deploying troops overseas to prevent problems reaching New Zealand. This ideology is based upon the principle that the best defence is offence. New Zealand is strategically difficult to capture, but with a small defence force, New Zealand would be incapable of self-defence with its current numbers. Our greatest enemies at this point in time (such as ISIS) are not capable of attacking New Zealand directly. New Zealand ought to keep it this way by sending additional forces to target these threats. We need to leave enough defence force personnel in New Zealand to manage continued training of new defence force personnel, cyber security, surveillance of our EEZ, and responses to natural disasters and emergencies.

Q6: The defence force should be used to meet New Zealand's interests overseas when other means of negotiation, such as political talks, sanctions and embargoes, do not provide the necessary outcome. The defence force should be used domestically to ensure that New Zealand companies are not exposed to cyber threats, that New Zealand's EEZ can be patrolled and our sovereignty enforced, and that natural disasters and emergencies can be dealt with in the most effective means.

Q7: The NZDF has a great role in contributing to responses to unforeseen events and natural disasters. The NZDF is essentially an arm of the government that can be used immediately in the event of a national emergency. New Zealand requires this capability of a rapid response as our country is prone to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, tsunamis and other severe events.

Q8: The NZDF provides a great opportunity for New Zealand's youth to seek employment. The high youth unemployment rate could be curbed by additional recruitment efforts nationwide.

Q9: The NZDF lacks some capabilities which are capable thanks to recent technological developments. Namely, New Zealand ought to increase its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities to reduce operating costs of a number of surveillance activities. The advent of low-cost, disposable UAVs also allows for an upgrade of the Army's old fashioned Hawke UAVs, using a fixed-wing platform. Quad-copter UAVs are cost-efficient and provide excellent capabilities for all arms of the defence force to use. Outside of technology, the defence force ought to be expanded in terms of people due to increasing threats to New

Zealand's interests.

Q11: In general, it seems that defence has not been a priority for the New Zealand government for over 10 years. There has been some upgrades completed, namely the acquisition of the NH90s, and the retirement of the Iroquois helicopters, but much more could be done. A larger, more capable defence force is in the nation's best interests, even if this comes at the expense of less expenditure in other areas of government.

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Q1: Being physically remote, our threats are largely from well-funded international commercial interests, or individual disgruntled bad actors. We remain heavily dependent on imports, and in the event of a global-scale calamity would be particularly exposed to a shortage of high-technology commodities which our infrastructure has become dependent on.

Q2: Frequent attempts are made by even large nations to discredit the UN. Due to NZ's remote location, our mandate to operate outside of our national boundaries depends heavily of the UN for credibility. Australia's support is no longer credible as they have become, frankly, a political laughing stock. We need to be mentally and physically prepared to operate with the UN in the face of political, economic and internal pressure to act independently in controversial areas.

Q3: We need to police our own economic zones effectively before even considering our influence abroad. We cannot do this (witness the recent antarctic poaching fiasco) and it weakens our credibility. We must act and be seen to be acting effectively, rather than merely performing paper exercises.

Q4: Unless we police it, we'll lose it. Oceanic resources are shrinking and conflict over them will increase. Logic suggests that investing in new technology for scanning and surveying would be desirable, but that there is no substitute for being able to make a difference in disputes via an actual physical presence.

Q5: Australia is an unstable ally, prone to putting marginally insane people in charge of portfolios it regards as inconvenient. It is growing increasingly right-wing, is involved in operations that are likely to be regarded in the near future as gross violations of human rights, and cooperation should be strictly limited to physically overlapping geographic areas in which we have no choice but to operate cooperatively.

Q6: The Defence force needs to maintain a firm grasp on the defence of New Zealand rather than pandering to the whims of international armed forces. We should be particularly wary of being manipulated to set a precedent, or used to make up the numbers by other countries bent on overseas tasks that are dictated by political ideology. Indigenous manufacturing and design resources should be used more often to increase independence as well as boost the local economy. A wider view of how the defence budget interacts with the economy is necessary.

Q7: The Defence force is not a panacea to large-scale disasters. It is small in size and would best concentrate on developing rapid and effective response to small-scale events. Large scale events are the work of Civil Defence, but maintenance and training are areas where the Defence Force can provide reliable resources to maintain CD.

Q8: Protecting them, not grooming them.

Q9: Given that we have a relatively large expanse of ocean, we have island protectorates, and the ocean's resources are dwindling, it is becoming increasingly likely that NZ will need to become more active in patrolling and protecting our seas. Consequently, a larger portion of our effort is needed in that direction. Increasing the use of UAVs and underwater drones would give us an edge - and stimulate indigenous technology industries. New Zealand's industrial and IT skills are well placed to produce this equipment, with obvious increased influence in export markets and the extension of use by land forces.

Q11: One often overlooked strategic resource in NZ is the railways. These have been left to decay by recent governments with narrow budgetary views, leading to less use, allowing more decay to be implemented in a vicious spiral. They remain an efficient way to move large quantities of materiel and should be utilised as such. The Defence Force should be taking a stand towards their preservation and indeed extension.

Q1:1. Very dangerous and increasingly likely: Involvement in a air and naval conflict with a rising and technologically advanced state (past experiences of WW1 and WW2 indicate the risk is real). 2. Moderately dangerous and very possible: Lead involvement in a peace-making force in a politically and environmentally fragile Pacific state(s), with rogue armed elements challenging the force. 3. Slightly dangerous and ever present: Increased need for fisheries and sea-border protection, along with SAR and peacekeeping.

Q2:Many reputable observers highlight the growing security risks in the Asia-Pacific region, which combines a rising and expansively nationalist power (China) and a rogue, nuclear-armed feudal tyranny (North Korea), together with rapid rearmament of littoral states and no overarching security architecture (unlike Europe, at least for now). Expanding risks to NZ's trade routes and trading partners, and potentially a naval and air threat to Australia.

Q3:1. Credible contribution to a joint naval combat taskforce. 2. Substantial contribution to an intervention force. 3. Capable control of NZ's borders (including search and rescue), and assistance for disasters, both local and regional.

Q4:1. Major - but less likely - risk of foreign submarine incursions, both to scout zones of interest (i.e. Antarctica) and to dissuade NZ's interest in military alliances. 2. Significant risks of people smuggling, now that Australia has successfully deterred the activity. 3. Increasing likelihood of rogue fishing activities, and confrontational environmentalist actions.

Q5:Priority should be placed on enhancing and expanding our naval capabilities, both in terms of combat assets (frigates) and support elements, including a proper Landing Platform Dock. These vessels are always in scarce supply and are highly valued for their utility and presence. Real consideration should be given to expanding the frigate force from 2 to 3 modern vessels, once Te Kaha and Te Mana are replaced in 15 years. This expansion would permit a deployment of one frigate at all times.

Q6:Defence diplomacy and training activities (both overseas and in NZ) could also tie into trade promotions activities.

Q7:Rapid deployment of trained personnel, rescue helicopters (essential given our terrain) and support vehicles, along with tents.

Q8:Maintain the current (voluntary) Limited Service Volunteer scheme with the Ministry of Social Development. No apparent demand or need for any significant expansion.

Q9:As noted, expand the naval combat force to 3 modern frigates, fully inter-operable with Australia (and by extension the USA and Singapore). A modern replenishment ship, and a proper Landing Platform Dock. Three offshore patrol vessels, one fitted for littoral support operations. Army seems to be balanced sufficiently for likely intervention and peace-keeping roles, though with an eye to upgrading the armour element given the proliferation of advanced anti-armour weapons. Air force must give priority to enhancing the sea control role, which means replacing the Orions with a modern and combat-capable equivalent. Naval helicopters are also key. Long-range transport is another requirement - replacing the C-130s is fundamental.

Q11:

Q1: Now, Tomorrow, next week: -The instability of North Asia, its proximity to international trade routes and the implications for our maritime security. -The world dependency on fossil fuels, and the unwillingness of western governments to push fossil fuels and global warming onto the agenda. Although it is difficult to say when, the combination of fossil fuel dependency and rising food prices will have a part to play in NZ's security position and posture. Future: The renegotiation of the Antarctic Treaty and the effect on our regional maritime environment. The NZDF needs to up the anti in the ice and define 'good behaviour', show the likes of China how Antarctica is a haven not to be touched/exploited.

Q2: I am concerned about Australia's poor foreign relations posture, it alienates Asian nations in particular and sets NZ up, because we are signed on to back them, the AUS Govt have signed on to back Japan. The USA and JAP are signed on to each other, which means we are locked into the thick of heavy weight regional security. However, our national investment does not reflect this situation; the numbers in the NZDF seem Army heavy when our security environment is maritime dependant. How well can the navy do with fishery patrol vessels, a converted ferry and 2 frigates? I am also concerned that the Australian nation seems hell bent on offending everyone in our area, signing up to ridiculously expensive defence projects that we just can't seem to match. This means we are caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to defence investment.

Q3: Humanitarian Disaster help Peacekeeping Maritime security (from the equator to the antarctic, sea and air) Special operations

Q4: Fishing rights The renegotiation of the antarctic treaty The emergence of China as a regional influence (sometimes playing by the rules, sometimes setting their own).

Q5: NZ has to invest at a higher rate than it currently does. The defence force looks lean and fragile. I think the NZDF should invest in proven technologies (why are we leading the way on NH90?) that are reliable and economical. This means that we shouldn't be looking at the capital projects as the Australians if it will break the budget, but we should be looking at the right numbers of capital assets (e.g. long range lift aircraft and frigates) that match our needs. The Government needs to buy into the defence of our country and not be afraid to spend the money to protect our interests.

Q6: As it is.

Q7: Immediate response only - not long term response. Need to get better at getting the defence force reacting quicker (e.g. Vanuatu) - this means MFAT need to get better at defining needs.

Q8: As it is. YDU and cadets are a good product.

Q9: I support a Defence Force with a strong Maritime capability (4 or more frigates, a more credible sea lift capability and a newer diving ship), long range air lift, capable rotary aviation that matches our environment, and a more agile ground capability. In order to deploy such a large ground force, the navy needs a lot more investment.

Q11:

Q11:I note other countries (UK, Australia, USA, Estonia) have identified 'cyber' risks as a key element of their defence statements. Apart from direct 'hacking' of software governing commercial and government infrastructure, an associated and highly public risk is that of remote radicalisation of susceptible people. Our government should explicitly recognise and manage this risk, but not just through reliance on existing agencies (SIS, GCSB, GCIO). Rather, a public outreach scheme - a 'cyber reserve' - targeting IT students and professionals should be put in place with a customer focus, not the usual inflexible MinDef structures. Australia showed a way with their past 'gap year' military experience scheme for school-leavers, as a way to build the profile of the ADF and encourage future recruitment. In a similar way, NZ could use its Limited Service Volunteer scheme experience, but extensively retooled for highly capable & intelligent (if slightly autistic) people who may have an interest in the military. Weta Workshop's effectiveness in developing the two WW1 exhibitions indicates that there is an interest here; how to build on it effectively will require the NZDF to open doors to the IT sector.

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Q1: The primary threat in my personal opinion, but shared by many, is that of Indonesia, both presented by them as a nation, but also from rising Islamic Extremism within the country. For many years this has been a perceived threat, and it is a well known fact Australia builds its own whitepapers around this threat. However even with the Australian focus upon this threat, they alone still do not have the power to truly match Indonesia in every way, so therefore it is a possibility that they may be overrun leading to the same happening to us.

Q2: The change in battle tactics that has arrived in the latest months is sure to be a concern for our defence. Prior to these last two years, the main conflicts have all been based around insurgency and other forms of terrorism, but as we have had new threats arise like the Islamic state, and the conflict in Ukraine, we have started to see more conventional battle. At the same time as this though, we have seen a rise in the threat from cyber warfare, which especially for us, is far more of a pressing concern. The change means we need to also change, we can't keep building our forces for battling insurgents when the enemy is using tanks and artillery to attack. While our prior vehicles like the NZLAV may have been effective in fighting insurgents, even an older tank is more than a match for one, so we need to build our ability to fight these conventional threats. This is how it will affect us.

Q3: I believe our primary role should be to support our traditional allies, Great Britain, Australia, and Canada, in all ways possible, as not only does this help keep them safe, but it helps maintain our relationships with these nations, which secures support and security for our own nation. I do not believe foreign aid missions are in the best interest of New Zealanders, but I do believe there is a need for a certain amount of support to other nations. I believe we should reform our foreign aid, so not only does it help the nation intended, but also keeps in the best interests of New Zealanders.

Q4: Piracy & illegal exploitation of resources. Specially as people start to eye the arctic as a source of natural resources, and people turn to its seas for its rich marine life.

Q5: We should most definitely place ourselves and Australia first in everything, however we should always maintain our place in peace and security globally, as long as it does not impede on the prior.

Q6: If I understand the question correctly, the Defence Force should be planning every acquisition and move in a way that works for New Zealand first, can the piece of equipment be purchased here, and can we use Defence spending as a way to help other departments of the government.

Q7: The role is really to maintain order and establish the basics of life. The direct rescue of people is likely more suited to the Police/Ambulance Staff/Fire department Search and Rescue, while establishing the basics of life like supplies of running water, and of course maintaining civil order is better suited to the military.

Q8: The defence force should offer itself as a tool to better our youth, it should start programs like the Australian 'ADF Gap Year', which serves as a way to give their youths development through service, while also benefiting the ADF. Education in return for service should be expanded, it is a great way to get Kiwis through university whilst also benefiting our nation. Personally I feel the Defence Force has a role it could play in terms of a compulsory national service, however as I already plan on going into a service, I am not the best person to decide if the nation is willing to do so, it was abolished for that reason after all.

Q9: Projectability of our forces is a big one. We have the helicopters to help nations in need, but no helicopter carrier to launch them off. We have the troops to help neighbouring island nations in the event of a Coup, such as that in Fiji, 2006, or any number of other threats, but we have limited means to get them ashore.

Q11: I worry we are not exploiting all the possibilities presented to us, as the Americans prepare to drop hundreds of A-10 Warthogs out of service in favour of the F-35, we don't appear to have even looked into picking up some of the surplus for our own use. While a lot of equipment that is being decommissioned, is being having it done because it is outdated,



there are roles much of it can be used for. The A-10 for example is one of the cheapest Aircraft to operate, and could be used in roles the Americans might not have need to fill, such as naval patrol, but that we do. I of course use the A-10 as an example, I am unsure if it could fulfill the role suggested, and whether the Americans would be willing to sell surplus in the first place, but the point is I feel we are passing up opportunities.

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Q1: The sea, air and land approaches to New Zealand. Our Defence Force needs to focus greater effort into 24/7 surveillance of our EEZ by either satellite or by remote controlled air assets. Naval interdiction needs to be enhanced. We should consider establishing a permanent land component in Northern Australia for example 1 RNZIR.

Q2: New Zealand and Australia are western democracies sitting underneath the Asian landmass. We are geographically isolated from our traditional allies by vast sea distances. Indonesia poses an ongoing military threat, she has a Defence Force of 476,000 and 107 million men of military age. The rise of China's ambition in the South China sea, poses real concerns as does her moves to develop strong bi-lateral relations with our Pacific neighbours, Tonga, Fiji and Tokelau. New Zealand and Australia need to make fresh efforts to combat the influence of China in our area of influence.

Q3: The Government needs to get a clear direction from the public. For too many years Defence Policy has been left to politicians and NZDF professionals. The public should be requested to discuss all Defence issues through a referendum. Only then will the view of all citizens be known. The roles should not change much - but the Army needs to have indirect combat air support, from either helicopter gunships or combat aircraft.

Q4: Surveillance of our EEZ is poor and must be enhanced both sea and air assets. The Ross dependency cannot be supported by NZ air or sea assets and is this a critical issue for NZ? The cost of providing support and protection to the Ross dependency may be beyond the resources of NZ. The Defence of NZ takes priority.

Q5: Our first priority should be to support the land, sea and air approaches to Australia. NZ should reestablish a military force in Australia to demonstrate our commitment to her Defence. Our contributions to International Security should be very carefully considered before support is given. New Zealand trade should not rely on Defence commitments to other countries' conflicts.

Q6: The NZDF is the only military protection that the government has - any direct military threat to NZ must come by sea or air and we rely on the support of Australia and the USA to stop any such event. The Government is obliged to maintain the military alliances that we have for the safety of all our citizens.

Q7: The NZDF is well versed in both capability and effective response ability to support all Government efforts to support areas after natural disasters. This is and remains a core NZDF function.

Q8: This is a factor that needs public involvement so that the government can get an accurate view of the nation's intent. My view is that we should reintroduce compulsory military training for all citizens. This would have a significant cost but would be in the public good. Study the effects in Singapore and Switzerland to understand both the cost and benefits.

Q9: 1. Enhance both sea and air surveillance of our EEZ and develop an interdiction capability. 2. Bring back the indirect air combat platform. As a Commander of NZ troops on operations I would refuse to take my troops into combat without NZ combat air support. 3. Enhance intelligence gathering data in Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Pakistan and China.

Q11: The Government needs to get an independent Review Board to examine the structure of the Defence Force. Does a one Brigade Army need a CA, and Joint Force HQ and a Defence HQ? How many senior Officers above the rank of Lt Col does the Defence Force have? My contention is that NZDF is grossly top heavy with senior officers, Policy planners and highly paid civilian staff. Any review would have to be independent of NZDF.

Q1:  
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Q9: The RNZAF should reacquire the Air Combat Wing to play our part in the world, it's embarrassing we have lost this and it's return would give the RNZAF some well earned pride again, along with the benefit it would create for the Army and RNZN in their training. Even if it initially started out as fast trainers, such as the BAe Hawk. Also replacement of the Hercules and Onions with equal numbers of 21st century aircraft to help with humanitarian efforts and for the patrol of our EEZ. This could be in the form of 6x C-130J and 4x P-8 (With drones as support). The Andovers were never truly replaced, a good replacement could be found in the C-27 which would relieve pressure on the Hercules replacement. Additional helicopters are needed - how can 8 helicopters be in the same place as the 14 they replaced?! The Army should form a Parachute/Ranger Regiment in between the RNZIR and the SAS, this could operate similar as to the British Army's '1st Battalion, Parachute, Special Force Support Group' it would also help with recruitment, as for the British Army's Parachute Regiment recruits are never hard to find. The RNZAC should be equipped again with a squadron of tanks for training purposes so our infantry know how to operate with them in coalitions - with the amount of MBTs being withdrawn in allied armies this could be a cheaper purchase. The RNZN must return to a 4 frigate navy, or 3 at the absolute minimum, this is one of the most direct ways we can contribute to allied operations and be seen to 'doing our bit'. The Army's Commando regiment should be turned in to Marine Commando's similar to the Royal Marines. The powerful recruiting potential of a 'Royal New Zealand Marine Corps' would be immense with the huge amount of US marines shown through TV and cinema to youths. The Commando and Parachute Battalions would give the NZDF quality, not quantity which would be invaluable in future operations with our allies and greatly appreciated.

Q11: The reserve forces should be expanded, returning to the 16 Infantry, and 4 Mounted Rifle regiments. This gives us a reserve force to fall back on, an increase pool of soldiers available for deployment rotations, extra hands for unforeseeable emergencies such as the Reina and Canterbury earthquake, and is a huge benefit for society as a whole from the skills they bring into the workforce. Incentives such as subsidised education should help bring in recruits. Additional benefit should be made such as Tax breaks to add benefit.

Q1:Terror Attacks Military Invasion to secure resources (oil, water, food ) Natural Disasters (Earthquakes, Floods)

Q2:the international relations with states, corporations and institutions will become muddier and New Zealand should sail a simple, predictable and straight line: territorial self defence and support of UN missions abroad.

Q3:Physical: Defence of New Zealand Territory (including the big West Island and the other islands) Massive Support of UN Missions abroad. nothing else. Cyberspace: 5 eyes.

Q4:New Zealand is likely to face new and unknown security challenges and should prepare for that flexibility.

Q5:rebuild a defence force that could defend NZ territory (Air Defence: Fleet of strategic fighter planes and Surface to Air Missile batteries at the 3 big cities,Naval Defence capabilities/ fregattes at every port, Land Defence: tactical bomber planes, 2 independent tactical tank forces for each island...) build a strong UN support force that will operate fully independent from the territorial Defence forces and will not drain these under any circumstances.

Q6:"advance the nation`s interest" is a political term and the military should never be abused for political party reasons. "Protect and defend" is clear and easy and God's (and Nature's) law: everyone has the right to defend himself and the duty to defend those who cannot defend themselves. The defense forces need enough autonomy from political parties to be able to react quickly to a territorial threat. Details must be defined in a NZ constitution.

Q7:The Territorial Defence forces (Military and Civil) are the perfect lead agency in the case of national Natural Disasters.

Q8:the Territorial Defence force should be open to all young New Zealanders for a voluntary service year and reserve trainings afterwards. The UN support force should be world class professional Military specialists only.

Q9:rebuild a defence force that could defend NZ territory (Air Defence: Fleet of strategic fighter planes and Surface to Air Missile batteries at the 3 big cities,Naval Defence capabilities/ fregattes at every port, Land Defence: tactical bomber planes, independent tactical tank forces for each island...) build a strong UN support force that will operate fully independent from the territorial Defence forces and will not drain these under any circumstances.

Q11:

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Q1: World population growth, instability and conflict of other countries placing pressure on our resources (EEZ), refugee quotas and the changing demographic of traditional NZ beliefs and culture through immigration.

Q2: Expectation that we will take more refugees as a more involved international citizen and the expectation to provide more and larger military support where it is needed. More dependency on our Asian neighbours for our imports/exports will require us to shift our focus away from our traditional trade partners. More effort is required to train with these partners particularly China.

Q3: Be seen as fair and well trained to deal with varying situations from minor conflict to peace stabilisation/keeping. Protect its EEZ and of those in the SW Pacific. Particular need for relevant and efficient intelligence to prevent terrorist activity at home and our region.

Q4: Illegal fishing/smuggling/demand on natural resources (oil)/illegal immigration.

Q5: The last white paper set out a clear direction for the Defence Force to follow and achieve. Drastic changes now could jeopardize relevant progression to the 2035 plan.

Q6: Interact more at the middle management level of government departments to provide insight and experience particularly with customs/MPI/Police/MOD/NZAID/NGOs.

Q7: On call with well trained, well equipped and well organised personnel and equipment.

Q8: Continue with the Youth Development programme in partnership with the Ministry of Social Development. Where possible this programme needs to be offered to other than main centers as it may have a bigger impact for towns with high unemployment/youth problems.

Q9: Secure and relevant information/communication systems as well as relevant equipment to conduct the Governments outputs. Some of the equipment includes strategic air lift that can operate in most areas of the SW Pacific and more than one sea lift capability (HMNZS Canterbury). We need to be able to keep up with change quickly so the equipment we are using does not become irrelevant and compromise our ability to perform government outputs.

Q11: The use of 3PL and contract partnerships was meant to relieve the pressure for the military for them to focus on core business. After 6 years they should be well embedded and offering Defence opportunities to improve efficiency. Has this been realised to date and into the future what is the expectation of these relationships? I think that the military are too busy to actively monitor performance and suggest that an independent 4PL be considered to ensure the various agreements/contracts are performing and providing the agreed levels of service.

This 4PL could be provided by a suitable Government Department to maintain independence.

Q1:Global warming / Climate change. Accommodating displaced persons through sea level rise. Accommodating displaced persons through conflict.

Q2:

Q3:Support for displaced persons / refugees of climate change and conflict. Support other nations in dealing with: -Climate change. -Maritime police. -Crimes against human rights.

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8:

Q9:The high cost of upcoming capability spending needs to be reviewed. Managing of acquisitions needs to be more intelligent and frugal than previously. More public transparency is needed in this area to avoid previous mistakes of a tunnel visioned 'old boys club' spending mentality. Our role is not to be testing and or trialing latest capability technology. Thus we should purchase older & historically well used and tested kit, learn from mistakes of our allies acquisition blunders, and stay clear of the 'latest and greatest' kit. i.e (better to buy 5 low maintenance Toyota Corollas as appose to 1 ferrari) We need to be more sustainable and smartly integrated with neighboring Australian capabilities. Adopting a more more holistic approach where machinery should be part shared between the two nations could improve the efficiency of our spending. For example, instead of buying 2 new planes, and have 1 remaining hardly used 99% of the time, We should only buy 1 for our selves and co share the 2nd plane with the Australians.

Q11:

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Q1:Terrorism and extremist activities asylum seekers

Q2:global warming will affect our pacific partners this means we should be looking at getting another vessel like Canterbury to asset with disaster relief.

Q3:we should keep doing what we have been doing but we need air support for the infantry otherwise they will just be cannon fodder we should look at some A-10 warthogs or the new scorpion fighter jets

Q4:poaching of fish stocks and other resources transport to ross sea C-10 would be great for this

Q5:we should be planning our purchases and training with australia to consolidate costs

Q6:the defense force should work seamlessly with all departments

Q7:is a major role as seen in vanuatu we need more ships being an Island.

Q8:It should be something for them to strive to we need more interaction with schools

Q9:WE NEED AIR SUPPORT A-10 warthogs should be going cheap or Scorpion fighters

\$20 mil each and better transport systems C-17's, Osprey V-22's, C-27J's More Naval Transport another canterbury

Q11:The biggest forces should be Airforce and Navy We should look at making The army more intertwined into these two forces

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Q1:protecting our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and interests in Antarctica/Ross Sea, stability in SW pacific and SE Asia, protecting commercial sea lanes to global markets, cyber threats to NZ and threats to international stability (eg international terrorism)

Q2:territory disputes in the South China sea, West Papua, southern ocean and Antartica.

NZDF may be utilised to honour international commitments or to promote peace and stability within our region.

Q3:Search and Rescue (SAR), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), and patrolling/monitoring our EEZ. SAR and HADR should be performed by NZDF predominantly within NZ borders and SW Pacific. NZDF should also contribute to protecting commercial sea lanes to global markets through anti-piracy patrols/operations. NZDF should work closely with allies/friendly nations and trade partners to promote & maintain improved trade relations and protect humanitarian rights abroad.

Q4:Illegal fishing and protecting mineral resources. Possible territory disputes in Antartica and Ross Sea.

Q5:Maintaining a ready force to react to local emergencies (natural and security threats), maintaining a physical presence in our EEZ and dependencies that deters illegal activity, and providing a credible contribution to FPDA and ABCA exercises and operations.

Q6:Integration and exercises with Other Government Organisations (OGO) such as MPI and emergency services in order to provide efficient and effective response to domestic emergencies and threats.

Q7:Engineer support, helicopter and transport aircraft, medical support, amphibious transport, all terrain transport. Reserve NZDF personnel to respond quickly to localised disaster relief (incl flooding, heavy snowfall events etc.

Q8:Continue with a Youth Development Unit programme, support the NZ Cadet Force and maintain a Reserve force footprint in the regions

Q9:Air mobility (strategic and tactical) that is able to land with a full load on small airstrips in the SW Pacific in adverse conditions and an amphibious capability (to conduct HADR and support dispersed military operations), air reconnaissance (for SAR/ patrolling EEZ), protected mobility for protecting troops from Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs)and small calibre weapons (while on operational deployments), Logistics and Combat Services Support (to support dispersed military operations/ HADR/ SAR), a medical capability (to support the full spectrum of military operations/ HADR), a land surveillance and reconnaissance capability (to support OGO and dispersed military operations), Offensive Support (to support dispersed military operations), Engineer capability that is able to conduct reconstruction and improve infrastructure, provide physical facility protection and littoral water mobility (to support HADR and dispersed military operations), Special Forces (to provide a Counter Terrorist capability, mentor and assist capability to foreign states and special military operations), a blue water naval fleet that can sustain counter piracy and EEZ/ Antartic patrols, and a naval support fleet that can operate within the littoral environment and support the blue water fleet. Re-acquiring a strike air capability would also provide the government more options for contributing to international operations that over the last 10-15 years have increasingly utilised strike air as a publically acceptable contribution within other nations. Strike air would also provide a quick response to any threats within NZ borders/dependancies and may be able to provide quick situational awareness to developing situations.

Q11:IEDs are increasingly common in military theatres of operations where NZ deploy, and this should be a key consideration when conducting the NZ Light Armoured Vehicle (NZLAV) refresh and procuring any operational vehicles for the NZDF (and NZ Army in particular). This increasing threat may even be justification for the procurement of a Protected Mobility Vehicle to complement our operational vehicle fleet and/or replace the current NZDF Light Operational Vehicle (LOV)



Q1:1) Integration with allied forces in high risk global "hot spots" such as middle east. 2) Anti terrorism 3) Protection of our EEZ against fishing vessels who do not have a right to fish there. 4) Protection of Antarctica against fishing vessels who do not have a right to fish there.

Q2:1) Global Terrorism Hotspots. Require ability to quickly insert modern well equipped forces who are full interoperable with allied forces into high risk zones of insurgency. 2) Resources depletion. More exploitation of New Zealand's EEZ by unregulated fishing vessels with require increased naval focus on our EEZ. 3) Pacific as a region will become increasingly contested for as resources are depleted. Pacific has been docile for majority of last 60 years - may not be the case moving forward.

Q3:1) Pacific Rim Strategy. Need to be able to form trusted military alliances that are binding with like minded allies in addition to the US and Australia. Broaden our foreign policy relationships to include Canada, Japan and be able to have credible arrangements with China re the South Pacific. 2) Global Hot Spot Strategy. Be able to quickly place forces, supported by best practice technology and logistics, into foreign high risk combat zones to support allied efforts. Iraq, ISIS etc. 3) Australia strategy. Form an integrated defence strategy with Australia where we have binding agreements re how the forces complement each other. New Zealand should spend its capital based on that arrangement. This includes Frigate replacement strategy, interoperability of ground forces, naval strategy for Pacific Rim, defence of Australia's northern border including location of forces permanently in Australia. 4) Antarctic defence policy integration with Australia. ANZAC policy re defence of Antarctic against foreign unregulated fishing and habitat exploitation that is not legitimate. 5) Global population increase will lead to more localised resource stress and conflict that has been seen in the last 60 years.

Q4:1) Increased exploitation of EEZ by unregulated foreign fishing vessels. Need more sophisticated monitoring and alerting, and rapid response by Navy and Air Force, = more capability. 2) Ross = increased exploitation by unregulated foreign fishing vessels. Need more sophisticated monitoring and alerting, and rapid response by Navy and Air Force, = more capability. Integration with Australia here critical. 3) Same for other close zones such as Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations

Q5:1) Focus on increased integration and policy alignment with Australia for "contributing to international peace and security globally". New Zealand should have formal agreements here. We may buy capability and assets based on this. 2) Better Logistics is a pre requisite whatever we do. Herc replacement with credible aircraft is mandatory. What forces we do maintain must have the best equipment, modern technology and capability. Niche "best of breed". 3) Our EEZ and surrounding areas such as the Ross dependency will become increasingly at risk of exploitation as earth population balloons. We need to invest with allies on monitoring and alerting and rapid response capability. Navy is key here, and I believe we need to integrate with Australian air force. Is there a case for having a small Australian fighter contingent permanently located in New Zealand? What deals can be struck here?

Q6:1) Protect our EEZ. Need an agile modern Navy, helicopters capable of launching aggressive action if required from Naval vessels, world class surveillance and monitoring of the area albeit drones, satellites or the upgraded Orions. 2) Protect dependencies such as the Ross Dependency (Antarctica) from illegal resource exploitation. 3) Partner with allies to rapidly deploy advanced capable forces into foreign hot spots. 4) Humanitarian aid 5) Disaster relief 6) Partner with border protection as an enforcer. 7) Be credible in terms of negotiating deals with Pacific Rim foreign allies such as Canada and Australia to ensure our role is valued and understood in all matters our allies get involved with. 8) Provide valuable employment and trades training for many New Zealand citizens. Having a credible armed forces is an excellent way of producing highly qualified, trained and motivated civilians and is hence an excellent use of tax payers money. This point should justify a slightly larger spend on military than what the above points would in and of itself. Albeit Engineers, Fitters and Turners,

Mechanics, Project Managers, Electricians and all manner of skillsets that benefit our economy should these staff leave the armed forces and enter civilian life.

Q7: Need ability to rapidly deploy AID, assistance both on the ground and in the air. Strong helicopter capability (NH90s need to be kept current) combined with air lift (Hercules replacement needs to be well planned with capable planes for long range and near shore and on shore airlift). Need to have specialist staff who can be deployed to earthquake, flood or Hurricane affected zones, who have world class logistics support.

Q8: Extremely important. Young people who leave school benefit enormously from having a career path available to them in the armed forces, especially during their formative years. Having a credible armed forces is an excellent way of producing highly qualified, trained and motivated civilians and is hence an excellent use of tax payers money. This point should justify a slightly larger spend on military than what the above points would in and of itself. Albeit Engineers, Fitters and Turners, Mechanics, Project Managers, Electricians and all manner of skillsets that benefit our economy should these staff leave the armed forces and enter civilian life. Gives youth structure, discipline and direction they would not easily have. People I know who are ex military are generally disciplined, motivated and very good to deal with. This is an extremely important aspect.

Q9: 1) Air Logistics. Hercules need to be replaced. I favour a 5 x A400M option, as I think what we are faced with Globally warrants that capability. The C17s are an option, but I am think they may be overkill and have high operational costs for the benefit we will get (need to see the 'numbers' - leave this to someone else!). The A400Ms will get us anywhere in the world, fast, with enough logistics to support our staff. 5xA400Ms also allows us to standardise parts etc. 2) Helicopter, capable of fast deployment via Naval vessels. Need to keep the NH90s capable, and upgrade them so they can fly off all our OPVs, Frigates and the larger vessel (can't remember name) delivered under Protector. Patrolling our EEZ we need helicopters capable of operating off our Naval vessels. 3) Helicopter ATTACK. New Zealand needs a credible attack helicopter contingent. Can't expect to send combat troupes abroad with no ability to call in our own air support. Buying 10-15 AH-64 Apache Long Bow's (or equivalent) I would see as an excellent investment for New Zealand to improve the safety and credibility of our forces in global hot spots. This is the one additional capability I believe we need as a nation. Working in unison with our ground troops, this would ensure we have a highly credible force capable of providing the required protection levels to our sons and daughters offshore, as well as providing highly credible deterrent to illegal vessels exploiting resources in our EEZ and surrounding dependencies. 4) Naval. 3 x modern frigates, and ensure what we have under Protector is kept modern. Need to look at Frigate replacement, and ensure we have 2 world class ships available. These ships need to have the very best surveillance, missile (surface to air and surface to surface) defence capability. Purchase an additional frigate with the replacement program in 2020s is what I am saying, given our population growth and increased stress on global resources. Frigates are necessary to work with Australia and Pacific Rim allies to provide a credible way of protecting trade links, anti piracy on the High Seas which will worsen as resources become scarcer, and for use in negotiations with other countries if we want to, for example, leverage their attack aircraft capability we can supply best of breed frigates. 5) Monitoring and detection. Look at a drone program. Also, Orions need to be equipped with the very best submarine and undersea detection, also capable of being deployed quickly to survey our EEZ and identify unwanted 'alien' vessels. If we replace the Orions later on, we need to plan very carefully for a modern equivalent. 6) Army. Needs to be equipped with the best technology and firepower available to them. Integrated with Airforce for Logistics support. Capable of rapid deployment into foreign hot spots. I am strongly in favour of 10-15 best of class attack helicopters to support

our troupes. It's a relatively small price to pay (NZD500M) to add that capability. I hate the thought we are sending troupes into global hot spots with no TANK or Air Support, and attack helicopters are an excellent way of delivering this support.

Q11: We are spending NZD3.5B on defence now. We should be spending 4.0B, and the delta should be justified on: 1) Acquisition of attack helicopter capability to support our troupes in foreign hot spots. Extends the NH90 capability, with pilots being cross trained, look for synergies where possible with the NH90 (if possible). But I cringe sending troupes into foreign hot spots in any capacity 2) Herc replacement, capable of deploying all logistic support rapidly 3) Plan for frigate replacement, and consider increase to 3xfrigates subject to strategic white paper outcomes (could just stick with 2, but they need to be 2 of the best equipped in the world). 4) Additional jobs and employment for young New Zealanders. I think we undervalue this benefit in our armed forces. They are an excellent way of giving direction and certainty to young New Zealanders, and adds to a better overall society. There is no question in my mind, given global resource depletion and population expansion, increased risk of terror threats, increased need to credibly defend our EEZ and dependencies from illegal resource taking, and partner with allies on the Pacific Rim on global initiatives, we need to increase out spending by 500M pa. The Herc replacement should be kept simple. Go with 5xA400Ms - more a case of "why not" than why".

Please refer the Official Information Act 1982

Q1:With this restructure of the defence force as mentioned in the white paper all threat and challenges will be meet. Border entry, changes in community demographic, population changes.

Q2:The Defence force will need to be integrated, "The Integration Expansion Group" all ages based on the end of the school term.

Q3:Be a world leader, Preparation, Planning, Time and Space.

Q4:Events that require resources and manpower to support, security, earthquakes, fire storms, floods, ect. Reactions at a local level.

Q5:Review its structure, goals, objectives yearly, But What if?

Q6:Have across party policy, agreed at all levels, a plan, the white paper.

Q7:The Integrated Expansion Group, all ages, based on the end of the school term. Be welcomed to be part of the long term community plans. The Clyde Community plan welcomes all combined service group, as a means to support the centralization of government services.

Q8:To serve the Country, The Integrated Expansion Group, all ages, based on the end of the school term. Industry, Councils, all service groups, corrections departments, police, Rural fire services, health board, doctors, nurses, others.

Q9:Role: To seek out, kill and capture, repel attack both by night or day, regardless of weather, season or terrain. Base training on this with gallery shoots, for weapons training, once trained. To be integrated.

Q11:The Defence white paper has outlined the pathway the combined services should take as it become a world leader, towards its policy, plans and outcomes. It should include all ages, as it takes ten years to train a defense person? I.e What do you want to do at the end of the school term, (To become a better person)

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Q1:NZ does not face a direct, conventional military threat. NZ does face the prospect of small-scale terrorist attacks on NZ soil NZ's extended security (that is, its economic wellbeing) faces threats from SE Asian instability and major global instability (e.g. impact of Russo-Ukraine tensions on commodities etc.)

Q2:The international environment today resembles the international environment since the end of the Cold War - relative stability in the First World, and recurring instability in a range of Third World states.

Q3:1. Ensure a sufficient trained and equipped cadre to expand to fight a conventional war if world tensions change over the next decade (think UK in 1933) 2. Contribute meaningfully to peace operations (with the ability to permanently deploy a bn gp or two coy gps simultaneously) 3. Patrolling of the EEZ 4. Close relationships with the ADF 5. Where necessary, provide suitable deployments to non-conventional military operations such as the current campaign against ISI

Q4:Economic issues (fishing)

Q5:Fundamentally, the NZDF needs to retain sufficient core capability to expand to a more potent force capable of defending NZ - this is its ultimate rationale, but also the most unlikely. In terms of likelihood, the NZDF should first be able to contribute to international peace operations, second be able to contribute to Australian security, and third contribute to the security and stability of our broader friends

Q6:The NZDF should be cautious about working too closely with non-military agencies. That can lead to mission creep.

Q7:The NZDF possesses disciplined manpower, engineering equipment, and strategic transport capabilities. This makes it eminently capable of responding to natural disasters, but it should not be a core role.

Q8:Nil. The purpose of the NZDF is to deploy military forces in the national interest, not to act as a branch office of WINZ.

Q9:1. Expanded Army of 3 battalions enabling the permanent deployment of a bn group as required. 2. A navy capable of patrolling the EEZ and deploying forces in a non-opposed but non-port disembarkation (peaceful over the beach) 3. An air force capable of providing strategic and tactical movement of land forces as well as maritime surveillance

Q11:The NZDF often gets into public trouble with seemingly flawed acquisitions such as the LAV, Protector fleet, and the NH-90. I think in each case the justification for the purchase was brilliant, but we were let down with the specifics of selection and implementation. The NZDF needs to work on public perceptions by explaining exactly why the NH-90 etc were selected. Clean infographics, sound bites etc all help

Q1:

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Q11: I have just read Defence Assessment 2014. It is very impressive with a lot of insights about conflict trends in the world in the next decades. However, there are also huge gaps in the paper. First, it does not read as a white paper of New Zealand. It does not have the particular perspective of New Zealand. For instance, it does not identify particular vulnerabilities of New Zealand in security terms. Second, it missed a vital geographic area of potential military conflicts because of the way in which the paper divided the whole world into different geographic parts. For instance, it mentioned the South China Sea in passing because no sections in the paper discuss potential conflicts between China (in North Asia) and ASEAN members (in South East Asia) because they belong to different geographic areas. Third, it does not discuss China-US rivalry on the global scale. The United States of America, the sole superpower, is grouped with the Arctic! I will be happy to discuss relevant parties if interested. Thanks.

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Q1: One thing that is a challenge to New Zealand security is the many illegal fishing vessels that illegally fish in New Zealand waters.

Q2: The rise of Isis in the Middle East is affecting the world as it threatens people who go there and if Isis is not contained THEN crushed, Isis will continue in its goal to defeat the rest of the world. This affects New Zealand's interests as Isis stands for everything against humanity and human rights and therefore affects New Zealand the world's interests as New Zealand has always stood up for what is right. This would affect the NZDF as the situation in the Middle East has only been getting worse so the NZDF must prepare to up the role it is serving in Iraq if things get worse.

Q3: Patrol of New Zealand's waters, the exclusive economic zone and the waters around Antarctica. To patrol the airspace of New Zealand. To provide transport with both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, wheel vehicles and transport ships in disaster relief and transport of gear the Defence Force needs to operate effectively. To provide air security for NZ. Providing a land combat force to be deployed at home or overseas if necessary.

Q4: One challenge is that the NZDF does not have the resources to patrol our waters and the EEZ. 6 maritime patrol aircraft, a couple of coast guard cessna's and a couple of PT boats isn't enough to cover the area the size of the United Kingdom. More P3 Orions should be purchased from the United States from the Arizona Boneyard and upgraded to P3K2 standard. The aircraft number should be brought to a MINIMUM of 12 so a second squadron could operate from the South Island. Also for the patrol capability the MQ-4 Triton should be purchased to increase the NZDF's maritime patrol and surveillance capabilities. The reason I am emphasising on maritime patrol is the fact that we are surrounded by water and are an island nation and like any maritime nation, maritime patrol should be emphasised on.

Q5: It should prioritise the patrol capability of the air and sea as we need to make sure that no activities are occurring in the air and sea that could threaten the interests of New Zealand or its neighbours such as trafficking of illegal material, drugs or people. Finding illegal migrants on boats that are travelling to New Zealand or Australia. Stopping illegal unregistered fishing in the EEZ, New Zealand waters or the ocean between New Zealand and Australia.

Q6: It should operate as of protection force, a offensive and defensive force and as a patrol force.

Q7: To provide transport by land, sea and mostly air to deliver relief supplies and ferry out injured victims. Air transport should be prioritised as it is the fastest method of transportation carrying large loads or gear.

Q8: To give youth a sense of purpose and to give them an opportunity in a career that is rewarding and enjoyable.

Q9: Air security and patrol roles as the nation is completely unprotected against any form of airspace intrusion.

Q11:

Q1:-Terrorist organisations or Countries that support them -Religious Fanatical organisations  
-Any such organisation Eg ISIL getting hold of NBC WMD's -Cyber crime- Cyber terrorists  
who target National or Military Infrastructure

Q2:-Cold War with Russia re-ignited over Ukraine, other break away states & proliferation  
of NATO into former Soviet block countries -Proliferation of ISIL and other terrorist groups  
overseas -Civil war spilling countries in 2 or many factions

Q3:-Support any action by our Major allies or UN -Partake in Military exercises over seas -  
Continue to provide security intelligence to our allies -Support local agencies Eg  
Police/Customs/Coastguard

Q4:-Countries poaching or fishing in NZ territorial waters -Smuggling operations either drugs  
guns or people

Q5:-Work with Australia to provide assets as required in support of United Nations or our  
Allies. -Have similar defence capabilities & equipment as our Allies to allow interoperability  
-Target capabilities our allies dont have to provide support in that area

Q6:-Ensure Government ministers have a full understanding of actual defence capabilities be  
it personnel or equipment. Eg some Govt ministers attitudes towards our so called clapped out  
A4 Skyhawks that were actually very capable after upgrade with F16 Radar & Precision  
Guided weapons. -Ensure open & frank communications between Defence force & Govt  
ministers

Q7:Provide Logistical support by way of equipment & man power

Q8:Supporting NZ Cadet Forces possibly including some form of short term Compulsory  
Military Training for School Leavers or Unemployed. Create a conscript force across all 3  
services for duty as required such as Disaster Relief or Security work for important events.

Q9:Invest in proper Infrastructure/Equipment to support National & Overseas interests in  
terms of Defence and Disaster recovery Eg new Transport Aircraft that can carry the NH90  
Helicopter. Recreate Strike Assets for Air support operations such as Fast Jets/Attack  
Helicopters & Drones

Q11:A future NZDF in 10-15 yrs may look like this: Drones for all 3 services. 2

Diesel/Electric subs for Navy 10 Attack/Recon Helicopters for Army support AH64 or AH6?

. NZ Airforce Re-equipped to support National & Overseas operations. Huey replacement is  
complete, other Aircraft as below: Current - Replacement Strategic Transport 2xB757- 2xC17  
Regional Transport 5xC130- 4xA400M Maritime Patrol 5xP3K - 5xP8 Air defence & Strike -  
10xF35 PLUS UAV



Q1: Many - but my particular concern is the impact of both domestic and regional emergency/disaster events that impact on New Zealand. Climate change and greater dependency on technology is making NZ more vulnerable to large scale natural disasters. The only agency with the appropriate ability to plan, respond and sustain effort during a large event is the NZDF.

Q2: Climate change and greater dependency on technology will require a reconfiguration of the NZDF's posture, capability and capacity. Free trade agreements, open borders and climate change flight (people leaving vulnerable nations and heading towards NZ) may require greater coastal patrolling and surveillance. Chinese and US interest in the South Pacific is increasing and may mean that NZ opportunities to project power and influence are diminished. A plan to monitor and address this may be required.

Q3: We can advance our interests abroad by leveraging the considerable emergency management expertise gained by NZ citizens and NZDF staff. Many HADR events will provide NZ will opportunities to display NZ's strategic interest.

Q4:

Q5:

Q6: The NZDF should be fully participating in HADR and emergency management planning at the national and regional level. This has been mandated in the past but does not happen in a meaningful manner. The role of Liaison officers, niche military skills, available manpower, logistics and equipment specific to the NZDF remain poorly understood and under utilised.

Q7: See above. The NZDF should be far more proactive in participating in EM and HADR planning, response and recovery. Traditionally the NZDF has only had a limited emergency response role, however this does not fully exploit all of the capability of the NZDF in MOOTW and means other Govt and local government agencies assume responsibilities that they are less equipped to manage.

Q8:

Q9: Greater and more sophisticated emergency management and HADR personnel, training, exercises, networks and operations. As the distinction between low level conflicts, natural disasters and asymmetrical warfare response becomes increasingly blurred - the NZDF needs to nurture and sustain professional level planners, operators, commanders and specialists able to operate in these environments.

Q11:

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Q1:As the previous Defence White Paper explained New Zealand currently faces no direct threat, however could face challenges from non state organisations. In the future the chances of nation on nation conflict may increase over natural resources and increasing populations.

Q2:The defence force is likely to be drawn into any international conflict either in direct combat or in stabilising operations.

Q3:Similar to now, humanitarian and showing the flag missions.

Q4:increase pressure on natural resources. Also increased illegal immigration and illegal fishing.

Q5:cannot be prioritised, they are connected, any threat to international peace is a threat to New Zealand and Australia.

Q6:As is does now, working with other government agency's utilising defences unique capabilities. However these should be secondary to defences chief purpose of protecting New Zealand.

Q7:providing capabilities that any other organisation does not have

Q8:should not have a role, should focus on its main objectives. should be seen as a suitable career path.

Q9:International efforts in Libya and currently in Iraq/Syria have demonstrated that need for a modern air combat capability that is able to operate with out international partners in air policing roles. The removal of such a capability from the New Zealand defence forces was a clear lack of any amount of foresight and is currently the case limits options in many situations. the reinstatement of such a capability should be blindly obvious. Since the removal from service of the air strike capabilities the lack of any naval defence capabilities such as ship mounted anti ship missiles or missile capabilities on the P3s is also of concern.

Replacement of the air transport and air surveillance with frontline capable assets and in sufficient numbers is clearly needed. Sufficient numbers of ships is also important and for appropriate availability I would consider 3 frigates to be a minimum. The retention of the naval combat force when the current frigates are replaced should also be a necessity in order to allow options in future situations. Most importantly of all the defence forces capabilities should be sufficiently funded to allow them to operate to their full potential. The current level of capabilities is such that only the navy and army are capable of limited combat and any further cuts to capabilities could well see the defence forces become redundant as their outputs would be able to be achieved by police and the coastguard.

Q11:Funding should be increased to enable the replacement and enhancement of current capabilities and to match other countries in our region. Australia's commitment to increase defence funding to 2% of GDP should be followed.

Q1: I believe that although NZ does not face a direct threat to its security in the next 1 to 3 years, I think longer term NZ there will be a number of challenges in our environment. We are facing a number of challenges including climate change, demand for resources, terrorist groups, failed nations, challenges in the middle east and in the merging militaries in our region. We are already seeing tension over resources in our region

Q2: I think there will be further tensions in our region as nations compete over resources. I think this will have a direct impact on NZ interest including our obligations to our close partners. As result I think there will be further demands on the defence force resources, capabilities due to the changes in the international environment

Q3: The defence force has a huge role to ensure NZ is secure and to advance our interests abroad. It needs to be flexible in its role and be able meet these demands. The role needs to be one of peace maker or peace keeper and have the resources to undertake any thing that is required of it. An essential part of its role is its ability to be combat ready. They have also a role to play in humanitarian help and aid to nation in our region and further afield.

Q4: I believe the emerging security challenges NZ does is likely to face include climate change, demand for resources, terrorist groups, merging militaries in the asian and pacific regions, poverty

Q5: First and foremost the government needs to ensure we have a credible defence force which can defend itself, its partners and our ally australia. We need to be interoperable to work with each other. We need a defence force which is flexible and is capable to meet these challenges. At the moment NZ is limited to what it can provide help for. This is evident in the help we can provide by the way of trainers to Iraq. We need to have a wide ranging defence force that can meet these contingencies. A navy that is a blue water navy, a air force which has a small number of fighter jets and army that has the hardware it needs in high level engagements.

Q6: I think there is a role here but its secondary role. A nice to have role.

Q7: I think the defence role has an important role to play here. I think the role they have been doing now is about right.

Q8: I think the defence force has a role here in developing leaders for the future, offering programmes that target youth

Q9: We need to have a wide ranging defence force that can meet any contingencies that it is faced with. A navy that is a blue water navy, which is combat capable, has a range of ships that can be used, including a Naval Logistic Support Force and Mine Counter Measures Team. I'm not sure if we need an inshore patrol capability. I think the funding could better be used to upgrade the offshore patrol boats or the combat ships further. A air force which has strategic and tactical airlift capability. I also think that we need a small combat capability such as fighter jets. as this would allow us to play a bigger role in world affairs. we also need a surveillance capability - which the Orions give us. The Army needs hardware that allows it to work in high level engagements.

Q11:

Q1:Fishing and protection of domestic waters. Less focus on rest of world, protect our seas from over fishing etc rather

Q2:Clearly more asymmetric warfare and more terrorist organisations. RNZN has little if any role here.

Q3:Protect our seas from over fishing and pollution. Focus on NZ and Oceania first.

Q4:Over fishing in waters.

Q5:New Zealand number 1 Supporting AUs, Singapore, Uk 2nd

Q6:Reduce size and improve quality of RNZN. Focus on maritime patrols around NZ

Q7:Movement of people and resources, eg helicopters to earthquake zones in NZ and Aus/Pacific.

Q8:Minimal, should be mission focused and provide opportunities for those from groups struggling to find employment

Q9:More IPV, OPV's, more robust operating procedures (dont just follow and ignore illegal fishing) Cease the RNZN reserve - time and budget drain.

Q11:The RNZN Reserve is pointless and contributes little. Its more of a drinking club and is used to supplement incomes, rather than be useful. Its a waste of tax payers money and money should be saved by closing the Navy Reserve. Devonport navy base is on valuable useful land, the base should be moved over time to a cheaper area and the Crown to benefit from the sales of affordable housing. Why are there so many senior officers (16? Captains) in the RNZN? Its a tiny organisation and is top heavy, lacking leadership and milking the tax payer for too long.

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- Q1:China, Russia, North Korea and Iran are a threat to global stability and therefore NZ. Regional threats include Indonesias unbalanced military strength and the general south east Asian arms race being fuelled by Chinese aggression (eg South China Sea).
- Q2:The international environment is getting less and less benign strategically (if it ever was).
- Q3:We need to have the type of equipment and training that enables us to collaborate with our allies and build up goodwill.
- Q4:New Zealand needs to advertise its strong capabilities by policing its local waters assertively where breaches of sovereignty occur.
- Q5:They are really all one and the same thing; NZ cannot defend itself by itself so we need to be a significant (in measure) participator in the international scene and cultivate international relationships with our allies which will mean they are perceived as our protectors and will actually do so.
- Q6:The national PR resulting from deployments like Yugoslavia are immeasurable and come from helping some of the globes most needy.
- Q7:A strong defence force isn't money wasted because its a national force which is flexible and under direct government control for things like disasters.
- Q8:A large part, the premise behind that question is excellent. The army is an excellent way to get ahead even financially (for the unskilled) and to get discipline training on a scale that can help the whole country forward.
- Q9:We worry that the defence budget is too tight. Whilst we don't need the spending percentages of a 'superpower', we do need to spend enough to be significant enough to be included on the world stage in a meaningful way. And its not money wasted - it directly helps the economy and training levels of the nation.
- Q11:The deployment of the SAS to Iraq is excellent and clearly justified.

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Q1: The Local councils need to look out there window and decide others are trying to archive the same, a uniformed New Zealand. 1. to save duplication. 2. Quick response to threats, 3. others... What i mean is since local government reforms 1989, they all want the same, end of the school term for all ages so all people have a chance in the workplace, to nbe better educated.

Q2:

Q3:

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8:

Q9: Long Term Plan 2015/25 I want the Central Otago District Council, with other councils, within the Southern District, to consider a starting point since 1989 local government reforms, for a community workshop to elect members to gauge expression of interest from the Clyde Township, thereafter the greater area of Central Otago, Otago-Southland-Canterbury, for a neutral working group. The community plans are the start point for economic development with a neutral board that is given the resources to facilitate all community outcomes that will benefit the overall plan, building partnerships with interested groups. All of the areas that surround the township of Clyde need to be considered. . Old building and land no longer required by government departments. . The rural fire centre. . Dairy creek. . The Clyde Hill. . Earnsclough side of lake Dunstan. Funding should be supported by a uniform rate, southern Region, industry, private public partnerships, there after support from the government. Integrated Expansion Group (for all ages) 1. The working group made up of skilled Clyde community residents and ratepayers need to focus on supporting these ideas, and have an change to buy in, supporting, the workforce, volunteers, community needs, with coordination's of all services. . Be flexible and adaptable. . Coordinated with strong leadership. . Able to provide strong leadership. . Efficient and be able to become more so over time. . Others. 2. All services need to be one and learn to work together. . Health and safety . Volunteer shortages in some parts of the country. . To support the workforce. . Some responsibilities are mixed or unclear. . Service groups face challengers to be effective, efficient. . To better meet the community needs, and bring governance arrangements up to date. The Clyde Community needs to have an overall plan that supports the changes of local government further reforms, and build on the skills of all ages to support economic development for all ages, for the greater areas of the southern region. Considerations of the former council will need to be supported to get the best outcome for all agencies, as amends to keep the rates at acceptable level. After waiting so long for the Central Otago District Council support I will be more than happy to chair the new working group. Yours sincerely

Q11:

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Q1: Possibly now, internal extremist religious groups. Long term, secretive relationships being promulgated by politicians without adequate public scrutiny. Former allies may not be our friends in the future. America for example is the most dangerous and unstable country the planet has ever seen and their ambitions of domination will inevitably hurt New Zealand if we pander to their demands in treaties without fully understanding what this will mean to us in the future.

Q2: Treaties between countries or states will inevitably have an impact on how we trade and deal with other countries. The increasing belligerence between India and Pakistan is a time bomb. Constant wars overseas will see an increasing and more strident demand for asylum in NZ. This country does not need these people and for every ten allowed in, there will be a thousand more behind them. Australia is grappling with this problem now as of course is Europe. Our defence forces are pretty much irrelevant in all of these occurrences and we do need to vigorously assess how best to structure our forces to look after our interests locally. Realistic fisheries protection vessels and an emphasis on transport aircraft and surveillance types is needed. APVs and guns are worthless.

Q3: As above, strong surveillance and tight borders are required with harsh penalties for those caught trying to circumvent our laws. The Navy and Air Force are the major players in this. If it is believed that we suffer a potential threat of landings by foreign troops, a well trained militia could be trained for this, though this scenario is hardly realistic.

Q4: We do not face security issues here but trade and resource issues. Japanese and Chinese fishing companies are already in our waters raping and pillaging the fish stocks having bribed the Pacific Islands for the right. The whole ecology of our part of the Pacific is under threat as a result. Antarctica could be seen as a new resource for oil exploration and uncontrolled fishing that is a definite cause for concern. Unfortunately, international law is a toothless joke in resisting the rapacious demands of corporate capitalism. Gunboat diplomacy once worked for Iceland but would be a serious business now for any small country like us.

Q5: Contributing to international peace and security is impossible and a complete waste of time. Politicians might feel good about sending troops overseas to be killed in some godless hole, but it changes nothing. As for supporting the security of our friends and allies, in politics these do not exist. Sending our people overseas to construct homes and infrastructure is a useful tool to keep allies since this country simply lacks the resources for anything else and will continue to do so as long as welfare is kept at the level we see today.

Q6: Protection of our resources is the key. The right tools to allow this must be made available.

Q7: A military trained in civil defence as part of their other duties should be in place in a country prone to natural disasters. Obviously though hugely expensive, transport such as helicopters are a necessary requirement as are a few vehicles capable of navigating rough terrain.

Q8: Bringing back compulsory training is an unpopular option nowadays so all that is left is the military being more visible as role models to our youth. It is impossible to do anything meaningful without the backing of parliament and since our polities are a vapid spineless lot, it is all uphill. Youth camps for the more incorrigible offenders seems to have worked in a number of cases but is this really what we require of our military personnel?

Q9: We had a golden opportunity some years ago to purchase Russian amphibian aircraft for the cost of cheese and butter exports. 6 of these types would fulfill pretty much most of our duties at home and around the Islands. This needs to be looked at again. Surface ships for protecting our shores need to be built and greater penalties imposed for transgressors. A well trained army in general civic roles- bridge building and administration is also demanded.

Q11: Some years ago I inspected an anti aircraft gun newly purchased for the army. The squaddie who showed it to me had never fired it since the army could not afford the ammunition. The troops were using the successor to the Bren- an awkward piece of rubbish

the Poms used, a general purpose machine gun. I can only ponder at the people employed to purchase ordnance. The Personnel Carriers purchased at huge expense that proved to be woefully inadequate still springs to mind. Obviously, we need to employ someone with a true understanding of what we require. Our role in the Pacific does not require manually operated anti aircraft guns. Our borders need to be tightened up to prevent contaminants from coming here-including undesirable people. This of course does not require military involvement. But a firing squad could be a most useful deterrent were the army to be given this opportunity.

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Q1:I believe the biggest threats to New Zealand security now and in the future are our close ties to internationally antagonistic nations such as the USA.

Q2:New Zealand has no credible international threats that aren't directly related to who we choose to align ourselves with. Those threats that do exist are more likely to be domestic due to poor immigration control than external therefore the changes I suggest to the NZ Defense force would be a reduction in size to correspond with an increase in the size of our Department of immigration and internal affairs.

Q3:Our defense force should meet obligations to send troops to war zones by sending non combat support such as medics, doctors and engineers. At home our ability to patrol our seas should be improved as should our Air defense but the size of our armed forces should not be increased and if anything they should be reduced

Q4:i have nothing to say about this

Q5:I believe that there is very little to be gained in sending fighters to war torn areas. We should be sending medics to help the people and engineers to help rebuild damaged infrastructure. give these troops the means to defend themselves and that's all that's required.

Q6:Focus on defence

Q7:nothing has changed in this regard. This is an important role for our military

Q8:None

Q9:none that it doesn't already have

Q11:I am aware that my answers to the above questions make it clear that I am to a certain extent a pacifist. However I did serve in the NZ Army for six years so I am not an uninformed or ignorant pacifist. I believe that the ability of a nation to defend itself and its territories is very important but the current uses of our military exceeds this role of "defense". Please change that. Lets make our armed forces into forces for good rather than forces for USA corporate interests. I do not want to be named in any publication related to this submission however I have no objection to being quoted.

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Q1:1/Global level environmental catastrophe as a result of climate change, leading to mass population displacement, social unrest and social collapse for large parts of the world, and battles for resources. 2/ US foreign policy and our relation to it. The US has instigated or engaged in more armed conflict situations than any other power this century, and is accountable for the resultant civilian and personnel casualties. 3/Economic inequality leading to social unrest.

Q2:The inability of the nations of the world to take meaningful action on climate change places everyone at risk of disaster. Defence forces need to be prepared for their role in managing the consequence of this failure. This will include- 1/ Disaster relief 2/ Population control 3/ protecting resources 4/ Managing mass illegal migrations etc.

Q3:1/ Distance ourselves from US foreign policy and disengage from foreign conflicts, as we will need all our resources at home/ within the region. 2/ Combat ready rapid response coastguard to deal with resource poaching/conflict and deal with illegal migration. 3/ Enhancing the capability of the defence forces with regard to disaster relief- Engineering, environmental management, etc

Q4:as mentioned above- climate change causes global issues. NZ will not be immune. The ability to deal with issues independent of foreign relief may be the key to survival, as other nations will most likely be dealing with their own disaster issues.

Q5:NZ comes first, UN comes second, everyone else is just a vested interest that NZ should distance itself from.

Q6:see above Q3 & Q4

Q7:#1 important question as mentioned above. Climate change is not unforeseen, it is already happening, and the survival of our nation depends on the military being able to help hold it together since International efforts to mitigate the potential consequences have failed.

Q8:In relation to Q7 above. It's primary role in the future is to ensure the survival of the nations youth, to ensure the continuation of our species when faced with the consequences of global climate change.

Q9:All budgetary spending needs to focus on the survival of NZ when faced against an unprecedented level of global disaster. Spending on any other area will be ultimately viewed as wrongly spent.

Q11:The current govt has made defence spending difficult by increasing NZ's overseas debt to a level where debt payments are the 2nd largest contributing factor to the national budget. Defence spending tends to be expensive, but within this climate, it is hard to justify upgrading defence capabilities..however we need to increase NZ's ability to deal with a global level climate disaster and the best way to do this is through the military.

Q1:1) Maritime resource pressures i.e. fisheries, minerals. The race for regional resources is increasing with population growth and Asian consumption. 2) Regional instability (South China Sea) developing into conflict and in turn affecting NZ trade, sea lines of communication, regional relationships and interests and strategic partnerships i.e.

HQIADS/Five Power Defence Arrangements

Q2: The global/regional decay of traditional power bases (i.e. states) will mean the NZDF will have to be dynamic and nimble to understand, assess and react to change (economic, demographic, political and cultural).

Q3: Seek every available opportunity to exercise and operate with our regional allies at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This will mean NZDF needs to remain relevant both doctrinally and technically to maintain influence. Continue to lead Southern Ocean Patrols in support of CSAMLR and in combatting IUUs in the Southern Ocean.

Q4: 1. Resource pressures (maritime, mineral etc. Illegal fishing and mineral exploitation. 2. Illegal immigrants 3. IUUs (Southern Ocean)

Q5: A better regional framework to utilise national strengths to better affect. NZ should leverage off its strong maritime patrol presence (EEZ/Ross Sea etc) to expand in this area (a third OPV) and help support Australian EEZ patrol requirements. In turn Australian reciprocity at higher end military coverage (navy and air). Maintain strong SAS and global UN commitments.

Q6: Further develop and enhance the NMCC

Q7: Dynamic and reactionary forces able to deploy effectively in support of national disaster and support all of government efforts as was the case in Christchurch earthquake.

Q8: NZ Youth need far greater exposure to what the NZDF is/does and is capable of. School career management engagement with relevant service personal should be actively driven and lead by a 'tiger team' of NZDF leaders similar to Sir Peter Blake Trust Dream Team. YDU - continue and grow in scope for those youth in most need.

Q9: A more comprehensive maritime patrol capability that includes air surveillance technologies such as UAVs off the back of OPVs. Become a regional leader in maritime constabulary operations by replication NMCC to a regional level i.e. regional coordination centre. Strong defence intelligence teams to support. Ability to work with our larger allied forces effectively.

Q11:

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Q1:Economic security, protection of our economic zone surrounding NZ. ISIS inspired radicals undertaking random acts of terrorism within NZ Can not be seen to be free loading on our allies

Q2:Security now harder to defend due to random acts of groups such as ISIS. Climatic conditions in the Pacific produces more intense adverse events, such as Cyclone Pam.A security threat anywhere, is potentially a threat to NZ interests. International travel routes through the Middle East means our geographic isolation is no longer a valid protection. Increasing threat from China in the South China seas, increasing instability arising from Russia's aggression to Eastern Europe

Q3:Take part in peace keeping missions, participate in regional cooperation , not only with Australia, but also other Asian nations. Invite USA Naval ships to NZ, we would not refuse a nuclear powered aircraft carrier if Wellington was flattened in a major earthquake.Ensure that our civil defense type air force can actually deliver aid to the Pacific, in an emergency.

Q4:NZ needs naval ships with blue Water capacity, to defend and police our Exclusive Economic Zone, two is insufficient. Fortunately our cooperation with the USA in the Ross Sea area ensures our security there. A treaty to prevent exploration of resources there has ,I believe, been signed?

Q5:Defense spending should be integrated with that of Australia, to get greater economies of scale, and interchangeability in the use of such hardware. The long term spending has been capped at 1% of GDP, in the UK it is 2%.Updating our transport aircraft and ensuring that we have sufficient ships to protect our national interest is essential. Due to shortfalls in the past, and abdication of responsibility, plus poor spending decisions, driven by left wing political agendas, more funding is required in the short term than 1% GDP

Q6:Necessary to have multi purpose helicopters, and transport aircraft that are capable of transporting army equipment. Frigates also have a humanitarian role delivering aid to cyclone damaged Pacific Islands, as well as personnel. Retaining medical capability is also necessary, as demonstrated in the Christchurch earthquakes, with field hospitals etc. Peace keeping forces need adequate equipment for their particular locations

Q7:As above, multi purpose equipment, capable of any environment, unlike the inshore fisheries vessels

Q8:Extend the limited training courses already undertaken esp for youth at risk

Q9:Adequate ships and aircraft, no more LAV'S

Q11:Cooperation with security services in NZ, Intelligence and Police resources. Defending our sovereignty is the first responsibility of a national Government

Q1: Exogenous factors unpredictable. What is almost certain: - increased sophistication and variety of challenges across various spheres - increased cost of meeting these. Therefore, the unavoidable and core challenge is to achieve fierce prioritisation so that what really matters is achieved. The necessary implication is that secondary programmes are dropped, no matter how precious, successful etc. they may be. That in itself is a huge challenge.

Q2:

Q3: Only core roles (cf A to Q1) Any non-core roles that are maintained will draw off resources, be supported by incumbents and potentially tempt politicians off course. Therefore, the greatest threat to NZDF in its core roles is its non-core roles, not any enemy.

Q4:

Q5: Given response to Q1 and Q3 above, priority must go to: - NZ's security - working together with Australia on security and stability of neighbourhood. Attempting anything more will undermine these. If we remove our ability to contribute to international peace and security, then we can't be asked, and our politicians can't be tempted, to do so: a good thing. A far greater contribution could be made globally by NZ taking in more refugees.

Q6: Focus, focus, focus on what is deliverable in its core areas; cf answers above.

Q7:

Q8:

Q9: Look at it the other way round: what capabilities are not needed to achieve, or realistically cannot be maintained without threatening achievement of, core tasks. The following are not needed and if continued their opportunity cost makes them threats to our national security: - frigates - NH80 and A109 helicopters. These platforms are complex, sophisticated, expensive and difficult to maintain to operational readiness level. They contribute disproportionately to the unwieldy array of skills and gear that our small forces are expected to maintain. The helicopters are vulnerable in any operational environment. Solution: fold into Australian forces or transfer part of their funding to Australia. NZ Navy to be coastguard. NZ Airforce to provide transportation and coastguard services (possibly these might be contracted out privately).

Q11:

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Q1:Chinese influence in the South Pacific.

Q2:Disintegration of stable governments in the Middle East and other like trading partners.

Q3:Expansive maritime operational fleets including air surveillance. A light agile infantry unit/s that are South Pacific orientated, to win Hearts and minds of indigenous peoples and geographical awareness.

Q4:Rouge fishing platforms, coupled with refugee flotillas.

Q5:Not to spread its resources too wide, to refocus on South Pacific and Ross Sea dependency.

Q6:Training towards Aide to the Civil Powers, Police, Customs and MPI.

Q7:Contribute to resource management and C2 in the event of earthquakes, flooding, fire and drought.

Q8:Maintain support to Cadet Forces and Territorial Force Training. Discontinue training for Youth Development Unit (YDU). Offer unemployed youth, with suitable skills, Territorial Force Contracts.

Q9:Maintenance of Moral, C2, maintain credible manned units throughout the Brigade/formations.

Q11:More commissioned officers held at home to enhance their C2 experience. lessen their role with UN deployments.

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Q1: The major security issues for New Zealand are not in the Middle East. We should not have involvement in Middle East conflicts unless it is at the behest of the United Nations. Because we are a small nation without global clout, we should focus our Defence Force, defence policy and associated strategic planning on more localized threats such as those in the South Pacific. The potential for instability in Pacific island nations such as Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Papua New Guinea poses a much more credible threat than I.S.I.S. or al-Qaida.

Q2: The competing interests of China and the United States in the South Pacific are a concern in that the monetary and economic offers usually come at a cost, such as the nation making the offer will turn a blind eye to human rights abuses or permit environmental harm that these nations cannot afford to happen. The potential for a power vacuum to form and let in outside threats in Pacific island nations, or a brazen attempt by a world power to use their military capacity to influence the island nations.

Q3: Any participation in war situations should be only those related to our immediate national security, or sanctioned by the United Nations. Outside of war situations our roles should be: - Peace making/peace keeping - Disaster relief - Securing weapons of mass destruction and assisting with dismantling per United Nations It is also important that we work with Australia on South Pacific issues.

Q4: Having an intelligence gathering network that is specific to New Zealand's interests is vital. However it needs to be transparent about what it does - that does not necessarily mean sharing classified data, but certainly answerable to the New Zealand Parliament. Ensuring that said intelligence network picks up on foreign power activity in the South Pacific, especially with regards to the Cook Islands. Dealing with illegal foreign intrusions into the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Continental Shelf area and the Ross Dependency. We must be prepared to arrest or physically warn intruders that we are aware of their presence, and that it will not be tolerated.

Q5: A.N.Z.U.S. is out of date. It should be retired or thoroughly overhauled on the grounds it was set up for a Cold War security environment, and not for dealing with the establishment of terrorist entities such as Islamic State. New Zealand, whilst maintaining good relations with Australia should be prepared for the fact that Australia's military orientation is trending towards the United States, whereas ours should be focussed on the South Pacific. We cannot make a really meaningful contribution to American national security policy, and it seems to be a mess with no clearly obvious long term goals or a sense of how to achieve any goals that the U.S. might have. In contrast, there are clearly obvious problems that we can focus on in the South Pacific and have a realistic chance of establishing credibility.

Q6: With integrity and credibility. You are representative of New Zealand on the world stage. The successful protection of international law, operating with the respect of foreign powers, but above all else the defence of New Zealand are your core outcomes.

Q7: Integral. The N.Z.D.F. played a major role in Christchurch and Canterbury during the 2010-11 earthquake emergencies. Maintaining the logistical capacity to assist other nations and help in local emergencies is essential. The ability of the navy and airforce to move large amounts of supplies was of major use. This should be developed and individual emergencies learnt from so that the next one can be responded to more effectively.

Q8: Whilst the Defence Force would be useful for instilling discipline, developing skills and confidence, it should not be viewed as a one stop sort of entity for dealing with youth issues. Not all are appropriate for military style training, and nor given a choice would all want to enter the military.

Q9: All three branches of the armed forces need a combat component. Their first and foremost role is the defence of New Zealand. Our forces should be structured with a view to possibly having to deploy in a South Pacific nation with little infrastructure. The airforce transport capacity should not be diminished. When replacing transport planes it should be plane for plane. The airforce does not need C-17 aircraft - two very expensive planes is not very good

use of money, when several smaller transport planes could be purchased, namely because if one plane is grounded for maintenance or crashes there is only one plane that could be used. Airforce transports also need to be able to carry army vehicles. To complement the P-3K Orions surveillance capacity, would drones be considered by the Defence Force? Future frigates do not necessarily need to be A.N.Z.A.C. Class - would the Ministry of Defence consider European models as an alternative. Preference is a four frigate navy, but am aware of the cost of individual frigates. Army vehicles need to be able to be carried by navy ships or in airforce transport aircraft. They need to be able to deploy in somewhere like the Solomon Islands. In the hopefully unlikely case of being deployed an operating environment where air power is being used, has the Defence Force given thought to how these vehicles would be protected, and if so, how?

Q11: New Zealand has a clean reputation on the subject of torture and mistreatment of combatants captured. As the son and nephew of ex-Navy and Airforce personnel I view it as absolutely essential that this clean record be maintained. When dealing with multi-national coalitions we must be absolutely clear that torture/mistreatment of combatants is wholly unacceptable, and that the N.Z.D.F. will have no part in it. If necessary our service personnel should be given instruction by N.Z.D.F. staff about the rules of conduct that they are expected to abide by and what happens if they do not. The Royal New Zealand Navy needs to be able to arrest intruding ships that have no right to be in New Zealand waters or waters of geographic areas such as the Ross Dependency that we are responsible for administering.

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Q1: Increased instability in the middle east, especially with the increasing threat posed by non-state actors such as ISIS and associated islamic groups. Increasing belligerence in other states such as North Korea and Russia also pose a threat. Closer to home we need to protect our borders, fisheries, and island neighbors.

Q2: The big one is the move from state led aggression to religion/ideology, non-state led aggression. This makes any future threat less predictable and potentially more aggressive where capability allows. This means we need to be prepared in advance for unpredictable events that could rapidly evolve. Hence my comments about rapid fixed wing fighting capability in question 9.

Q3: Develop and maintain a multidisciplinary force to protect our borders and interests... I agree with the direction set out in the discussion document.

Q4: Increasing fisheries threats, unpredictable actions by non-state actors, increasing noise from Asia - especially North Korea.

Q5: primary focus should be ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia. Secondary to that is contributing to international peace and security globally. Both are important but primary function as I see it is our national defence

Q6: much the same as it has been

Q7: The Defence Force is uniquely positioned with personnel and equipment to aid in natural disasters and unforeseen events

Q8: Where appropriate the Defence Force has a unique opportunity to instill a sense of discipline, purpose, and self worth in youth who otherwise do not have that.

Q9: In addition to what is already being considered, the one gaping hole is a lack of rapid air-support and strike capability. The new helicopters are all well and good but do not have the range and speed of a fixed wing fighting plane to support our troops and respond to direct threats. The F-16V developments look promising and are less expensive than the F-22 or F-35.

Q11: I'm glad to see consideration being given to RPAS

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- Q1:- Climate change refugees seeking asylum in New Zealand - Terrorism - Further biosecurity breaches as international travel and trade increases
- Q2:Issues: - Extremist religious groups - Climate change issues and resource scarcity - Shift in global economic centre to East Asia Defence Force response: - Supporting other countries in fight against terrorism - Focus on humanitarian aid/assistance in South Pacific - Participation in international institutions - Five Powers Defence Agreement, NATO - Maintain good relations with East Asian powers
- Q3:- Building larger Navy to assist with South Pacific aid and post-disaster support -e.g. supply of desalination plants to South Pacific states after cyclones. - Larger Navy also to assist with protecting EEZ and NZ waters to Antarctica to prevent against illegal fishing, dumping of hazardous waste and shipping compliance - Work on management plans for natural disasters, looking to improve further on lessons learned in Christchurch and Vanuatu.
- Q4:- Illegal fishing and dumping of hazardous waste which could affect fishing industry - Climate change refugees seeking asylum in New Zealand - Homegrown extremism - e.g. copycat attacks mimicking terrorism in the middle east
- Q5:- Focus should be on neighbours and regional security - to build further linkages which ensure effective collective security framework.
- Q6:- Continue working with intelligence community, MFAT and MPI to protect and advance our interests
- Q7:- Build a bigger Navy to quickly deploy ships to put desalination plants to use following natural disasters - Invest in further NH90s for LANDSAR and disaster recovery purposes, and an upgraded airlift capability to enable rapid evacuations of large numbers of people.
- Q8:- Education in trades - Encouraging New Zealanders to be healthier and fitter - Increase the percentage NZDF recruits to join the Navy
- Q9:- Stronger joint forces training and coordination - consistent with Joint Forces strategy 2035 - Investment in emerging military technologies - e.g. new advancements in UAV technology, finding a replacement for Hercules - High-tech clothing - e.g. integration of electronics in fabrics/smart textiles; Performance enhancing fabrics; Fit for purpose. - Replacing obsolete ships and aircraft - e.g. Hercules replacement project to 2025; and develop a plan to grow the navy sector.
- Q11:Increase proportion of Navy as part of Defence Force; we are an island nation with extensive inshore and oceanic interests requiring protection.

Q1: NZ govt's refusal to accept that its primary responsibility is to provide for the protection of the NZ peoples safety and sovereignty irrespective of any perceived lack of immediate threat. NZ Govt's failure to develop capability for the actual defence of NZ based on a defence in depth using a 'modern system' defence. These are explained, along with an outline of how they might be applied in a littoral defence, in my book Defenceless New Zealand - copies sent to NZ Gov't. in 2014 and to the Minister this year. The NZ Govt's failure to consider the possibility of 'siege' - a foreign power declaring a no-go zone around NZ to force us to comply with whatever demands it has.

Q2: The continuing rise of the Chinese military and the PRC's militancy in the South China Sea and in the use of invasive cyber attacks. Diminishing ability and willingness by the US to guarantee Australasia's security. Increasing global competition for land and resources. Possible eventual conflict between China and India and China and the USA. The rising power of multinational corporations (many now bigger than many national economies) and their possible resort to influencing nation states to engage in aggression. The increasing unreliability of an international rules based order to guarantee world peace when whole economies can be ruined by capital flight and ideological imperatives (e.g. Islam or resurgent Russian nationalism)

Q3: Equip and train our military to protect NZ in a direct state-on-state conflict using a modern system defence in depth. A responsible govt. has no right to neglect this responsibility, especially on the basis of necessarily limited geo-political risk assessments that cannot possibly foresee future events. The NZDF should not be seen as a means to 'defend our interests abroad', but to protect our national interest at home by being equipped and charged with preserving our sovereignty and freedoms. Secondary roles related to the EEZ and regional security should flow out of the above

Q4: Competition for raw materials and other resources and control over them by foreign powers. Engineering the means of conducting a littoral (out to 30km) defence in depth in a direct state-on-state conflict.

Q5: No prioritisation is necessary. If NZ provided for its own defence on the realistic basis that it CAN and SHOULD be prepared to defend NZ in a direct attack the capability necessary to do that would automatically mean we would be well placed to contribute meaningfully to regional and international security issues if and when they arise.

Q6: By being capable and able to deter any would-be aggressor and as a corollary be able to contribute in cases of non-military national emergencies as an adjunct to its primary defence role.

Q7: By its very nature a modern military, properly equipped and resourced FOR DEFENCE would be able to provide transport, medical assistance, leadership/coordination, communications, security, reconnaissance and personnel. A national militia set up to support the military in a time of conflict would also be well placed to provide for national resilience by having functions related to transport, heavy plant/equipment, communications, facility security and medical aid secure earth movement, etc.

Q8: Provide youth with career opportunities in the trades, leadership, character-building and transferable personal life skills.

Q9: The ability to conduct an effective littoral defence in depth - described in my book Defenceless NZ: A completely mobile force in CBRN/blast protected vehicles Long range vehicle mounted artillery Precision guided missile and munition systems - anti-ship/anti-air/anti-tank A national air defence system. The ability to project considerable 'all fires' out to 30 km off-shore to defeat an amphibious force

Q11: Current policy lacks integrity. In effect it says (pp. 16 and 37 2010 White Paper) that we will run to our allies to save us. They can spend their money, expend their resources and sacrifice the blood of their sons and daughters on our behalf because we don't want to. All we are prepared to do is pretend our armed forces might buy us some deterrence time so our allies

can rescue us. This is not defence policy, it is an abrogation of governmental responsibility. It is a policy without honour.

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Q1: The growing economic and military power of China and the re-emergence of Russia are the greatest threats to the world's peace and security today and in the immediate future. Terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda also present an indirect threat to NZ. Cyber threats (particularly out of China and Russia) are also a growing and constantly evolving threat to us. Climate change and pollution is also likely to change the security in certain areas of the world. Water and food shortages could become a trigger for conflict and threaten NZ directly as we could be seen as a source of clean space, food and water for a large country that has lost theirs.

Q2: China's growing assertion in the SE Asian region (particularly its claims to large parts of the South China Sea) will eventually bring it into military conflict with neighbouring states. It is likely that this conflict will draw the US and others (including Australia and NZ) into it. Conflict between Russia and NATO is also possible. NZ is likely to become involved whether we want to or not. An economic and military alliance between China and Russia is also possible which could change the balance of power in the world. Growing conflict in the Middle East and Africa will likely cause further instability in these regions and NZ will be expected to participate militarily in some way.

Q3: The NZDF exists first and foremost to fight. Military combat capability is our highest priority, everything else comes second. We are a maritime nation and the likely coming conflict with China/Russia will require primarily maritime forces (sea and air power). We are currently pretty weak in these areas and not in the same realm of capability as our traditional allies (we are currently very poorly equipped to fight a high level/intensity conflict).

Q4: Piracy, illegal fishing and the economic influence of China (in the South Pacific particularly).

Q5: NZ's security (and economic prosperity) is 100% dependant on the security of the wider region and that of our closest allies. We cannot act alone and must have forces that are able to operate alongside our allies (primarily the US, UK, Australia, Singapore and Canada) and at the same level of sophistication and capability as them. Our equipment must be "fitted for" not "fitted for but not with". We must train as we would fight. "Peacekeeping" is not what the NZDF exists for. It performs this as a secondary role, it naturally falls out of a full combat capability (but it doesn't work trying to do it that other way around).

Q6: The NZDF plays an important part in this all-of-government effort. The NZDF is the only Gov't organisation funded and equipped to "fight" on behalf of NZ. God does not defend NZ! The NZDF does. Waving the flag when on overseas deployments and promoting NZ are important peacetime roles that nicely flow out of a full deployable combat capability. Defence works closely with Foreign Affairs in promoting our interests overseas.

Q7: This is a secondary role and not the NZDF's primary role. But it is an important one given our relative isolation to the rest of the world. NZDF assets (people and equipment) can provide useful assistance during natural disasters. It is also a positive way for the NZDF to be seen by the NZ public who generally don't understand the real reason we have Armed Forces.

Q8: It is important but again is a secondary role. The NZ Cadet Forces provide a natural career pathway into the NZDF so is valuable for recruiting. The expenditure in this area is very small but provides great "value" to NZ Inc. and it should continue. The NZDF still provides some of the best technical and trades training in NZ and once people leave the forces those skills are not lost to NZ Inc.

Q9: We need a greater focus on Maritime Combat capability (air and sea) than we have at present. The lack of an Air Combat Force (modern fighter jets) is a significant "hole" in our capability (we also lack the ability to train at home for the higher end conflicts that we may face overseas in the future). Up until 2001 we had one of the best Air Combat Capabilities in the world. The loss of the FAC/JTAC capability has already cost NZ lives in Afghanistan. The looming threat from China will require strong Air and Sea Combat Capabilities. If NZ wants to be seen to be pulling our weight then we must bring back this capability. Freedom

isn't free, we must pay our way. Since 2001 we have not done this. We can afford it (it is our choice) and we must reinvest in it. It may not be politically popular but the price we will pay if we don't get it back isn't worth thinking about. We might as well scrap our defence forces and all start learning to speak Chinese! Given our distance to the rest of the world we also need strong strategic air and sea lift capabilities. We badly need those C-17s and something else in the light/medium Tactical airlift space (we need to replace the Andover!). Our Rotary transport capability is about right, we just need a few more airframes.

Q11: Since Helen Clark declared to the world that we lived in a "benign strategic environment" the world has in fact changed a lot and quite quickly. The future is indeed unknown and unpredictable, and that is why we have Armed Forces. Sadly the scrapping of our air combat capability can not be quickly reversed. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't do it. The time is coming when we will wish we had that insurance policy. It was a wrong that must be put right, for all NZ'ers sake.

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Q1: Though I see no immediate threats to the country (five year perspective), we may be drawn into supporting allies - in the manner of current deployments, e.g. the training cadre in Iraq. Over the longer term there is the probable movement of peoples caused by famine and / or by population pressures. This is inevitable and though it is some 700 years since Europe experienced the Mongol invasions (and 1400 years since the Slavic peoples moved west), this is the progression of history.

Q2: Should there be a major movement of people as outlined in Q.1, whether as "refugees" or as a migrant movement it may be the role of the NZDF to control the effects for NZ. I use the word control deliberately for such a movement of people would be beyond the ability of most nations to actually prevent. To a lesser degree, we have, over seventy years since 1945, been involved in "infantry actions" consistently supporting treaty partners. Since withdrawing from Vietnam these actions have been of low intensity (Malaya) and of a peace-keeping (Timor) nature. I do not see this changing greatly - yet we have appeared to neglect the ability of our armed services to achieve in this field. New Zealand's interests lie in maintaining trade and trade routes - currently from piracy (as in the Malacca Straits specifically) and in being able to maintain a significant naval and ground presence in support of and in conjunction with treaty partners and allies. We are too small to carry this alone, so military cooperation is vital, but must not (r) not necessarily commit the country without due thought. 100 years ago we learnt that war is no answer to international disputes; seventy years ago we learnt that appeasement and doing nothing is not an answer either.

Q3: Ideally this should be in combination with the United Nations in a peace-keeping role. It would be difficult with two under-strength rifle battalions to do much more. Apart from an all out war (where the full effort of the nation can be focused and drawn upon) the best we can offer is tokenism. I believe however that token should be of high merit - not just a paper-thin commitment (as in Afghanistan). If we are going to commit to an active theatre, then our forces should be trained and equipped properly so that they can contribute properly. A token force yes, but an effective one.

Q4: NZ has an extensive area to cover in its EEZ. It appears unlikely that the marine minerals will be allowed to be mined (viz Chatham Plateau phosphate mining), but the zone does encompass a large potential pelagic fishing resource. With regard to this resource we are in a weakened state. The previous government had built two offshore patrol vessels and two inshore vessels, a step in the right direction but far too much a penny-packet response to a need that was evident many years previously. There is a need for several more such patrol vessels - both offshore and inshore. It is a vast area and with only two vessels it is impossible to effectively patrol. I suspect that as the world's oceans become depleted by the super-efficient fishing techniques now used, that our fish-stock resource will simply become too tempting. Air patrols (Orions) are the most efficient way to maintain surveillance but enforcement and arrest can only be done by a vessel. One ship may be required almost permanently on patrol in the southern waters to prevent the rape of the Toothfish resource. To achieve this would require at least a second vessel on replenishment and leave. These ships would need to be based in Bluff. Another pair may need to be stationed in Wellington or Picton to interdict unauthorised fishing off the west and east coasts and likewise, out of HMNZS Philomel, to cover northern waters. To maintain a squadron of six will require at least one more at Philomel, for refit and major maintenance. Due to the seas they will operate in, these ships require to be operated in sea state 6 - with the ability to survive sea state 8. These vessels however are a Coastguard - they are not truly "Navy". To project marine protection to our trade routes - particularly to co-operate with the forces of Singapore, Malaya and Indonesia in the marine choke-points of the Malacca Strait (virtually 60% of our seaborne trade passes through that strait), we need ocean-going frigates. We need to show willing to our allies in the region - which means taking - or at least showing willing to take some of the load. This will require a minimum of three frigates. Our current vessels are both now

approaching 20 years old - the effective life of a small warship. The planning needs to be done now - to replace both Te Kaha and Te Mana, and if a commercial model is used, this should be on a cyclical build schedule -

Q5: As noted in Q 3. we have been involved in "infantry actions" for about forty years yet we have only two under strength rifle battalions (circa 450 ... war-strength might be 600). The paucity of this has been revealed many times. In Bosnia when the British general commented that if we were not going to be properly equipped - why bother coming? At that time, the NZ Army was stretched to maintain an enlarged company (out of two battalions and sundry support arms). It was embarrassing to say the least. It was also revealed in Timor and Solomons when to maintaining the units there would have been impossible without the contribution of the Territorial Force (now renamed Reserve). Though dedicated the TF drew men away from their civilian occupations and often severely disrupted commerce and industry. Frankly, this is not good enough if (r) if we are to pull our weight and live up to obligations to the UN and our other allies. I believe we must make up our minds. Either do it properly - or do not do it at all - effectively in the latter case, publically withdrawing from all international commitments and treaties. If it is the will of the people (by implication the government of the day), to be involved then the Piper must be Paid. The infantry therefore needs to be bolstered in order that those troops committed may be committed with full support and not in penny-packets. Companies might be four rifle platoons with a fifth - support and HQ platoon; battalions of four rifle companies and a fifth, heavy support and HQ company. To maintain this level it is then standard practice to have a third light infantry battalion. I do not think it will be sufficient in force of numbers even then, however, a certain lack of manpower can be made up with better training - so to this end all infantry might be trained to the skill-level of say the US Ranger units. It would then be said that "Those NZers are few and far between but they are "good". Concomitant to this must be suitable artillery (L119) and light armour (as appropriate for the theatre and deployment. The Air Force is now a surveillance and transport service. Though we have upgraded the Orions and the C130s they are approaching the end of their service lives. Replacements for both should be scheduled now, again on a commercial basis - that is ... we need X aircraft to fulfill our commitments. We therefore need a new aircraft operational every Y years so we will commit to purchasing such. This gives the manufacturer an extend list of orders into the future and updates our air-fleet in a timely fashion. I note here that the C 17 factory closed its doors this week and that the C 130 is about to follow. Whether the A 400M is suitable is something that I am not qualified to say. Logistic lift is central to ALL operations whether purely military or emergency relief for the islands. Likewise the P3 Orion is now obsolescent and allies are looking to replace it with the adapted version of the B 737. Though this is not my field, I cannot see replacing an aircraft capable of 20 hours surveillance flight with one that can (just) manage six hours is questionable, considering the extent of our EEZ. Here again, if two aircraft are to be maintained on patrol - there is a need for six. In all recent theatres where our soldiers have been put in harms way, the need for helicopter support has been woeful. Eight NH90 aircraft - a good start but might be doubled.

Q6: Dealt with in other questions.

Q7: This is a very important part of their "internal duty". Though severely under-strength currently, the ability for a rapid response to civilian emergencies is of great value. This was demonstrated in the Christchurch earthquakes - to a limited degree. I believe that the manpower available there (Burnham) was not used to its best extent, but it was used and did provide the people with a uniformed presence in support of civil power ... and of course there was no need for the carrying of arms. It was remiss however in that more might have been done - an engineering detachment deployed with suitable equipment - on a 24 hour notice.



The important function here being the rapidity that such deployment can (should) be made - not just for practical reasons but for the equally important reason of civilian morale. The Services on such occasions are seen as a commitment by government - a visible commitment - there, rapidly - in time of great stress.

Q8: Beyond its recruits - none. Any form of Compulsory Military Service is a waste of the defence dollar. It might (?) contribute to the self-discipline of some dissolute youth but would absorb huge amounts of time and effort from the professional services as well as wasting the time of the draftees. Three months training in my day, did little to produce soldiers but cost the taxpayer disproportionately. Any such funds should be expended in the training and supply of our professional forces.

Q9: In great part I have covered this in previous questions

Q11: Historically NZ has been loath to spend money on its armed forces. In 1899 they had to supply their own horses and tack; in 1914 they went to war with the Lee Enfield Mk I - 50 inches over all and subject to excessive wear from the Mk VII ammunition. These weapons were bought as a (cheap) job-lot from the War Office and were not suitable. They were rapidly replaced with the SMLE - at additional expense. Again in 1939 NZ Artillery was trained on 75mm weapons resurrected from WW 1; In the 1960s I trained on the No4 rifle and it was late in that decade before my unit was armed with the L1A1. The current F88 (version of the Steyr AUG), is now being openly questioned as suitable for combat roles. Though a delightful weapon to handle (compared to the brutish recoil of the No4), it has proven to be wanting in two theatres - in Timor the small calibre caused problems due to wicking water up the barrel (capillary action); in Afghanistan it could not "over-match" the range of enemy sniping rifles (often very old 303 SMLEs). In the action where three of our soldiers were KIA, it was the L129 rifles that discouraged the enemy, not the fire from the F88s of the support section. Let us learn from experience. Let us not buy equipment that causes us to alter infantry doctrine (LAV III), but purchase equipment that fit TO our doctrine. In the end, it is cheaper - both in money and in the lives of our soldiers. As a nation we decide to put our servicemen in harms way. That is what they sign on for, but should we do so, they need, no, they deserve, the most appropriate equipment - suitable to the theatre and conditions - and - they deserve that equipment WHEN they are committed - not as UORs some time later. To do less is to let them down. In simple terms - "Give them the tools and they will do the job."

Q1:1. Imbalance of wealth globally. 2. Economic and military expansion of emerging powers which are short of resources including energy, minerals, food production and potable water 3. Effects of climate change and natural disasters either domestic or abroad which lead to large population shifts which cause sudden change to national expectations of lifestyle and entitlement.

Q2:1. China as a key trade partner having a significant confrontation with US interests in the SW Pacific and later into the Southern Ocean and Antarctica, through or around Oceania. It is only a matter of time before China will have to expand militarily in order to sustain its population. GONZ will have to deconflict old traditional alliances with new trade alliances and be prepared to militarily support culturally similar allies such as the US/UK/AUS rather than risk alliances with cultures which are incompatible with our current way of life if we do not wish to lose our identity. NZDF since ANZUS split has been perceived by Australia to be a weak flank to their regional defence and with our low % of GDP spent on defence, we are still seen as defence freeloaders by our closest ally. 2. Displaced diaspora from global conflicts bring risk of uncontrolled border incursions and mass immigration by potential undesirable including global jihadists and other issue motivated groups. 3. The UN will become increasingly irrelevant as a global player as larger alliances such as NATO take the lead in dealing with conflict, to a point where the heavy weighting the GONZ and by proxy NZDF's desire to see the UN as relevant will also be marginalised.

Q3: Strive to rebuild links lost with the ANZUS debacle, even if it means revisiting the anti-nuclear stance. NZ is not anti nuclear anyway. There are radio-active devices in all areas of industry in the country, and there is no conclusive proof that there are not incursions into our waters by SSBN by any nation who possess that capability. The ANZUS pact should be reinstated and NZDF should be developed to support allied interests offshore so we are not placed in a situation to defend our interests domestically. Strategic projection with allies who will assist in defending NZ's interests if threatened in the future will be key.

Q4:1. Large numbers of illegal refugees making landfall. 2. Dwindling global fisheries will see larger illegal international fishing piracy occurring in territorial waters. 3. NZ land territory directly threatened as it is a strategic staging point for Antarctic exploitation, especially from a future Chinese lead Asian coalition, and also if secured, would make a land invasion of Australian territory tenable by securing the Eastern flank from US disruption. 4. Domestic security as a result of terrorism, civil unrest as the national wealth inequality increases and more likely civil disorder as a result of a major natural disaster.

Q5: GONZ should prioritise rebuilding ANZUS as the US is key to ensuring the security of Oceania remains strong, and our way of life is not assimilated by another culture. Supporting allied operations will become more challenging if the public doesn't understand the foreign policy linkages and especially if they are not UN mandated, even though the UN lacks any real credibility. As a small developed nation we could also learn a bit about self defence by looking at the Swiss model. Offshore operations inevitably cost lives (I am speaking from personal experience) but they hone the collective skills of the NZDF and guarantee support from allies in times of need.

Q6: NZDF is an extension of foreign policy. The question should be how do we get the nation to understand this linkage? Without a credible defence force, we are not seen as being a serious player on the world stage and therefore a risk as a trading partner. China doesn't trade with us because they like to pay our prices for products they trade because they need what we are selling and have a strategic plan to expand commercially throughout SE Asia, Oceania, and ultimately gain a foothold in resource rich Antarctica. NZDF needs to be able to reassure the public that it is on constant vigil so that military threats to our interest can be deterred whilst providing a capability that feeds into question 7....

Q7: The NZDF core characteristics of Courage, Commitment, Comradeship and Integrity are key to the belief the public has in the NZDF being a trustworthy organisation, even if

politicians and other public servants are perceived to be corrupt. The NZDF was instrumental in the initial response to the Chch EQ by having the resources and personnel who could rapidly adapt to the environment. I was personally involved in this effort for both EQ's and the perception was that the NZDF would sort something out when the bickering council and CD reps could not. NZDF should remain as a key player when these events occur and be resourced to do so, including training and provision of resources to support. The Reserve units are ideally placed to support this, however with dwindling numbers Govt needs to have a realistic understanding of what they can actually provide.

Q8: I also have extensive experience in this area and the NZDF provides an organisation that can play a significant part in youth development, but should not do so to the detriment of primary roles. Essentially the existing programs are designed to instill self discipline and determination, ethics in accordance with the NZDF core characteristics (see Q7 above) and the spirit of team not self. These qualities were also by-products of National Service (CMT). CMT at least provided a pool of trained personnel who could be drawn on in the event of a natural disaster or to respond to a military threat. Unfortunately the Youth Development Unit (YDU) can't provide this HR product.

Q9: The loss of the strike wing under the previous govt was short sighted. Every 5 - 10 years a service chief rolls out a new strategic road map, but it does not match the NZDF procurement of capital equipment. What is the point in developing an 'Amphibious Task Force' when the NZDF doesn't have the equipment capability to conduct opposed landings on unprepared coastlines? The Govt need to define what it wants the NZDF to achieve more clearly and then resource it accordingly. Perhaps re-instate an air strike capability, but using a rotary platform such as AH-64? ADF doesn't have this, only ARFF, so it would be complimentary to their air capability whilst providing our ground elements with organic close support for the majority of missions they undertake as part of a coalition. Complement the P3K maritime surveillance role with suitable long range UAV such as the MQ-4C which would be cost effective and could plug into allied operations.

Q11: The current govt obviously is taking the role of the NZDF seriously leading into the future. It is unfortunate that politicians of any party are now thinly represented by former members of the NZDF and therefore understanding of NZDF culture is now limited which translates to public perceptions and trust. This was highlighted by the poor journalism and govt responses around the casualties that occurred during Operation Crib 20 in Afghanistan in 2012. Had the govt explained the Counter-Insurgency model of Governance, Development and Security better to the public, then they would have understood better why the Provincial Reconstruction Team were still obliged to provide security support in order to allow governance and development to occur. A better understanding of military operations at all levels of govt would improve this. Finally, in accordance with the below, I DO NOT wish my name to be included in any summary of submissions that you may publish.

Q1: New Zealand faces a range of threats to our communities from radical Islamic groups and other extremist organisations. This threat - although real - is more one of isolated attacks on public places than of one that threatens our territorial integrity and our democratic institutions. Other challenges that could involve NZ Defence Forces include the need to maintain civil order after a serious natural disaster effecting one of our major metropolitan areas or to help facilitate emergency remedial action in the case of major Infrastructure failure occasioned by seismic or volcanic activity. However the most serious existential threat to New Zealand as a sovereign nation in the medium to long term is that of a resurgent People's Republic of China (PRC) growing in its territorial ambitions and provoking a war that could envelope the Asia Pacific Region. The PRC is one of our most important trading partners, but we must not let this blind us to the fact that it is a totalitarian regime involved in rapidly modernising its military and aspiring to project its power throughout the Pacific region. The PRC claims Taiwan, and has territorial disputes with Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, India and Japan. Its approach to these disputes doesn't inspire confidence that it will conform to International norms in the event of an escalation of any one of these areas of friction.

Q2: New Zealand has had a long history of involvement with UN Peace keeping missions in various parts of the globe. This has sent a positive message to the international community as to our willingness to "pull our weight". However the UN risks becoming increasingly irrelevant due to its inability to restrain the territorial ambitions of Russia in the Ukraine and the fact that the majority of its voting members do not share our democratic values or abhorrence of corruption. It is critical that New Zealand rapidly forges high quality defence relationships and interoperability with Australia and the United States and other like minded democracies that share our values. History has taught us that our defence was, is and will be intricately connected with these nations and that we do not have the financial, demographic or material resource to defend ourselves from a major power threatening our sovereignty. It is untenable that we allow the warships of the PRC into our harbours but effectively bar the ships of the US Navy. One change that needs to happen is an urgent move to rectify this situation either within the existing anti-nuclear legislation or by repealing it. We need to get into a position where we can come under the shelter of security guarantees of the United States - the only nation that has the ability to protect our territorial integrity in the event of a threat from China. Such an alliance in the nature of the now void ANZUS arrangement would be more efficient as it would allow us to concentrate on areas we could complement our allies' capabilities and accept their assistance in areas where we are weak. I.e. basing an Australian or US air combat wing in this country. New Zealand needs to have the military capacity to work with our allies and be seen to be "pulling our weight". This would include ability to patrol the Tasman Sea, south to the Ross Sea and north to the Pacific islands. Another technological change that NZ could take advantage of is the rapid advances in drone technology. Although our air combat wing has been long disbanded drone technology allows a lower cost alternative to reconnaissance, anti-ship and air to air capabilities.

Q3: New Zealand is an island nation and therefore it needs sea and air capabilities to identify and intercept threats before they make landfall. The NZ Navy needs the capacity to patrol our coasts, our EEC, work with our allies in the Antarctic and the Pacific Islands. This must include the capacity to detect and destroy submarines. Ideally we need and should reinstitute the RNZAF's air combat wing air combat wing. An Island nation without air combat capabilities in tantamount to dereliction of duty. However the loss of skills and the huge cost of re-establishing this make it unlikely. As an alternative we need to encourage Australia and the US to rotate air combat aircraft through New Zealand and work on state of the art drone technology to see how we can fill this glaring hole in our ability to defend our nation. The NZ army needs to be able to work with our allies and have the skills and equipment to fight in any part of the country. It needs to be able to fulfil its peace keeping duties with the UN, and be able to assist in conflict zones where it is in our national interest to support like minded

nations. Our Special Forces have a reputation as being effective and courageous. These forces need to be given the resources to enhance their capabilities. All 3 branches need to be able to work together in the event of a major natural disaster within NZ or the Pacific Island to impart emergency relief, maintain civil order and repair infrastructure.

Q4: In the short term, threats will mainly be of the nature of isolated terrorist activity, illegal fishing, and the possibility of submarine activity testing our detection capabilities. However in the medium to long term we need to be preparing for the increasing projection of Chinese military power into our immediate neighbourhood. Although this may appear unlikely at present, the rise of the PRC mirrors the rise of Japan in the 1930s. If we are to learn from history we must be sure we have the alliances and the capabilities to safeguard our sovereignty should war erupt over the PRC's quest for territorial hegemony.

Q5: Our first responsibility as a nation is our own security. This includes the protection of our territorial integrity, the population, the lifestyle and culture we enjoy and our democratic institutions. New Zealand's contribution to global peace keeping through the UN is important. However it is absolutely critical we foster strong and abiding military relationships with like minded nations and alliances. These include Australia, United States, Japan, and South Korea in our part of the world and the UK and NATO further afield. Strong military alliances with nations that share our values do not diminish our sovereignty but rather serve to protect it. It is therefore in our national interest to assist these nations according to our ability in areas where they are seeking to counter aggression and activity out of accord with international norms.

Q6: The Defence Force in many respects is the most visible arm of government in many areas where New Zealand is involved in Peace keeping and disaster relief activities. It is critical therefore that it maintains the discipline and freedom from corruption that it is respected for. As discussed above it is in our national interest to be assisting and be seen to be assisting our allies and partners where we can.

Q7: The NZ Defence Force will be the first port of call in the event a major natural disaster affecting a sizable populated area or occasioning serious damage to infrastructure. The Defence force needs the capability to get the required manpower to any point in the country quickly in order to maintain civil order, care for the population and begin repair to infrastructure.

Q8: Defence force discipline and training is of immense benefit to "at risk" youth and serves to give them comradeship and a sense of purpose in their lives. Any initiative that extends the availability of this will benefit the nation.

Q9: Through the whole history of the NZ Defence force there was been a gap between the capabilities required for the military to carry out its role effectively and the money (or political will) to fund such capabilities. As stated previously drone technology could well provide a cost effective way to fill some of the gap in New Zealand's air defence capabilities and this needs to be investigated to see how it could be best used in our environment. As an island nation dependent on trade; ideally New Zealand should have a blue water navy of 4 to 6 frigate size ships or submarines and an air combat wing. However with a population of only 4.3 million and a complacency born out of 70 years of peace, the political will to raise defence spending to finance what should be a minimum requirement isn't there. It is this state of affairs that that makes it all the more important to cement an alliance with the United States and work with the US and Australia to see how the forces of each nation can complement one another to be used most effectively in the defence and security of this part of the world.

Q11:

Q1: The threat is terrorism. We have never been so vulnerable to this danger that has blurred the lines between civilians and soldiers. It can emerge from anywhere in the civilian population. The challenge is maintaining our image and freedoms whilst continuing to protect.

Q2: No matter what happens on the international stage or in any other relations the morale and effectiveness of the Defence Force should be protected. We need first to ensure that we be alive and functional in order to have any relationships.

Q3: I think keep doing what it's already doing.

Q4: Unfortunately we can never be fully secure in light of terrorism but we can work towards minimizing threats.

Q5: COUNTER TERRORISM ANESTHETIC DEFENCE SYSTEM (CTADS):

Hostage/terrorism situations are messy with innocent lives lost. With CTADS we can handle a hostage crisis in a confined space like Lindt Cafe Sydney with a lot of control. Sevofluorine (changes from liquid to gas), Desflurine (pressurised and encased). These are Operating Room anesthesia which expand when released are cheap, readily available & invisible. Once room volume is calculated, gas is administered through a pathway (eg: air-condition ducting); once sufficiently anesthetized all we need is oxygen masks to bring the hostages back up while the perpetrator is disarmed and arrested in his sleep. Whole process feasible within 2hrs. In further defence infiltration applications non-metallic Desflourine canister systems can be embedded strategically in enemy territory, air dropped or delivered overnight into a hot zone by robotic snakes (Israeli Technology) and armed with options of triggering by IR, coded laser fired from a distance, timed trigger, etc. The system is civilian friendly and effective in disarming the enemy especially in a confined place where gas doesn't quickly escape. Imagine this being used in the Bin Laden capture. Modern warfare is increasingly happening in civilian environments with embedded subjects using civilians as shields. Our invasion strategies can be freed up with now not only a Plan 'A' and Plan 'B' but a Plan 'C' also. This idea is novel and sounds strange at first but imagine for a moment terrorists using this idea to take over seats of power in our country. Metal detectors won't pick up a plastic canister of gas; security guards can be knocked out; politicians taken hostage; etc. If this concept becomes real, it will become well known but the only way terrorists can circumvent this technology is by carrying oxygen and masks which likely can not be done in a very discreet manner in public places, thus heightening suspicions and being a deterrent. It could also be used in prison riots, etc.

Q6: Start and sustain this effort with effective communication between government departments and the Defence Force to recognize and specifically define areas of need and then formulating an effective collaboration to protect and advance our interests.

Q7: The Defence Force is a heavily tax-payer funded arm of our country's protection. It exists to defend and protect our citizens and to sustain life no matter the disaster be man-made or natural, foreseen or unforeseen.

Q8: Inspiring our youth with the power of 'discipline'. So they can apply this in all areas of their lives and become effective serving citizens who are proud to call this our home.

Q9: CTADS

Q11: Use immigrants to understand the enemy. \*For the sake of my family's security I do not wish my first name to be included in any summary of submissions that you may publish.

Q1:Internal threat from ethnic based groups. In the future we may face increased competition for our fisheries.

Q2:Our SEATO partners may face threats from China / Indonesia. South China sea may become a flash point

Q3:Protect our interests in the pacific. Limit Asian influence in the south pacific

Q4:Fishery's protection. Resources in the southern ocean must be protected

Q5:NZ first Australia/Pacific second Peace Keeping third

Q6:No change

Q7:No change needed.

Q8:I am a product of the LSV's. It changed my life. Make the course so that any one wanting to join the army after the LSV course can join straight away.

Q9:Strike force capable airforce Higher standards in small arms training Better IW 1 more infantry batt

Q11:Back to basics training when it comes to IW. More range time needed. You have a massive amount of knowledge in the civilian world when it comes to marksmanship, so use it. I look forward to the NZDF dropping the AUG as the IW and adopting a decent weapon platform.

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Q1:Regional threats from SE Asia and trade/cyber threats

Q2:We need to be able to coordinate with other defence forces and be seen to be doing our bit in an international defence community

Q3:Foster pride in national identity, patrol our waters, convey the impression that we are looking after ourselves and others. Without a strike force our Air Force capability is severely undermined and the perceived ability for us to protect ourselves, contribute to multi-national forces and display appropriate military pride at civic functions is lacking

Q4:Illegal fisheries, smuggling

Q5:We need to get a strike force back. This contributes in a big way to international cooperation and it fosters pride in the country amongst general population when we can be seen to display strength when necessary. Without a strike force you can't defend against air attacks or stray airliners.

Q6:Refer comments on a strike force. Seeing jets fly by makes you want to fight for your country.

Q7:As above with a strike force - foster national pride and a desire to fight for your country and being able to support disaster relief.

Q8:Show them a country that takes defence seriously and that therefore youth should take defence of their country seriously.

Q9:Greater air power and air support. Greater emphasis on Navy. Expanding the territorials program.

Q11:

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Q1:

Q2:

Q3: The Role of the New Zealand Defence Force The Defence White Paper 2015 Public Consultation Document envisages the future roles of the New Zealand Defence Force as remaining largely unchanged for the last generation. The primary role of the Defence Force is to secure the nation's territory and resources, and protect its citizens from external military threats. New Zealand would consider the use of military force in response to a direct threat to New Zealand and its territories. In addition to defending New Zealand, current policy settings envisage that the Government would consider the possible use of military force in the following circumstances: . in response to a direct threat to Australia; . as part of collective action in support of a member of the Pacific Islands Forum facing a direct threat; . as part of New Zealand's contribution to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (which includes Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and the United Kingdom); . if requested or mandated by the United Nations, especially in support of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific; or . at the request of another government. An overwhelming majority of New Zealanders would support the above statement. It is common sense. However, within the limits of that broad policy, the government has a range of options available to equip and train a force able to meet these roles in the most effective manner possible. This means making the most efficient use of our national resources. New Zealand, like its close ally Australia, is thinly populated when compared with its neighbours in Asia (or elsewhere or that matter). Using the same comparison, both Australians and New Zealanders are well-educated, with a relatively high percentage of tertiary graduates. This gives both countries the option of employing high technology defence systems in place of some of the traditional manpower intensive organizations. This has an additional benefit of providing the new technology educational paths provided by the possession of the new Defence Systems, thereby increasing the technological sophistication of the national educational base. The Second World War broke out when the New Zealand Army Regular Force had been run down to very low levels of equipment, manning and training. New volunteers were marched into tented camps that quickly became quagmires that hosted influenza and other viruses. Soldiers were issued with uniforms and trained in basic military skills prior to being sent home on leave, loaded onto troopships and despatched to Egypt for training. Fourteen months would elapse before the New Zealand Division would be ready to deploy to the war zone of Greece. But World War II began 76 years ago. The techniques of warfare have changed markedly since then. Not only have the techniques changed however, but the manner in which Armed Forces can now be employed for Defence are unrecognizable from those in vogue three generations ago. Instead, it can be more cost effective to maintain state-of-the-art Forces in Being able to react to any threats with trained and well-equipped units. This concept would lead to an increase in the numbers of troops enlisted as tertiary-qualified specialists trained for their tasks rather than the concepts that were followed in 1939. We would need fewer, more qualified personnel with greater strike power at greater distances from our home shores. There would still be a need for the individual soldier in a traditional role, but his primary employment would be at lower conflict levels such as those involved in peacekeeping. So it is for consideration that New Zealand should be aiming primarily at developing a Defence Force manned and equipped to defend New Zealand, participate in the Defence of Australia, and be capable of taking part as a full member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement with our allies. Separate yet complimentary provision could be made for maintaining peacekeeping and similar units. The challenges of deploying, operating, and sustaining forces in the South Pacific are considerable. The trends identified in a strategic review indicate that they could become even more so over the next 25 years. This uncertainty means the NZDF will need to be equipped for a range of situations, potentially including armed conflict. This would also allow us to make a credible contribution to stability in Asia, as well as further afield. The cost

of the capabilities required to contribute to high-end combat between large and sophisticated military forces is increasingly beyond our means. Even middle powers struggle to maintain the range of such capabilities. We could devote considerable resources trying to maintain advanced warfare capabilities and still fall short. But the possibility of traditional inter-state conflict cannot be excluded, nor that a New Zealand Government may want to contribute militarily to such a conflict. We therefore have, and should retain, some particular high-end capabilities which would enable the NZDF to play a meaningful role in an inter-state conflict. New Zealand's strategic outlook suggests an uncertain future. We do not have the resources to respond to all conceivable contingencies. We therefore need to have a clear sense of what our priorities are, where the likely risks lie, and how we can best position ourselves to manage risks as yet unseen. Appropriate Defence strategies for managing unforeseen risks include: participating in whole-of-government efforts so that the risks of being surprised by strategic shocks are reduced; ensuring that vital components of the Defence infrastructure are protected; maintaining well-equipped, combat-capable forces so that the full range of military responses is available at short notice; and ensuring that the NZDF can be enlarged at relatively short notice if necessary. New Zealand should maintain high quality, disciplined forces that can be used as a basis from which the country can expand its capability to use military force to defend the nation and its interests. Using military force is an option of last resort. But in a sometimes violent world there are occasions when its use is appropriate. The uncertain strategic outlook for the next 25 years means that this is not a time to be reducing the utility of the NZDF, or narrowing the capabilities that present forces can provide.

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8:

Q9:

Q11:

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Q1:Natural hazard events: Earthquake, Tsunami, Flooding etc

Q2:Sendai Framework March 2015 calls for greater integration on DRR Climate change:  
More extreme tropical cyclone events in the region

Q3:Ability to respond to natural emergency events - both domestically and regionally

Q4:As above

Q5:In that order

Q6:Participate in the National Security System Note responsibilities under the National  
CDEM Plan

Q7:Described in the National CDEM Plan Order 2015 (Clause 52-56)

<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/regulation/public/2015/0140/latest/whole.html#DLM6486713>

Q8:No comment

Q9:As above

Q11:

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Q1:1.Radicalization and militarization spreading to all countries involved in the conflict between western and Islamic State forces. 2.Climate change leading to food insecurity. 3.Escalating resource wars. 4.Economic failure due to over-investment in agricultural exports sector and also due to housing crisis.

Q2:The Defence Force will operate under increasingly complex and morally ambiguous scenarios. Contributing to this moral ambiguity is the continuation of human rights abuses of prisoners by the US and atrocities committed against civilians by IS forces, leading to increased radicalization on both sides. The moral stance of NZ Defence Force may also be compromised because of the involvement of private corporate interests and trade-related political pressures in policy and strategy decisions involving the New Zealand Defence Force.

Q3:The New Zealand Defence Force should take an independent stance. Such a stance will improve New Zealand's long-term security as history proves the folly of militarized religious extremism and the long-term un-tenability of pursuing acquisition of petrochemical /other natural resources using military force.

Q4: 1.Food and resource insecurity due to increasingly extreme weather events related to climate change; increase in climate change refugees. 2.Potential for resource wars involving the Pacific region. 3.Overuse and illegal use of marine resources (overfishing and illegal fishing). 4.Increase in political refugees seeking asylum in Australia and New Zealand 5.Possibility of foreign corporate involvement in New Zealand parliamentary and / or legal process via the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 6.New Zealand's becoming a target for terror attacks, because of: i.Morally ambiguous political and economic relationships with the US (ambiguous because of the US's ongoing human rights abuses of prisoners, and the lack of transparency in trade negotiations between the US and New Zealand). ii.Morally ambiguous relationships with other countries involved in human rights abuses to which we fail to hold them accountable, e.g. Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Papua New Guinea.

Q5:1.Any international involvement in conflict zones should be focused on morally defensible restorative work such as post-conflict community rehabilitation, reconstruction of sustainable infrastructure, and the care and protection of people affected by conflict. 2.Soldiers should be highly skilled in conflict de-escalation and resolution. 3.Clear, humane, transparent, and accountable practices should be implemented with respect to all prisoners of war. 4.Domestic focus should be on disaster-relief, search and rescue, and coastal patrol, and training in conflict resolution. 5.Defence policy should be developed with a long-term view that addresses the fundamental injustices and abuses that lead to radicalization. A moral, peacekeeping stance is the best protection long-term and the best basis for good long-term international relations.

Q6:The Defence Force should not be advancing and protecting the nation's interests internationally. New Zealand's international interests should be advanced and protected through diplomatic processes.

Q7:Ensure that resources are not wasted on combat roles in unwinnable and / or immoral wars overseas.

Q8:Training in conflict resolution, search and rescue, survival skills, outdoor skills, anti-bullying programs; promoting an example of ethics, humanitarian service, and peace-making for those who aspire to be soldiers.

Q9:1.The capability that comes from being known and trusted as a moral, independent, constructive presence in the world, and the courage and commitment that come from supporting morally clear and transparent causes, rather than supporting causes we might feel forced to be part of because of our trade aspirations. Generally we could achieve this by supporting UN resolutions, rather than countries that have vested interests in the conflicts. This would give soldiers security in their missions and the confidence and extra motivation to achieve them. It would make them partners instead of enemies in the areas where they work. 2.The commitment and confidence that comes from having valid public buy-in. No more

cover-ups of New Zealand soldiers in non-combat roles being killed in conflict situations for which they were not trained (i.e. the Baghak incident). Transparency and accountability about our soldiers' activity overseas is the only sustainable way to have valid public buy-in. 3. On a practical level, there is a need for sufficient small units capable of fast response patrolling New Zealand's territory, policing fisheries and conservation areas adequately and enforcing international maritime conventions. There is also a need to have suitable, ice-capable vessels for patrolling the Arctic seas.

Q11: It seems to me that this is a critical time in the world for an ethical and independent stance that addresses the root causes of conflict: injustice and oppression, a continually widening gap between rich and poor, and an increasingly resource-constrained world which is calling for a paradigm shift in corporate policy and practice. I would appreciate a response to this submission.

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Q1:

Q2:

Q3:

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8: Greater benefits for University Students joining the reserves while studying.

Q9:

Q11: Further recruiting efforts, higher pay for defence force personnel, increased university support for reservists.

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Q1: Our Defence Forces being unable to effectively defend New Zealand from conventional and unconventional threats.

Q2: ISIS's expanding influence in South-East Asia and the Pacific. China expanding influence in Asia/Pacific. Regime change in Asia/Pacific or of powerful countries. There is always the threat, albeit small, that the NZDF will have to defend New Zealand until a larger ally can assist us.

Q3: The NZDF should be able to effectively defend New Zealand. New Zealand is not a strategically hard place to defend.

Q4: Illegal fishing and smuggling.

Q5: Our first priority should be that the NZDF should be able to defend NZ from conventional and unconventional threats. Our second priority should be assisting our immediate allies in our geographic sphere in their security - particularly Australia. Our final priority should be deploying a force to troubled spots around the world where morality - rather than political or economic cunning - is the reason for their deployment and action.

Q6: The Defence Force is key to advancing the nations interests. No matter how much economic or political power we have, we must have the military power to back it up if things turn sour. We live in such a dynamic, fast changing world that a regime change overnight could completely turn the worlds geo-politics and provide us with a previous unseen threat within hours. New Zealand is a small nation, but we are a nation that people trust and look up to. That is why New Zealand should take the moral lead on creating a peaceful world.

Q7: New Zealanders need to be proud of their Defence Forces and be confident that they can defend our nation from any threat. This simply comes down to the government providing our defence Forces with the tools to get the job done.

Q8: Encourage unruly youth to join the force in order to teach them discipline, team work and life skills. Have this as an option in the judiciary

Q9: 1.) Air combat force. New Zealand is one of the only developed countries without an air combat force. As an isolated island nation we need fast attack aircraft to eliminate threats before they come on to our shores. Right now, there is very little we could do if ISIS called us up an hour off our coast and said they were landing 300 fighters from a cargo ship in Cape Reinga. They would get as far as Auckland before we could even think about mustering up a defence. We can not rely on our allies for air support. At the very least we need a small number of armed helicopters. 2.) Increase frigate fleet to a three ship fleet. 3.) LAV replacement should be more combat capable - CV90 for example 4.) Increase anti-tank missile launcher numbers 5.) Increase A109 fleet to 10 helicopters 6.) OPV up-armed in order to take over some of the frigate patrol duties 7.) Purchase armed UAV fleet

Q11:

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Q1: I believe that the radicalist Islamic State, Boko Haram, and the expansion of Chinese interests into the South China Sea are possible threats to NZ's security in the medium term. IS and Boko Haram pose the issue of religious conflict, because they are seemingly ruthless and carry out whatever they believe in regardless of the morals of most of civilisation. An attack on NZ soil is a possibility because of the diversity in the nation and the seemingly slack security in contrast to the USA or Australia, where people's actions and involvements are heavily tracked. I also believe that if America is drawn into an "on the ground" conflict we may be drafted in due to our dependence on the USA for exports and military ties. The South China Sea expansion may be a possible threat because of the fact it is not only a major shipping channel but America will be very conscious of the move and may act with military actions. Any conflict here will impact on much of NZ's trade by sea so the economy will be effected with a lower level of exports and imports and higher prices.

Q2: The South China Sea expansion by China could mean lower levels of trade in the globe and for NZ. NZ is dependent on sea trade so if the corridor was blocked off by a conflict then there would be a severe impact on the amount of trade NZ receives. I don't think the NZDF would be called on to engage in a conflict there however the economic impact would be sizable. The conflict in Iraq with IS is a very likely threat and theater of combat for NZ troops. Airstrikes do a lot to help the issue however IS will try to impose its dominance, and that is best combated by troops on the ground. Not only does it mean the smaller parts of IS and radical groups can be wiped out that are undetected by satellites, manned aircraft, and drones, but the citizens of the area will get more stability and confidence from boots on the ground as seen in Afghanistan.

Q3: Peacekeeping in areas of conflict such as Iraq and the middle east, because of the expansive oil fields and for the sake of the people living there who are threatened by radicalist groups. Protecting our maritime interests such as fishing, marine reserves, and the Antarctic continent. The ecosystem it provides is critical to NZ's cleanliness as well as the wildlife here, so by patrolling and keeping levels of pollution, over fishing, and whaling to a minimum the nation can retain or increase its "clean green" status.

Q4: Over-fishing, pollution, people trafficking, asylum seekers/illegal immigration.

Q5: By firstly keeping NZ free from radical groups, pollution, a bad economic state because of foreign events such as conflicts in the oil fields, and making the citizens feel threatened or be under a high threat, there will be a peace of mind in troops' minds if they are deployed. This should be priority as it is the NZDF, the name implying it is for NZ. However there are also interests such as foreign security, radical groups and peacekeeping that need addressing. To be a member of the UN means to help one another out in times of need, so when a nation comes under an uprising by a radicalist group such as IS or Boko Haram, or when one nation tries to take another in the name of their own political/economic gains yet putting others at threat, then the NZDF needs to step up and provide assistance for what we as a nation stand for. It is however a balancing act between what is wrong in our eyes and normal in their eyes.

Q6: Keeping the fish stocks and pollution levels in the ocean down, maintaining a constant security network to eliminate the threat of people trafficking, helping nations who provide NZ with some sort of benefit out in times of need, standing up for what we believe in yet keeping out of things NZ has no right to be involved in.

Q7: Providing disaster relief to not only NZ, but foreign nations who are hit by unforeseen events. Helping people who are in need out, whether it's food, housing, clothing or a basic form of education such as construction or plumbing to help their own country.

Q8: Providing more scholarships to school leavers to pursue officer careers, such as MEO/WEO in the Navy. This would entice a lot more people to leave school, join the forces and get tertiary education, and decrease the unemployment rate. Keeping a good relationship with kids going through intermediate school is important too, as that can be the stepping stone of inspiration to join the forces. However it must be kept in check that the forces are not



glamourised too much, especially for school leavers, because the realities need to be known.  
Q9: A force that can be readied to go to the aid of others to provide disaster relief. Being able to cover a large range of scenarios to their utmost best, and have no mistakes. Being able to work with other forces seamlessly. Also, allowing the public a better insight into what the NZDF do, because 90% of civilians think our DF is not that great and merely train and catch fisherman. The public is needed for support and it may also increase the quantities of enlisted.  
Q11: Please make the application process easier, the candidate coordinators can be slack at times losing appl

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Q1:- Instability as a result of widening inequality in New Zealand - Climate change leading to shortage of resources and conflict - Radicalisation of some sectors within New Zealand as a result of marginalisation - Sale of assets and privatisation of essential services such as power and communication can leave New Zealand vulnerable.

Q2:The effect of having close defence and trade relationships with countries such as the US who have poor human rights records may compromise the moral stance and integrity of the New Zealand Defence Force both in the eyes of those in the Defence Force and from the perspectives of other agencies, groups and people both nationally and internationally. This Defence Force could support UN resolutions rather than support countries with vested interests in conflicts.

Q3:- Promote and protect human rights at home and abroad - To assist in the development of essential infrastructure in countries who are in the aftermath of conflict or international disaster. - To be at the forefront of protecting the environment of New Zealand and its territories from threats posed by such things as illegal fishing etc.

Q4:- How we can best assist in dealing with food and resource difficulties that will increase as a result of climate change. This will be particularly so in the Pacific where we have special obligations and ties.

Q5:- It is vital that New Zealand maintains its independence in speaking out on human rights issues. The New Zealand Government via the Defence Force has a role in sharing expertise in creating and maintaining institutional models in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. - New Zealand's involvement in international conflict zones should be focused on morally defensible restorative work such as post-conflict community rehabilitation, reconstruction of sustainable infrastructure, and care and protection of people affected by conflict. New Zealand Defence Force personnel should be highly skilled in conflict resolution. Clear, transparent and humane practices must be implemented in regards to all prisoners of war. - Defence policy should be developed with a long-term view that addresses the fundamental injustices and abuses that lead to radicalisation.

Q6:Once again this effort should be focused on enhancing and protecting human rights at home and abroad.

Q7:The Defence Force should be highly skilled in assisting with disaster relief and search and rescue. They should have the ability to be involved in reconstruction of essential infrastructure and providing humanitarian aid in the event of a major disaster

Q8:Groups involved with youth in New Zealand should promote programmes that promote humanitarian service, conflict resolution and anti-bullying. This role would probably suit other organisations rather than the Defence Force.

Q9:The Defence Force could be renamed to be the Reconstruction and Peace-keeping Unit. This group could develop a reputation as a moral, independent and constructive presence in the world. Because New Zealand has so many priorities that need financial support it is vital that this unit comes up with innovative ideas for minimising costs while maintaining effectiveness perhaps by partnering with industry groups.

Q11:

Q1:Refugee's Regional Security and Natural Disasters EEZ Protection Alliances and Partners

Q2:Establishing an ANZAC Force.

Q3:Strengthen commitment to natural disaster response.

Q4:Renewed commitment and greater engagement.

Q5:Maintain support for UN Security Council initiatives.

Q6:Strengthen alliances with relief and humanitarian NGO's.

Q7:Maintain the current situation.

Q8:Conduct a full review of the "Boot Camp" campaign, as to it's overall effectiveness.

Q9:Strengthen the status and attractiveness of the Reserve Force, through greater incentives and provisions, especially for ex regular personal.

Q11:"cost effective" capital purchases and renewal programmes may not have been the best long term policy.

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Q1: These are clearly outlined in the defence assessment 2014. The government and defence need to develop a strategy for managing cybersecurity in NZ.

Q2: As above, these have been identified in the Defence Assessment 2014.

Q3: As NZ trade is largely dependent on shipping, maintaining political stability and the rule of law at sea in the relevant geographic regions is a priority. To meet these requirements may require more deployable naval ships (frigates or patrol craft) or maritime patrol craft.

Q4: Increased scarcity and demand for resources will make increased illegal exploitation of NZ fishing stocks an issue. We need to increase our aerial and naval surveillance capacity to address this. This may necessitate acquiring more maritime patrol aircraft and offshore patrol vessels and UAVs.

Q5:

Q6:

Q7: NZDF needs the capability to deal with natural disasters that may affect NZers in the future, both in NZ and overseas. With increased offshore oil drilling looking likely, the capability to deal with this would be useful. Likewise deployable field hospital facilities and aeromedical evacuation capability should be developed for our new helicopters.

Q8: NZDF should be able to offer NZers sustainable career pathways, with qualifications that will be recognised outside NZDF.

Q9: To maintain credible naval combat forces into the 21st century, in the context of increased investment and modernisation of defence forces in the Asia Pacific region, NZDF needs to give its naval combat force and its maritime patrol craft credible offensive capability so they have both a deterrent value and so that they are able to meet the capabilities of any potential adversaries. Our naval combat force needs to be armed with a stand off range antiship missile beyond the penguin equipped seasprite. Penguin missile puts the launch aircraft well within the range of modern surface to air missiles, and is therefore of limited utility against a modern military opponent. JATF: The JATF requires a deployable organic tactical UAV type system to maintain persistent ISR over the battle space. Even in low level peace keeping missions that NZDF has been involved in over recent years, such a capability would give the JATF better situational awareness. This may also be useful in HADR operations. There is potentially room to extend this capability to providing close air support capability. The Defence assessment 2014 states that the distinction between low level peace support operations and traditional combat is likely to shrink in future. Our deployable capabilities need to address this. Combat support vehicles/light operational vehicles are not suitable for deployment due to their lack of armour and vulnerability to mines and IEDs (cheap and easy to make). Therefore, the Pinzgauers should be replaced with something with better protection.

Q11:

Q1:Protecting our country. Ensuring that all illegal operations within our shoresand our sea are stopped and offenders caught and prosecuted. Defending our country should becour first priority. Keep away from other countries except for humanatarian aid in event of natures castrophic events. Do not participate in any man made wars and conflicts. Train unemployed youth and give them hope and life skills and our country a future. Defend our economic zone. More planes more ships and train our youth. We will need all our fish to feed our own country in the future.

Q2:Keep out of other countries wars.

Q3:Patrolling our shores and worry about our countries defence not anything abroad. Too many rtes have been lost in useless wars. Lets lead the world by doing something different and showing what a beautiful pacifist country could do.

Q4:Illegal fishing Possible invasion by another country. Smuggling. Need more planes and boats and people.

Q5:We should look after our own first and offer only humanatarian aid.

Q6:Protect our shores.

Q7:This is the other important role. Helping with natural disasters.

Q8:Train the unemployed. Give them hope and a job.

Q9:More planes more ships and more training for unemployed people. Hence more money.

Q11:Please lets start a new way. Just defend our country not participate in others wars and provide to the world how a country should use its defence force to protectvits own people first and help others only with natural disasters not man made wars. :-)

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Q1:the growing threat of terrorism against western countries extremists both domestic and foreign trying to impose inhumane doctrines environmental changes resulting in civil emergencies requiring mobilisation of defence personnel

Q2:instability in the asia/pacific region primarily around nth korea, indonesia and fiji will affect diplomatic and economic relations as will, to a lesser extent, the middle eastern and some of the african situations. nz defence forces must continue alongside australian and other aligned nations to provide security, training and support (of humanitarian efforts) to ensure the wellbeing of our neighbours and the global population

Q3:the navy and air-force in cooperation with Australian forces should maintain our border security, exclusion zones and participate in search and rescue operations the army should continue in peacekeeping/training roles and collaborate with Australia in defence cooperation tasks through the pacific and asia

Q4:increasing incursions by foreign vessels impacting on New Zealand economic future, illegal drug trafficking via smaller craft and growing refugee trafficking bringing with it the possibility of terrorists/violent radicals.

Q5:home first, region second and then global.

Q6:the defence force is just that, a force. they are our protectors and guardians so need to be deployed with a clear mandate, they are our first and last line of defence so there should be no confusion as to what is required of them.

Q7:in civil emergencies defence forces should not be hamstrung by buereacraic red tape, emergencies are civilians in danger and help should be dispatched as quickly as possible

Q8:military cadets are the perfect introduction to what our forces actually do and should be wholeheartedly supported. compulsory military service for a two year period would be of great benefit to both youth. the military and nz.

Q9:communication is paramount in any operational situation, as is the ability to deploy with speed. correct, extremely functional equipment need not be expensive and frivolous spending is self defeating. consultation with all levels of the forces would give government valuable insight as to what works best. government does not need to follow the u.s. example of excessive capability just the right tool for the job.

Q11:a more combined approach with Australia, as we are the primary countries of this region, is just good sense. shared responsibility and a united presence would ensure our individual and combined interests are served. believe me the anzac spirit lives on.

Q1: Broadly agree with Defence Assessment 2014 and current policy.

Q2: Broadly agree with Defence Assessment 2014 and current policy. The Defence Force needs to be flexible above all given the difficulty in predicting future events.

Q3: Broadly agree with current policy.

Q4: Broadly agree with Defence Assessment 2014 and current policy.

Q5: This is always a difficult balance but I am broadly in agreement with the current settings.

Q6: Broadly agree with current policy.

Q7: Broadly agree with current policy. The Defence Force should not primarily be structured for this role but obviously has the capability to be of great assistance.

Q8: Not more than currently.

Q9: Given financial and other constraints the current mix of capabilities is broadly appropriate. However there are two principles that I believe need further emphasis: - Congruence of policy and capability - In order to have credibility and practical utility the Defence Force must be able to deliver what has been stated as policy. The worst example of a deficit in this regard is the stated policy of a Joint Amphibious Task Force. Although this capability is still being developed it will be totally reliant on one vessel for sea transport. Although HMNZS Canterbury is one of the most useful vessels in the fleet, it has very significant limitations. The system for unloading onto landing craft is a cost-driven compromise which is inferior to the usual method using a well dock. This results in weather restrictions and problems with interoperability. The actual load capacity, although useful, is rather limited compared to vessels operated by other nations. The most serious problem though is the fact that it is a single vessel. Like the frigates, at least two vessels are needed to ensure one is available. I do not believe the JATF policy is realistic given the reliance on one vessel. - Quality of contributions to international operations - If New Zealand is making a contribution to multi-national operations the capabilities offered need to be of a standard that matches that of other countries involved. In general this is the case currently but there is often pressure to downgrade capability on the grounds of cost. In practical terms this means that, for potential contributions, quality should be prioritized over size or sustainability. For example the frigates, which are an important potential combat contribution to international efforts, need to be kept up to date compared to the frigates of like minded nations. Spending on capabilities that are neither useful for local/regional operations nor of a high enough quality for international operations is pointless. An example of this wasteful spending would be the re-establishment of a second or third rate air strike force. I do not believe a first rate air strike force is justified for New Zealand, and thus we should concentrate resources on improving the current deployable combat capabilities we have.

Q11:

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Q1: Global hotspots such as ISIS, North Korea and quite possibly Russia. We need to have our say and input in these issues as much as possible. Particularly if they encroach on our global asset

Q2: Obviously a bit more training with the US is happening. Maybe a look at reinstating ANZUS? That would give us a bit of sway against ISIS if attacks are made on New Zealand

Q3: Increase in training for our soldiers. Our last few contacts in Afghanistan were a joke. Reports of blue on blue. We're better than that. I don't trust our military has the capability to defend this country for more than a few hours.

Q4: Our EEZ needs a bit of a better defence. I don't feel qualified enough to discuss this though

Q5: Possibly discuss the possibility of putting troops in Australia on a semi permanent basis. And in return we have Aussies come here and train. They get another training environment that we excel in. And we get world class training in the outback. Win win

Q6: Instead of us being primarily peacekeeping. We need offensive capability. Not in huge detail. But enough to be capable of advancing interests. The skills are there. But the equipment we have isn't

Q7: Boots on ground in the first hours after the fact to provide support and infrastructure.

Q8: Keep YDU as is. It's doing amazing work. Also consider supporting services academies in high schools. With the option to recruit fresh out of high school? There are students who want to join fresh out of high school. Give them a fast track option.

Q9: Start considering ways we can combat advances in tech. Our enemy won't always be under equipped. Look at ways to combat tech like thermal imaging and EMP strikes, as much as that sounds like a 'Calls of Duty' fantasy.

Q11: There is a huge issue, at least that I've noticed. With Kiwis thinking our military is lacking and under equipped. Sent out to prove them wrong.

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Q1: Piracy in both SE Asia and the East Coast of Africa near Somalia that may put our maritime cargoes in jeopardy. Islamic fundamentalists of the ISIL and the Al Qaeda fraternity Fresh Water shortages for India, Pakistan and China due to global warming and the reduction of snow drop in the Himalayas which feed these nations principle rivers

Q2: Fresh water supplies, clean air and trading abilities ie cash supplies to purchase our produce petroleum supplies. ( Further fallout from the GFC still to come ???) Will we see a degeneration to warrior / clan state warfare for resources??? We need to be able to defend our shores from invasion or do we accept political and financial subjugation realising that we are better to live in our homes and ultimately integrate the invaders through marriage as happened to the Romans in Britain and later the Vikings .....

Q3: Assist with the "Rules based " ethos of the UN Assist with Civil Defence support in the Pacific and other nations on the Pacific Rim and where appropriate eg a naval presence with our cargo ship style frigates and the Hercs ability to drop in stores

Q4: Illegal fishing in our EEZ and the Ross Dependency "Invasion" by refugees from non-democratic nations in Africa and Muslim nations seeking a better life style than what they are subjected to at their home territories.

Q5: Replacing expensive plant so we can look after our assets eg more deep water ships ideally 3x destroyer class and 2x more Frigates plus replacement of the Hercs and Orions with planes of an equivalent capacity ie airlift and surveillance and maritime SAR

Q6: With nimbleness, open and honest dialogue with other Depts ie Foreign Affairs, Trade and Health. Maintain it's presence in the scheme of things.

Q7: Refer to Q5. ie have suitable and relevant plant at hand being planes ships and land transport vehicles

Q8: Maintain NZCF commitment. The real emphasis should be on expanding Basic training across all arms of the services to increase the pool of skills and knowledge of systems that are able to be utilised in community groups specifically team work, consensus discussions, safe working habits. CMT attendees of my acquaintance look back fondly on those 3x months as being some of their happiest days in that they were fit, fed and "entertained". I realise this was truncated by both cost and the lessening need of a large reserve capacity however with the high unemployment figures we have plus the Generation X mentality that the marketers have engendered I wonder if the PB Taxpayer can be squeezed some more to assist our 18 to 25 yr old cohort???

Q9: Self review to see funds are expended both strategically and adroitly. Are our base locations ideal?? Should we sell off Devonport and Whenuapai and relocate out of Akld in the sense of would a fair not fire sale of the land generate sufficient funds to purchase new sites and develop them to a sufficient standard for staff, operational requirements and families of service personel??

Q11: Not withstanding the intake of breath for the eye watering figures for plant replacement money needs to be wrung out of the system for building replacement of the various Drill Halls in the firm. Here in Dunedin we have two spectacular Edwardian brick skinned buildings that will be interesting in a decent earthquake. Luckily we are resident in the least likely zone seismic wise but that only delays the day... replacement of the dunedin Drill Hall by one of these concrete tilt slab boxes will be sad but it will provide better working conditions for the staff and volunteers??? plus support the building industry for 5 minutes. I realise sucking blood out of a stone is challenging. Good luck.

Q1:In the future, New Zealand's food producing capability will be coveted by others.

Q2:Exploding populations in asia and third world countries will want access to our relatively empty country.

Q3:Restore the "buddy - buddy" relationship with the U.S.A.

Q4:Pirating of our fisheries resources in our economic zone

Q5:Not qualified to comment constructively.

Q6:develop and maintain personal contacts with military leaders in the region.

Q7:To recruit and maintain in appropriate numbers, a force of motivated, practical personell; skilled in directing others at all levels. Taking charge of situations in civil emergencies in co-operation with other agencies such as police, fire service and medical

Q8:By going forward with a compulsory programme of military discipline and training of both sexes at a basic level. The objective being to develop self pride,loyalty to the team. basic healthy living with hard P.T. And a strong sense of national pride. To be conducted parallel with the regular forces but not as part of their defense budget.

Q9:Pay scales and allowances adequate to attract the very best people they need for the roles on offer.

Q11:Veteran's affairs dept.to be working for the veterans. The treatment of veterans subjected to "agent orange" in Vietnam and radiation in the Pacific has been a sad indictment on successive governments. Simple statistics of cancer deaths and deformaties speak for themselves.

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Q1: The major threats to New Zealand are not military but from social disruption caused by inequality, economic injustice, poverty and environmental degradation within this country or in other countries. This could cause repressed desperate people to become violent or seek freedom or asylum in undesirable ways eg. refugees from wartorn nations or escaping climate change. New Zealand needs to address the causes of violence and warfare and realise that one of the major threats to our security is global insecurity based on militarism and increasing militarisation of the world which does not contribute to security.

Q2: The NZ Defence force needs to be focussed on defending New Zealand airspace, land and coastline itself whereas currently it is mainly being called upon to deal with wars in foreign countries to show support for its allies. This combat or even training soldiers role should only be for the purpose of UN Peacekeeping operations. In addition, NZ is investing millions of dollars in military hardware and participation in massive military exercises in the Pacific with select partners. New Zealand needs to take greater responsibility for creating the positive changes it would like to see in the international environment. One important element of this is to refrain from participation in warfare exercises which assumes certain nations to be enemies and others to be merely defenders. If this mindset was changed it would mean that the defence forces would be trained in a different manner for a different purpose.

Q3: The NZ Defence force should focus on developing civilian based defence to overcome the feeling of vulnerability or fear of attack on this land (however unlikely that is) This is would be based on non-violent action not military methods. However NZ could have some kind of standing army/navy perhaps like Switzerland as an interim step to waylay the fearful of unlikely foreign invasion. The same principle should be the predominant focus of our overseas services although a UNited Nations Peacekeeping police force would be an acceptable part of our contribution. However most of our defence budget and forces deployed would be trained in delivering humanitarian aid, providing food, water, shelter, medical and health facilities, rebuilding bridges and infrastructure in countries suffering from warfare. This would advance our interests abroad and prevent provocation and retribution that is the outcome of military forms of action.

Q4: The illegal fishing and overfishing seems to be the main problem as well as dumping and pollution in these areas for which NZ rightly feels responsibility for managing. The defence of our coastal waters should involve a fleet of patrol boats to maintain constant monitoring of all the South Pacific and Antarctic region-not a few military frigates.

Q5: New Zealand should ensure its own security as the priority but this must not be based on military means. The defence forces would be better employed to learn how to restore degraded environments eg. replanting forests, cleaning waterways, removing chemicals and toxic rubbish from the land (tyres, mining, etc) The same kind of environmental defence services needs to be offered to other countries our friends and other nations who we might not regard as our allies but who would soon become our friends if we provided health or engineering services to restore their environments eg. establish clean readily available water for every village or mosquito nets for a whole country etc. If we really wanted to help Australia we would contribute to desalination and restoration of their desert areas. We would work with our ANZAC allies to help with education and economic development of Pacific nations especially threatened by Climate change. This is what really threatens us globally and this is the kind of response that is called for by us within our region in order to genuinely contribute to international peace and global security.

Q6: The NZ Defence Force needs to transition from a military based activity to one who builds its pride and image around the courageous role of being an international leader in delivery of humanitarian aid, medical and health services, building of schools, law enforcement facilities, sustainable renewable non-polluting electricity and water purification systems etc. (to name a few) These kinds of activities suit a physically oriented public service but transfers the

investment and energy away from military machines and hardware to more useful civilian services. This would truly protect and advance our nation's interest.

Q7: The NZ Defence Force is ideally suited to being trained and immediately effective in dealing with disasters of all kinds. This also provides the exciting element of overcoming danger and facing destruction which many young men seem to want and certainly like the opportunity to exercise extraordinary courage. Once again the well trained NZ civil defence force to deal with floods, fires, earthquakes etc. will be useful in helping other nations to deal with their disasters-contributing further to fighting the real battles threatening humanity and by so doing achieve greater international security.

Q8: It is vital that the NZ Defence Force is not pitched to entice our youth into war fighting or weapon wielding roles or ideas of manhood or bravery. This is what we most condemn in terrorist or crime gangs and in our global society striving for child protection and international human rights we do not want to produce another hypocritical contradiction of stating we are against child soldiers and then start indoctrinating our own youth with this model. Thus the NZ Environmental Defence Force should be the only form of engagement for young people. It could take the form of a Conservation Corp and Peace Corp with ample opportunity for all young people to contribute to national service for humanity. This would involve tremendous discipline and development of multicultural higher values which is what young people need to learn to become responsible global citizens.

Q9: The NZ Defence Force needs to develop its capabilities through a shift in its culture and what it defines as defence. The philosophy, psychology and social belief systems need to change from the past ideas of warfare and military defence to a more enlightened consciousness of the future which many of us have in the present. People who have this progressive attitude need to be given positions of power, decision making and planning to prepare our people for the new way of thinking about defence as predominantly a peacemaking, peacebuilding operation for humanity in every country but some nations will make this progressive shift more quickly and easily than others. Costa Rica is an excellent example of a nation that has made this quantum leap to dismantle its military defence. New Zealand is particularly well placed to do so as well and become a leader in this field.

Q11: Perhaps the most important part of this process not touched on in this broad based general overview and summarised submission is the need for a clearly defined NZ Foreign Policy as the proper platform for the Defence Policy. This should take the form of International Peacemaking to End all Wars and could even be based on the idea of Positive Peacemaking Neutrality in that it means we would not be part of military alliances. This is really an extension of our Nuclear Free policy which has stood the test of time and allows us to build upon it as the appropriate and desirable contribution to the international community. Our goal would be to assist in making the United Nations the most effective body it is meant to be according to its Charter that allows all nations to prosper without the threat of war and violence based on human rights, social justice and environmental well-being.

Q1:Earthquakes ,tsunamis ,radicals,extremists ,aliens , and who knows what else

Q2:

Q3:

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:to keep order and discipline

Q8:every youngster should have an opportunity

Q9:as much as it takes

Q11:National service should be compulsory as this will cure a lot of society problems we have today

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Q1:

Q2:

Q3:

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8:

Q9:

Q11: I would like to state; that my son who is 19, and who enjoyed a very good education; could not get into the army! Because he is gluten free, he is wheaten intolerant. He is an amazing person, a leader, fit as a fiddle. Ran the Auckland Marathon in 2014 in 4 hours and 3 min. Enjoys his football three times a week. Did the World Challenge and worked in an orphanage in Cambodia. Has a sister who is Intellectually handicapped; knows about compassion and human rights and advocacy. And he is a proud New Zealander. He has all the qualities; but can't join the army. As a parent this is very frustrating; to see my son stopped in realizing his dreams! When I watch his football games; he is a warrior and he is very motivated to win! Would a person like this not be beneficial to the army?! I would like a response to this. Kind regards, Ineke Dirkzwager

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Q1:NZ was at war with Iraq and there has been no proof of threat. Yet this Government has created a security risk to this country by sending troops to Iraq to engage in a illegal Corporate takeover and mass genocide of the nations people. The challenge is, will this Government withdraw all NZ troops from Iraq to restore the security of our nation...?

Q2:Theres nothing wrong with our defense forces The problem is how this Government is interacting with internationals which aren't in the best interests of NZers.

Q3:Our defense forces are fine they way they are and interests abroad are not our business.

Q4:Orchestrated legislated theft and exploitation of our water,food and mineral resources. Economic takeover by the same corporate cartel that's ruined the economy's of other countries.

Q5:The Governments priority is to protect the lives of our defense forces by not putting them in comprising situation to support the agendas of the Corporate cartel.

Q6:There is nothing wrong with how our defense force operates Stop trying to change it Bring our solders home

Q7:Its already clear. It doesn't need to be changed.

Q8:LSV is fine Nothing needs to be changed.

Q9:Guns to shoot down foreign chemtrail planes that come into NZ airspace.

Q11:

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Q1: Threats to our resources over the next 25 years.

Q2:

Q3: A Naval presence in the Southern Ocean. A military presence assisting our allies overseas in peacekeeping ops.

Q4: Resources being pillaged. Fish / seafood in the short term and natural (oil/gas/water/ land) in the long term.

Q5:

Q6: We must remain a team player on the international front. This includes supporting activities such as peacekeeping with our allies and other international forces. We must be mindful of the economic impact of not supporting our allies abroad.

Q7: A major player, and we must be equipped appropriately to do this.

Q8: A lead role. However, We must put money into programmes that produce results. YDU / YLS programmes currently run do not address a youth problem and cost a huge amount per person. On completion of the programme most youth go back into the environment they were taken from. Very little statistics are held to substantiate or quantify the success of this programme. NZ Cadet Forces model is far superior and with very little funding by comparison. NZDF Should be focussing and expanding its support for youth into NZ Cadet Forces.

Q9: Platforms and equipment that meet the needs of the task at hand. Deployable ships including multi platform such as CY. Frigates. Offshore Patrol Craft for Southern Ocean patrols. Reduce Army vehicles such as LAV's etc as they rarely get shipped overseas - we instead use Allies vehicles. Look at adopting commonality between other Nations equipment (IE small Arms). Aircraft

Q11: Reviews of capital equipment purchases should be reviewed before being authorised by an independent body. The LAV purchase many years ago demonstrates this. 105 LAV's purchased and 50% are in mothballs. Mainly due to the Army not having enough clever operators for these technical vehicles (clever people dont join the Army). Defence wastes a huge amount of money on commercial contractors such as ESS/ Compass Group/ SG Fleet/ / APX / The Workwear group etc. It is not good value for money and takes away the NZDF's ability to manage itself. We are at the behest of a contractors ability to supply goods and services. In some cases (clothing for instance) can take 2 months to fulfill simple orders. This is unacceptable when deploying. NZDF staff do not have the skills to manage contractors effectively.



Q1: Terrorism, NZ needs a counter terrorist response that come from Police and not military. The budget for the Commando squadron should be given to Police and invested in their STG. The STG are more hands on carrying out operations regularly as opposed to their military counterpart who seldom do a single operation. Effectively we have 2 groups doing the same role.

Q2:

Q3: UN peacekeeping roles and take the lead in pacific emergencies. Lets not be behind Australia, lets get ahead of them.

Q4:

Q5: More involvement for Police and military in UN missions. Taking lead roles in key areas, professional standards, operations, community policing. Roles where we can make a difference. Taking leadership roles see paint us in a better light and we can actually make a positive difference.

Q6:

Q7:

Q8: More LSV courses or even compulsory military training. Youth is a driver of crime and mandatory 6 months training for all youth can only help to eliminate this problem. Even for those non problem youth there is much to learn.

Q9: As above replacing Commando Sq with a Police led response under STG.

Q11:

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Q1: Incursions within the NZ EEZ and ECS zones especially illegal fishing .Not being able to interface effectively with or allied partners due to differences in equipment (need common equipment, makes servicing, spares sharing and logistics, qualifications + skills transfer easier). .Our allied partners need us to interface with them without NZ being an oddball.

.Internet cyber threats

Q2: While the threats of old remain (Nuclear, Biological and Germ Warfare in some theatres worldwide - and these still require being in the training forefront) new forms of warfare need thought and consideration such as suicide bombers, ISIS, cyber warfare, Internet cyber threats

Q3: Maritime Patrol .Defence of NZ EEZ and ECS .Medivac, SAR and disaster relief .United Nations efforts .Joint support, training and exercises with allied partners such as Australia and US

Q4: Incursions into NZ EEZ and ECS without being able to do anything about it (ref fishing boat in southern ocean that our RNZN attempted to board three times unsuccessfully January this year). .Need good robust equipment in very challenging conditions.

Q5: NZ internal priorities first, Medivac, SAR, disaster relief .United Nations Participation and a closer operational relationship with Australia.

Q6: The NZDF should be able to have an increased budget to be able to operate without such economic restrictions as they do now. The NZDF needs to be reinvigorated to make it an employer of choice for young people looking for good career prospects. Those within, need good opportunities for advancement and career development with qualifications that are directly comparable (read same) to those in civilian workplaces.

Q7: NZDF role is in Medivac, SAR and Civil Defence - and must have capability to dispatch immediately in 'all weathers'

Q8: Cadet forces - good feed into NZDF

Q9: UN support, relief and Guidance .Maritime Patrol + SAR .Medivac, Civil defence + SAR

Q11: NZDF in the past has procured its equipment in a fashion of trying to save money and has risked operational robustness and capability. RNZAF This time the NZDF needs to ensure that mission capability is not undermined. For example, procurement of new 'All weather' helicopters resulted in a NH90's being purchased and within a short time one was struck by lightning, the cost to repair was not foreseen - well actually it can be foreseen if the right people are asked before hand. I forecast the NH90 will be a pup in 10 years time with major corrosion issues. Why the NZDF bought a relatively new type helicopter that hadn't been operated extensively in this part of the world - and a different type from Australia remains to be seen. The procurement selection process is flawed and no doubt will be demonstrated once again. However here's what the NZDF needs to do: Our partners are the Australian Defence Force and the US. So why not use the same equipment? Therefore in all our missions we get use the same equipment, can share spares and logistics and personnel, easy. Replace the C130's with the latest spec C130J's. We use our Herc's all the time all over the world. They are robust, mission capable, simple enough to work effectively and yet not so complex as to slow us down. (The existing C130's reliability is suffering due to their age and realistically we can't continue in the present situation. We look pretty NAF with such un-reliable aircraft. This procurement needs to happen first). If the B757's need replacing then get one C17. The RNZAF will finally be able to lift the Army's LAV's C130J's will be able to continue NZ's relief efforts across the Pacific, with backup of the C17 which can fly our UN missions across the world. Replace the P3Orions with new ones with the latest spec engines and avionics. Nothing else will replace the existing hardware to the same operational capability let alone reliability. Regarding Helicopters, NZDF should have bought Black Hawks (or maybe super Puma's). The Black Hawks would have interfaced with the RAAF and USAF well. NZDF went the cheap option in purchasing the T6C Texon's and while these may turn out to be a good trainer we have once again going down the route of purchasing different hardware from

Australia - our main training and operational partner. So now our pilots will have difficulty in interfacing the RAAF! -(on the Airbus A400M. Airbuses are very complex aircraft - they go well when everything is good. However in moist, turbulent conditions (such as NZ weather) - they turn into an operators worst nightmare and as a result are very taxing with respect to maintenance and reliability. The Avionics systems require significant personnel skills increase, qualification and experience and while this may be good for personnel the RNZAF will require more experienced staff (and more quantity of such staff) to ensure reliable ops. Mark my words, if the RNZAF purchases A400M's then the costs to maintain and service will go through the roof. Corrosion will be a factor after 10 years operation and the service life (scrap aircraft after this time) of Airbus aircraft is 12-13 years - then things get really expensive! Airbus hasn't been able to get on top of the Corrosion issue for operators in this part of the world. Only those operators with large numbers of them will be able to ensure they operate effectively. Suggest you ask rated Airbus engineers their opinions. No doubt Airbus will market them well and offer a cheaper cost however the long term cost will be far more on an aircraft we can operate for a comparable shorter time. US built aircraft work as advertised, work well, are robust, are not overly complicated, have mission robustness, don't corrode like their European counterparts and will be a good purchase for many - many years - as the NZDF has already demonstrated. Oh yes, The Australians and US operate them! So, buy once buy right. First: C130J's (ASAP) Second: C17 (when the 757's are end of life) Third: P3Orions (when the existing P3C are end of life) RNZN We need more Frigates to patrol our waters (EEC and ECS) and to ensure more effective SAR capability. Good reikiable heavy seas capable ships that don't make our crews sick. Army Good reliable equipment and resources, with common equipment to our partners. Not sure if the concept of combining the NZDF into one force with different arms such as a NZ Marines would show effective savings.

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Q1: The undermining of New Zealand's security by Muslim immigration and the threat of Islamic terrorism. New Zealand as a small population is more at risk than other countries from a change to its population and demographics through excessive and potentially dangerous mass immigration, and the risk of the domestic security issues that come with that.

Q2: Moving away from the mutual support of traditional allies such as Great Britain and Australia in favour of other nations, in the search for other economic partners will leave New Zealand in a difficult and isolated position in the future. Other less traditional emerging world economies come with much greater risks.

Q3: A strong and adaptable armed forces is a must to help ward off potential aggressors and protect New Zealand from threats both here and abroad. A curb in the media's dissecting of any NZ defence force operations and reporting of 'its often incorrect' analysis would be helpful in not giving our adversaries information they can use. It projects an image of weakness to other countries and causes a lack of support amongst the population for what NZ defence force may need to do.

Q4: On the local stage the threat by manipulation of surrounding partners / Nations / Islands populations by islamification is the most dangerous. The taking over of the economic wellbeing of those nations and our own by more dominant emerging asian economic superpowers. Threats to New Zealand's Cyber Security also.

Q5: Ensuring New Zealand's security and wellbeing is the number one priority and must come first before any commitments to international peace initiatives. New Zealand cannot afford to inject money into international peace initiatives, that money needs investing into our own security and wellbeing. New Zealand must not be sucked into other countries agenda's and conflicts. New Zealand needs to better secure its borders and not take unwanted and potentially dangerous, so called, refugees just because the UN or other pressurise us to do so.

Q6: Advancing the nations interests on the world stage needs to come second to investing, modernising and enlarging our capability to protect our security here at home.

Q7: This is a core role for our forces second only to military defence and requires better equipment and training for such events. The ability for our servicemen and women to be part of specialist teams would enhance their role and employment and help retain staff, going some way in helping address the terrible staff retention issues due to boredom.

Q8: Better treatment and, professionalism towards young people and better opportunities for them. I have seen some superb young people unable to join the NZ Army etc. Youths that although not necessarily very academic, would have been a great asset to our forces but now feel unworthy and rejected. The drinking culture in the NZ Army is disgraceful and is often led by higher ranks. Drunkenness in the forces is a real problem. Also, although NZ Defence want to be seen to 'do their bit' for youth, they should not allow disruptive, problem or unprofessional individuals to remain. I have known very good young soldiers become completely disillusioned with their career because whilst they themselves have worked hard and are professional, other less desirable and unruly youths are allowed to enter and remain. Helping young people posted to either North or South Islands away from their families get reasonable help with travel costs is something that really needs to be done. I have two children in the NZ Army, they often do not come home because flying back can sometimes cost them over \$300 dollars each way. This is unfair when others have leave and, due to location, can easily and without cost get home. Retention rates could be greatly enhanced with an affordable travel deal for young people posted away.

Q9: Much better equipment and opportunities. An effective and proper airforce with the ability to properly protect its ground forces without the reliance on partner nations.

Q11: Stop the appalling drinking culture. Stop favouritism as regard opportunities and overseas travel. Help young service personnel with their appallingly expensive inter island travel costs.

Q1:

Q2:

Q3:

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8:

Q9:

Q11:1. In providing an effective response capability, it is essential that the NZDF has sufficient resources to increase operational tempo when required. With a high level of operational activity when functioning on a 'business as usual' basis there are currently inadequate resources in the support sectors to meet requirements to surge. There is, in my view limited point in investing in the 'sharp' end while allowing the 'blunt end' to degenerate. The 'sharp end' is only sharp if the 'blunt end' is able to support it effectively. 'Double-hatting' has increasingly become the norm in many areas since the civilianisation process substantially and damagingly (directly and indirectly) reduced the numbers of experienced personnel in critical areas. The human cost of this is fatigue, burn-out and, increasingly mental health issues amongst service members. Continuing to attempt to meet required outputs without adequate resources is unsustainable. Investment across the Defence Force must be balanced in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. 2. In certain, particularly specialist officer areas the NZDF is critically undermanned. It is having severe difficulty recruiting and retaining. Until it accepts that it must compete with the civilian sector in terms, conditions and remuneration, this will remain a major problem. Quality is never cheap. Benchmarking and aligning with public sector arrangements will not change anything. What is required is matching if the NZDF is to be regarded as an attractive employment option, especially for experienced professionals.

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Q1: Environmental damage will be the biggest threat to New Zealand's future by far. With roughly a 40% decline in life on Earth since 1960 (Refer BBC News) protecting our economic zone should be a top priority. The actual threat of conflict is so small and will remain small so long as we are seen to be doing the right thing and avoid conflicts without the critical mass of local support in those countries with difficulties.

Q2: I think a little more understanding of the Asian nations would be good. Possibly could be helped by changes in New Zealand in general. i.e. moving from a bi-cultural country to a multicultural country. A constitution my help with that rather than a flag change... Could do both I guess.

Q3: Peace keeping, Rescue, Disaster relief, Aid work, Anti-piracy and drugs etc. Is all good. A little bit of motivating New Zealand to do its best would be good too. I would love to have a defence PTI train our hockey club for an afternoon. Maritime patrols and just as importantly working with MAF to collect data about our area of responsibility (it's important to know what we have so we can manage it better).

Q4: Over fishing/illegal fishing and possibly some boat people trying to cross the Tasman. As far as our partners are concerned they tend to be very stable and can handle their own problems. Helping with Intel and monitoring movements of key people is still very important.

Q5: We should not take refugees. I know this sounds mean but these people are supposed to be the balance/the opposition parties, the freedom fighters in their own country by removing them you only make the situation in that country more extreme. This is where the UN needs to earn it's pay by monitoring and assisting those in need in their own country.

Q6: Be as open as possible (excluding Intel and SAS that's no ones business but the people involved). Be seen to be helping in disaster relief and maritime patrols and rescues. Look after your people, less drink, keep them fit, fast, smart and strong.

Q7: You are the armed force but also "The Thunder Birds". So be there with well trained staff and good equipment when something goes wrong.

Q8: There is a lot of focus on kids and school visits but why not try and help everyone. Are we the second most obese nation behind the USA? We must be close, so some community help with that would be good.

Q9: A replacement to the Hercules, something that is big enough for the NH90's and LAV's New rifles, Steyrs are really good (and I did not like the look of them to begin with), you do not need a Zombie apocalypse rifle (AR16) you need something that does the job better than the opposition has. Better Maritime patrol aircraft. Have you considered the Beechcraft King Air or Pilatus PC12 for this role? Several of these smaller planes would have enough range and could be operated from both Islands possibly on a contract basis.

Q11: You can spend \$80 million on a helicopter but next to nothing on the barracks. Spend some money on the barracks, it is their home, look after the people. A single bed sitter styled hotel unit is not much to live in on a semi-permanent basis really. So I would consider a bed space, table area, natural light, kitchenette and ensuite the minimum for our forces.

Q1: Presently, the biggest threat to New Zealand's sovereignty is violation of our EEZ, namely illegal fishing. Perhaps it could be said that there is no military threat to New Zealand at the moment. The problem with this view is that this position could rapidly change. Our ties to the United States and Australia could potentially mark China as a threat some time in the future, especially if tensions increase with the USA over China's new focus on maritime strength. If Australia comes into conflict with Indonesia within the near future, we could also be threatened by that conflict. We must also be ready to combat terrorism. Despite a lack of terrorist attacks in NZ so far, this too could rapidly change.

Q2: As previously stated, if China takes a more active role in the Pacific/East Asia through an enlarged navy, conflict could emerge between them and the USA. Though perhaps an open war between the two is unlikely due to economic interdependence, it could well result in a number of "bush wars" between proxy states, as witnessed during the Cold War. If Antarctica is opened for resource gathering, New Zealand might be in a position of greater strategic importance, garnering more interest internationally as an industrialized base of operations. The NZDF must expand due to this, without compromising capabilities already held, as to ensure our sovereignty and international interests are preserved.

Q3: The most probable tasks that the NZDF must perform are counter piracy operations and counter-insurgency operations. New Zealand's dependence on trade means that secure maritime trade routes are paramount to economic survival. Counter-Insurgency operations and other peacekeeping operations help support weak states, thus hindering the activities of criminal and terrorist organisations. The EEZ must be patrolled and secured to protect our sovereignty, and the NZDF can work with other governmental organisations to ensure this. The NZDF must also be a credible force in conventional military operations. It must be able to defend New Zealand from foreign aggression (perhaps not indefinitely, but for long enough that support from our allies can arrive). Similarly, the NZDF should retain an expeditionary capability, allowing us to deploy troops for conventional engagements in support of our allies, and UN mandated missions.

Q4: The EEZ is already contested by illegal fishermen, and this will likely become worse if population growth in East Asian countries does not slow. If international convention changes regarding Antarctica, we will most likely find our claim fiercely contested by resource-starved countries. This could either be from South American countries in close proximity to Antarctica, or from nations with an adequate industrial base to project power that far (China, Russia, potentially India). Terrorism too is a security issue to be addressed, and must be viewed as a credible threat.

Q5: The NZDF must be able to ensure the sustainable survival of the state. We cannot assume that allied armed forces will protect trade routes that New Zealand depends on, so maintaining a navy capable of exerting influence at great distances from NZ is perhaps the top priority. This has the added effect of being able to assist in patrolling the EEZ, and in contributing to the defence of our allies from maritime threats too. The next priority is sustaining adequate land forces to perform the tasks that are required of it: contributing to international security through UN mandated operations, providing a deterrence to invasion of the New Zealand mainlands, and being able to contribute to the security of our allies and neighbors.

Q6: Many of the tasks that the NZDF takes part in are led by other governmental agencies. To ensure greater efficiency in these style of operations, the NZDF should endeavor to work with them in exercises. as to increase cooperation and help both parties understand the procedures of the other. It would also help to increase the size of the reserve forces, thus bringing greater civilian knowledge and skills into the NZDF.

Q7: The NZDF is not the lead agency in these type of operations, but should maintain the ability to assist in them. Transportation of personnel and supplies is a major contribution that all three services can provide. Manpower, and specialist engineers are also of great assistance.

The NZDF has greater planning ability than most governmental and non governmental organisations, so even if the NZDF isn't the lead agency, it should be able to contribute to the planning and organisation of disaster relief.

Q8: Anything that the NZDF can do to assist in this is helpful but higher priority tasks are more worthy of the Defence Force's attention. Funding seems to be a constant issue in defence capabilities, and anything drawing away from the ability of the NZDF to act in New Zealand's best interests abroad should be considered a secondary priority.

Q9: The navy needs to maintain the maritime combat force, as to patrol trade routes and the EEZ, in addition to contributing to maritime security of our allies and protecting expeditions conducted by the other services. It should also retain the ability to transport both ground and air forces. The Army needs the ability to conduct conventional and unconventional operations. The current organisation of 1st Brigade seems fairly competent at a range of tasks, but it may be of use to retrain the two light infantry battalions as amphibious and air mobile battalions, as to allow for greater capabilities in expeditionary operation within the South Pacific region. The Air Force must have the ability to transport troops and equipment quickly, and should also have the ability to monitor the EEZ. The reinstatement of the Air Combat force would allow for control of New Zealand's airspace, and allow for greater contributions to international military operations, but is perhaps of low priority compared to the other required capabilities of the NZDF.

Q11: On a smaller note, I seem to believe that the army has 24 Javelin ATGM launchers. If this number is correct, I believe it would be recommendable to purchase three more, allowing them to be issued to each platoon in 1st Brigade. Thank you for allowing me to contribute to this process.

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Q1:1. Internal. Any group, religious or otherwise deciding to take matters into their own hands. 2. External. A nation, becoming like Japan prior to WW2, deciding to be expansionistic.

Q2:Changes that affect N.Z.'s interests will be economic both here and countries abroad. Religious problems that affect other states or between states e.g. perhaps Islamic Bangladesh and Buddhist Myanmar.

Q3:The roles should be to answer requests for help from reputable organizations like the UN or countries that are threatened or invaded by a belligerent nation. Assisting in major disasters both here and abroad.

Q4:Most of these challenges are unknown at the moment but a well trained and properly equipped Defence Force should be ready at all times.

Q5:The major priority is a well trained core of military personnel that can be ready to train new recruits if any emergency demands an increase in Defence Force numbers. The other priority is to ensure they have the appropriate modern equipment.

Q6:It should operate as an integrated force as much as possible.

Q7:The Defence Force's role is to be as ready as possible if this resilience is suddenly abated through various factors

Q8:It would be advantageous to offer military training during school holiday breaks. This would be voluntary of course. During the 1950s the writer attended Linton when the whole school went into the camp for the start of the 1952 school year. I returned voluntarily in 1955 during the summer holidays and underwent a mortar course which included a live firing (without an explosive warhead).It was great!!

Q9:1. Well trained people and excellent leadership. 2. A review of equipment in the three forces.

Q11:I am not in touch with naval matters so no comment in that area. With regard to the army, it is a matter of good discipline and having the correct equipment. As an ex Air N.Z. captain I have an interest in the RNZAF aircraft. There appears to me, no problem with the new Training aircraft. The new Brazilian KC390 military transport aircraft appears to be the best replacement for the Hercules. Its size is appropriate. Being a jet its speed is needed to alleviate our rather isolated country. It has 60 plus orders. Its first flight was in Feb. Its engines are the same as Air N.Z.'s Airbus A320 and there is a major overhaul base for that engine in Christchurch. Boeing is assisting Embraer, the manufacturer, in further development and the marketing of the aircraft. Finally a comment in a recent Flight Magazine from Squadron Leader Wright of the RAF, " we can't get the majority of army equipment in the Hercules any more." Is this happening or going to happen in N.Z.? Details of the KC 390 are available from many sources so I won't go into that here. The C17 which the RAAF have are too big for us and anyway Boeing are closing down the production line this month. The Airbus A400, at twice the payload of the C130 and KC390 is also too big for use and slower than the KC390. Its engines are a new breed and have had a troublesome introduction. A new C130 is possible but on many features the KC390 is by far the best choice for the future.

Q1:Climate Change

Q2:We need to be proactive in peace keeping, membership of the UN and assisting mediation to avoid conflict.

Q3:Peacekeeping, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance

Q4:Climate Change, refugee and boat people issues.

Q5:It is a threat to us that Auustralia is so close to the USA on defence issues. We need to remain non-aligned and non-combative. Coasta Rico is a good model for New Zealand to follow.

Q6:being a neighbour in the South Pacific and world. Looking at advancing the interests of our planet and all peoples in the area, not merely New Zealand, is a primary protective strategy.

Q7:A nimble, fast acting response force that offers neighbourliness, leadership, support and enhancement of resilience within our region is a tremendous national asset. Disarming and becoming a focus for collaboration and a resource for environmental and development assistance has benefits for everyone.

Q8:I see wonderful value in search and rescue, environmental protection, and leadership skills for young people. Helping them resolve conflict, build peace and work co-operatively are great aims.

Q9:A ready reaction team would need to develop new knowledge and capabilities in peace studies, reconciliation, mediation, communications and environmental management.

Q11:

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Q1: As of right now, one of the current greatest threats to New Zealand and its citizen's security is the advent of domestic terrorism and the uprising adversity of cyber-terrorism. With the War on Terror forming significant global terrorist cells, NZ needs to have appropriate means of counter-terrorism activities through use of intelligence and military co-operation with civil agencies while also being able to support coalition activity to put an end to foreign terrorist groups like ISIL. Another current significant threat to New Zealand and its allies is the tensions and fragile political and socio-economic situation in South East Asia, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the situation and diplomatic tensions in North Korea with their unauthorised and highly controversial nuclear weapon testing and significant military drills/exercises. This will be a challenge New Zealand and the Defence Force will have to face as we have to be prepared for any diplomatic and possible military contributions to the Korean peninsula in the present or future political situation. In terms of future threats and challenges to New Zealand, unstable Southeast Asia (especially with South China Sea tensions/disputes with China's new military reef island expansion) or Oceanic regions pose potential future threats in terms of radical political changes (i.e. possible coups) or crisis (whether it be a natural, economic, ethnic and/or political complication). China, now being the largest economic superpower along with their rapid modernisation and increase in military activity and expenditure (with their navy in particular), whilst does not pose an immediate threat to NZ and its allies security, should be put into account especially in a country with a fragile political system which could change at any time (especially in the wake of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong which usually leads to unfair response from the government and local authorities) especially during their current expansion economically, politically and militarily.

Q2: New Zealand's geographic location makes New Zealand with its interests highly vulnerable to natural disasters. This can have a significant adverse impact on nearby foreign nation's (in particular nations which are less economically stable) economic and political situation. Current and future diplomatic, immigration and ethical (like the recent Bali 9 executions) problems pose a foreign relation threat which could put significant strains on NZ's trading and collective security status with nearby countries. Violent non-state actors could also have significant negative implications in smaller nearby nations in the future which could pose a threat to New Zealand's interests. In terms of keeping security in the face of radical terrorism, political coup's and ethnic tensions, the Defence Force will have to be ready to deploy peacekeeping forces to keep security and stability in the affected region(s) in an ever-changing world.

Q3: In the current global situation, the Defence Force needs to continue supporting global United Nations and/or US-backed peacekeeping operations to keep less fortunate countries stable and keep New Zealand and its allies/interests safe. Contributing to collective security exercises and training foreign forces (especially in the case of helping train Iraqi soldiers to combat ISIS) help advance New Zealand's security and positive peacekeeping image abroad. In addition to supporting training, exercises and peacekeeping missions, the Defence Force should continue to provide aid and support to domestic and international natural disasters. The Defence Force, in particular the Navy, should continue to protect New Zealand's Exclusive Economic Zone from illegal fisheries, drug/human trafficking and other illegal practises. In addition the Defence Force should continue to support Naval patrols and coalition support in New Zealand's naval sphere of influence, that being the Pacific and other nearby oceans in both military conflict zones and/or anti-piracy missions.

Q4: Illegal Fisheries/immigrants and changes in the political environment are all potential emerging security challenges that NZ will have to face. Foreign vessels, with military submarines in particular, are emerging challenges as countries like China and Russia up their Pacific naval reach. Being able to detect and deter foreign vessels entering in or near our

territory's, whether military or illegal civilian, are nearby challenges that NZ will have to face in a constantly changing political environment. In addition to rising superpower influence, areas in Antarctica need to be monitored where countries may attempt to illegally exploit certain areas (which could include the Ross Dependency) for economic or strategic/military gains.

Q5: Peacekeeping and training is a vital core part of New Zealand's support-type role in coalition and collective security missions/operations. In terms of Navy, New Zealand should continue to patrol our EEZ and Pacific Ocean area's with appropriate armaments for any potential adversary. Having a well-armed navy with possible armaments such as long range anti-ship Harpoon and long-range anti-air Standard missiles (which could be added on when we replace our ANZAC-class frigates) could heavily help patrol, peacekeeping, exercises (e.g. RIMPAC) and coalition military operations. The government should also prioritise working and training with nearby partners and countries for collective security. The defence force could help increase military exercises and operation effectiveness through the use of a small but advanced fleet of jet aircraft (like the cheap and highly advanced SAAB JAS 39 Gripen or even use the remaining in-storage MB-339's) to bring back NZ's air combat capability which could help benefit current (i.e. military air action in Iraq) and future military operations. Strong relations with other countries are optimal given the size of the Defence Force. The NZDF should work interoperability with the Australian Defence Force for maximum combat efficiency. In addition, The NZDF should prioritise ADF as the most preferential partner in any Joint Task Force (with the US and then UK next). Strong military relations, through routine exercises and joint military operations, will benefit New Zealand's defence capability as a whole. The US should and most likely will remain the NZDF and the ADF's primary supplier of military assistance and hardware. Securing good, affordable deals with the US is a goal for both the NZDF and interoperable ADF. Likewise, NZ should avoid mass cancellations like that of the cancelled 28 F16A/B's that the previous Labour government did as this did not just hurt the NZDF's capability but also military relations and trust with the US.

Q6: The Defence Force should operate in accordance to the capabilities and doctrine outlined throughout this submission.

Q7: The Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience for unforeseen events and natural disasters should come in the form of immediate civilian humanitarian aid and resources in the affected areas/regions. In addition, the Defence Force needs to be able to work in unison with civil authorities during an unforeseen event/natural disaster in the form of emergency transport, help with Urban Search and Rescue support, Medical Evacuation, humanitarian aid/logistics transfer and emergency law enforcement. In addition, the Defence Force's role should be to be able to work in emergency situations where the civil authorities are unable or in too great of a risk to successfully operate in the affected area(s) (e.g. Protection of assets and core vital infrastructure during a man-made or natural disaster).

Q8: The Defence Force should help develop New Zealand's youth through a variety of defence courses, experiences, public displays, advertisements and work with the New Zealand Cadet Forces. Adequate funding for programmes and skilled personnel working with the New Zealand Cadet Forces is vital for youth to learn vital defence and leadership skills that will be beneficial for young cadets if they decide to further pursue a career in the Defence Force. Schemes and programmes like the 'Youth Life Skills' scheme and the 'Fresh Start' programme help develop youth with beneficial skills and qualifications that will help them both in the Defence Force but also in civilian jobs later in life.

Q9: Air Combat Capability - With the previous Labour government scrapping our Air Combat Wing, New Zealand has had a significant 'force multiplier' absence. In a world where

coalition air strikes and air superiority is vital in a conflict zone, the NZDF would benefit bringing back air combat capability in Army (air to ground support, i.e. Close Air Support), Air Force (protection of air assets) and Navy (reconnaissance and anti-air/ship capability) operations. NZ should look into possibly bringing back the Aermacchi MB-399's (for training and light multirole capability), purchasing Australia's F/A-18's (when Australia replaces them with F-35's) or preferably buying a small fleet of cheap, modern and highly effective jets like the SAAB JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighter jet (which is economically and militarily appealing especially with the Swedish Air Force's surplus of these cheap, modern and highly effective multirole jets). Bringing back the Air Combat Wing would also benefit New Zealand's global defence image by benefiting alliances (which can have positive results in trade/economic relations) and helping in global coalition conflicts while avoiding putting excess 'boots on ground' by helping in air strike operations. Above all, Air Combat Capability is and has been considered a 'force multiplier' in current and future military operations and thus should be considered a priority for the future New Zealand Defence Force. Blue-water naval capability is a vital capability that the Defence Force needs for defence of our nation, its allies and interests. Since our Navy is too small to have dedicated-role frigates (like Australia's Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyers), our frigates should have multi-role armament capability (i.e. Long range anti-ship Harpoon missiles, torpedoes, short range anti-air/missile and possibly long range Anti-air capability (with missiles like the RIM-67 Standard)). When our current 2 ANZAC-class frigates get replaced, they should have the capability (or equivalent) listed above and be in a decent number to support our defence force (i.e. 3 or 4 frigates of a higher than 3600 ton displacement). In addition to the armament and future upgrades, the current SH-2G (I) Seasprites should be, if possible, armed with the AGM-Penguin anti-ship missile's successor, the Naval Strike Missile (that has almost 4 times the range and has increased stealth capability). When replaced, the SH-2G (I) Seasprites should be replaced by the most modern airframe and armament capability maritime helicopter instead of a modernised avionic and armament variant of a dated airframe to avoid any future compatibility issues. Sufficient strategic and tactical airlift capability is vital for the logistical transport of troops, cargo and military vehicles. As our C-130H's finish their Life Extension Programme, sufficient replacement is vital for transporting present and future vehicles. Aircraft like the Airbus A400m would be more suitable than purchasing aircraft expensive to own and operate like the C-17. Although, since A400m's are expensive, a combination of 2 C17's and 5+ KC-390's would also be a sufficient replacement for the C-130H's. A proper replacement for the retired Andovers, such as the C-27J, would be beneficial if we decided to replace our C130H's with ~5+ larger A400m's as this would allow smaller troop, vehicle and/or cargo transportation at a cheaper and more efficient price. Disaster relief capability is vital in a nation and Pacific region vulnerable to natural disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic activity. Amphibious Assault capability - future Light Armoured Vehicles and other similar vehicles should have an amphibious design capable of engaging infantry and enemy armour through the use of a tank cannon, (similar to that on the M1128 MGS Stryker) or anti-armour missile on some of the LAV's. The NZDF would also benefit reviewing and possibly adding some of these lower-priority capabilities. HMNZS Canterbury replacement - HMNZS Canterbury is a ship based off of a civilian design and is not optimal for the future military threats from foreign nations. This ship should be replaced with a Landing Helicopter Dock ship of a similar but smaller design of Australia's new Canberra-class LHD. These ships would be more beneficial at transporting current and future vehicles, helicopters and possibly future S/VTOL aircraft. HMNZS Endeavour replacement should be able to transport fuel and logistical items (including vehicles and helicopters) to act as an intermediate between an oiler and a transport logistics ship. This ship's replacement would work optimally in tandem with

the above-proposed LHD ship. Littoral Operation Support - The HMNZS Manawanui and HMNZS Resolution replacement should have ocean surveillance/hydrographic capabilities along with other Littoral Operation capability as part of the replacement. HMNZS Manawanui should be replaced with a separate dedicated diving support vessel with Mine Clearance Warfare capability.

Q11: The 35 LAV's that the government/Defence Force has addressed as surplus should not be scrapped or sold as some politicians have suggested. The surplus LAV's should be converted to artillery carriers, mobile command and control and/or M1128 MGS Stryker's to give the Army fire support and low-intensity anti-armour capability (through the 105mm turret on the M1128). The issues with our NH-90's not being adequately sufficient for naval transport (as demonstrated recently with their lack of deployment to the Vanuatu natural disaster relief effort) should be addressed with adequate upgrades. In addition, the 13 retiring UH-1H Iroquois were replaced with only 8 NH-90's. Whilst the NH-90's can take a more significant payload, the NZDF should consider increasing NH-90 numbers in the future as New Zealand's interests, population and defence demands increase. This could be achieved by a possible purchase of 4 more NH-90's which should be equipped in a NATO Frigate Helicopter variant (as opposed to the standard Troop Transport Helicopter variant) to supplement our current Troop Transport Helicopter variant NH-90's while also supplementing naval operations.

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Q1: The major threats and challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future are effectively set out in the Defence Assessment 2014, and briefly addressed in the consultation document. However, the issues of cyber security, Antarctica, and the US and China interest in the Pacific need to be highlighted as particularly important. New Zealand geographic location is an advantage in the sense of traditional defensive strategy, but is equally at risk to malicious cyber activities as any other nation. Significant untapped resources in Antarctica will be of increased interest as resources become increasingly scarce, and New Zealand is highly likely to be challenged in this area. US and China's interest in the Pacific will potentially provide a major challenge for New Zealand's security in the future, as both nations seek influence in the area.

Q2: Increased interest by global powers in the Asia Pacific area will affect New Zealand's interests the most. New Zealand is a leader in the South Pacific region and will have to actively cooperate with other countries who are searching for influence in the wider Asia Pacific region. This provides an opportunity for the Defence force to collaborate on projects and events, while also monitoring and ensuring that these activities are beneficial for the regions affected.

Q3: The roles of the Defence Force as outlined in the consultation document are correct. Operation in support of peace and security provide an effective means to show New Zealand's contribution in the international arena. Australia will continue to be our most important bilateral relationship, and while it is highly unlikely that this will change in the foreseeable future, New Zealand should continue to actively engage Australia in military practices to maintain this strategic relationship.

Q4: As highlighted by the Defence Assessment 2014, unmonitored and illegal fishing poses a risk in New Zealand's territory, and will increase as a risk as traditional fishing areas are depleted. Increased surveillance and monitoring in these areas will help address this issue, and emerging technologies such as remotely piloted aerial systems may prove extremely helpful in this area. Information sharing with the nations bordering our territories will also contribute to addressing this issue.

Q5: It is critical that our contributions are done with a focus on contributing to international peace globally, and not only in areas of interest to New Zealand or its allies. While it is important that New Zealand contribute to operations in regions such as the Middle East, these also run the risk of negatively affecting New Zealand's reputation as an independent nation, which is our greatest source of influence in global affairs.

Q6:

Q7: The Defence Force is a critical part in New Zealand's response to unforeseen events and natural disasters, both domestically and internationally. The Defence Force has proven to be effective in responding to natural disasters when needed, but this role may become increasingly important as climate change is expected to contribute to worsened effects of some natural disasters.

Q8:

Q9: The Defence Force must be flexible and mobile, in carrying out primary and secondary roles both domestically and abroad. While New Zealand is a small nation compared to our allies, we should seek to opportunities for shared equipment with our allies, particularly those who invest more heavily in technology and equipment used for defence. The US is the source of some of the most advanced military technology, and remotely piloted vehicles for reconnaissance purposes are an example of a technology that could prove to be highly useful for New Zealand's defence activities. Furthermore, it is crucial that critical defence systems are air-gapped from connected networks, to prevent malicious cyber interference during significant activities.

Q11: New Zealand should actively seek to improve military relationships with South East Asia

nations, such as Indonesia. While these may be countries with cultural and historical differences from New Zealand, developing these relationships will provide an opportunity for New Zealand to guide and be influential, which will prove helpful in potential conflict situations that may arise in the Asia Pacific region.

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Q1: The Defence Assessment covers this adequately. There is nothing that general members of the public can add to this assessment.

Q2: The Defence Assessment covers this adequately. There is nothing that general members of the public can add to this assessment.

Q3: The same roles as outlined in the consultation paper.

Q4: The Defence Assessment covers this adequately. There is nothing that general members of the public can add to this assessment.

Q5: The Government needs to place a considerably higher priority on all aspects of defense relative to other budgetary pressures. All of the listed areas should be supported, but our capabilities and equipment are often woefully inadequate. Locally, there needs to be a recommitment to the goals set out in Project Protector - now over a decade old, and the original goals of patrol days and flying hours. Set the targets of what is required for adequate defence, and then allocate the budget that is needed to meet those targets.

Q6: As a start, the Defence Force should be resourced so that it can actually meet the Project Protector targets.

Q7:

Q8: Significantly more than what it is now. Greater budgetary commitment to the NZDF will enable the various Forces to train more young people in a wide range of trades that also have application in the civilian world. The Forces also provide training in basic life skills and self-discipline that is much needed by many of today's youth. While this might displace private sector employment of some of these youth, others would otherwise be unemployed. In both cases the government funds will be spent on developing skills, and for those youth that would otherwise be unemployed there is a reduction in benefit payments. Longer term, the development of trade skills will be of benefit to the country.

Q9: The state of the NZDF is an embarrassment - tiny forces with not enough of the right equipment, too much of the wrong equipment, and not enough people to operate it. Above all, morale, money, and people are required. Government-imposed cost-cutting has been blamed for extremely low levels of morale in some branches of the NZDF. Amongst other effects, this has seen the Navy having insufficient personnel to be able to fully utilise its inshore patrol vessels. Increased threats to border security would suggest that New Zealand requires all inshore patrol vessels to be operational. The RNZN desperately needs increased financial resources so that crews can be trained and retained. The NZDF requires a capable ground combat force. A proven multi-role helicopter - one that is proven reliable in service with other nations, capable of supporting disaster-relief operations, and readily transported by large transport aircraft. A modern air-lift capability. In particular, the C130s require modernisation, and there needs to be more of them with a higher level of availability/readiness. 5 is not sufficient, particularly when there may be 1 in maintenance and 1 unserviceable at any given time. The capability to provide air cover for our ground troops. The capability to conduct airborne maritime surveillance and prosecute targets if necessary.

Q11: One of the most critical issues facing New Zealand's Defence Force is that time and time again procurement decisions are an utter disaster, purchasing equipment that we either do not need, is not up to the job, or requires additional expensive modification or procurement before it can be used as intended. Examples: Which bright spark never thought to check whether the NH90s could fit inside the C130? The NH90s also are unable to assist in our disaster relief operations in the Pacific. The army's LAVs were a total disaster: too many, unsuitable for some of the operations we require, and insufficiently armoured.

Q1: Refugees in the Pacific region. Internal zealots with potential for terrorism. Spread of Chinese aid and influence in the Pacific. Large foreign ownership of core assets and businesses. Fisheries threats

Q2: Destabilisation in Asia such as ISIS type influence in Indonesia. Destabilisation in Europe. Impact on the 5 eyes alliance and the demand on us to support overseas conflicts albeit on a small scale involvement. The Defence force capability may need to expand its front line capability. Navy may need greater capability to protect our fisheries. Pacific nations may want our protection / involvement but maybe they will turn to China which would create a very challenging situation for NZ

Q3: Our interests abroad are protected through our primary alliances relationships (5 eyes as these are the allies who protect our economic interests and heck we need to be capable of supporting them. The role does not need to be only front line full offensive as the priority but in a range of roles that includes peace keeping.

Q4: Food challenges globally mean fishing by foreign parties needs to be prevented in our waters. This extends to the Antarctic waters which are under threat now. We need to defend Australia regarding boat people / refugees as well as stopping them arriving ourselves. This is not anti refugee but simply controlling the flow of people.

Q5: We need to protect ourselves first as we can't necessarily rely wholly on the allies coming to our aid depending on the situation. To the extent possible we need defensive capability and the capability is also deployable into other theatres of conflict. The sequence stated in the question reflects our view of the relevant priorities.

Q6: The Defence force is really a "good government citizen" capability which our allies can rely on and thereby NZ is seen as both an effective ally and an engaged one. This helps ensure they treat us favourably on the global trade front, well maybe more favourably than otherwise.

Q7: Unchanged from present day.

Q8: The core training capability and upskilling opportunities are a key avenue of development that youth can aspire to and know they can also have roles in civilian life after a period of service. Maintain the cadet forces. Cadet exchange programme (like UK) to expose cadets to a range of experiences and gain an understanding of the international situation.

Q9: Stable and lower turnover pool of service personnel. Good equipment relevant to our roles. The complexity of making decisions on equipment needs to be addressed so decisions can be made quickly and money and effort put into the equipment rather than selection effort. Minimise inter-service competition for resources and what is seen from the outside as considerable waste of time, effort and energy on ridiculous outmoded rivalry that serves no purpose in NZ.

Q11: Governments need to act far more responsibly with regard to continued funding for the defence forces. Constant budget cuts the moment money is short is idiotic and in the long term exceedingly dangerous and short sighted.

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

The New Zealand public lacks the appetite to support the deployment of military forces in combat roles, regardless of the threat to the country's interests or Govt policy. Linked with this is a general lack of knowledge of the roles and capabilities of the NZDF and its mode of operation.

Communication/electronic security is likely to be the area with the greatest growth of risk for New Zealand.

Collapse of overseas fisheries will increase the pressures and poaching of fisheries within the New Zealand EEZ

2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

Economic instability, increased pressure on national borders, and increased scale climate event will likely put nations with weak governmental systems at greater risk of breakdown; several nations within the Pacific/South East Asia regions are at risk of breakdown and instability associated with these effects. With China and the USA now publicly competing for control of security in the Pacific, weak countries will become pawns in regional politics. New Zealand's large Pacific and Asian communities, mean there is real public interest and concern with stability in the region. In addition, horticultural industries now utilise Pacific Island labour forces for seasonal work, linking regional stability to a portion of New Zealand's economic stability.

Independence of New Zealand Territories could also have impacts on security in the region. The growth in the strength and competition between India, China and the destabilising effects of Russia could add to instability across the globe in coming years.

The increasing reliance on the internet for economic transactions also means that cyber threats will become a greater part of foreign policy and a threat to the nation's security.

3. What are the roles that the defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

Maintenance of logistics capability to Antarctica is in the interest of our nation.

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nation and the Ross Dependency?

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally, Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

The NZDF current roles in supporting other govt agencies is entirely appropriate; such activity provides experience for NZDF personnel and utilises strategic equipment operated by the NZDF (though not in a combat scenario), removing the need for other Govt organisations to purchase, maintain and operate expensive equipment and capabilities; this creates efficiencies for the Govt and strengthens the NZDF.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

The NZDF is a critical part of the nation's response to natural disasters. Regional sub-units and camps have a responsibility to maintain links with councils, New Zealand Police and Civil Defence. The NZDF has many capabilities, but two of importance are: the ability of command elements to offer planning early in a civil defence response and to provide basic logistic support within a region. This requires working relationships and vehicles with operators. The ability to provide logistic support is waning in some rural regions due to a lack of vehicle operators. To maintain this capability, NZDF recruiting must have a requirement to maintain manning in the ARes and the NZDF must ensure ARes pers have access to driver and vehicle training courses.

8. What should be the Defence Forces role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

The NZDF YDU has been very successful in creating opportunities for at risk youth. The programme utilises the skills and expertise of both RF and Ares pers. Success of the programme relates directly to the personnel contributing towards it; therefore any substantial enlargement of the YDU programme risks reducing the effectiveness of the programme, should appropriate staff not be available. Not only does the YDU assist at risk youth but it acts as a potential recruiting medium and provides positive publicity to the New Zealand public about the NZDF; for these reasons the YDU should remain part of the NZDF activities, though it should remain a targeted programme.

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

Recruiting

I question the ability of the NZDF recruiting system to be able to provide enough recruits to support a Bn group deployment, especially at short notice (Many defence units are under-strength already). This represents a significant weakness in the current defence strategy of maintain low numbers of defence force personnel.

With regard to the ARes, a rethink of recruiting is required; the development of a policy supporting targeted recruiting at the level of regional sub-units will strengthen the ability of the Ares to provide troops for RF training and exercises, troops for deployment and maintain civil defence capabilities.

Role of the ARes

The ARes is a critical part of the defence force. Not only does the ARes provide troops for the RF to maintain NZDF outputs, but the Bn's provide important training for RF officers and SNCOs. The ability of the ARes to achieve its required outputs is linked to manning, and currently NZDF recruiting is unable to supply enough recruits to rural regions. This is resulting in some regions becoming unsustainable (i.e. Marlborough and West Coast).

ARes personnel should receive the same type of training as RF personnel, at least to a BLOC level of competency. Courses such vehicle driving, shot guns, and CQB should be available to at least a portion of ARes personnel. Otherwise how are ARes personnel expected to be able to integrate into RF units on exercises (Local and international) and on deployments.

ARes personnel should also be paid equivalent to RF personnel, especially on cses.

LAV

The LAV have come under much criticism in the past, however they provide a means to train for high risk operations. They also give the NZDF the capability to protect troops should they ever be deployed in high risk situations. Loss or degradation of the LAV capability would create a serious inter-operability gap with our allies, exposing our troops to increased risk when deployed.

Fire support

The NZDF should maintain the ability to provide fire support to troops on the ground, in order to maintain inter-operability with allied nations.

Diversity

The Army needs to take seriously its obligations with regard to women in the defence force, diversity of personnel and support for minorities, in particular the combat corps need to change some aspects of their culture. Initiatives, such as to Women's Forum and Overwatch are commendable, but they do not operate at the sub-unit level... yet...

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Q1: Indirect threats such as the blockage of major commerce shipping routes by either nations in the case of the Spratley islands dispute or pirates that hijack commercial shipping would have an impact on a maritime nation such as New Zealand.

Q2: Maintaining our relations in alignment with like-minded countries such as those we share intelligence with the UK, USA, Canada and Australia can and should be maintained, along our contribution to the Five Power Defence arrangements and with balancing our free-trade agreements such as China.

Q3: Concur with the Defence White Paper of 2015 as written.

Q4: Protection of the fisheries would be the most important ongoing challenge, especially if larger nations use their economic influence to buy fishing rights in these small nations and thru overfishing deplete not only the fishing stocks of various species, but the breeding stock as well will have dire future consequences for all.

Q5: As a member of the international community it is our responsibility to participate in not only International Peacekeeping (UN Observers) operations but Peacemaking (Somalia, East Timor) operations as well, regardless of the size of contribution, we must take an active part when asked by our international friends and partners.

Q6: A larger emphasis on Cyber Security would be a start

Q7: The NZDF should utilise their organizational structure and skills to fall-in to support civilian Natural Disaster, and the unexpected arrival of large numbers of refugees exercises on a regular basis. These type of exercises are of great value in building a future operating model that is of benefit to all New Zealanders. Relying on the number 8 wire mentality in this area should only be used as a last resort. A contingency organizational structure constructed around both civilian (ANZAC Ave, Auckland) and military (Joint Forces HQ Trentham) organised in support of one another and exercised on a regular basis would be of great value.

Q8: The current NZDF participation in the nation's youth programmes could be expanded to allow students to spend time with service personnel in their day to day jobs, this along with the sports emphasis events would be great. Anything that gives youth the opportunity to speak with people their own age and their experiences in the NZDF would be great.

Q9: - We are a maritime nation, a larger Navy would be a start, with ships built of steel to handle the worlds oceans. They would last longer and prove to be more cost effective. - Replacement for Strategic airlift. If we buy the C-17 (great aircraft) how will we maintain it? Since we only have A lease agreement with Australia perhaps? For the times which require the airlift of NZDF personnel for the long hauls, why not lease our national airlines, i.e. Air New Zealand? - Tactical Airlift. Replace the current C-130's with a later version, this has been a tried and proven aircraft and continuing this model would alleviate retraining of maintenance crews on another aircraft like the A400. The tried and proven C-130 Hercules is the ideal aircraft for New Zealand's area of responsibility. - C4ISR The P3 Orion with an adequate comms suite would give New Zealand the upper hand in their area of responsibility

Q11: The NZDF desperately needs an adequate Command & Control system that can operate in such a way as to maintain a level of sovereignty as well as share intelligence with other coalition partners. Example: GCCS (Global Command & Control System) requires a great deal of dedicated training in order to utilise it's full functionality. A SERIOUS effort in this area would provide the New Zealand Defence Force with a much needed system that would provide the NZDF with timely intelligence, current up to date informed decision making and and as a result be able to task the limited NZDF resources in an informed way.

Q1: International and domestic terrorism. Cyber warfare. Expansion of larger countries military power and geo-political dominance over smaller states, particularly in the South Pacific and East Asia.

Q2: Increased tension between larger states (NATO vs Russia and United States + allies vs China), which may result in proxy conflicts. The NZDF may have to be deployed on peacekeeping missions under the United Nations. Countries may try to impede the trade of other countries, which could affect our relationships with our trading partners.

Q3: Contributing to peacekeeping missions under the United Nations. Patrolling New Zealand's EEZ (RNZAF + RNZN). Support to other Government agencies such as Civil Defence and Police.

Q4: Potential patrols by foreign nations near our EEZ and near the Realm. Increase interest in Antarctica for mineral exploitation. Domestic terrorism & terrorist attacks conducted by foreign groups.

Q5: Working with other countries to further our interests, particularly in trade, as well as provide support to countries that request it or if asked by the United Nations.

Q6: Close co-operation with government agencies at home and abroad.

Q7: Help Civil Defence to effectively co-ordinate a response, especially in providing security and distributing aid in an affected area.

Q8: Continue the cadets programme, work with the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Education to see if an expansion is feasible.

Q9: Effective C4ISR. The capability to deploy sea, land or air assets rapidly to disaster zones. To be able to operate effectively in a combat environment. The ability to patrol our EEZ efficiently.

Q11: Equipment: NZ LAV Upgrade: Close co-operation with the Canadian Department of National Defence as they upgrade their LAV III's. Potentially reconfigure some of the LAV's M1128 Mobile Gun System (to make up for our lack of armoured forces) and/or mortar carriers or other role specific modifications. Special Operations Forces Equipment: Replace the M4 carbine with the Heckler & Koch HK416, as it used by other Western special forces units like Australian and United States units. It is also produced by the same company that makes the MP5 (another weapon used by the SAS), and is more reliable. Future Air Mobility: Replace the C-130 Hercules with another tactical airlifter, perhaps the C-130 Super Hercules because it is relatively similar, newer and many friendly nations use them. Future Air Surveillance: Replace the P-3 Orion by 2030 with either a manned (such as the P8 Poseidon) or unmanned aircraft (such as the Global Hawk) Remotely piloted vehicles: increase the amount of RPV's/UAV's in service over time, particularly ones that can be launched by catapult or by individuals, like the current Kahu UAV.

Q1:With climate change and massive water shortages in other parts of the world (eg California), New Zealand could seem to be one of the best places to live on the planet.

Perhaps not now, but in the future this could have grave security implications for NZ

Q2:NZ should continue its peace-keeping role and earn the respect of all peoples around the world by serving this role in a balanced fair and non-partisan way.

Q3:

Q4:Theft of the ocean resource especially fish.

Q5:We should not ally with those who act immorally internationally. We should only act through UN.

Q6:

Q7:It should continue to provide the organization, infrastructure and hardware to face such events.

Q8:It should avoid promoting militarism and jingoism, but could provide training and outlets (adventure, character building outdoors resilience etc) at levels less demanding than say the territorials require. It could continue to provide opportunities for trades training when the private sector falls short in this area.

Q9:

Q11:The Defence forces should not be involved in the war on drugs. This is a disaster. If they have spare capacity, they should use it for good purposes. The drug war is not a good purpose.

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Q1: The most significant threat is internal. It is the way NZ progressive government's think about Defence. Historically, no matter what threat changes happen in the Pacific region or internationally, the outlook of NZ Defence policy hasn't changed in over 35 years. This could be due to a truly flexible and dynamic Defence policy, capable of responding to all new contingencies, or it could be a sign of what strategists and psychologists call 'social herding' - everything is OK. The inside view presses us to ignore the lessons of other times and other places, believing we are different and our era is different.

Q2: NZ current Defence and Intelligence have a fairly accurate grasp of the changing environment. - Increasing individual terrorist attacks, significantly larger 'flooding' migrant populations and greater reliance on international cooperation and involvement with wider alliances seem to be the trend, among others.

Q3: The Defence Force should be changing its outputs to confront the changing threat scenarios of the 21st century. Outputs are severely underfunded but NZDF leadership will defend the status quo with all their professional ability. Outputs are significantly static in a very fluid and asymmetric environment. A simple troops to task assessment across the 3 Services will show just how inadequate manning and therefore operational capabilities truly are. Defence is process-driven. The White Paper needs to ensure it doesn't become a drive towards mediocrity and irrelevance. Take the example of the Light Task Group for tasks EC 1 to 5 inclusive. Is it by nature of its indiscriminate size - 2 men or 2,500? If there is no quantifiable size, how is the output to be measured? Does one size (whatever it maybe) meet all the ECs 1-5? If so how and how is it measured?

Q4: As for Question 2.

Q5: The Government needs to break free of the thought-sterilizing White Papers of the past. Defence is a giant insurance policy yet the key assumption for the last 35 plus years is we have no discernible threat. This false logic and false assumption underpins our thinking and attitude to Defence. But like the emperor's clothes no government or Defence Chief, for that matter, is willing to speak up and acknowledge the obvious flaw.

Q6: This is currently done; natural disaster, maritime coordination and search & rescue etc if on slightly ad hoc basis - as and when circumstances force it. Further integration and cooperation is overdue if you want dynamic change and transformation. In an ideal world all government departments would be creating integrated and imaginative synergies to multiply the effectiveness and success of New Zealand. It isn't unrealistic to expect greater leadership and significantly meaningful action in this direction.... Start with individual projects which FORCE departments to work together to create meaning.

Q7: No change.

Q8: This topic is a possible development scenario arising out of Question 6. Regardless of the high quality and effectiveness of the current NZDF youth development programmes, in the wider picture they amount to tokenism - below critical mass to create the transformational change we all seek. Greater inter-government departmental integration and involvement is needed if we are to turn our youth around and provide positive exemplary training and living environments for them to excel. Human capital is the key significant factor in developing future New Zealand. Our young deserve better and NZDF programmes, like many of the stated Defence outputs remain a shallow reflection of what is needed.

Q9: The Defence Force needs to be a credible force. In the wider international circles (NZSAS excepted) it comes across as almost irrelevant. Ironically, within our Defence Forces we have some of the best trained people and on an individual level have much to be proud of. The ability to project force, the ability to be taken seriously is waning. Firstly, to be an armed force of any relevance today it needs an offensive air capability. Since the removal of this capability in 2001, there has been no identifiable political will amongst politicians or senior NZDF personnel to re-visit this issue. Policy projections 2020 through to 2035 do not include

discussion of the appropriateness of an airpower capability. This is in direct opposition to the collective wisdom of countries such as USA, Australia, UK, Canada, India, Russia & China etc, etc ... - One must ask why are we so certain about this that we don't even discuss it? Secondly, current options suffer from process-driven thinking which doesn't relate to our world today. However it does maintain the historic status quo. Defence Outputs need to be re-examined and related to today. In house people will claim they already do this, but simple historical analysis will show how leaden and unchanged they have been for 35-40 years. If we continue to follow the same path we will become just what our critics already claim - all show and no punch.

Q11:Further thoughts: Too many Command Headquarters for such a small force. Imbalance in NZDF personnel levels between junior (not enough) leaders and senior leaders (far too many). Inequity of the NZDF pay system. New Zealand is the only country in the OECD which has a separate (and secret) pay system for officers at/above Lt Commander/Major/Squadron Leader. This is divisive in principle and practice and could create endemically weak leadership at higher levels. Growing lack of connection and relevance in eyes of the general public.

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Q1: The major threat to NZ security and the security of other nation-states is the increased militarization of society that has resulted, in part but not only, from a choice to respond militarily rather than through the application of the rule of law and justice institutions to events such as those of 9/11. It is widely acknowledged that the threat posed by ISIS and other similar organisations cannot be addressed by military means and until that is recognised and new innovative thinking is introduced to counter the current pervasive threat-defence logic we will continue to face increased threats, which, like 9/11, may come in novel and unexpected, and hence devastating, forms.

Q2: Whatever changes occur in the international environment, a military response is the least likely response to address the underlying causes of inequality and global injustice hence NZ should reconsider the need to maintain a defence force.

Q3: If NZ is to retain a defence capability, and whether it will do so should be the subject of informed public debate and consultation rather than assumed, it should focus solely on narrowly defined defence capabilities.

Q4: As noted in the White Paper, one of the most significant challenges facing New Zealand is the impact of global warming both with regard to ourselves and our Pacific Islands neighbours. A key area of concern is the development of coherent government policy around addressing global warming and strong leadership, in consort with like-minded countries, to reduce carbon emissions and engage in disaster risk reduction and preparedness work. NZDF has no role in disaster preparedness - it should be left to those agencies and organisations with the relevant capacity to do so. Should NZDF be engaged in any DRR or preparedness it must be under civilian leadership. The NZ government should also look to build civilian capacity for search and rescue and fisheries surveillance given the much reduced cost of agencies without military capability, which is not required for the bulk of this work. NZDF would remain a measure of last-resort if the need arose.

Q5: The 'price' of friendship in the international sphere has been too high for NZ. We no longer have an independent foreign policy despite claims to contrary. Our contributions to international peace and security should be restricted to only those operations mandated by the UN Security Council and led by the UN. There is no legal mandate for the Responsibility to Protect under which guise coalitions of the willing are increasingly operating. NZ must not risk being party to operations that are outside of international law.

Q6: NZDF should only be involved in all-of-government operations as a last-resort, without exceptions. Civil defence capacity should be strengthened to ensure the capacity to respond to all but exceptional events.

Q7: NZDF has no role in building New Zealand's resilience to disasters and emergencies. A role in facilitating emergency relief supplies is important given the vast ocean spaces across which our Pacific Islands neighbours are spread but engagement should be last-resort and under civilian control at all times, in particular with regard to distribution of emergency relief in the affected country.

Q8: NZDF has no role in youth development in NZ or anywhere else in the world. It should desist from so-called current youth development activities.

Q9: If NZ is to continue to have a standing defence force then government should ensure that it has the capability to fill a narrowly defined role with regard to strategic defence issues and not stray into areas of work that do not require specific defence capability. The defining feature of NZDF as stated in the White Paper is as a combat force and it should focus specifically on that role.

Q11: International humanitarian assistance following a request from an affected-country government to the United Nations UN Under-Secretary General in times of natural disasters or complex emergencies must be informed by UN guidelines on good practice such as the Oslo guidelines and the companion guidelines for emergencies, as well as international

humanitarian and human rights law. Both sets of guidelines state that military involvement in humanitarian action must be a last resort after all other civilian options have been explored. NZDF should reference these guidelines in all documents and commitments to upholding them, which is stated in MFAT policy, in the interests of policy coherence. NZDF has no role in nation or state building in conflict-affected countries. The notion of 'state fragility' has been shown by much research to have no analytic value what-so-ever and NZ should cease the use of this phrase which has been shown to be used by members of the international community of liberal democratic states to justify armed intervention ostensibly for humanitarian purposes.

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Q1: Terrorism expanding past the borders of originating nations and elements pose the single greatest threat to our domestic security. We need to ensure major areas such as airports are adequately protected but far more importantly it is imperative our borders are secured and policed to the highest standard through an increase in naval size.

Q2: The rapidly changing situation in the middle-east (Iraq, Syria) is turning the middle-east into a far more hostile actor that threatens the security of New Zealand and other nations such as Australia that have played an active role in assisting the Iraqi Government. The increase in conflict in such areas also creates displacement of peoples. Refugees and asylum seekers may attempt to make their way to New Zealand. Whilst we have a program in place we must be vigilant in accepting these peoples as we can never fully be sure of their past associations and the potential threat they present to our domestic security.

Q3: New Zealand needs to play a heavy intelligence role in ensuring that foreign actors or organizations do not attack New Zealand or plot to cause any damage to our immediate interests. The defence force should have resources in areas like Iraq and work along-side our allies such as the United States in non-combat roles. The defence force needs to work hard to help restore dignity and competency to the Iraqi National Forces.

Q4: The defence force should ensure that our waters and borders are protected to the fullest extent possible and that any foreign actors within our exclusive economic zone do not interfere with our interests. Illegal actions such as fishing in our waters should be met with strong and stern opposition. It is unacceptable for foreign vessels to be allowed to carry out illegal actions in our waters. The Navy faces major challenges in being able to adequately monitor and protect our waters. Increasing naval resources should be a priority for the defence force to ensure our national security is protected and our economic interests safeguarded.

Q5: We need to work closely with Australia in ensuring both our waters and borders are secure and monitored. The defence force also needs to work closely with Australia in places such as Iraq to carry out operations that support our shared interests. The primary priority for the defence force should be protecting New Zealand's physical geography from threats. Our secondary priority should be training and assistance in areas such as Iraq. And the defence forces third priority should be to work with the international community to safeguard international peace and security.

Q6:

Q7: The defence force needs to work closely with civil defence in creating a strengthened plan that can be executed fast and effectively in times of national disaster.

Q8: Provide more resources both educational and physical to schools and associated organizations.

Q9: A major increase in funding, with a large emphasis in national planning, and an increase in naval and air-force resources.

Q11: The defence force needs a surge in funding. We need more ships and multiple armed aircraft to deal with the changing international environment. New Zealand's borders are increasingly at risk of infiltration and we need to ensure they are protected and monitored. The defence force needs to work closely with domestic agencies such as the police in ensuring that our nation is safe and protected from potential acts of terrorism on our soil. Airports, major population centres etc are vulnerable to attacks that could result in major casualty and damage.

Q1:Now: Looking after our interests in the 4th largest EEZ including our potentially disputable claim in Antarctica. In the future: In basic terms, we need to be aware of the growing military capability of China and India, as they both pose a direct threat to NZs access to trade routes should a conflict in South East Asia escalate to armed blockading of shipping lanes.

Q2:To expand on the above points, the efforts by China to win political favour in the Southern Pacific needs to be monitored. Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia and the Philippines may escalate to armed insurrection and potentially move jihad out of the Middle East and onto our doorstep. India now has a blue water naval capability. While they have not been in a position to directly threaten New Zealand, they will possess the ability to do so within the scope of this White Papers tenure. The implications for the Defence Force range from assisting governments as part of a UN Peace Keeping force, to maintaining order in a Bougainville type police action, to armed patrols keeping shipping lanes clear.

Q3:Expansion of our intelligence gathering and cyber warfare capability Maintaining of special forces and their support structures Continued and expanded capability to project aid, disaster relief and rebuilding functions in the Southern Pacific region.

Q4:People/Contraband/Narcotics Smuggling Illegal Fishing/Whaling Exploitation of our Antarctic resources

Q5:The first and foremost goal is to defend New Zealands sovereignty. From there, moving out to stabilize the region we live in should be next, followed by our obligations to Australia and the UN.

Q6:The Defence Force is there to project NZs interests up to and including armed conflict, but any avenue of completing the mission successfully should be used. This is why our service personnel are so highly thought of.

Q7:Providing man power, equipment and first response in events too large for the NZ Police to handle. All done under the auspices of Civil Defence of course.

Q8:Enhancing self esteem and self confidence in our young people by means of group activities currently being run through the Cadets Scheme and MoE/MoSD.

Q9:Increased capability in cyber warfare Expansion of intelligence gathering utilizing autonomous Drone technology. It seems to be the most cost effective way to police such a large EEZ. I also think the Government should consider obtaining amphibious patrol aircraft similar to the Shin-Maywa US-2 or Beriev Be-200 for the RNZAF in order to get first responders out to remote islands in the Pacific faster than the Navy in the event of a natural disaster. They may also be re-roled for SAR and Fire Suppression duties if required.

Q11:

Q1: The nature of war has suddenly changed. It is no longer just fleet against fleet. Our military must now also be able to track and disable individuals and small cells. NZ Defence needs to add capability for detecting and fighting these much smaller units. This new type of battle shifts the emphasis away from the conventional hardware of the last three hundred years. We need to add a more agile and quick defence resource (e.g. a new force) to target the new and less predictable threats to NZ interests. This requires domestic and international reach.

Q2:

Q3:

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8:

Q9:

Q11:

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Q1: I consider the Defence Assessment has made a credible attempt to summarise the strategic threats to New Zealand. The most immediate threat is that of cyber-warfare or cyber-terrorism. While NZDF should have in place robust measures to protect itself from electronic attack, I see no reason why NZDF should take the lead role in NZ-wide or whole of government cyber-security. This task is better suited to civilian security or intelligence agencies, as the traditional hierarchical military command structure fits poorly with the motivations and skills of the IT community. Other threats are discussed in the following sections.

Q2: 1) Increased tension in the South China Sea resulting from China's claim that the 'five dash line' gives it territorial rights over maritime areas in close proximity to other nations. While it is clearly in no one's interest for this to lead to armed conflict, a combination of nationalistic posturing on all sides, populism and human error could have unfortunate consequences. Under the Five Power Defence Agreement New Zealand could readily become involved. Tension in this area, through which much of New Zealand's seaborne trade passes, is a strong argument for New Zealand building and maintaining relationships with defence forces in the region (including traditional allies like Singapore, and newer trading partners such as Vietnam, China, Philippines). In the highly probable event that some disputes go to international mediation/legal resolution, NZ maritime surveillance assets may be useful in providing independent verification of any agreement on the positioning of vessels/oil rigs/military forces. 2) Increased risk of terrorism, arising from Islamist militants. New Zealand needs to maintain a small but robust domestic anti-terrorism capability, and be capable of assisting neighbouring countries with this capacity if needed. 3) Uncontrolled illegal immigration, as previously seen to the north of Australia and currently in Southern Europe. While NZ's geographic isolation has proved sufficient deterrent in the past, this is unlikely to be adequate in the future. It is of key importance that NZ has a robust legal and policy framework to deal with this challenge. Plus military capability, if necessary, to intercept any such vessels at sea. While there is natural human sympathy for people in desperate situations who risk everything in a voyage to NZ, even one voyage leading to successful settlement in NZ could spur a flood of imitators, which would inevitably cause loss of life at sea. I believe NZ should substantially increase its current refugee intake from UN-designated refugees, but not accept any self-declared refugees who sail to NZ.

Q3: These roles are adequately outlined in the Defence Assessment issued as part of this White Paper process.

Q4: 1) Cyber-security, as above 2) Maritime intrusions, including illegal fishing, illegal migration and smuggling. Increased maritime surveillance and response capability is likely to be needed in future. 3) In the Realm Nations plus Pacific allies, rapid population growth and limited economic development will continue to restrict abilities to carry out maritime surveillance, border protection and SAR. Requests for NZ support are likely to become more frequent, along with advice that they will turn to other states if NZ is unable to provide the level of support they seek. NZ has a strong geopolitical interest in remaining the preferred supplier of these services. 4) There is a high risk of civil unrest requiring outside intervention in Pacific Island countries. NZ, along with regional allies, needs to maintain the capability to undertake a RAMSI-type operation at relatively short notice, and maintain this deployment for an extended period. In my view the Solomon Islands crisis would have been much more easily managed if NZ/Australia had been more ready to intervene to support an elected government under threat rather than waiting until law and order had completely broken down. 5) In the Ross Dependency and Antarctic waters, there is likely to be increased risk of illegal fishing. Increasing tourism numbers will cause a corresponding increase in the need to carry out long-distance SAR. The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty will expire in 30 years, which could potentially trigger a mineral rush if there is no widely-accepted international



agreement governing such activity. While this is some time away defence equipment procured in the next decade will still be in service when the Protocol expires. In short, NZDF is likely to have to carry out increasing activities in the Antarctic.

Q5: This will inevitably be a balancing act for the government of the day. In relation to NZ's contribution to the international community, NZ should continue to contribute modest numbers of peacekeeping forces to missions in our geographic area or where we have historic links. If NZ wishes to make a more substantial broader contribution to international security, it needs to accept that the scale of NZDF and the NZ population means we simply cannot contribute to large-scale peacekeeping deployments. NZ would be far better to develop a specialist capacity in a single area that is routinely needed in peacekeeping, but which the countries that supply the bulk of UN peacekeeping forces (South Asia, Africa, Fiji) are unable to provide. Possibilities include tactical transport (rotary or fixed-wing) surveillance, or intelligence assessment. This will require some capital investment, but relatively low numbers of personnel, and is likely to provide more 'bang for buck' to the UN than the existing policy of ad-hoc assistance.

Q6: This is such a broad question I have no idea how to answer it.

Q7: NZDF is not a disaster relief agency, but has equipment and trained personnel that can make a vital contribution to disaster recovery in NZ and elsewhere. The key focus should be on working closely with specialist agencies (Police, Ministry of Civil Defence, Maritime Safety Authority, MPI) and having clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Training alongside other agencies is beneficial, but clear recognition of where specialist capability and responsibility resides is essential.

Q8: I regard youth development as a responsibility of the education and social sectors, rather than a core responsibility for NZDF. Some young people appear to respond well to a military environment, leading to demands for NZDF to provide a training/ education service to the wider community. This should only be undertaken where the additional costs imposed on NZDF (including personnel costs for NZDF staff) are fully funded from an external source such as the Ministry of Social Development.

Q9: I commend the Defence Ministry and NZDF on the DMRR. This is the first realistic attempt I have seen to look at different levels of military capability and accurately cost them. It has also been done in close cooperation with Treasury and other central government agencies, giving the work a degree of credibility and robustness previously lacking from military cost estimates. I believe that NZ's surveillance aircraft, fixed-wing transport fleet and all the pre-Protector naval vessels will need to be replaced in the next 10-15 years. It is far outside my competence to offer any advice on types of replacement equipment, but I am reassured by the recent improvement in NZ defence procurement. (Plus, there is internet abundance with people giving advice on these topics at no cost to NZ govt) The purchase of MAN trucks and new training aircraft appear to have been executed far more skillfully than many previous procurements. In my view the Defence Capability Plan provides a good guide to NZ's spending priorities. I strongly support NZ continuing to follow Track 1 - the pathway designed to maintain and upgrade NZDF's capabilities. The only additional points I would make are: - equipment should as far as possible be inter-operational with Australia, but need not be the same. Australia has developed the unfortunate habit of using defence procurement as a regional make-work scheme, and ADF has a taste for gold-plated equipment that NZ can ill afford to emulate - NZ's procurement still appears to be highly Europe and North America-centric. It can be argued that only providers in these regions respond to NZ RFIs and RFPs. Given NZ's history of buying equipment from these regions, Asian and other suppliers could be excused for not bothering to seek contracts in NZ. Project Protector is a good example, where NZ opted to spread the build over NZ, Australia and the Netherlands, three countries

that have no reputation for cost-efficient ship-building. The outcome in terms of budget, capability and time-frame was predictably dismal. NZDF should give serious thought to proactively contacting suppliers in Asia and elsewhere that appear to have the capability to supply NZDF needs when RFIs are being issued. This would also be a way of increasing military links with some of our major trading partners. This will become increasingly important in the future. -When assessing equipment purchases, NZMoD needs to robustly make the case to politicians and public that the right equipment costs less in the longer term, as demonstrated by the outstanding service record of the P-3Cs and C-130s. Cut-price solutions are likely to cost more in the long run.

Q11: An inescapable conclusion is that the NZDF is inadequately funded to carry out the range of tasks expected of it by the NZ government and the general population. A comparison with peer nations (Aust, Canada UK, Singapore, the Nordics) shows that NZ has lower military expenditure than any of them. According to SIPRI figures, in the late 1980s, NZ spent close to 2% of GDP on defence, admittedly an atypically high number for NZ. In recent years, defence spending has been extremely close to 1%. NZDF has only been able to maintain current levels of activity because of higher investment levels in the past, particularly the purchase of surveillance and transport aircraft in the late 1960s. These venerable assets are rapidly approaching the end of their useful lives, notwithstanding expensive efforts to maintain them in service. Unless NZ wishes to see a substantial reduction in transport, HADR, surveillance and SAR capability, NZDF will require substantial cash injections over the coming decade to replace obsolete equipment. While the NZ population remains ambivalent about participation in foreign military engagements such as Afghanistan, there is very strong support for the activities outlined above. In addition to equipment funding there is a need for pay and allowance levels to maintain parity with those in the civilian sector, or NZDF will be unable to maintain adequate numbers of skilled and experienced staff. The government could do a much better job of explaining the cost of military purchases, the roles the equipment is needed for, and the length of time it is expected to remain in service.

Q1: Defence of territorial waters with particular reference to fishing and natural resource exploitation. Increasingly unpredictable political situation in South Pacific countries and possible conflict and refugee issues associated with that.

Q2: Increasing influence in both military and economic terms of China in South Pacific. Defence force and its role will determine the significance China affords NZ

Q3: Peacekeeping unless NZ territory is attacked or threatened, or its citizens endangered overseas. NZ has a significant role to play as an 'honest' broker between belligerent western, eastern and religious powers. It is a credible, established democracy with a proud tradition of speaking its mind. It has a role to play without being aligned to a particular coalition.

Q4: I believe the search for natural resources will increasingly focus the interest of Russia, China on interests in Antarctica. New Zealand must have a Defence Force capable of at least monitoring and patrolling its own backyard. I believe it has no business outside its regional sphere unless as a diplomatic option.

Q5: As a small nation alliances are inevitable for NZ. However, these must not be unquestioning. NZ has value geographically and politically and should not be pressured into being part of 'the club'. Poor military planning and policy by our historic allies has not made NZ or the rest of the world a safer place.

Q6: The Defence Force, with its history and professionalism, is an excellent ambassador for the country. It has the ability to project our values and democratic way of life throughout the Pacific and nations therein for which it acts as a natural leader. Through this active participation in our own significant geographical and diplomatic sphere of influence it can protect and advance our national interest.

Q7: In a country where natural disaster is a real possibility, there is an obligation for the government to provide a degree of organised aid self defence from a professional and readily deployable service. It would be a mistake to underestimate the reassuring effect of a well established and well regarded military in times of national crisis.

Q8:

Q9: Effective funding, clear areas of involvement, a clear 'charter' of its role in 21st century. This should mean that any deployment is with the approval of a parliamentary majority and not in the hands of only the Prime minister.

Q11:

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Q1: Threats must be weighed by both the probability and the consequences of that threat. Currently it does seem that low probability events with significant consequences are being given inadequate consideration. The probability of a direct threat to New Zealand resulting from other countries having a supply issue with food or water has increased greatly. This may be driven by Global warming affect crops or rain's greatest effect on New Zealand's security influences will result from food and water supplies. A genetic engineered plague on a primary food crop, deliberate or otherwise, could result in extremely aggressive trans Asia conflict that would deliberately targeting civilians, such a conflict could develop within a couple of weeks, if not days (I recall a journal article from the late 90's reporting a case where a GE fungus was within 6 weeks of field trials before it was found to likely kill a third of all plant species). A combination of minor food related effects such as, increases in the effectiveness of global logistics (reduction in the levels of food held at any one time), increased speculative trading in food, and the second impending global financial crisis could result in events being driven by something as simple as a country being unable to buy food and going to war for it, be it, a military invasion or fishing fleets with a naval escort. The above considerations reflect what would generate non optional conflicts, there are many other possible conflicts that New Zealand may be involved but these are most likely optional. These optional conflicts, such as the army's deployment to Iraq & Afghanistan, must also be considered a risk to our security as these deployments tend to result in the services investing in irrelevant equipment / force structures when considered in terms of direct defence of New Zealand. Optional conflicts such as the anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Africa and maritime patrols in the gulf of Oman are much more compatible with the New Zealand's general defence requirements. The last 20 years of New Zealand's leadership has seen New Zealand slip into repeating past mistakes, be it the current military deployment to Iraq, which currently bears a striking resemblance to Vietnam but with a even poorer chance of success, or that where once we dependent on trade with the UK we are now depended on trade with China, the former being somewhat benevolent, while the latter is clearly closer to the malevolent end of the scale. While terrorism can't be discounted as generating a major threat to New Zealand, is unlikely to eventuate unless with state backing (It is worth noting that the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior was actually espionage). Small attacks such as the Lindt cafe are little different to those typically encounter by the police. Fundamentally they should remain a police problem, except in cases where the attacks show complexity. Autonomous vehicles and other similar systems present new and major risk. In some cases the risk to life is of the same or greater magnitude than nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The threat could revolve around the hacking the automotive fleet say Toyota's or a common sensor component, and using this to cause a mass fatality event. This could be carried out by a state or a non-state organisation. If we are unwilling or unable to invest sufficient wealth to maintain & deploy a suitably strong defence force, a more able nation will take our land & our lives from us; this is the fundamental nature of war.

Q2: The United States, as a super power in decline, presents only as an out liner of a direct threat to New Zealand but it still must be considered because as its power aspirations diverge farther from its actual power, they will become more unpredictable, this is farther exasperated by the left wing swing of the voter base and Republican parties attempts to exclude numerous left wing voters from the eligible voter pool. The how and why of this risk cannot be known. We do know that we cannot rely on the America technology advantage or military might for much longer. Their decline is also likely to make the UN even less useful in full scale conflict. The Peoples Republic of China sees herself as returning to her previous glories as the Worlds Superpower. This seems has resulted in her military having much the same view of itself as the Japanese in the 1920's to 1940's. The PRC conducts herself as if she is at war with the rest of the world, be it her land grab in the South China Sea, aggressive / offensive cyber war,

territory incursions around the Pacific Rim. Also with her vast army of government owned corporations, she is also able to acquire immense political leverage in any targeted countries. It has to be noted that there is no way to distinguish this from commercial investment. The PRC fears most of all, her own people; this means a manufactured crisis against a foreign power, as a way of unifying the population is a likely event. Remote food baskets, far from neighbouring countries may present a tempting target. We must expect the PRC to continue her campaign of gaining influence in the South Pacific and that the end goal will include at least one south pacific military base. Assuming that the PRC has not territorial ambitions, her very size, let alone, her highly polluted food chain, limited resources, political instability and military culture pose the major threat to New Zealand. The conflict in Ukraine illustrates that the value of allies is only as strong as their leadership. The PRC's massive foreign investments mean that the reliability of our allies or their timely assistance cannot be relied upon. Not that this leverage exclusively held by the PRC. Nor is it solely at the country level there appears to be a current trait that anything publicly stated that is negative about the PRC must be counted by a former public figure stating that it is just racism, whether they believe this, don't want to offend their business partner's or an actual PRC intelligent exercise is unknown.

Q3:

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8:

Q9: The Peoples Republic of China sees herself as returning to her previous glories as the Worlds Superpower. This seems has resulted in her military having much the same view of itself as the Japanese in the 1920's to 1940's. The PRC conducts herself as if she is at war with the rest of the world, be it her land grab in the South China Sea, aggressive / offensive cyber war, territory incursions around the Pacific Rim. Also with her vast army of government owned corporations, she is also able to acquire immense political leverage in any targeted countries. It has to be noted that there is no way to distinguish this from commercial investment. The PRC fears most of all, her own people; this means a manufactured crisis against a foreign power, as a way of unifying the population is a likely event. Remote food baskets, far from neighbouring countries may present a tempting target. We must expect the PRC to continue her campaign of gaining influence in the South Pacific and that the end goal will include at least one south pacific military base. Assuming that the PRC has not territorial ambitions, her very size, let alone, her highly polluted food chain, limited resources, political instability and military culture pose the major threat to New Zealand. The conflict in Ukraine illustrates that the value of allies is only as strong as their leadership. The PRC's massive foreign investments mean that the reliability of our allies or their timely assistance cannot be relied upon. Not that this leverage exclusively held by the PRC. Nor is it solely at the country level there appears to be a current trait that anything publicly stated that is negative about the PRC must be counted by a former public figure stating that it is just racism, whether they believe this, don't want to offend their business partner's or an actual PRC intelligent exercise is unknown.

Q11:

With the current fixed wing force elements coming to the end of their lifespans, I believe the NZDF should change its approach to how the fixed wing fleet is structured. Having a smaller number of large, more capable aircraft such as the C-17 and P-8 in conjunction with a larger fleet of smaller multi role aircraft similar to the French CASA would be advantageous in several ways.

The P-8 is a more advanced aircraft than the P-3K2, and is being used, or about to be used, by several of our allies, notably the USA, Australia and the UK. Acquisition of this aircraft would improve our capability and allow us better interoperability with allied air forces and navies. 5 SON should be able to function with 3 aircraft; one for deployment, one for SAR/local training and one in maintenance. Because the P-8 is based on the 737 and is used by several other countries, spare parts should be available for the lifetime of the aircraft. Having half the number of aircraft should compensate somewhat for the higher per-unit acquisition and running costs.

A large transport aircraft would give us the capability to deploy the NH90s almost anywhere in the world at short notice, a capability we lack with the ageing C-130. Again, by having an aircraft used by other countries means better interoperability and availability of spare parts.

Obviously with a reduced fleet of these larger aircraft there will be a reduction in the number of tasks they can complete at any one time. A squadron of small, multi role aircraft, similar to the French CASA, would pick up the slack whilst being cheaper to run. It could do a fisheries patrol of the NZ EEZ one day, a SATS run the next and parachute drops the day after. Aircrew could be trained on this aircraft initially and gain experience before moving on to the larger aircraft, reducing the training burden and cost to the larger squadrons. This also means the NZDF could get rid of the leased king air fleet.

In summary, I believe having a smaller number of more advanced, larger aircraft combined with a squadron of smaller, multi role aircraft would be advantageous to the NZDF. A smaller number of more advanced aircraft would increase our current capability without the cost of a large squadron of aircraft. A larger squadron of smaller, multi role aircraft would conduct local tasking, currently done by the force elements, as well as provide a platform for aircrew to train and gain experience before moving on to the large aircraft, all at the reduced operating cost of a small aircraft.

## A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE PEOPLE PROBLEM A PARALLEL STRUCTURE – THE NAVAL SPECIALIST

This is not a service paper. It is not based on first principles analysis or research. Its objectivity is limited by my personal beliefs and perspectives, which are unlikely to be universally shared. However, it is informed by my belief that the main obstacle to our ability to achieve our vision is a seemingly permanent inability to generate sufficient numbers of people to man our fleet and our support and C2 infrastructure. This problem waxes and wanes in scale and severity, usually (but not always) in sync with the national economic cycle. Nonetheless, it is perennial.

The exclusively naval context of this paper is a function of my background as a naval officer. It may be that the proposal is adaptable to Army and RNZAF circumstances, but I do not feel able to apply the arguments set out below directly to the other services because I do not fully understand their cultural context. The fact that I have confined myself to the naval context is a function of my respect for the other services, not naval parochialism.

I will start by defining what I see as an opportunity. I will then outline my proposal, which is to create a new specialist personnel structure in parallel to the existing rank defined system. Next I will outline some of the potential counter arguments. I will conclude with a recommendation.

The naval personnel structure is defined by rank, and is of necessity pyramidal, albeit with some rather odd bulges. If maximum benefit is to be derived from the available pool of talent, merit based opportunities to rise within the pyramid must be provided, performance at a given rank being at least partially fed by the aspiration of those who hold it to rise to the next. This requires what I suggest could be called “talent shedding”. People performing perfectly well at a given rank level who are not selected for the next must be released to feed the aspiration on which the entire structure is based. The talent that these still-effective people represent is thus lost to the Service, despite the fact that many would prefer to continue serving. This may have been acceptable during the halcyon days of low attrition and lifelong career commitments<sup>1</sup>, but when seen through the lens of our inability to get ships to sea, talent shedding represents chronic waste that directly impedes our ability to deliver security to the people of New Zealand.

<sup>1</sup> Which I would suggest ended with the introduction of the right to seek release with three months notice introduced in 1978.

Let’s assume that WO Snodgrass has reached the end of his engagement and is not offered an extension of service because of numbers in that rank and the need to create promotion vacancies, despite the fact that his continued effectiveness is not in doubt. Let’s then assume that in his trade the real shortfalls are at PO and LH level. Technically, Snodgrass is at liberty to apply for re-engagement at those rank levels, thus filling a gap that could be 2

sufficiently critical to allow a ship to go to sea. However, Snodgrass almost certainly won’t do this because his personal dignity and self-esteem would be unacceptably compromised. His contemporary in length of service, Cdr Hornblower, is equally certain to reject further employment as a Lt or Lt Cdr for exactly the same reasons, even though he has no desire to leave the Navy which is so short of OOW and PWO (which Hornblower is) at these levels that ships are either in reserve or officered by people without the experience necessary for their ships to be fully effective. In short, the re-deployment of Snodgrass’ and Hornblower’s expertise at levels in the service where they are desperately needed is rendered unthinkable by the way in which our cultural construct links dignity to rank. Incidentally, thanks to the Navy’s emphasis on the MSFT and fitness for service, both Snodgrass and Hornblower are medically and physically fit for unrestricted service.

Let's also consider ex Lt Flashcar, who when faced 15 years ago with a choice between committing to a naval career or spending maximum time with his young family chose the latter. He has since forged a highly successful civilian career, acquiring experience in commerce and in leadership that is in many ways directly transferrable to a naval setting. He was a notably efficient OOW marked down for PWO training, he still identifies strongly with the Navy, has never lost his love for the sea (he runs his own yacht), and he retains significant mental "muscle memory" in relation to OOW competencies. His business career has reached a point where he has a certain flexibility in how he allocates his time, and now that his family are essentially independent, he is searching for new challenges equal to his energy and abilities. Flashcar often thinks about the Navy, but is deterred from joining the Reserves for the same reason Hornblower would never contemplate reversion to a lower rank – the reserve rank equivalent to Flashcar's competency when he left the Navy is inconsistent with his self-esteem. In addition to sailing, Flashcar runs 8km daily, and at 45 is the same weight with the same BMI as on the day of his discharge at age 30.

Let's also consider ex POMT Bighouse, who has, like Flashcar, carved out a very successful civilian career having left the Navy at an equivalent career point. Bighouse has been employed by a succession of offshore oil industry companies. He has continued to deploy the marine engineering competencies he acquired in the Navy, but he has led large multi-disciplinary teams and gained significant managerial experience. He looks back on his naval service as some of the best years of his life, and while not prepared to resume a full naval career, he would happily commit to service at sea for extended periods, preferably in the IPV/OPV type ships equipped with commercial systems akin to those he has become familiar with in the offshore industry. However, entering the Reserves at his old rank is inconsistent with the status he has acquired in civilian life. He understands the need for and will submit 3

to discipline, but he's deterred by the status gap that would exist between himself and senior ratings and junior officers many years younger.

If the current rank structure is considered inviolate, this proposal has no value. If a parallel structure could be entertained, it might be possible to exploit the opportunity presented by Snodgrass' and Hornblower's willingness to continue serving, and Flashcar's and Bighouse's willingness to re-engage on some level.

A graded structure to operate in parallel with the current would be created. Specialisations would match GL officer specialisations and rating branches, with grades derived from competencies held. To use the seaman officer competency structure as an example:

Competency Equivalent Specialist Grade  
 OOW(B) Navigation2 Specialist Grade 43  
 2 Or "Seaman Officer"

3 Flashcar might come in at this level due to the length of time he has spent out of the Navy

4 Could be "3A" if MFUNO qualified

5 Could be "4A" if MFUNO qualified

OOW(A) Navigation Specialist Grade 34

OOW(W) Navigation Specialist Grade 25

Long N Navigation Specialist Grade 1

The nomenclature above is purely illustrative, although the term "Specialist" is useful because it signifies difference. These people would indeed be Specialists, employed purely for the specialist competencies they hold.

Specialists would be subject to the AFDA and would remain bound by their attestation oath or affirmation. They would be "superior officers" in relation to their duties only, which would present legislative challenges, albeit surmountable. They would be required to conduct



themselves in accordance with a code which would exempt them from compliance with some aspects of service custom (such as saluting and being saluted) and which would introduce customs and expectations around how they are themselves treated, with the aim of accommodating the dignity and self-esteem considerations outlined above. They would perform OOD, Divisional Officer, Duty Senior Rating and Duty Technical Senior Rating duties, but would have no ceremonial function. Uniforms could be based on GWD, with insignia to indicate specialisation but not grade. In circumstances where a higher standard of dress is 4

required, which would probably be rare, given that the primary focus would be on service at sea or at the waterfront edge of the support organisation, specialists would wear either 3AW or 3B, which would be their most formal uniform. Specialists would be subject to exactly the same fitness and medical standards as regular personnel. Lastly and critically, Specialists would accept that although they may advance in grade should the need and opportunity arise, they do not have careers per se that the Service is required to manage. This is the fundamental premise on which the proposal rests. The specialist scheme should ease career management for those people we do wish to advance to Command and beyond by providing greater opportunities to satisfy their personal aspirations and provide them with down time – in addition to addressing the shortfall in people competencies and qualities that prevents the fleet from going to sea.

It could be argued that the specialist scheme provisions around behaviour and status would be insufficient to reconcile Hornblower (who has probably had MFU Command) to filling subordinate seaman officer appointments. This may well be the case. However, the Merchant Service (which is much more tradition conscious than many naval officers realise) provides ample precedent. Many traditional shipping companies ceased cadet training in the 1980's. This has dramatically impacted the supply of deck officers to those companies that survive. It is the norm for such NZ flagged vessels as continue to trade to carry Second and Third Officers with Master Mariner qualifications and many years service in Command. Merchant Service customs have adapted to accommodate the dignity and self-esteem of these invaluable people.

Qualifying criteria for the specialist scheme would need to be established. A candidate would need to have reached a certain rank in the Service, or to have been in civilian life for a certain length of time – in which case aptitude suitability re-testing would be required. I do not anticipate, however, that a Lt (for example) would be given the chance to opt for the specialist scheme as an alternative to a standard career path. Aspiration to advance must remain central to our mainstream officer career structure. A different view could perhaps be taken for ratings, such as in circumstances where an individual's technical competence is not matched by leadership potential, but where the criticality of those technical competences is such that retention is highly desirable. Lifting that individual out of the mainstream advancement structure might simplify career management for those remaining.

Specialist remuneration and conditions of service at various grades and in various specialisations could be linked after proper study with regular ranks, with a reduction in military factor in recognition of reduced command responsibility in relation to the equivalent rank and to enable differentiation in favour of the mainstream officers and ratings with the 5

same competencies who would be liable for the full range of duties associated with their rank. Status such as mess entitlement could also be a function of grade/rank linkage.

Counter arguments are many and varied and include the following:

- The specialist scheme might be too attractive. Notwithstanding restrictions on eligibility, people who might otherwise persevere with mainstream careers might find a way to opt for the specialist scheme before their full mainstream potential is reached.
- The specialist scheme might be completely unattractive. Snodgrass, Hornblower, Flashcar and Bighouse might be figments of my imagination.
- Remuneration might be a much bigger factor in Snodgrass', Hornblower's, Flashcar's and Bighouse's calculations that I have allowed for. If this is the case the proposal is not viable, because the need to pay mainstream people more than specialists with the same competencies is a central plank of its viability.
- Relationships between those in the traditional structure and those in the parallel structure might be undermined by uncertainties and jealousies.

To address each of the points above:

- The specialist scheme must be differentiated by remuneration and opportunity, with the people in the mainstream structure advantaged. Specialists must be seen as addressing shortfalls, not providing alternatives to mainstream competency equivalents.
- We know that Snodgrass exists. Many WO's seek repeated extensions of service, and some accept reversion in rank to CPO in order to continue serving (none, to my knowledge, have accepted reversion to Petty Officer). With regard to Bighouse, recent work done by CFPT indicates that there are significant numbers of former ratings for whom the primary obstacle to re-enlistment is the need to accept a significant reduction in the status they enjoy in civilian life – Bighouse is therefore out there too. Flashcar's existence is not entirely a figment of my imagination. He is in fact an amalgam of several former officers of my acquaintance, all of whom fit the description above to a greater or lesser extent. It is Hornblower whose existence might perhaps be in doubt. Many experienced officers leaving the service seem happy to make the break and accept entirely fresh challenges, and most do very well. However, this might be because they have no choice but to think in those terms. The fact that they do well in civilian life perhaps indicates the extent of the talent that we must lose in order to maintain our pyramidal structure.

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- Remuneration is indeed a significant issue. Snodgrass, Hornblower, Flashcar and Bighouse are all likely to be able to earn more as civilians than as either mainstream officers and ratings or specialists – in the case of Flashcar and Bighouse, much more. Some clarity around what I mean by pay differentiation of favour of the mainstream competency equivalent is therefore necessary. Differentiation would be competency based, not appointment based. Hornblower's remuneration would be based on that of a Cdr PWO, not that of an OPV XO (Lt GLX OOW(A)) if he were serving in that appointment. In the case of Flashcar and Bighouse, a remuneration matrix that took account of their civilian experience and competencies would be needed. This matrix could link remuneration steps with non-traditional factors, such as the size of the teams managed in civilian life and the scale of responsibilities held. In the case of engineers, IPENZ collects data on market remuneration which could assist. In the case of seaman officers, reference could be made to the Merchant Service Guild – the internationalisation of merchant shipping in recent years has been such that deck officer pay rates are nowhere near as high in relative terms as they once were.
- I firmly believe that relationships such as that which would exist between a mainstream officer or rating and a specialist are functions of two things: a benefits, remuneration and privileges structure that is manifestly fair to both parties, and behaviour. The first is

achievable with the right study and attention to detail. The second is equally achievable given good leadership and sound codes of conduct. With these in place, the values that all good officers and ratings live by should ensure sufficient goodwill to make the scheme work.

It might also be worth considering the corollary benefits that the presence of specialists in a ship's company or in a wardroom might bring. Maturity, judgement and wide experience might rub off on mainstream officers and ratings in a way that aids professional and leadership development. Mentorship would be more accessible than when junior and senior people are separated by rank and convention, as at present.

Change of this magnitude could be disruptive. It certainly challenges principles and beliefs that until now have been considered inviolate. I fully acknowledge that there may well be practical and/or cultural impediments that I haven't foreseen. However, I ask the reader to consider whether a rank structure inherited from the Royal Navy and which may still be perfectly well suited to the needs of larger navies is in fact appropriate for us, given our lack of critical mass and our vulnerability to attrition shocks. If we were to design a people structure from scratch to meet our current needs, might it not look very different from the one we have today? Most critically of all, I ask that this proposal be considered in light of the 7

severity and impact of our perennial people challenge, and the fact that we still have two highly capable little ships sitting alongside the boiler wharf for want of people to operate them.

In closing, I'd suggest that as radical as this proposal might seem, aspects of our current structure were considered an intolerable threat to the wellbeing of the Service when first proposed. For instance, when First Sea Lord in the early years of the last century, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher proposed a structural change that was fought tooth and nail by a wide and influential segment of the Royal Navy officer corps. The change in question was the granting of equal status to engineering officers, and was initially defeated.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Q1: I think the Paper sets out the strategic outlook relatively well. I think it might understate the implications and extent of global economic weakness. It also fails to address the growing instability in Europe, not just Russia/Ukraine but threats to NATO members from Russia, possible regime change in Russia, and the risk of serious unrest in Greece, Spain etc as a result of economic pressures - think 1930s Europe. Regime change in DPRK would also appear a real possibility also. The US pivot to Asia is rather unconvincing. Don't get hoodwinked by the rhetoric. And I am afraid we will probably see growing refugee numbers in our region. Some may one day make it on see all the way to NZ.

Q2: I worry that we no longer have a fighter/bomber capability in our airforce. Frankly I would prefer the use of such assets and the navy should NZ be called upon or feel the need to contribute to collective efforts than I would boots on the ground. It is a challenging few years ahead. Our Defence forces will unfortunately be busy. They need to be equipped appropriately.

Q3: Disaster relief, peacekeeping, participation in offshore deployments alongside our friends to contribute to global peace and stability.

Q4: Fisheries and mineral exploitation interest will grow, and we may be welcoming some refugees....As you note cyber security will be an increasing challenge. Russia and others will continue to try and break NZ away from the Five Eyes arrangement. We are currently seen as the weakest link and most vulnerable.

Q5: New Zealand security Regional security Protection of our shipping and aviation links Contribution to global peace and security

Q6: NZDF must be part of the wider NZ Inc effort. Hopefully if other parts of the system do their job properly NZDF will not be called upon to be too involved. But sometimes NZDF will end up playing the lead role.

Q7: This will remain an important role.

Q8: I don't see this as a core function. But I do believe that the Defence Force is a very good training ground for young people.

Q9: Keep the army and navy capability pretty much as is. Add a fighter/bomber capability to the airforce. We need to renew the heavy lift capability of the airforce, and have planes that fly heavier payloads faster and faster. We need a new VIP capability also. Maybe something smaller than the 757s but with a much longer range.

Q11: We probably need to invest more in intelligence analysis/ strategic thinking capability in Defence/MFAT.

## Major threats to New Zealand's security now and in the future

As a nation, our ability to maintain influence, and where appropriate, take a lead role in responding to regional security challenges is decreasing, as is the natural 'safe distance' through physical geographical isolation that we have historically relied up as a means of defence. This is because of the spread and sophistication of cyber; rising security concerns over returning foreign fighters; increasing transnational criminal activity in our region influence; and an increasing presence of growing regional powers seeking greater access and influence in our region. Additionally, the lines between discretionary and not discretionary tasking for Government is becoming increasingly blurred, which is placing greater demands on the NZDF.

The future environment is also pointing towards a greater presence of state and non-state actors in and around New Zealand's waters seeking access to the vast untapped resources that lie within our EEZ. We are now seeing evidence of foreign fishing fleets operating on the fringes of our EEZ while plundering the fisheries stocks of the South Pacific waters. It is only a matter of time before they are returning into sovereign territory in pursuit of fish. The sheer size of our EEZ alone creates a massive surveillance problem for maintaining an accurate picture of whom and what are operating in our waters. Reporting by compliance goes some way to assisting in the maintenance of a recognised maritime picture, but what we don't know, we can't act on, and the problem is going to increase. Technology breakthroughs are also revolutionising undersea platform capabilities that will soon enable protein harvesting, deep sea fossil fuel and minerals extraction, and increased surveying and surveillance capabilities by state and non-state (invariably commercial companies) actors. If we are to maintain our sovereignty through being able to 'influence and deter', we need to investigate, amongst other things, emerging underwater surveillance technologies to ensure we are able to fully protect our EEZ with future naval platform and system replacements.

Given our geographical isolation, the size of our maritime domain and its intrinsic value, the future challenges around its management, the significance of the maritime threats will continue to grow. And as a maritime nation, dependant on global maritime trade for economic prosperity, our national interests will continue to be influenced by emerging regional and global trends in the maritime environment.

The NZDF, particularly the Navy and Air Force, has an implicit role to play in the ongoing maintenance of our sovereignty, support fisheries management and compliance, border protection, and providing security and protection of mineral and energy resource extraction assets within our EEZ. If, as the Government is seeking to do, any expansion in offshore mineral extraction is realised in the coming years, then naturally demand for an increased naval presence for security and surveillance will rise. As will the need for increased patrol operations to enforce the Fisheries Management Act and to deter transnational crime within our Maritime Zone.

## Increasing military challenges to New Zealand's interests

The ranges of military challenges in the global maritime commons are rising, and our challenges are no different to that of our friends and allies. 'Most prominently, the

proliferation of technologies that allows potential adversaries to threaten naval forces at greater ranges complicates unimpeded access to some maritime regions (anti-access), as well as the ability to manoeuvre within those regions (area denial), including the littoral and landward access.<sup>1</sup> Albeit that this is a conundrum faced by larger navies, as a longstanding ally of the US, we too face the same challenge if we are to maintain a credible level of local sea control as part of the 'global network of navies,'<sup>2</sup> and become the regional expert of naval operations within our maritime domain.

As technology is evolving, military strategists are trying to tackle the issue of 'how to employ surface forces in a maritime environment where anti-access/area-denial (A2/D2) is becoming increasingly available to a greater number of naval forces around the globe'<sup>3</sup> While we may never be in the game of total domain dominance, we too must start looking at how we can take advantage of, and counter the rapidly evolving threats in cyber and automation, emerging sensor, power, processing, and communication technologies.

How we connect into that 'global network of navies' in the future will need to be very carefully considered to ensure the types of naval capability New Zealand acquires to compliment or enhance the coalition force we may be working with. At the same time, we need to increase new defensive and offensive capabilities to meet an increasing requirement for self defence of our own forces, either to defend ourselves until international assistance arrives, or to safely withdraw until reinforcements arrive.

The DCDC, Strategic Global Trends 2040 predicts that ballistic missile proliferation is likely to continue through indigenous development of missile technology by technically adept emerging powers, and the import and local adaptation of systems procured through international markets. Once the domain of major powers, ballistic missiles with ranges in excess of tens of kilometres now number in excess of 5000 globally, spread across more than 20 countries, and will become a necessary consideration for maintaining a future defensive capability for our forces that are operating regionally and globally.

### **Roles that the NZDF should perform to maintain, secure and advance our interests abroad**

The New Zealand economy is completely addicted to information technology and connectivity, and cannot operate without it. Any future national and maritime security strategy must consider the impact that this will have on the importance of sea lines of communication, including the means to protect the information highways that traverse the maritime domain (fibre cables on the seabed and the RF spectrum of the space above the sea).

### **Global Participation**

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<sup>1</sup> USN, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, p.23

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*, p.32

<sup>3</sup> See the '*Distributed Lethality*' paper by VA Rowden, RA Gumataotao, and RA Fanta, USN, on the future challenges the USN faces allocating limited resources across a larger set of defended targets.

Freedom of navigation is more than sea control. It is about protecting all forms of commerce that travel to and from our shores. It is about supporting our trading partners in their maritime endeavours to ensure the smooth flow of goods imported and exported via the sea. And in times of conflict, it is about ensuring that the global sea-lines of communication remain free from peril and accessible for all mariners around the world to ply their trade. With globalisation comes a greater global dependency for ensuring the world's trade routes remain open. New Zealand's prosperity depends almost entirely on the freedom of access to global markets for imports and exports along the sea-lines of communication, which is increasingly becoming a non-discretionary task for the NZDF. And as we have no nationally owned shipping line, our economic prosperity is entirely dependent on foreign owned national shipping companies being able to sail to and from our shores, and along the world's shipping lanes, unimpeded. To maintain that international access we need to have a Defence Force of sufficient size that can be continuously deployed to support international efforts in maintaining the freedom of navigation and access to ports and facilities, both from the land and the sea.

### **The NZDF and RNZN**

Over the last 30 years, through evolving policy settings, New Zealand's Navy has transformed from a 'cold war orientated' and 'combat focussed' 'blue water' navy into a 'modern and versatile' navy, capable of operating from the Southern Ocean to the equator and far beyond. We now have a fleet of heterogeneous ships and capabilities that deliver a mix of effects: combat – at sea and from the sea; constabulary patrol; underway replenishment and sea lift; humanitarian aid and disaster relief; interdiction operations to disrupt criminal, terrorist and illegal activities at sea; and coalition enabling capabilities that enable us to participate in global operations. But the numbers of each class of ship we have will not meet the rising demands of successive Governments seeking to maintain a position of influence and credibility as a global citizen.

Future choices on capability will require us to take full advantage of emerging technologies, both for operations at sea and ashore in order to maintain a credible capability to have 'influence' over state and non-state actors who may choose to operate within our maritime domain, or in the global areas of significant national interest. Based on the future strategic environment, the Defence Force (as a part of a whole of government strategy for maritime security) will be increasingly called upon as the first responders/ defenders in an ever expanding role of military and maritime tasks over time.

Scaled to our national means, and to meet our national interests, an ability for us to be able to maintain effective local sea control (above and below surface against ASMs, armed long range UUVs, cyber and directed energy attacks) is rising, and may well become the minimum entry requirement for coalition combat orientated operations in the future. Our dilemma is always going to be constrained by a policy need to operate across the spectrum of operations with a limited number of assets. Perhaps we should be thinking about the actual effective contribution we could make, whether our coalition contributions are biased towards being able to operate 'blue water' – to defend New Zealand, or orientated to operate in the 'littoral' – to protect

our national interests overseas (therefore protecting the 'system'), then signal that to our friends and allies.

### **Future Capabilities**

Any change in policy that determines a greater need and more frequent use of NZDF capabilities must require a commensurate increase in the Defence Budget to enable the delivery of required capability.

There is no argument that, despite the advances and evolution of military technology, the cost of acquiring appropriate new maritime continues to rise. As a service that is platform centric, operating in the maritime domain with a heterogeneous fleet is becoming more expensive as the cost of maintaining orphan capabilities continues to rise – both in terms of people, platform maintenance and sustainment.

Technology is also providing growing opportunity for the NZDF to develop a greater capability to monitor and maintain security within our EEZ and maritime zone through satellite, remotely operated vehicles (airborne and subsurface) and localised platforms that provide the necessary 'human' interface of enforcement at sea (boarding for inspection, arrest, seizure and interdiction). The offset to this, however, is the increasing growth of supporting personnel and infrastructure required to operate remote systems, analyse all intelligence collected, and create effective and actionable information that Government and NZDF commanders can respond to, or pass to coalition partners for further action.

Could 2015 be the year where we start a rolling fleet replacement programme of platforms and systems from a single primary manufacturer for a 'family' of ships and supporting facilities over the next 20-30 year period? Admittedly, initial build costs would be significant but the through life efficiencies, both in costs and support etc., could be funded and spread over the entire period. This would also maximise commonality across the fleet; enable the realisation of new 'plug and play' systems of equipment and personnel to support missions; facilitate seamless integration with our allies and partners; and promote a greater availability of platforms for the forecasted increases in naval tasking. It would also be a clear demonstration to our allies and partners that we remain to be an effective contributor to the 'global network of navies in a hyper-connected global community'.<sup>4</sup>

How we position for the future will require an in-depth study of our foreign policy and how we want to contribute to global issues through application of military power. If Government decides that the increased risk to our national security closer to home is becoming more important than international participation, then capabilities for the defence of the homeland may be of more importance than capabilities for regional and global commitments. Should that be the case then a decision will have to be made on the physical make up of the fleet and where we are to focus our skill sets in the facets of warfare.

As a maritime nation, is having the majority of our forces made up of land forces the right orientation? Or should we be transforming more into a 'marine' type force

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<sup>4</sup> USN, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, 2015



that is focussed on delivering operations from the sea that are operate in remote and far away places both at sea and ashore? A national defence strategy based on an 1880 philosophy of defending ' principal harbours and ports' with coastal defences and land forces while relying on allies with large navies to defend New Zealand from the sea is no longer relevant for a global community that is entirely dependant on each other for economic prosperity and security. We should be looking at increasing the size and make up of the NZDF to be able to meet the growing threats to our national interests.

If we are to maintain relevance internationally, and be seen as a reliable military contributor to issues of regional and global significance, then we must invest more in defence. Whatever risk to national security is decided as the policy and funding priority (defending the homeland, or defending our national interests abroad), the mix and make up of the NZDF needs to be re-orientated towards being able to maintain that ability if we are to remain to be limited 1.1% of GDP for a Defence Budget.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

1. I believe that one of the biggest challenges facing the NZDF, based on the limited experience I have within the RNZAF, is that relating to personnel. This includes both the numbers of personnel available and particularly the level of experience of currently serving personnel. I believe that with the promise of 16 billion dollars to spend across defence, it will be easy to be lured into purchasing brand new, modern and expensive capabilities, but without the qualified and experienced personnel to operate these capabilities, their effectiveness will seriously be reduced to the point where it will probably be ineffectual to have purchased them in the first place.

2. Personnel within the NZDF should be viewed as **the most important capability**. Without well-trained, experienced people who are motivated and committed to the organisation, no capability will ever reach its true potential.

3. The NZDF must grow to be able to employ its capabilities and meet its obligations. This is evident in a number of areas. One example is that 3 SQN are required to have 12 NH90 crews. They currently have five. In order to grow this, the Pilot Training Capability must meet its required output, looking for 24 students a year. In order to sustain that level of training, a study has identified that 28 QFIs would be required across CFS and 14 SQN. They currently have 12, and only expect to have 17-18 by Jan 2016. I am sure, based on anecdotal evidence, that similar situations exist across defence.

4. It should not be viewed that minimum manning is good enough. This leads to higher workloads on those that are left, therefore a reduced quality of life, which ultimately leads to experienced personnel leaving. The very people we cannot afford to lose.

5. Investment should be applied to solve this problem by increasing the number of personnel within defence and ensuring that those personnel already engaged are looked after so that they remain motivated and committed.

Q1: Climate change; associated economic refugees; depletion of oil and water resources; growing US-China rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region.

Q2: Following from our comments above, New Zealand needs to develop a more nuanced, even-handed stance in its relations with its primary economic partner China, and its former military ally the US.

Q3: The DSC broadly endorses the need to maintain military capabilities to fulfil the roles outlined on pp16-18 of the Defence Review Consultation Document. However, New Zealand should adopt a non-provocative, defensive posture. This entails deploying NZDF forces overseas only on UN-approved peacekeeping operations, using minimum force to achieve the aim.

Q4: Policing depleted fish resources and economic refugees in its EEZ; helping with relief operations following extreme weather events.

Q5: 1) Provide military support to Police, Customs and other agencies responsible for responding to security threats to NZ territory and EEZ. 2) Provide military support within the South Pacific in response to requests by states for assistance with disaster relief and restoring security. 3) Respond to wider regional security threats in conjunction with Australian defence forces, but only with UN approval. 4) Contribute to UN peacekeeping operations further afield. NZDF should be interoperable with Australian forces. However, any move to merge capabilities further, such as the posited ANZAC rapid response force, should be resisted. Inevitably, this would lead to domination and control by Australia, and probable mission creep to respond to US demands, like joining the illegal invasion of Iraq.

Q6: As above.

Q7: As above.

Q8: NZDF should continue to offer rewarding careers, involving peacekeeping and disaster relief training and experience that enables veterans to make a constructive contribution to society. NZDF should not be sidetracked into providing boot camp experience for troubled youth, let alone a form of national service.

Q9: The current mix is broadly satisfactory. However, higher priority should be given to ordering a sister ship to HMNZ Canterbury, so that this valuable NZ contribution to amphibious lift and disaster relief capability in the South Pacific region can be enhanced and sustained for longer periods.

Q11:

1.

Q1: New Zealand cannot obtain security by partnering with Military forces that routinely abuse human rights See answer to final Question.

Q2:

Q3:

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8:

Q9:

Q11: We submit that New Zealand should suspend all defence ties to Indonesia. This would include the Defence Attache based in Jakarta and the regular hosting of an Indonesian military officer to attend the 6 month training course at the New Zealand Defence Force Staff and Command College, Trentham. In 2011 it was revealed that a Kopassus Special Forces officer attended the Trentham course. Kopassus has a particularly black record of involvement in human rights abuses, including massacres in East Timor in the decades it was occupied by Indonesia, and the ongoing violence in West Papua. Kopassus is also linked to the killing of New Zealander Gary Cunningham, one of the 'Balibo Five', in 1975. From information obtained under the Official Information Act we know that this officer was not vetted for his previous human rights record. The Indonesian military is also responsible for the death of Kamal Bamadhaj at the time of the Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor in 1991 and indirectly for the death of Private Leonard Manning, New Zealand peacekeeper, who was killed by a militia member in 2000. Of course while we remember these New Zealanders we must not overlook the immense conflict-related loss of life in East Timor under Indonesian occupation - close to 200,000 or some one third of that country's population. We do not believe that the democratic change in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto in 1998, has extended to the military. Despite extensive documentation of historic military abuses, no high ranking Indonesian military officer has been prosecuted for a human rights crime. On the contrary, those accused of command responsibility for black crimes in East Timor have been promoted, have stood for presidential office (Prabowo Subianto, Retired General Wiranto) and gone to serve in new conflict areas such as West Papua. President Joko Widodo appointed Retired General Ryamizard Ryacudu as Defence Minister, despite his questionable human rights record. As former army chief he was well-known for his hard-line stance on 'separatism'. During the time of martial law in Aceh, when thousands died, the army was against negotiating a peaceful solution. "Our job is to destroy GAM's military capability. Issues of justice, religion, autonomy, social welfare, education-those are not the Indonesian military's problems", he said in an interview with TIME Asia, June 2, 2003. West Papuans remember that Ryacudu defended the low-ranking Kopassus soldiers charged with killing their charismatic independence leader Theys Eluay in 2001. He said that the killers were 'heroes' because they had killed a 'rebel leader'. Last December Indonesian security forces opened fire on a group of unarmed school students in the West Papua highlands, killing at least four of them. Six months later there have been no arrests and no sign of the independent investigation recommended by Indonesia's Human Rights Commission. We are willing to attend in person if there are hearing to consider submissions. Maire Leadbeater West Papua Action Auckland

## Defence White Paper Submission

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?
  - Ability to effectively patrol/monitor our borders, EEZ and southern ocean
  - Sale of assets to foreign nationals and companies, in particular sales of land and industry – leaving us open/susceptible to political and economic influences in decisions involving the involvement of Defence in a dispute or action/response.
  - Influence of our youth (all), and low socio-economic groups by extremist groups through either social media or infiltration/ingratiation into these at risk peoples. (particularly in terms of offering a better way of life, or the ability to be part of something that matters)
    - Couldn't Defence provide an opportunity to give 'direction' to some of these people?
  
2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?
  - Political and financial pressures on NZ as a result of trade agreements/alliances
    - The risk of putting all of our eggs in one basket (aligning (economically) with a particular group/faction/state/country) may result in the inability of NZ to respond/act/enforce in a particular situation without some form of economic impact.
  - The lines between Defence and Trade will be blurred even further - the ability to choose between defence alliances and trade alliance will be a political/economic decision, not a traditional Defence decision – right and wrong – protect the weak/innocent or our property/interests
  
3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?
  - Protect and serve NZ and citizens, assets, technology and industry at home and abroad.
  - Patrol, protect and enforce our claims/interests on land, sea and air
  - Respond quickly, efficiently and effectively to unforeseen incidents (natural and man made) and planned activities and have the ability to support, maintain and SUSTAIN this activity for an indefinite term.
  - Have the ability/capacity to attract, train and RETAIN the NZ Defence specialists we need, now and in the future, across a broader spectrum of skill sets than currently supported
    - Look toward not only attracting the traditional trades and skills sets for Army Navy and Air Force but investigate the recruitment of trained or carry out training of specialist IT personnel, programmers/analysts, NAV/Guidance systems, Electronic Warfare systems operators, Intelligence Analysts, Military Police/Investigators/First Responders (Marines)
  
4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

- We do not have sufficient capacity, both personnel and equipment to support effective protection oversight of these areas.
  - We lack sufficient/effective sustainable capability in long term/long range surveillance over a wide area, lack the analysts, the personnel, equipment and the 'teeth' to protect or enforce our territories.
    - Consideration must be given to a purpose built (off the shelf) multipurpose RPAS/UAV/UAS system that can provide efficient and effective long range surveillance not just for the use of Defence but to also provide information to Customs, Police, Immigration, MAF and other Government Agencies (consider Dept of Conservation).
    - Provide information to allow Navy to pursue, apprehend and appropriate Department prosecute as applicable (Police, MAF, Immigration).
    - DO NOT try to develop a UAS system 'in-house' this is too expensive and inefficient given the huge range of systems already available on the market that have been tested and approved by various Airworthiness Authorities (both Civil and Military) and incorporate appropriate technologies such as;
      - High resolution cameras – recording and real time playback
      - Thermal/infra-red sensors
      - Programmable flight path and/or manual control (inc. override)
      - Collision avoidance and 'lost signal - RTB' software
      - Long range capability
      - Ability to carry payload – sonar buoys, emergency kits, other
      - Land or Sea launch
      - Transponder fit
5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia and contributing to international peace and security globally?
- The Government needs to ensure it provides Defence with sufficient support either through assets, funding, personnel or legislation to enable Defence to carry out all the roles/functions and additional tasks it and the people of NZ have come to expect from their Defence Force.
    - Defence doesn't just mean going to war, for the general public the Defence Force is that group of people that shows up when everything has gone wrong, to make things right, or just a little bit better – to protect, clean up, take care of, listen, support, build, defend and generally take care of all those 'nasty bits' that no-one else can. The last line of defence – the last bastion - to be all, to all. (whether we like it or not)
  - Government priorities will walk a fine line between traditional loyalties/alliances and economic/strategic alliances. Government has a responsibility to ensure it does not place Defence in a position where we are unable to maintain or sustain a rate of effort that we are either unprepared for or typically under-resourced for.
    - Either by virtue of deficiencies in equipment, personnel, training or logistic support due to reductions/restrictions in funding.

- Government decisions to support or not support our friends, partners and allies need to be carefully weighed against both economic effects (potentially short term) and long term strategic/relationship effects (potentially long term – consider consequences of ANZUS, which impacted on political, economic and defence spheres) before decisions are made. The decision to satisfy a few outspoken opponents/supporters in the short term may have far reaching consequences in the long term, affecting our ability to provide or receive assistance, training or result in missed opportunities (trade, defence or other) with our friends, partners and allies.
  - Government decisions when considering strategic/global priorities needs to consider the core competencies of Defence and the impact these decisions have on meeting our responsibilities with the available resources within our own backyard, NZ, Pacific and Southern Ocean and Antarctica.
6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?
- Defence can provide support for government departments (& vice versa) in terms of intelligence gathering, monitoring and patrolling . working jointly with Customs, MAF, Police and Immigration to provide additional support (advice, technology) as required.
  - Defence does not currently have the capacity to take a leading role in this area as we lack the resources (particularly personnel) and are still building capability (maritime patrol)
  - Consider joint partnerships with Government Departments, both training and operations to better develop both working relationships but a 'force' to protect NZs interests.
7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?
- Defence is typically regarded as the 'fall-back' unit to provide support Emergency services for these occurrences, this is a role we need to maintain as NZ has no other way of dealing with these issues (unlike the US we do not have a National Guard or thousands of reservist/territorial bodies to call on to assist).
  - It is a responsibility of the NZDF to provide support and assistance to the NZ people, whether this be off shore or in our own backyard.
  - Unfortunately due to the decline in NZDF personnel we have now lost that capability, the flexibility (capacity) and resilience to support any event (unforeseen circumstance both on and off shore: CHCH earthquake/cyclone relief in the islands) for an extended period of time (anything more than one (1) month would start to significantly impact normal operations (day-to-day activities, training, response, operations)
8. What should the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?
- Defence underestimates the impact it can have on youth, where it be through roadshows, advertising, but more importantly making experiences/contact with defence more accessible, these are after all potential recruits.
  - LSVs is an option that needs further support not just from Defence, but a commitment from the government. Consider partnerships with social services, polytechnics, police

and corrections to provide educational opportunities run in conjunction with the LSV programme.

- Look at not only teaching youth (not just those that are 'at risk' but open to all. Where they have an opportunity to learn to respect themselves and others through military training, and experiences 'outside the norm'.
- Include not only educational 'life skills', but other learning options, whether basic reading/comprehension through to possible entry to (during training) and continuation of a polytech course post LSV training (it may be a trade, childcare or healthcare).
- The 'choice' may not be related to Defence but will ultimately benefit the individual and in turn the NZ people overtime as they will have more opportunities to make a real contribution to NZ society as a whole.
- I would be interested to know how many pers have gone on to enlist post this experience, and if so, why? if not, what was it that we could do better? or was Defence never an option at all?
- Defence needs to be smarter in how it attracts potential recruits, perhaps including a focus on the qualifications you can obtain whilst 'working' your way through a degree, not just a focus on the 'active' side of service \_ lets face it, not everyone is 'super sporty' – or a potential action man.
- Additional focus on the other trades available to people – typically the public does not realise there are options apart from pilots, infantry or deckhand, that is the type of perception that needs to change before we can attract youth to our 'family'.
  - Consider an RESA approach to trades – include non-commisioned personnel, not just office ranks.
  - Sign up with defence (some form of ROS – 5-8 years dependant on level qualification sought), complete your papers, if you pass defence pays, you fail, you pay.
  - Do not dictate exactly the qualification that can be done ie Engineers must do Mechatronics at Massey University, there are some far better options for engineering education at Auckland or Canterbury Universities.
  - Utilise the current 'Wed Sport policy' for recognised sports clubs make this available for those enrolled in approved courses of study to utilise this time as 'study periods'.
- Compulsory Military training – I like this idea, but don't think it would get much support in todays society, unless it was presented as an option of 'diversion' a period of training as opposed to community service, or suspended sentence – it's not great thinking of military service as an alternative to prison, however, fact- many at risk youth have never been presented with any other opportunities, or think they can achieve anything more than they are.
- Defence has been seen to do so much good, we need to make use of that good press and use it to our advantage.



9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

- Flexibility, Capacity and Resources – The CAN DO attitude we ‘pride’ ourselves on (rightly or wrongly) can only get you so far, this attitude is reliant on the loyalty of your people, which is a two-way street. Defence has done little to encourage the loyalty of it’s people over the last 10 years (pay does not equal loyalty, it is state of mind).
  - The CAN DO attitude is a double edged sword, yes you can achieve, but CAN DO + work/time/operational/task pressures (real or perceived) = bereaved or distraught families and sensational headlines. Human factors 101.
  - Flexibility requires both the capacity AND the resources to complete allocated tasks.
- Resources: People, people, people – we have been haemorrhaging people over the last 5-10 years to our detriment. It only takes a month to lose a person but it takes 3-5 years to gain one back – that math is not in our favour.
  - Need to focus on how to attract, train and RETAIN specialist personnel
    - Defence needs to acknowledge that it is losing more people than it can replace – It needs to honestly investigate why we are losing people – factors include BUT ARE NOT limited to pay and conditions. Defence expects loyalty from its personnel, but does little to give this this in return.
    - Look at recruitment methods and approaches
      - Consider offering additional trade qualifications open this opportunity to All RANKS from recruitment – if you pass we pay, if you fail you pay, Return of service of Minimum 5-8 years, typically if you can get someone to stay for over 8 years they will be entrenched in the culture. (as above – comments on youth)
      - Consider specifically recruiting and training NAVY personnel as Aircraft Maintenance/technical personnel (Avionics/Aircraft) to service ship based Helos. Cross train NAVy S&S/Arm personnel in servicing support equipment
  - Personnel : Defence needs to consider changing it’s approach to ex-service personnel, instead of discounting them as a lost cause consider them as potential re-recruitment options after a 6-12mth period or beyond.
    - Stay in contact, pursue options to attract them back, invest some time into finding out ‘why’ they left, ‘what’ were their reasons for leaving, were they valid, were they result of a Defence action, or a personal one, has that action/cause changed?
    - Time and money has been invested in these people we should try to encourage them to return, Defence regularly goes ‘off-shore’ to recruit, do we need to when we may just have a vast pool of resources on our back door?
  - Re-think approach to direct posting of personnel – this appears to be one of the biggest contributions to personnel leaving. Defence needs to be more realistic in

considering other options to merely posting someone for 'service reasons' this has multiple impacts in today's society – many of them result in financially disadvantaging the family or splitting them up.

- Two income families reduced to one
- Owning home to either selling/ renting out and then trying to find affordable accommodation in new area
  - Affected by school zoning
  - Rent affordability
  - Living conditions vs rent
- Stress on partner/family left behind if service person commuting
- Affect on partners career – job options
- Core Competencies focus
  - Claw back our core competencies and self sufficiencies lost due to 'leaning', trade restructures (reviews – which usually result in less people), 'out sourcing maintenance' (small aircraft/helos/minor repairs/servicing) and Support functions (Administration, Motor transport and drivers).
    - Many reviews have targeted 'small trades' unfortunately what is not widely appreciated is that these pers are specialists (composite/metal workers/machinists and drivers). These personnel receive training, experiences that are not comparable in the public sector, unless you pay a vast amount of money for their services. Some of the activities they perform are not taught in the civilian sector to lose these personnel may result in effects that will not be 'overtly' apparent, but only become an issue when Defence is asked to deploy, or operate in theatre, by then, it is too late.
    - Defence/government is commits personnel to various exercises and operations yet does not provide them with adequate support and services to enable them to function, particularly when something out of the ordinary happens.
      - Example: Ability to manufacture/repair pipelines in the field, carry out composite repairs to enable continued operations.
  - Investigate Military/Civ combinations for some activities (Seasprite or NH90 Phase inspections/ T6C operations)
    - ie: T6C operations incorporate a MFC (S/L or Senior FLT Engineer) W/O, F/S, SNCO, JNCO, LAC & AC trades with supporting personnel in form of LAME with rating or NZDF accepted equivalent training and pers employed as purely maintenance personnel, skill levels may be spread between AC through to LAC/JNCO levels. This would provide development opportunities for NZDF staff (OLM/ILM on small fixed wing types). In addition greater RNZAF airworthiness oversight.
    - All pers used on day-to-day operations, military personnel used on away taskings/operations/deployments (keeping costs low as overtime need not be paid) alternate civilian contracts stipulating that TOIL used in LEIU of overtime payments by agreement of both parties.

- Benefits – reduce the loss of ‘continuity due to posting cycles of RNZAF personnel, maintained via civilian employees (ensure MFC and W/O have 12mth posting split at all times).
- Strategic Airlift – the C17 appears to be a Government driven done deal
  - This needs to be an Australia based operation to utilise their logistic maintenance/supply support network.
- Pacific response: We still have a gaping hole in our capability to respond to our Pacific partners, no ability for SRTOL post Hercules, no capability to airlift our helicopters to these regions as C17 is too large (and also too large/heavy for many of NZ regional airports.)
  - Consider A400M with links to Airbus logistic support (via NHI)
    - Ability to airlift NH90 to pacific regions, including support pers.
  - Consider Osprey links to Boeing C17 logistic support
    - Multirole both twin engine and helicopter capabilities
    - Capable of carrying 24 troops with ramp mounted weapons system.
- Maritime: Ability to monitor, patrol, police, protect and enforce our EEZ, and Southern Ocean (including Antarctica) interests
  - Need to support P3 with
    - Naval vessels
      - Require manpower – consider joint police/MAF/ Customs/Navy task force (Coast guard) to provide personnel and skills/knowledge
      - Require equipment and training
  - UAS/RPAS/UAV ‘off the shelf’ developed, tested, ‘in use’ and approved by an acceptable airworthiness authority (EASA, FAA, or Acceptable foreign military AA) for use – see previous comments for minimum requirements.
    - Consider a ‘joint’ approach with both navy and Army , but also consider the needs and requirements of other Government enforcement/monitoring agencies. Multiple funding options.
- Consider joint specialist service/unit like the Marines. These specialists would be the go to unit for initial response (when SAS is not warranted) this group would be trained to be familiar with aspects of operation on Land, sea and air, the first boots on the ground with the training emphasis on a secure, cordon and contain role. This unit could be comprised of Army, Navy and Air Force personnel (as opposed to a new service) eligibility to the unit not defined by their role or trade, but by their interest, and commitment, for example if a Comms. specialist, medic or aircraft technician decided they wanted to join the unit they would have the same opportunity as infantryman, gunner or MP/FP personnel.

We have downsized, pruned, leaned and outsourced our people and core competencies to the extent that we no longer have the ability, the capacity, flexibility or the capability to maintain any sustained rate of effort.

NZ Defence needs to consider a concentration strategy, focus on our core competencies, regain those skills we have lost, outsourced or 'deleted' in an attempt to save money. Defence is not a business, therefore a pure business model should be applied to what we do, we need 'fat' in the system, we need excess, we need 'spares' because without those we cannot meet the demands of any 'surge' activity for any extended period without the loss of our day-to-day functionality. For example, to meet parade commitments, entire units must close their doors, to meet current flying demands personnel go from day shift to night shift week after week, or even alternate days to fill 'gaps' or provide sufficient coverage. We must hire vehicles to get our personnel from one point to another, not just routine business but also to respond to an incident. In saving money, we have hamstrung ourselves to the point we have become almost ineffective, we are no longer self sufficient in some cases we are 'completely reliant' on services provided by external contractors – is this a position we, as a Defence Force should find ourselves? We attempt to raise our public profile (our standing, our 'brand') yet we could not even support a flypast for ANZAC centenary commemorations throughout the country, this was noted and commented on by not only Defence personnel, but also high numbers of civilians. It seems each time we do some good, we immediately cancel it out through some decision about things that 'don't matter' that have 'no strategic value' these small things do matter, these small things have the greatest impact. The strength and support of our Defence Force is linked (no matter what you might think) to the goodwill of the NZ public.

The Defence Force has a multi-role function, it is seen, perceived as the 'go-to' Force to deal with all the nastiness that no-one else can deal with. Whether Defence sees it as its role or not, like it or not we are the last bastion, the last line of defence, the protection, the fix-it-up-guy for all the things that go wrong. Whether it be; clearing oil from beaches (Rena), clean up, emergency support or security duties (CHCH), taking care of inmates (Prison assist) or rescuing snow bound sheep, we are it. We need to be much smarter in how we do business and how we operate with each other, not only Army, Navy and Air but also our interoperability with other Government agencies, Police, MAF, Customs, Fire and Ambulance services.

Q1:

Q2:

Q3:

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:

Q7:

Q8: I believe NZDF is in a unique position to assist with the currently escalating issues which are affecting NZ youth. The key issue that I see, as a senior social work practitioner, is around poor mental health outcomes for our youth. o Youth anxiety and depression statistics are increasing - this is seriously affecting the young persons ability to utilize educational opportunities and move on into permanent and appropriate work environments. o Youth suicide and self-harm figures are increasing o ADHD (Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder) is still being misdiagnosed for Conduct Disorder (CD) and Opposition and Defiance Disorder (ODD) which are all most likely to have initially been behaviour issues related to inappropriate parenting ( little or no predictability or consistency; inappropriate boundaries and no follow through) together with serious attachment issues form lack of bonding or being moved from one foster home / caregiver to another. These also all appear to be on the increase. o Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and similar conditions related to drug use during pregnancy are also now sadly quite common. All the above are greatly assisted, and respond well, to programmes, courses and activities that develop pro social attitudes and behaviours such a motivation, self discipline, cooperation, confidence, and respect. Ones where there are clear rules, clear effective consequences and absolute follow through. NZDF have already shown a clear ability to work minor miracles with their involvement and expertise - e.g.: ? LSV - in partnership with Work and Income ? MAC - in partnership with Child Youth and Family / Youth Justice ? Service Academy's - in partnership with individual schools / education facilities ? Blue Light Activities - in partnership with the Police All of these programmes, and especially the NZDF components, are held in high regard by those non NZDF and non Government based personnel working at the coal face of disenfranchised youth.. It is my opinion, as a senior social work practitioner, that no one does this work better than NZDF. Therefore Youth Development Units have three key roles. 1. Provide (six - 12 week) youth based programmes for disadvantaged youth (12 - 25 year olds) 2. Provide short duration courses and activities for youth (with an aim to assist basic leadership skills) aged 14 - 18 (possibly 12 - 18) 3. Train the Trainers programmes - because NZDF does it right - predictability, follow through, consistency and leading only by example.

Q9:

Q11:

Original Information Act 1982

Q1:Illegal and undetected incursions within our EEZ Refer to my additional comment below.

Q2:Increasing prevalence of non state sponsored ideology driven violence. Increases in migration of populations. Refer to my additional comment below.

Q3:More overt activity in the EEZ. Increased contribution to UN missions.

Q4:Lone Wolf attacks. Illegal resource plundering. Illegal migration.

Q5:See additional comment.

Q6:More integration of personnel and involvement in activities.

Q7:We are an additional resource which needs to be resourced and utilised more in order to raise our profile with the NZ public.

Q8:More engagement in schools.

Q9:Nil Comment.

Q11:Below submission, in my mind, answers some of the questions above. Whilst some of the content may be rather 'tactical' there are linkages to the strategic direction GONZ should be taking with the future of the NZDF to ensure it remains relevant and fit for purpose; Capability Growth Required to ensure security of NZEEZ The most significant ongoing threat to the security of New Zealand are unchecked activities within it's EEZ. Predominately these include plundering of resources and incursion of illegal immigrants. A DPMC report dated 2000 highlighted the inability of the RNZAF (and indeed NZ) to adequately patrol anywhere near the appropriate amount of the NZEEZ to achieve appropriate levels of intelligence assurance and security. Despite the investment in upgrades to the RNZAF fleet of LRMP aircraft and the purchase of Protector Fleet Vessels, the NZ Government has continued to fail in its ability to adequately resource appropriate agencies to achieve anywhere near the appropriate level of control to protect the integrity of sovereign territory of New Zealand. Simply put New Zealand does not possess the required number of systems (platforms within both maritime and air domains) to allow it to gather accurate real time intelligence and act on this in a timely manner. The advance in aerial technology only provides increased coverage to a factor of 1.5. This along with reduce aircraft availability (hours flown) has achieved little in terms of real gains over 10 years on. A failure to invest in critical supporting infrastructure to support and field front line platforms has resulted in a failure to improve EEZ surveillance. Millions of dollars of maritime assets, purchased for use in the NZEEZ, continue to languish unused alongside the Devonport Naval docks due to the inability to raise, train and sustain appropriately trained personnel in sufficient numbers. Despite the hype, in real terms, the GONZ has achieved little in improving its ability to sense and control activities in its maritime domain. The GONZ appears naive in its approach to protecting New Zealand's future financial security (EEZ resources). The capability required to protect this resource takes years to generate and now is the time to begin this. Continued strain on world food supplies coupled with the exponential growth in illegal migration requires the GONZ to take immediate action to significantly increase the resources available to police the NZEEZ. This requires investment to grow the physical numbers of platforms (both air and maritime) and the personnel required to operate them. Significant investment in UAS technology should be investigated to allow the NZDF to grow its current capability (which is currently less than that available to NZ consumers) to one which is credible and functional and which can not only support NZEEZ security initiatives but also other military operations. Improved Defence of Defence Establishments. Recent and continued instances of 'lone wolf' and ideology driven attacks on innocent populations of Western aligned countries continues to highlight the need for increased internal national security. The Lindt Cafe hostage crisis and the foiled attack on a Holsworthy Army Barracks in Australia highlight the ever present threat to national populations which are a heart beat away from NZ territory. More specifically, politically motivated groups could readily target defence assets for the purposes of furthering their case/cause willful damage. Refer to previous instances of vandalism at Whenuapai and Waihopai. Whilst the insidious nature of these attacks make them problematic to thwart, there

are basic and sensible actions a responsible Government needs to take action on to protect (and be seen to protect) key capabilities. One of these is Defence Establishments. Whilst every other Western Nation invests in this critical layer of Defence security, the GONZ continues to fail the brave men and women of the NZDF. It fails to provide adequate funding to install and maintain appropriate, professional 'security in depth' security in and around Defence establishments. Right now there is the potential for an entire generation of RNZAF personnel (up to 10% of the rank and file) to be killed, injured or maimed within minutes as they work and live within environments with little or no security. It is a fundamental failing for the GONZ not to recognise the need to enhanced security for personnel and assets involved in national Defence. NZ is the only western country which relies on a 'cattle fence' mentality and non-professional guard forces as the main method of maintaining defence area security. Considerable investment is required immediately in order to appropriately secure infrastructure and personnel and maintain the credibility of the NZDF in the eyes of visiting forces. Not only is this a safety and security issue it is a reputation issue. In what appears to be another case of under funding; the vetting and security clearance process (the very foundation of any security apparatus) continues to under-deliver and continues to fail in the delivery of appropriately cleared personnel within required timeframes across the NZDF.

Growing and Appropriately Sized NZDF. A fundamental principle of growing a competent Defence Force is the realisation that 'defence costs'. The associated cost is determined by what effect is trying to be achieved (EBO - effects based operations). Successive failure to invest appropriately in Defence has resulted in the focus of all NZDF operations being primarily driven by what can be achieved within a certain fiscal limit rather than driven by what is actually required. The most significant failing in recent years is internal restructuring which has now reduced personnel numbers to the extent where there is insufficient funding to achieve appropriate staffing levels within key areas of the NZDF (refer to the inability to deploy the Protector Fleet as one example). As a result, critical tactical level tasks are not being completed in a timely fashion (or at all) thus preventing the NZDF from developing and sustaining supporting functions to ensure it maintains a professionally trained and capable workforce. Whilst tasks are generally met, this is at the cost of our personnel who hold multiple positions, work longer hours and who are suffering increasing personal mental and health consequences as a result. The personnel planning model utilised within the NZDF to determine MRU is clearly flawed, yet it continues to be the prime reference and thus preventing the employment of appropriate personnel in numbers to allow the NZDF to achieve its outputs. That said, it does meet its outputs, but the detrimental cost of this is often not seen. The prevalence of NZDF personnel going on stress leave and comments around 'we have broken another one because we worked him too hard' are real results of the current environment. A desire only to staff areas to 80 percent of the required manpower level will continue to place the NZDF in a tenuous position in regards to meeting its directed outputs and appropriately caring for the health and wellbeing of its personnel. The staffing of uniformed personnel within the NZDF is suffering as a result of continuing to grow an inefficient civil staff workforce (see below) of the NZDF.

Review of Recent Defence Restructuring. The desire to outsource and centralise key services within the NZDF has been counter-productive to maintaining efficient military capability. Whilst it may have saved some money, it has eroded the ability of military commanders to gain ready access to key capabilities, added layers of bureaucratic dross, and disempowered uniformed commanders from being able to efficiently achieve their outputs. The NZDF has handed over critical functions to centralised entities which are staffed with personnel who appear not to possess the appropriate understanding of military intent. Mission creep in the minds of these centralised support service entities has resulted in the military arm of the NZDF becoming

subservient to the very support services designed to support military operations. Tasks which were once simplistic in nature have become inefficient and more costly and now burden (and distract) military personnel from achieving their primary outputs. This further burdens the reduced workforce and adds additional tasking outside of core outputs. The centralisation of supporting services should cease, be reviewed and where appropriate placed back in the hands of uniformed personnel who possess the ability to provide efficient, immediate service both in garrison and on deployed situations.

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Q1:Threats to our EEZ, natural resources and lines of trade and communication.

Q2:I believe the expansion of conflicts around the globe and NZ's seat on the Security Council will necessitate NZ GOVT having to demonstrate a greater commitment to UN peace-making and peace-keeping missions in future.

Q3:Be engaged in as many international forums as deemed appropriate to advocate for the 'smaller Nations' around the Pacific/globe.

Q4:The increasing effects of climate change and the frequency and ferocity of natural disasters in the South Pacific region. Greater pressure on the EEZ and in particular fishing and natural resources.Threats to sea and air trade routes/lines of communication for trade purposes

Q5:The NZ Govt needs to place greater emphasis on Sea and Air capabilities to enable the NZDF has the ability to project NZDF elements wherever they are required and as quickly as possible.

Q6:The NZDF should be fully integrated as part of the NZ response and have the ability to project military force if required. This requires the NZDF resources to be interoperable with those of Australia, Canada and US as needed.

Q7:This was fully demonstrated in the CHCH earthquake response. The NZDF needs to be ready to respond in whatever capacity the NZ Police and Govt require.

Q8: I strongly believe the Youth Development Unit has produced an outstanding product and needs to be continued to provide role models and a framework for those youths which need some guidance and direction.

Q9:NZ is a Maritime nation therefore we need the capability to project our military forces by Air and Sea quickly.The air component requires a mix of Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing assets. Our Maritime force needs to be equipped with more offshore capabilities to provide security and project forces as required.

Q11:There appears to be no alignment in strategic direction. To achieve the aspiration of Future 35 being a fully functional Amphibious Task Force, the NZDF must embrace 'jointery' to achieve the joint effects. This needs to commence at the very start of ones career through the embracing of common induction training for all Recruits and Officers. While this is being trialed for Officers, there are some in senior positions who are making this very difficult and appear to be 'waiting out' the current executive leadership. There are huge opportunities for the NZDF and with NZ Army wanting to move its Recruit and Officer training out of Waouru to another location, opportunity exists for the NZDF to plan for the future by perhaps establishing a Defence Academy at a location somewhere in NZ. The concept should be modelled like a University campus with co-located single Service 'faculties' and common areas where common training can take place. This would enable the single Services to conduct specialist training in their 'faculty' yet join the other Service recruits or officers for common components. This would eliminate the triplication of infrastructure which currently exists. I believe this could be achieved at RNZAF Base Woodbourne with some new infrastructure, taking advantage of the enormous spare capacity which exists at this site or potentially building a brand new purpose built facility at another location. At present The NZDF is maintaining three separate induction training sites, Devonport, Waouru and Woodbourne. It should be noted Woodbourne has been used very successfully for two Joint Officer Induction Courses catering for over 100 officer cadets from the three Services in 2013 and 2014. I also believe the NZDF needs to reshape its entire training methodology and strategy. The paradigm of old is the NZDF provides trade training for almost all its personnel. This needs to change and the military should focus its limited,highly valuable and specialised resources to delivering training on those areas which require military skills, for example, no university or polytechnic produces Improvised Explosive Experts, Snipers etc therefore this is something the NZDF must deliver. However, Chefs and stewards can be trained at civilian institutions to the NZQA standard and then be enlisted and undertake the specific military training needed to

use the military deployable field kitchens etc, that is the NZDF focus on the military training need not the generic skills required. This would reduce the NZDF resourcing and staffing needs and enable NZDF to access Tertiary Education Component funding or Student Achievement Component funding if structured correctly. This could also be linked to an NZDF trade scholarship programme to encourage personnel to undertake a career in the NZDF in some chosen 'generic' trade groups.

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### Submission to Defence White Paper.

**Thank you for having the time and patience to read this series of opinions. Some are informed by personal knowledge and experience; many are not and should not be given any greater weight than the eager megalomaniacal dictates of an over enthusiastic school boy.**

**Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

#### Estimating Threats

New Zealand is relatively geographically isolated. Conflict world wide is declining.

Against this technological improvements are reducing geographical isolation, and the decline of our traditional allies and in the last couple of years conflict has increased, destabilisation of South East Asia by nationalism, and many of the world's Islamic nations by revolution and religious radicalism.

One means of estimating threats is to look to the past. By comparison other nations are threatened with invasion much more frequently than New Zealand – at least once or twice in the average life span.

New Zealand has faced two credible threats of invasion; By Axis powers in the early 1940s, and by the United Kingdom in the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century. The former threat was deflected the later lead to a successful take over. Extrapolating simplistically we might calculate New Zealand will face an apparent existential threat every 80 – 100 years or so. If those were the odds a house is to burn down we would surely insure it.

It is worth noting that for other nations threats have usually arrived with warning of months to 3-5 years. Lead time to prepare is important in choosing what capabilities we will have.

#### Dangerous Memes

Since the end of the Boer war, New Zealand's main model of conflict has been between nation states, yet of all the post 1945 conflicts only in the Gulf War were the actors clearly nation states.

At my level the NZDF has tried to adopt, (using concepts such as 'Non-State Actors' and 'Issue Motivated Groups'). Unfortunately these concepts seem not to have effectively changed century old habits of military thinking. I have seen NZDF officers reframe alternative models of their opponents into old and comfortable ways of thinking, applying a veneer of fashionable acronyms and terminology and continuing as always. For example on deployment we were presented with 'the non-government forces order of battle' – representing a diverse collection of disaffected people as a neatly organised tree of crosses within squares in two dimensions, almost like lines of little lead soldiers.

I think better models may help understand modern threats.

One concept I find useful is the meme, the self perpetuating or infectious idea.

The concept of memes encompasses aggressive ideologies such as communism and fascism, religions and, via the tribalistic concept of nationalism, the nation state.

In this model an idea may cause conflict. Thinking a conflict may centre around stopping or reshaping an idea, rather than an army, helps make sense of events that are confusing to the old model of rational organised enemy forces. For example a rational insurgent group acting out of group self interest may be deterred by a show of force, yet the same show of force may provoke people whose belief is that the faithful like them will be persecuted by a devil using foreign military power, and resisting agents of the devil will be rewarded in an afterlife.

Compare the success of the meme with traditional models in explaining TG's experience in the first few years of this decade.

From 2010 as the US prepared to draw down their forces, security, measured by casualties or 'significant incidents, was year on year increasing in Afghanistan as a whole. However in the New Zealand AO, the NZ PRT attempted to improve 'security' (and combat prove the NZLAV) by swapping reconstruction and Toyota Hiluxes for aggressive LAV patrols, and also by militarising a part of the local police into a rapid reaction force to work closely with the NZDF.

The NZ PRT attempt to improve security was associated with a paradoxical decrease in security, (as measured by increased casualties and increased significant incidents in Bamiyan, on both NZDF forces and the local Afghan government forces, who suffered around three times the NZDF casualties, even when only considering actions they shared with the NZDF). In fact the militarised ANP reaction force suffered over 50% casualties.

Once the New Zealand 'security' force withdrew, ('completed retrograde'), casualties and incidents fell both for NZDF, but also Afghan government forces. Granted other confounding factors were no doubt involved in this association, for example the simultaneous Afghan Provincial government soft power initiative to disperse a concentration of potential opposition support away from extremist leaders by closing the illegal coal mines – an initiative opposed by the NZDF. However I suspect if the situation had been analysed as a conflict of ideas rather than military forces, it may have lead to an approach more like the Afghan Provincial Government's soft power initiative and less like the NZ PRT's aggressive approach.

#### Unpredictable

Threats are unpredictable. In order to detect and meet likely future threats we need;

- Open minds with broad experience

There are some strength here.

- 1) The New Zealand education system and multicultural milieu does provide a diverse and potentially well educated pool of recruits.

2) The NZDFs deployments to deal with unrest in the new millennium have given the NZDF some exposure to a range of different cultures and foreign militaries. The NZDF therefore has a degree of understanding greater than most recent adversaries and some allies.

Unfortunately a number of factors have compromised these advantages.

- **Group think within narrow pool of senior officers.**

The military structure limits those who can obtain high rank, power and influence, effectively requiring long service. **It values physical fitness and 'combat' trade experience.** The result seems to me to be an all male middle aged leadership with little or no exposure to a life outside the combat military since often lacklustre performance in school. Even support trades go unrepresented and misunderstood as combat trades are deemed to be infantry, armour artillery, aircrew and ship drivers – even though trades like medical staff and engineers deploy more frequently.

This has led to higher ranks within the military having a high degree of group think, a collegial drift from the standards common to all New Zealanders, a sometimes surprisingly naive approach to many issues. (for example the senior officer who spent months believing several hundred Afghan National Police Officers were based in non crucial areas of the province where NZDF had not encountered them for after others were aware they existed only on paper so their salaries could be embezzled).

Consider great New Zealand leaders from the past. Freyberg was a dentist. Keith Park a Purser. Kippenberger had spent 4 years practising law for every year in command. They had exposure to a world outside the military.

- **Loss of balanced experience with concentration on mechanised infantry.**

The move from a 'balanced force' to concentrate on areas of perceived excellence has left an unbalanced experience and leadership, with a conscious or unconscious approach of 'three forces, one army'. Somewhat like the Battle of Crete, much ink is spent on the actions of the army, when for any island, that is all but irrelevant compared to air and sea. There is a real lack of knowledge experience with other capabilities. This is illustrated by the skirmish at Baghak, where doctrinal reflex to send troops onto high ground provided little intelligence that air assets already but despite similar lessons from the same problems in earlier contacts NZDF forces had difficulty communicating with air, despite these being the most effective assets on the battlefield and indeed through danger close and confusion about difficulty identifying friendly ground units the NZDF eliminated the potential for air assets to intervene had this become necessary or possible under rules of engagement. Fortunately when the NZDF dismount force was unable to extricate itself or it's wounded coalition air power was able to provide support to enable this and turn a potential defeat into mutual withdrawal. Unfortunately the lessons show being given a solid ignoring or by the report written by the all army officers of the Court of Inquiry working within restrictively tight terms of reference.

#### **Flexibility**

To maintain flexibility presumptions should be few and carefully considered. A glance at present capabilities suggests the NZDF plan at present relies on a number of quite questionable assumptions which seriously limits flexibility;

- 1) NZDF structure and investment indicates an assumption that our in any conflict the most welcome contribution would be a light mechanised combat infantry, artillery support, lightly armed frigates or a transport capability. Sea and Air transport do seem to be in demand. However for most UN type missions the rest of these capabilities are common place and easily raised from even third world nations arguably much more economically, and in the case of the artillery is probably of little use.
- 2) NZDF training and equipment lacks any realistic ability to defend against sea or air attack. Given lead times to provide that capability this indicates a presumption that New Zealand will not face a threat to territorial integrity or trade routes within a 10-15 year horizon, or that the NZDF will have no significant role in defending the nation against any such an attack. It also assumes that either alliance with a major power such as the US will be re-established at will, or New Zealand will be able to purchase the equipment and expertise

required to establish a credible defence without difficulty possibly in an arms race environment. This seems a high stakes gamble.

- 3) Similarly NZDF training and equipment presumes that all NZDF ground forces will not be deployed near threat of attack by modern armour or any form of aircraft, that naval forces will never be near any complex maritime attack, or that allies will protect us from all of these. This assumption seems optimistic.

**Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

While the Nation State as unit of organisation has not yet become as obsolete as the Empire or Polis, it is certainly becoming less important.

This is both the case with ideological motivated threats which may come from rogue individuals rather than national armies.

Climate change disease and natural disasters are significant threats, the organisations that deal most effectively with these – and that the NZDF may need to work with – are often non state actors and international institutions. Unfortunately they often seem suspicious of the Military – for example in Vanuatu this year. It would be nice if we were able to spend more time engaging with these potential allies.

**Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

New Zealand may hope for other nations for help but I believe we would be unwise to completely depend upon it.

Much of the following may be self evident, but it is sadly rarely stated.

New Zealand is an island nation dependent upon trade for maintaining a standard of living better than third world. The NZDF has no stockpile of resources and could easily be exhausted by blockade.

As a nation of islands New Zealand can only be directly threatened by sea or air, (the Ross Dependency is an unlikely and ultimately expendable exception, space borne threats are unlikely if for no other reason than the cost to an adversary).

**New Zealand's contribution to a coalition is a flag and token force.** As the NZ contribution to any coalition is token the choice of contribution to offer a coalition can be dictated by what is available from those things also useful to defend New Zealand, rather than what a coalition partner really needs. For this reason the NZDF can disregard coalition wish lists and look to the defence of New Zealand first. If we do look at what coalition partners really need it tends to be specialist expertise and equipment. Not, to be blunt, a small force of mechanised infantry.

**Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**  
**Threat by Sea**

The heavy equipment of an invasion force must come by ship. Raiding or reconnaissance parties may come by small vessels. An ambitious terrorist may arrive by boat - as the DGSE has shown. Dozens of navies have the ability to carry sufficient personnel and heavy weapons by sea to completely overwhelm any conceivable NZ regular ground force, and those that do not can easily improvise such a capability from commercial shipping. At least nine navies can send fixed wing aircraft carriers that could wreck devastation at leisure, while dozens more have helicopters that could eliminate the Protector fleet and NZ LAVs at will.

The best means of finding a ship is by aerial reconnaissance. In this role 5 Squadron is critical. The best means of sinking a ship is by fast air. The next best method is by slow air; here the slow vulnerable and obsolescent Orions and Seasprites are inadequate but essential.

Sea surface and submarine defenders in affordable numbers are easily evaded, (and in any event New Zealand has no submarines, the frigates are poorly equipped to tackle a surface target and the 'Protector vessels' are built for gunship diplomacy, minus the guns). It would take several years to re-establish any naval surface capability and many years to establish a submarine arm.

While sea is the most likely route for any threat to NZ territory, at present New Zealand does not seriously attempted an effective defence against this.

**Threat By Land**

Fortunately there are no land boundaries outside the disarmed and environmentally hostile Ross Dependency. Consequently there is minimal threat to New Zealand by land.

Successful large scale land threat would come by sea or air and the best means of defeating it is before a bridgehead is established. The small size of New Zealand's regular force means it can be of little use once the decisive battle for a port or airfield is lost, utilising reserves for a resistance campaign is more viable.

Largely individual rogue actors or a small inserted group of special forces are plausible land based threats – formed land units are poorly placed to meet these threats, in fact the police are probably more effective, failing that special or irregular forces.

At present reserves are trained to supplement regulars for overseas deployments – I believe we could plan to take advantage could be made of their advantages with local experience knowledge and tactical and intellectual flexibility.

#### **Threat By Air**

Reconnaissance, destruction of NZ naval assets, disruption to trade routes and insertion of small teams and to seize bridge head of a port or airport is best accomplished by Air. A small number of long range, air to air refuelled or carrier based aircraft equipped with all but omnipresent smart weapons mean can pick off key military political and infrastructure targets at will from 30-40,000 feet.

Only the SAMs on board frigates offer any protection against air attack at all but very low altitudes. A number of low level systems exist but these are pointless when even the cheapest aircraft converted to carry dumb bombs above their range. A number of NZDF weapons systems may with skill and a large amount of luck just possibly hit one or two low flying aircraft, and as a result members of the army tend to discuss air power in terms of what they have got, plus a great deal of optimism unsupported by evidence. The simplest answer to this cant is that aircraft fly low to avoid sophisticated radar backed air defence. As the NZDF lacks this, there is no need for even unsophisticated attacking aircraft to fly within range of NZDF's present weapons systems.

The best means of defence against air attack is an air defence system with AWACs, jet fighters and large SAMs: completely unaffordable for New Zealand.

The plausible means of establishing a defence against sea attack have long lead times that are very likely to exceed the time taken for any threat to emerge. Submarines are expensive and suboptimal for defence rather than offence. Militarily, fast air is clearly the best solution. Politically it is improbable in the short term.

An interim step is possible, shortening the time to stand up an expensive fast air should the security situation deteriorate, while providing a cheap additional capability needed by the NZDF. A ground attack / forward air control capability useful in the benign environment the rest of the NZDF prepares for can be acquired cheaply in the form of armed trainers. The T6 Texans acquired by the RNZAF are also available in armed form. Purchase of 8 to 12 of these would cost less than a tenth that of establishing true fast air, and enable the creation of a dispersible COIN / close support squadron. It may even offer a little capability against hostile ships.

To blatantly day dream, should this white paper bravely consider sweeping changes instead of tinkering with a comfortable status quo, small number of fast jets equipped with ASMs and smart bombs, dispersed and able to operate from small airfields, would provide a credible deterrent to any sea power except the US. They would also be a useful asset to our allies, and capable of supporting ground forces. This needs to be qualified, and not only because the political implausibility leading to discussion of fast air bordering on fantasy.

Fast Air does need to be dispersed. It is likely that if fast air was re-established there would be a strong push to interoperability and comfort for aircrew training leading to jets requiring fixed facilities with 2km of tar seal, a concentration of all fast air in Ohakea, and a single point of failure for any enemy to eliminate. It is also likely that there would be pressure from the Air Force to waste much time practising for air to air combat instead of practising to evade it.

Fast air remains just within the technical grasp of the RNZAF to re-master with assistance from allies, with perhaps a stand up period of 5 years to full capability. Unfortunately, (with the far too expensive exception of the F-35B), our allies do not offer directly suitable aircraft for sale. The overall cost of fast air is certainly affordable to sustain, (even within a stones throw of the present budget, if the present regular army was shrunk to its immediately pre World War II size), but that it is politically untenable. Leaving aside the desirable but impracticable interoperability, the closest approximation to the New Zealand requirement is probably the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. Back of the envelope sums suggests likely cost of re-establish a small but robust fast air capability spread around provincial airfields would be \$1-3 billion initially with ongoing costs of around \$400 million a year. This is economically easily affordable, (compare the thirty fold greater air combat force created in World War II which a much smaller economy ran at a profit). It is however politically impossible given conservative expenditure and an ideological distaste of anything smelling of Top Gun.

#### **Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

The most importance is defending New Zealand's security as for any of our efforts at best may provide a niche capability but are usually a token flag to show support and another flag in a coalition.

#### **Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

Working closer with other parts of Government is important for relief development work and in civil emergencies, it is also important in dealing with an existential threat.

At present I believe closer engagement is obstructed by security concerns and cultural barriers arising in a large part by the institutionalised culture of NZDF. I would like to see easier exchange of personnel

between agencies – including having NZDF roles at all levels held for periods by personnel from other government agencies.

**Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

At present sadly all that seems to be done is provide labour and transport as well as the ubiquitous and not very useful 'security'. Potentially the NZDF could make an important contribution but how is largely unexplored. There is a real opportunity to develop specialised capability here and I would love to see it happen. It will need specialised competent people, I do not think it would be wise to have such an effort lead by G-List officers. At this point I am day dreaming again and will try to return to the plausible.

**Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

None. Apologies to YDU. If a highly disciplined environment is desired for NZ youth I suspect that can be provided more efficiently by an outside agency no doubt with a fair sprinkling of ex military personnel. The New Zealand Education system however may benefit from a more balanced curriculum that did not concentrate solely on a 'Black Adder Goes Forth' view of the cost of war, without covering those moments when it can claim to have been necessary to save civilisation. Just as everyone undergoing officer training would benefit from reading Norman Dixon's excellent 'On the Psychology of Military Incompetence'.

**Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

**Intelligence**

Intelligence to detect, evaluate, monitor and assess potential threats, and weaknesses. This requires for example the ability to locate vessels in the South Pacific.

Signals and computer intelligence is a component NZ Inc does have but possible an over emphasised component, and certainly has become over publicised – usually an unfortunate thing in intelligence.

Other areas of intelligence that seem important to the verbose but not well informed author are;

- Human Intelligence,
- Aerial reconnaissance,
- Continual evaluation of our own weaknesses. One duty of intelligence is to provide an honest assessment of the enemy and our own successes and weaknesses. Compare assessments of the Japanese before World War II, or expecting the German population to react different to the British when exposed to strategic bombing. New Zealand is not good at this, witness continued use of the NZ LAV in Afghanistan despite verbal offers of MRAPS from the US, knowing unlike other options NZLAVs were channelized so there was only one vulnerable route between Romero, Do Abe and Kiwi Base, and after one was destroyed by essentially a home made IED and other IEDs were known to be planted on this route.
- Socio-psychological and economic analysis of potential threats, (a capability defence has either very successfully hidden or perhaps more likely put little effective effort into). Good intelligence and analysis is important.

I suspect much intelligence work could and possibly should probably be conducted by personnel not traditionally trained in the military. There seems an emphasis in present intelligence work in data gathering, picking cherries and pasting it into simplistic formats; power point slides and stock phrases to represent percentages are not a good models for understanding or explaining a complex threat. The military environment breeds group think, while military politics determines the threat conceived conveniently matches the project being promoted. Most relevant intelligence and analysis can come from public sources, and a good post graduate history degree with no military background possibly provides a better qualification for much of this than a G List officer run through an ABCA training course.

**Maximise International Support.**

Obtaining international support seems to be primarily seen to be being interoperable with other ABCA nations and winning friends amongst equivalent personnel in other ABCA nations' defence forces. This is desirable but it is also a very small part of the picture.

Maximising international support depends upon maximising moral support. An alliance is potentially helpful but no alliance will aid NZ if we are seen to be 'in the wrong', or even morally dubious – after the successive Middle Eastern debacles of the last 15 years, our likely allies have no appetite for backing the lighter shade of dark grey. Therefore to maximise international moral support it is important to capture and hold the moral high ground.

Unfortunately it seems to the author to be an area the NZDF seems to lack insight or competence.

I have the impression from personal experience and anecdotal accounts that at a tactical level members of the NZDF have become fixated on short term military tasks without sufficient regard for the potential strategic effects on New Zealand's reputation, (especially given the tactical tasks are all but irrelevant to an overall coalition effort in elective campaigns),

I have the impression that at the tactical level a desire to impress some service people within coalition partners and show ourselves as aggressive and security conscious as them has created serious risk of lessening our moral standing in the international community.

**I also have the impression NZDF's standard response is the reflexive dismissal, sometimes exacerbated by what is to my mind misuse of 'security' to evade answers.**

Examples of specific concerns I have personal concerns that we may have not been entirely in the right are ;

- Respecting the Indonesian border in East Timor.
- Respecting non-combatant status in East Timor and Afghanistan.
- Handing prisoners over to foreign agencies known to poorly treat them in the early stages of involvement in Afghanistan.
- Opting for an aggressive approach where restraint was being urged by both US and Afghan forces in Afghanistan, (added to by the hubris of a Court of Inquiry implausibly blaming foreign forces for continuing a fire fight when those foreign forces risked their lives to rescue NZDF).
- Dismissing the possibility of Blue on Green casualties without to my mind exhausting appropriate sources of evidence.

In peace time many of these slide by without notice. In conflict an enemy will exploit them. The best way of being seen to be doing the right thing is to do the right thing. No one sets out to do the wrong thing, they blunder into it. Doing the right thing requires situational awareness beyond immediate fears and ambitions. Blundering into doing the wrong thing seems to me largely due to low and middle level commanders having a narrow world view and poor situational awareness of non military factors due to institutionalisation coupled with a collegial drift of morals within defence. I believe we need to select for moral competence ahead of confidence.

#### **The ability to deter any effective attack against New Zealand's interests.**

Deterrence requires the capability to inflict such damage on a force as to make an attack not worth while. Preventing any attack at all is not practical, e.g. it is impossible to afford a navy that can protect all ships trading with NZ, or an air defence system that can prevent any enemy aircraft from reaching NZ. It is however possible to ensure the cost of attacks on NZ trade routes or attack by air exceed the benefit to an enemy. Realistically this means the ability to:  
Locate and sink enemy vessels in the South Pacific.  
Hold or recapture ports and particularly airfields.

#### **Return to a balanced force.**

We need a more balanced force for defending our islands and their approaches. Compared to the eve of World War II we have far fewer aircraft and no combat air arm, we have two frigates instead of two cruisers. Despite Project Protector and new trainers and helicopters, much of the air and naval equipment is significantly older. However the present regular army is more than 12 times the size of the regular army in 1939. The army is politically powerful, given greater numbers and higher turnover far more New Zealanders have served with and know the wants of the army than either of the other two services. However a standing army is of limited use defending an island nation, its trade routes, its island dotted oceanic area of interest.

The NZDF has become centred around the army, creating an unbalanced force.

Which capabilities might be reduced:

**Armour** – suggest transfer to the part time reserve force with a large regular cadre.

The NZ LAV platform remains very vulnerable to low tech IEDs and it can expect these to be used on any future environment other than wide open plains, which in the South Pacific exist essentially only in Australia and the two parts of New Zealand where LAVs are conveniently based. Outside a coalition the NZ LAV also remains very vulnerable to air attack and reasonably vulnerable to anti armour weapons. My impression is to retain credible combat capability, the NZLAV would need to be replaced with more capable and much more expensive equipment. Armour is of minimal use defending New Zealand, so it would be difficult to justify this expense. However as it can take time to rebuild an armoured capability, LAVs are of little second hand value, and there may be occasional instances when some armour is better than none. Accordingly I suggest transferring the NZ LAVs to the reserve forces, keeping a large number of regulars as a cadre to assist maintain equipment and skills. A handful of MRAPs could provide transport for a low intensity IED risk campaign, just in case we do refight our last wars.

**Artillery** – suggest transfer to the part time reserve force with a large regular cadre.

Artillery is only of significant use en masse. While accuracy has improved it remains an area weapon in an age of smart weapons. To be more the nuisance value it has to be deployed en masse, for which NZ simply lacks the numbers. Artillery has not been used since Vietnam, unless you count use as infantry in East Timor. The corps has tried to branch into other endeavours, using very light UAVs which were not effective in Afghanistan, while in New Zealand they seem to have high crash rates and high rates of breaching controlled airspace due in a large part to army disregard for air. Artillery has also tried to assist with intelligence gathering after a natural disaster. My personal experience of this includes



artillery officer sending two Samoan descent gunners who could not speak Samoan as translators, in order to ask the senior men in Samoan villages aid questions someone with basic cultural knowledge would have realised were better directed to Samoan women. Also providing the advice that there were 'three languages spoken in Papua New Guinea'. Retaining artillery some skill sand ceremonial roles may be useful. Accordingly I suggest transferring the NZ LAVs to the reserve forces, keeping a large number of regulars as a cadre to assist maintain equipment and skills.

**VIP Jets** – replace the 757s with a long range transport.

The 757 is seen as a VIP jet, and is a larger VIP jet than either the UK or Australia use 9and the argument about range is undermined by Australia.

**Part of protector fleet** – transfer to navy Reserve

The Navy can't man the fleet, and even retraining will take too long. Accept the inevitable and get some use out of smaller vessels by letting reservists use them.

**Command** – suggest rationalisation to make command more proportional to the size of NZDF.

**New Zealand's command structure seems disproportionately large. New Zealand is a much smaller force** than our allies, but yet aims to achieve the same standards. At a command level the policy governance and administration burden has immense lack of economy from small scale. I think it is doubtful our ABCA allies would do the same work if they were the same size. Other small forces do not have the same ambitions. In particular the NZDF often seems to independently duplicate rules regulations and procedures that are independently completed by civilian organisations or our allies. I have the impression at least some of the paper work undertaken is, use the Australian expression, 'a self licking ice cream' where a vast amount of skilled labour produces work that has little to no effect – often spending a hundred dollars to avert the risk of losing ten. Another factor is command size often seems related to paper units much larger than actual manning (where there are ten thousand paralines unfilled and never will be filled). For example we would struggle to man one infantry battalion yet have command in place for two; an air base with less than 20 aircraft is lead by a Group Captain. I suggest an independent review to see how much work is appropriate or necessary.

What capabilities might be added; -

**Forward Air Control and Light Ground Attack**

**A small number of MRAPs**

**Specialised HADR response.**

I suspect this would be best achieved by standing up a new unit with outside expertise, and some defence logistical, medical, and engineering input.

**Psychological warfare**

If the enemy is an idea, it is worth remembering you can't defeat an idea with an army. Changing people's religious beliefs is very difficult. Changing their misconceptions of fact on the other hand is achievable through education. Even in conventional war, people quit fighting when they believe further fighting is pointless, and stop wanting to fight when they believe their reasons for war were mistaken. It is worth comparing the German response to the end of World War I and II. This can be achieved on the tactical scale, (scuttling of the Graff Spee), but works best inexorably at a national scale. A psy ops unit would be a better contribution to any insurgency operation than the fuel to the flames of infantry.

Psychological initiatives can never succeed if it pretends that we are perfect – that is not credible. NZDF however remains very touchy to any criticism.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

I hope I'm correct in remembering that you were happy to take submissions on the White Paper review directly...

Following are notes I made at the time of the briefing, with every intention of going back and giving it some attention. Time has flown past of course, so if you're happy to accept my hasty thoughts on this one aspect, they are as follows:

#### Breadth vs Depth

Breadth and Depth are somewhat exclusive for a force the size of the NZDF, but I suggest a useful policy would be to alternate.

We maintain a standing force of some breadth, surging into depth as required to suit the mission of the time. It would require a force that can do a little bit of everything quite well, but when a mission requires a contribution of  $x$ , that becomes the focus for the (probably) years of the commitment.

It would be analogous to the Territorial model – maintaining body of personnel who can be called on as required, with a reduced requirement for training.

I have probably made an assumption that when we contribute to a coalition, although we are *pretty* good at what we do, we're not experts nor are we especially well equipped. The reason our contributions are well received is due to the good old Kiwi attitude, and indeed the simple fact that we're there, visibly and determinedly contributing. To put it simply, we bring 40% ability and equipment, but make up the 60% with attitude and presence.

Under this model, any of the areas that contribute to breadth might be called upon to deploy. I venture that this would generally be popular for that speciality, and in my experience, those personnel could be relied upon to bring high morale and attitude, ie ensuring that the 60% is solidly met.

Finally, I would advocate that the NZDF must remain a military force, geared to combat roles but able to move back along the spectrum as required.

My public submission is this – Let's consider:


- Climate Change (impact of flooding on low-lying atolls in NZ's EEZ & increasing HADR)
- Asylum Seekers (increase in maritime patrols/support – renew our commitment under UNHCR)
- Technological warfare (Cyber security/technological sabotage of our platforms)
- Ideological movements (use of social media for rebellion/extremist behaviour/recruiting)
- Scientific/resource exploitation (security of NZ's natural resources/Antarctica)

What should we do?

- Less weapons/a smaller force/greater agility/more maritime & air platforms
- Train for uncertainty/ambiguity/critical thinking/Intelligence (USE SIMULATION)
- More cooperation/coordination with global governance bodies & allies – greater involvement with UN etc, increase in military ambassadors (on the ground in nations like China/Middle East/SE Asia...)
- Information warfare – knowledge is no longer powerful – Attention is (use multi-media sources for Good and not Evil!)

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## Why the New Zealand Defence Force needs to maintain a credible Naval Combat Force.



**The Role of a Navy:** *A navy is a state's main instrument of maritime force. What it should do, what doctrine it holds, what ships it deploys, and how it fights, are determined by practical political and military choices in relation to national needs. Choices are made according to the state's goals, perceived threat, maritime opportunity, technological capabilities, practical experience, and, not least, the way in which the state defines itself and its way of war.*

George Baer,  
*One Hundred Years of Sea Power* (1993)

**Sea Power** *is the military power that is brought to bear at sea: on the surface of the sea, underneath it or in the air and space above it. A nation's sea power is determined not only by the weapons and armed forces with which it can affect events at sea but also by its merchant marine, its fishing and oceanographic fleets, and its maritime outlook and tradition.*

Hedley Bull,  
*Sea Power and Political Influence* (1976)

**S**trategy in military terms can be defined as Continental or Blue Water, depending on geography or character; a nation will decide to pursue their interests over land or over seas. Maritime or Naval Strategy therefore is the mandate to define how a naval service will complete its politically directed requirements. The NZ Government has confirmed its commitment to making sure New Zealand has a strong and effective defence force. It has committed to a Defence Force that must complete a range of roles. It must protect New Zealand's territory and citizens. It must conduct and lead

missions in the South Pacific and it must also enable New Zealand to contribute meaningfully to regional and international security with partners and friends. For New Zealand's military combat capability to be deemed credible, it needs to be deployable, autonomous, versatile, and adaptable. The current capabilities that are credible in terms of projecting combat are: Special Forces, Combined Arms Task Group (Mobile or Expeditionary) and the Naval Combat Force.

Every nation defines its naval requirements in its own terms, but for New Zealand, tasks in

and around our country and the South Pacific have been the historical starting point for such definitions. Working with Australia, New Zealand must have the ability to deal with any reasonably foreseeable contingency in the South Pacific. Such capabilities, by extension also allow us to make a credible contribution to stability in Asia, as well as further afield. If we are to further wrap our definitions with a continuing desire to remain interoperable with our principal partners. Navies exist therefore to specifically allow the state use of the sea for its own advantage, while at the same time attempting to prevent

use of the sea by others to its disadvantage. Maritime policy is based on the concept of *freedom of the seas* which has been codified in international law.

New Zealand is a Maritime Nation, but the definition is not allocated merely because we are surrounded by water. We are a maritime nation, because of our absolute dependence on sea-borne trade, mostly over the horizon; our own coat of arms contains three ships to symbolise our dependence on maritime commerce. It isn't just the waters surrounding New Zealand that make us a maritime nation; it is also our unreserved dependence on the waters on the other side of the world for our national well being and economic prosperity.

The free movement of commercial shipping through international waters is of critical importance to the livelihoods of all New Zealanders.

We are located in an ocean that is larger than all of the land masses of the world combined; we have an extensive coastline and the fourth largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world. Our maritime area of responsibility is one of the largest at 4,083,744 km<sup>2</sup> (15 times our land mass). Including Territorial waters NZ has the 7th biggest area, behind: USA, France, Australia, Russia, Canada and Japan. When NZ ratified UNCLOS in 1996, we were the 5th country to present a submission to the UN Commission for Limits of the Continental shelf (2006). The commission confirmed that under UNCLOS Article 76, NZ has rights to a further 1,700,000 km<sup>2</sup> outside the current EEZ.

In contrast to this extensive maritime area, New Zealand has a comparatively small economy and population, ranking just 53<sup>rd</sup> in the world by GDP and 123<sup>rd</sup> by population; we therefore have limited means and limited maritime security resources that we can call our own.

Unlike the land, the sea is a medium for movement. It cannot be occupied or fortified. Our reliance on maritime commerce therefore behoves us by obligation to play our part; to make a credible and effective contribution to operations and collective security.

To exercise freedom of the seas, a Navy is granted the rights to operate in all dimensions of the high seas. To exercise freedom of the seas, a Navy must have mobility and the capability to deliver force.

Accepting that the sea is a medium for movement and cannot be occupied or fortified, it is accepted that a Navy cannot hold ground to the extent that an army can. Equally, a Navy cannot reach as swiftly to an Area of Operation as an air force.

A Navy though, with the ability to stand off a foreign shore for an indefinite period with substantial capability cannot be matched; therefore any joint expeditionary concept of operations must be undertaken in recognition of the unique attributes offered by each of our services. The inherent flexibility of naval forces<sup>1</sup> makes them well-suited for a wide range of missions and tasks including those in politically sensitive crisis management situations.

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<sup>1</sup> Interpreted as Ships as well as embarked expeditionary ground forces.

A Naval Combat Force in particular, can deploy quickly and remain in an area for extended periods without the agreement of neighbouring states. They do not need to rely upon complex shore-based in-theatre logistic support systems; they have an inherent flexibility which allows them to change roles quickly without loss of efficiency or without having to return home to reconfigure. Warships have a symbolic value in that they are legal extensions of their parent state; in this, the presence of a warship is a clear signal of the interest or concern of a state (or of a group of states in the case of a multinational force).

When exercising freedom of the seas, warships have the freedom to navigate and conduct activities. There is no equivalent of "overflight permission" (warships may transit territorial waters in the exercise of "right of innocent passage").

To be effective and credible in the maritime domain; New Zealand must have an organic capability to project and sustain combat capability - the Naval Combat Force and the expeditionary nature of our Special Forces and Combined Arms Task Group provide that capability.

The Government has indicated that we are likely to see growing pressures on our maritime resources, an increase in illegal migration attempts and transnational crime. It has further predicted that some Pacific Island states may look to us for help as instability continues there, and the strategic balance in East Asia is shifting. The vast majority of the world's capital cities and state populations lie within 320km of

a coastline; therefore the political influence of Naval Forces operating adjacent to foreign shores is magnified.

New Zealand's maritime security approach is what maritime strategist Professor Geoffrey Till defines as "post-modern" in that we are focused on the globalised system and our place within it, and we are reliant on co-operation, collaboration and collective security. New Zealand is not preoccupied with a local potential adversary; but according to Till<sup>2</sup> New Zealand's immediate maritime domain; an area potentially rich in fish, oil, gas, and minerals may indeed have a 'transformational,' impact on the future of our economy. With such a potential impact, Professor Till suggests there is clear need to develop a strategy for the conservation and sustainable exploitation of these resources; and the jurisdictional capacity to exert and if necessary to defend their ability to enjoy them.

This paper opened with a quote and a definition of Sea Power. To bring Professor Till's thoughts into the local context, we need to also understand the position of New Zealand as military force in the world. We can show that New Zealand is a country that is committed to participate with responsibility and effectiveness in world events within a partnership of like-minded states<sup>3</sup>. In terms of military capacity, these parameters portray New Zealand as a *Medium Power*. This power

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<sup>2</sup> Home and Away: Defence priorities in a globalised world. The Sir Howard Kippenberger Visiting Chair in Strategic Studies (16 April 2008)

<sup>3</sup> Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective Peter T. Haydon (2000).

exists when a number of parameters (economic, cultural, intellectual, military, and geographical); all point in the same direction, towards a significant autonomy and capacity for self-help in the preservation of national identity and vital interests.

If we can accept that New Zealand is a medium power, we need to be able to classify what a *medium power navy* might look like, noting that the two terms are separate and by no means implicitly linked. Equally, it must be understood, that the term is not an extension or paraphrase of the *best small-nation-navy in the world* vision of the Royal New Zealand Navy. As earlier stated, each state defines its naval requirements in its own terms taking cognition of a range of complex inter related circumstances particularly relating to defence and foreign relations, tempered and modified of course by its economic prosperity.

When defining these terms for New Zealand, our dependence upon the sea needs to be a factor in our determination of actual operational capabilities. Being a maritime nation does not provide justification to a certain number of ships but it does require an ability to act independently across the spectrum of naval roles and functions, and the political will to employ the capability at some range from home waters.

To quote from a Canadian body of work<sup>4</sup> regarding the typology of Navies; a medium power Navy can be sub delegated into two further categories: a medium

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<sup>4</sup> The Future of Sea Power , Eric Grove (1987)

*Global Force Projection Navy*; or a medium *Regional Force Projection Navy*.

A Medium Global Force Projection Navy is defined as a Navy that may not possess the full range of capabilities, but has a credible capacity in some, and consistently demonstrating a determination to exercise them at some distance from home waters, including in cooperation and conjunction with other Force Projection Navies.

A Medium Regional Force Projection Navy is a Navy that possesses the ability to project force into the adjoining ocean basin. While they may have the capacity to exercise these further afield, for whatever reason, they do not do so on a regular basis.

The level in the topology below a medium power Navy is referred to as an *Adjacent Force Projection Navies*. Such a Navy has some ability to project force well offshore, but is not capable of carrying out high-level naval operations over oceanic distances. The bottom line therefore is the ability to project force regardless of distance or regularity. Without a force projection capability, the topology of Navies indicates you cannot be any more than an Inshore Defence of Constabulary Navy.

To recall the earlier statement, the current credible capabilities in terms of projecting combat (force) are our Special Forces, Combined Arms Task Group (Mobile or Expeditionary) and the Naval Combat Force.

New Zealand's naval combat capabilities are being upgraded, to ensure that our ANZAC frigates continue to provide a valued contribution to coalition

operations<sup>5</sup>. In order to ensure that New Zealand retains the jurisdictional capacity to exert and if necessary to defend the freedom to enjoy the resources that our nation so completely relies on to be prosperous; the maintenance of a credible Naval Combat Force, is arguably incontestable.

In the context of the environment in which we operate, in the context of our requirement to be a credible medium power Navy; New Zealand must continue to procure and operate an ability to project force at and from the sea.

Future procured capability must be able to function as tactically self sufficient units; but with the capability to integrate into

international and national forces that are likely to be involved in a joint and combined operation.

Our future naval combat capability must have the minimum requirement to conduct (mid-level) operations with adequate combat capability including suitable self-defence and reasonable offensive capability. Our future naval combat capability must be versatile and combat capable if it is to undertake even the most basic of functions with any credibility.

The NZ Government has confirmed its commitment to making sure New Zealand has a strong and effective Defence Force. The NZ Government has committed to a Defence Force

that must complete a range of roles and tasks to protect New Zealand's territory and citizens. It must conduct and lead missions in the South Pacific and it must also enable New Zealand to contribute meaningfully to regional and international security with partners and friends.

Implicit to this commitment is the competency, to be able to provide sea-based service to support, coordinate and influence events at a distance. Freedom of the seas and the free movement of commercial shipping through international waters is of critical importance to the livelihoods of all New Zealanders, the continuation of a credible Naval Combat Force should be too.

*For strategy must be a whole, and the maritime side of it must serve the whole and not unduly distort it.... That said, the medium power cannot neglect the preservation of its interests at sea nor the chance of safeguarding and promoting its more general interest by sea.*

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<sup>5</sup> Defence White Paper 2010

Q1:Climate change and the repercussions on New Zealand's territories, as well as the ramifications of those countries even more affected than NZ - such as Nauru, and their citizens justifiably seeking land. Changing power structure in the int. system with the US unwilling to accept its power is waning and not allowing others to grow.

Q2:

Q3:The roles the NZDF play MUST NOT be based on racist, ideology-driven presumptions. Information gathering is necessary, to a certain extent, but it MUST be bipartisan and open to public scrutiny.

Q4:

Q5:

Q6:the DF should only operate as is mandated - it should not have powers that are not answerable to the government and, therefore, the public.

Q7:

Q8:Promotion of free and open international environment.

Q9:

Q11:- NZ's defence policy must not follow blinding the US. This is with specific regard to the horrific and wrong 'war on terror', although this is not the only case. This policy is racist, bigoted, ideologically driven, patronizing, and morally corrupt. - NZ's policies must not be racist. There is no presently clear reason why NZ should be at war. NZ should not be at war.

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We were the first joint enabler to stand up, having combined the Navy Police, Army MPs and some elements of the Air Force Force Protection into one combined unit. The joint enablers initiative is a key priority for CDF and is outlined in the Future 35 document.

Unfortunately the only mention to NZDF MP in the Defence White Paper is on page 25 as a force element for Army which outlines "1 NZ Military Police Company located in Trentham" This is incorrect and should be changed. The 1 NZ Military Police Company has officially been closed however our HQ still remains in Trentham but we have representation in each of the bases and camps around the country. The NZDF MP is a true joint unit and operates independently of any one Service or unit. Currently my position reports to the new CJDS (Chief Joint Defence Services).

Additionally, the document makes no mention at all of any of the tri-service joint enablers. The Defence White paper is an important document that will influence a lot of decisions around funding and direction therefore I feel it important we are properly referenced in the document.

I also feel that with the new NZDF MP unit we can make a positive contribution to NZDF outputs, especially in the area of Peace Support Operations (PSO) (also see attached). NZDF MP could provide valuable support to these PSOs and I think this needs to be recognised in the document.

It is interesting to note that the paper specifically mentions the contributions of NZDF and NZ Police to these PSOs. Moving forward it is my vision that NZDF MP play a key bridging role in this arrangement between NZDF and NZ Police.

It would also be beneficial to know if Government chose Option 3 (p.10 #7) regarding a more proactive approach to the involvement in PSOs then NZDF MP could become an even more important cog.

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this important document

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This paper has examined potential climate change implications within the South Pacific and concluded that while not being *'the'* dominant security threat in the future, changes in the regional climate will nevertheless present a significant change in the operating environment and therefore presents a potentially *'significant'* security issue to the region. Changes to the regional climate, and particularly rising sea levels as a result of that, will contribute to loss of land, destruction of communities, potential changes to subsistence foods and lifestyles, and as a consequence are likely to result in increased climate migration. These are all issues that have the potential to contribute to significant regional socioeconomic impacts, which in turn could create instability or complicate existing ethnic and social tensions. For this reason the security implications of climate change should not be dismissed as either unlikely or insignificant.

As a South Pacific nation, and as a founding member of the regional Pacific Islands Forum, New Zealand has a responsibility to address these regional issues. This is particularly so given its historic association and ongoing engagement with the region, especially with Polynesian states such as Samoa which is a former New Zealand protectorate, and the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, which are New Zealand territories. New Zealand has a significant and growing Polynesian population which ensures that people-to-people linkages with the region continue to remain strong. The South Pacific's climate dilemma is therefore New Zealand's dilemma, and it must be prepared to take not only a leadership role in addressing the underlying issues behind climate change, but also the prevention and resolution of any security tensions that could potentially arise.

Any focus on climate change security conditions will not require a shift in current NZDF strategic thinking, and in fact is entirely consistent with the NZDF's existing Future 35 strategy. However what it would do is develop increased perspective behind the known security concerns that the new vision is being developed around. When considering the causes of any potential security concerns within the South Pacific in the future, it is suggested that climate change and the consequences that it creates, must be recognised as one of, if not the primary, contributor to regional instability. Climate change will affect all of regional society – the sustainability of

communities, economies, indeed in some cases, the future existence of entire South Pacific countries. For these reasons it can be expected that significant tensions, and competitiveness for resources, recognition, and survival, will create a situation which in itself may not generate conflict, but which has real potential to exacerbate existing tensions and rivalries.

This approach is not to advocate militarisation of climate change. Far from it, climate change is a whole-of-society challenge of legislative, environmental, economic, and social concern. However it is frequently the military that will be called upon to undertake a significant part in any initial response to environmental crisis, and if the regional security situation should deteriorate as a result of climate consequences, it will be the NZDF in conjunction with other regional defence and Police forces that will be required to respond.

This paper has examined a range of security implications which New Zealand, and more specifically the NZDF, should examine. Consistent with the existing Future Force 35 vision, seven specific policy and capability recommendations have been made. In reviewing military capabilities and competencies required to most effectively address climate change issues, it is imperative that the NZDF does not lose sight of its principal defensive war-fighting focus. That is why the NZDF exists as a national defensive institution. However, the capabilities and competencies required to satisfy this primary operational focus have considerable utility across other security and humanitarian tasks, provided that potential climate change security scenarios are factored into operation requirements and capabilities.

It is emphasised that while specific solutions or platforms have been discussed, these should not be taken as the final recommendation. They are simply a way of demonstrating what the potential capability options are. The outcome that this paper would like to see is recognition that climate change has real and likely security consequences within the South Pacific and that New Zealand has a responsibility to proactively try to minimise these issues. If necessary New Zealand needs to be prepared to respond with an NZDF structured and equipped with the right platforms and competencies to deal with them. The NZDF can positively influence the regional

security environment through a greater understanding on the regional security concerns, increased physical presence in the region through forward-basing and more regular engagement, and the selection and operation of platforms and equipment that not only are appropriate for the physical environment within the region but which have both credible war-fighting and humanitarian capabilities. Specifically, the NZDF is recommended to:

- Develop a programme of formalised personnel education and exposure to the issues of the South Pacific, and place greater priority on the recruitment of personnel with a South Pacific Island heritage, thereby strengthening the organisation's cultural databank about the region including enhanced understanding of the issues, the languages, the key societal groupings, and New Zealand's connections with the region.
- Develop a small capability of professional full-time environmental or meteorological specialists working at both the strategic and operational levels to monitor regional climatic trends and impacts on current and future operational and capability planning.
- Forward base maritime surveillance platforms within the South Pacific on a more regular basis, increasing the NZDF presence within the region, enhancing environmental and resource monitoring operations and contributing to security stabilisation.
- Consider the future acquisition of additional littoral maritime platforms to supplement and strengthen current capabilities operated by both the RNZAF and RNZN, not only to meet expected increased surveillance demands, but to ensure more cost-effective operations. Specifically, this should involve examining the acquisition and operation of additional Off-shore Patrol Vessels of either the same design as the existing two vessels operated, or of an alternative commercially based multi-role design.

- Examine the future NZDF fixed wing air transport requirement being met through the acquisition of a combination of a small fleet of large strategic transport aircraft, and a larger fleet of smaller tactical transport aircraft capable of undertaking a range of transport and surveillance tasks.
- Continual investment in deployable engineering and health support capabilities such as water purification, desalination equipment, medical treatment facilities, and small infrastructure construction, which can be utilised in multiple environmental disaster events within the South Pacific.

These recommendations do not suggest a dramatic reconsideration of NZDF future strategy, in fact they are entirely consistent with it. However what has been proposed within this paper is that likely security concerns within the South Pacific in the future will not simply be a result of isolated political, criminal or territorial issues, but will more than likely have their genesis within a changing regional climate. As a result these issues will be complex to address, have significant humanitarian, economic and societal effects, and as such must be recognised as being real, life-changing for the regional populations, and likely introducing security tensions requiring future military response. The NZDF needs to include within its security planning the real threat for regional destabilisation that climate change has the potential to create in the future, and structure itself to respond accordingly.

Q1:1. Radicalization and militarization spreading to all countries involved in conflict. 2. Climate change leading to food insecurity. 3. Escalating resource wars. 4. Economic failure due to overinvestment in agricultural exports sector and also due to housing crisis. 5. The widening inequality of income in our society and its resulting instability. 6. Youth disenchantment with older generations, lack of trust in those in power. 7. Disinformation by the media, shortage of truly independent information and investigative journalism.

Q2:1. The Defence Force will operate under increasingly complex and morally ambiguous scenarios. Contributing to this moral ambiguity is the continuation of human rights abuses of prisoners by the US and atrocities committed against civilians by IS forces, leading to increased radicalization on both sides. The moral stance of NZ Defence Force may also be compromised because of the involvement of private corporate interests and trade-related political pressures in policy and strategy decisions involving the New Zealand Defence Force. 2. Lack of transparency in trade agreements such as Trans Pacific Partnership

Agreement. ?Dealing with states and institutions where corruption is rife. Manipulation of finance by external players. Demands imposed by the International Monetary Fund and acceptance of their formulas for recovery in exchange for loans, leading to internal unrest in affected countries. 3. Sale of assets and privatisation of key services such as power and communications leave New Zealand unprotected in these basic areas.

Q3:1. The New Zealand Defence Force should take an independent stance. Such a stance will improve New Zealand's long-term security as history proves the folly of militarized religious extremism and the moral un-tenability of pursuing petrochemical and / or other natural resources. 2. Neutrality will enhance New Zealand ?s security. Non-participation in conflicts abroad will save money that can be used instead to strengthen Civil Defence at home, and prevent New Zealand's becoming a target of terrorism. 3. Promote human rights in countries where they are not observed. 4. Assist abroad and at home with education and social services that promote peace. 5. The New Zealand Defence Forces have a responsibility to inform the public about their actions. They should be accountable and transparent. The recent revelations in the media of the lack of transparency and censoring of video footage regarding the battle and death in 2012 of two New Zealand soldiers from the Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan is of grave concern.

Q4:1. Food and resource insecurity due to increasingly extreme weather events related to climate change leading to massive dislocation of people especially from our Pacific neighbours towards whom we have special obligations and ties. 2. Potential for resource wars involving the Pacific region. Food security increasingly compromised as NZ imports continue to grow. 3. Overuse and illegal use of marine resources (overfishing and illegal fishing). 4. Increase in political refugees seeking asylum in Australia and New Zealand 5. Possibility of involvement of corporations in New Zealand parliamentary and / or legal process via the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 6. Morally ambiguous political and economic relationships with the US (due to ongoing human rights abuses of prisoners) and other countries involved in human rights abuses, leading to New Zealand's becoming a target for extremist terror attacks.

Q5:1. New Zealand should keep an independent stance on security matters and stay on the path that started with saying no to nuclear weapons in our territory. Keep an independent voice on human rights issues. Share expertise in creating and maintaining institutional and organisational models in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that all nations have signed. Monitor their compliance at home and abroad. 2. Any international involvement in conflict zones should be focused on morally defensible restorative work such as post-conflict community rehabilitation, reconstruction of sustainable infrastructure, and the care and protection of people affected by conflict. Soldiers should be highly skilled in conflict de-escalation and resolution. Clear, humane, transparent, and accountable practices should be

implemented with respect to all prisoners of war. 3. Domestic focus should be on disaster-relief, search and rescue, coastal patrol, and training in conflict resolution. 4. Defence policy should be developed with a long-term view that addresses the fundamental injustices and abuses that lead to radicalization. A moral, peacekeeping stance is the best protection long-term and the best basis for good long-term international relations.

Q6: There is an assumption in this question that the Defence Forces have a role in advancing New Zealand interests. Rather it is the role of the democratically elected government to advance the nation's interests through policies that reflect voters' choices. New Zealand's international interests should be protected through diplomatic processes.

Q7: 1. The Defence Forces should fund and support community services and organisations that will be central to the survival and recovery of those affected by events and natural disasters. The Defence Force could play a role in the education and training of civilians in preparation for unforeseen events. 2. Ensure that resources are not wasted on combat roles in unwinnable and / or immoral wars overseas.

Q8: 1. Training in conflict resolution, search and rescue, survival skills, outdoor skills, anti-bullying programs; promoting an example of ethics, humanitarian service, and peace-making for those who aspire to be soldiers. 2. Assist the Police establishing and maintaining strong Neighbourhood Support groups and initiatives that involve youth and families.

Q9: 1. On a practical level, there is a need for sufficient small units capable of fast response patrolling New Zealand's territory, policing fisheries and conservation areas adequately and enforcing international maritime conventions. There is also a need to have suitable, ice-capable vessels for patrolling the Arctic seas. 2. More abstract, but also critical is the capability that comes from being known and trusted as a moral, independent, constructive presence in the world, and the courage and commitment that come from supporting morally clear and transparent causes, rather than supporting causes we might feel obliged to be part of because of trade aspirations. Generally we could achieve this by supporting UN resolutions, rather than countries that have vested interests in the conflicts. This would give soldiers security in their missions and the confidence and extra motivation to achieve them. It would make them partners instead of enemies in the areas where they work.

Q11: It seems to us that this is a critical time in the world for an ethical and independent stance that addresses the root causes of conflict: injustice and oppression, a continually widening gap between rich and poor, and an increasingly resource-constrained world which is calling for a paradigm shift in corporate policy and practice.

22/6/15

Defence White Paper Submission

Ministry of Defence.

Dear Sir/Madam

For the White paper on New Zealand Defence Forces

I would like to recommend:

- Released under the Official Information Act 1982
- ① All Armed Forces personnel do a training module in Civil Defence. It is apparent natural 'disasters' are on the rise, re: flooding, storms, earthquakes, tsunamis etc, whereby trained defence personnel could be first response. But trained for it, whereas now they help - but untrained.
  - ② Navy buys 3 more ocean going patrol craft, to supplement the other two. Two of our new craft ~~are~~ based strategically off Australian coast (Broome and Darwin) to help Australia re: boat people and early interception of any boat people heading to NZ. Third new craft does a perpetual Pacific patrol from Fiji to Tonga, Samoa and Cook Islands <sup>etc</sup> doing fisheries protection, search and rescue, and having a complement of personnel from Pacific nations as crew, in training. All 3 new patrol craft remain at their respective bases, and just crew rotate, on 3 month posting.



- ③ RNZAF be allowed to order 2 Airbus 4M cargo planes to arrive in 3 years time. In 5 years time, 2 of the current 5 Hercules are cannibalised to help maintain the best 3 until 2025. At the same time, <sup>(2020)</sup> two more 4M cargo planes are ordered to be here in 2023. By 2025 we will have 4 of the new aircraft probably capable of doing the work of the 5 outgoing Hercules.
- ④ Replacement of Orion aircraft could be, by a modern plane,  $\frac{1}{2}$  the size, with a comparable range, but more speed.
- ⑤ In line with above, <sup>point</sup> seriously look at modern air ship potential as these can stay aloft for days on station, for use out to 200km offshore. Ideal for border control, fisheries protection and in search and rescue monitoring.
- ⑥ Can the Texan single engine trainer be equipped with armaments? Air to ground/sea, missiles/rockets. If not, give serious consideration to reestablishing a jet capable (10-12) trainer like the Hawk or equivalent. This would give us jet pilots, able to get further training in Aust and serve (rotationally) in their jet fighters, without the expense of front line jet attack aircraft for NZ.


- ⑦ Army proceed with small arms replacement weapons as per the current short listed manufacturers.
- ⑧ SAS get (continue?) deployment to equivalent special forces in UK, Aust and USA for training, on rotating 2 month posting. Only 3-4 need be in each of the above countries, meaning no more than 12 troopers are away at any one time. On returning, troops share information they have gleaned. These postings keep SAS up to date and serve as added recruitment incentive.
- ⑨ The current complement of helicopters is pleasing to see. 8 Seasprites 5 NH90, and <sup>(109's)</sup> <sup>4</sup> gives a good basis and first response capability. This 'critical mass' should not be allowed to dip below current number of military helicopters. (Bye bye faithful Iroquis)
- ⑩ The current lean, mean, fighting machine of our combined military forces are to be congratulated, inspired and incentivised to maintain their high standards and moral by supporting them with adequate tax paying funding to continually achieve their mission.
- Defence of New Zealand.

To whom it may concern..

I feel NZ should adopt the same stance as Singapore, compulsory service before the age of 25 for 2 years..

It will install better values & keep our nation safer..

Released under the Official Information Act 1982



Submission: Defence White Paper 2015

## *New Zealand and the Fifth Domain of Warfare: Space*


### Summary

Geography, in terms of the supposed remoteness of New Zealand, is often cited as a reason why this country does not need a strong Defence Force. However, as I indicate in this brief submission, it is in fact geography that must surely lead to NZ playing a major role as humankind's activities in outer space grow to include warfare, as already happens to be the fact.


The core geographical reason is this. The majority of satellites orbit the Earth in the prograde direction, from west to east. The nations that presently have orbital or sub-orbital (i.e. ICBM) launch capabilities, or are expected to do so soon, and which might be anticipated to be possible adversaries of NZ and its allies, are essentially all in Asia; for example, China, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran. Prograde orbits mean eastward launches. Simple physics dictates that rockets launched eastwards from Asia will turn southwards, cross the equator, and on first pass will cross the southern Pacific. In fact, if one draws a line from NZ's sub-Antarctic islands to the northernmost part of the Realm of New Zealand (i.e. the north of the Cook Islands, and Tokelau) then it is almost inevitable that satellites launched by Asian nations will cross that line on first pass, this being the time (about 30 minutes post-launch) that NZ's allies in North America and Europe would need to have such objects detected and tracked if they are to be informed in advance of the approach of potentially-hostile spacecraft.

I give simple examples in the map below. I have shown orbital tracks (at altitude 500 km) for two launches each from the Chinese launch site at Jiuquan, and the Indian site at Sriharikota. For each launch site I have shown one satellite launched due east, which then has an orbital inclination (tilt to the equator) equal to the latitude of the site: 41 degrees for Jiuquan (path in red) and 14 degrees for Sriharikota (path in orange). I have also shown a more highly-inclined satellite launched from each site: inclination 52 degrees (in yellow) from Jiuquan, and 55 degrees (in green) from Sriharikota. I have additionally drawn three rings (actually circles of radius near 3,000 km, but distorted in this 2D mapping) to indicate potential coverage of suitable radar systems located at Invercargill, Auckland and Avarua (Cook Islands): these would, between them, be capable of tracking all four satellites.

Also shown in this diagram are Kwajalein (Marshall Islands), where the US DoD is to build its new Space Fence radar mark II (cost US\$2 billion and growing); and Hawaii, where the USAF maintains an optical tracking facility on Maui. Such US assets would not be able to track the two of these satellites that travel furthest south.



Finally I note that the US and Australia have recently entered into a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) agreement involving various assets being installed and operated in Australia, but tracking of such satellites by these assets will not be feasible on first-pass. It is only NZ-sited sensors that could guarantee coverage of potentially hostile rockets and satellites crossing the southern Pacific.



## Introduction

During the 20th century a third domain of warfare (Air) was added to the two ancient domains, Land and Sea. As we entered the 21st century a fourth domain was recognized and added: Cyberwarfare.

It should be obvious, however, that a fifth domain has already entered the fray, whether we like it or not. This domain is outer space. Modern armed forces depend to a large extent on satellite-borne communications for various aspects of their C4ISR. The race to the Moon in the 1960s was clearly not about science and exploration alone, and now a new space race is beginning. A quest for military domination of outer space seems unavoidable.

That this 21st century space race involves more than simply national prestige is obvious. As Sun Tsu wrote more than two millennia ago, "All armies prefer high ground to low, and sunny places to dark." Space is the ultimate high (and indeed sunny) ground. In modern times (2007) the Chinese have already executed a hostile action in space, an anti-satellite demonstration that has left the densely-populated altitudes between 800 and 900 km – an especially important height bracket due to its utility for sun-synchronous orbits – badly polluted with debris from the meteorological satellite that they destroyed using a ground-launched missile.

The tracking of such debris, and all orbiting objects, is conducted by the US DoD through a variety of optical and radar sensors, and the information database is maintained by the Joint Space Operation Center (JSpOC). Sensors include various optical systems such as the GEODSS cameras spread around the globe, and also the former Space Fence radar array that had transmitter and receiver sites located in various US states. Canada has also been a close, long-term collaborator with the US in NORAD (the predecessor to USSPACECOM and now USSTRATCOM) due to the perceived likelihood of ICBM attacks on the US being routed over Canadian territory, in the context of the Cold War.

Affairs in space and national defence have now moved on, and other potential aggressors occupy the attention of the US Government, and its allies. The US is currently building a new Space Fence radar, in Kwajalein (Marshall Islands). The choice of that remote location, rather than within the US itself, is not accidental: there is a need on the part of the US to detect and track orbiting or at least space-transiting objects coming from the west and crossing the Pacific towards the US mainland. Similarly the US wishes to locate early-warning radars in Romania and Poland because ICBMs launched by Iran (for instance) would travel over eastern Europe before passing over the Arctic *en route* to the USA via geodesic paths.


Since the beginning of the Space Age almost 60 years ago two of the Five Eyes nations, the UK and Canada, have worked closely with the US in military space projects, in particular Space Situational Awareness (SSA). Over the past five years Australia and the US have concluded agreements on SSA in the annual AUSMIN meetings. Specific actions now underway include: (a) The shifting of the prototype Space Surveillance Telescope (SST, the largest camera ever built, at a cost of around \$200 million) to the northwest cape of Australia (i.e. Learmonth); (b) The installation of a C Band radar near Darwin for the detection and tracking of satellites and debris in orbit; and (c) Planning for an additional Space Fence radar to be located in Western Australia.

This means that NZ is the only one of the Five Eyes nations not directly involved to any significant extent in space tracking activities. However, as I show below, the geographical location of New Zealand and its Realm – east of Asia and south of Kwajalein and Hawaii – results in a realisation that this is a vital range of locations for the operation of suitable sensors, tracking orbiting objects in general and satellites on first pass post-launch in particular.

## Optical Sensors

I will write comparatively little here about NZ as a likely location for optical sensors for tracking objects in geocentric orbit; that is, narrow-field telescopes and wide-field cameras. What I will note is that Mount John Observatory at Lake Tekapo is the southernmost year-round professional astronomical observatory in the world, having just passed its 50th anniversary.

Despite the well-known vagaries of cloud cover in the Southern Alps, and indeed NZ as a whole, Mount John would be an excellent candidate location for suitable telescope systems similar to those



the USAF maintains and operates at the AMOS (Air Force Maui Optical and Supercomputing observatory) site on Maui. In terms of the needs of modern astronomy, Mount John is not a competitive site; but neither is anywhere in Australia (and yet the SST is to be installed at one of the poorest 'astronomical' sites in that country), and in any case we are not talking about abstract astronomy here. The tracking of Earth-orbiting objects is a different game. What Mount John has in its favour is its latitude, and longitude.

The history of the USNO operating a small telescope at Black Birch (near Blenheim) is well-known.



Finally under the heading of 'optical sensors' I note that the Australian DoD has been supporting for some years the use of LIDAR (laser radar) systems for the tracking of orbiting objects, through the activities of the Canberra-based company Electro-Optic Systems.


### Space Radars

My main intent in this submission is to illustrate how and where suitable radars might be located such that NZ might *independently* make a major contribution to the Five Eyes SSA capabilities. I am not suggesting that the US (or anyone else) be invited to locate sensors of any type, or conduct SSA operations of any form, within New Zealand. What I outline here is a space situational awareness capability that NZ should be able to design, construct and operate on its own, with a range of likely benefits to the nation that I will discuss in a later section of this submission.

Let me repeat the map I showed in my Summary. I have shown orbital tracks (at altitude 500 km) for two launches each from the Chinese launch site at Jiuquan, and the Indian site at Sriharikota. For each launch site I have employed one satellite launched due east, which then has an orbital inclination (tilt to the equator) equal to the latitude of the site: 41 degrees for Jiuquan (path in red) and 14 degrees for Sriharikota (path in orange). I have also shown a more highly-inclined satellite launched from each site: inclination 52 degrees (in yellow) from Jiuquan, and 55 degrees (in green) from Sriharikota. These were not chosen randomly: it happens that such inclinations lead to ground tracks which, as the spacecraft ascends to attain orbit and drops its upper stages, do not pass over the territory of other nations: look carefully at those yellow and green tracks.

Additionally I have drawn three rings (actually circles of radius near 3,000 km, but distorted in these 2D maps) to indicate potential coverage of space radars located at Invercargill, Auckland and Avarua (Cook Islands): these would be capable, between them, of tracking all four satellites. The positions shown for the satellites in the upper diagram at right are all about 30 minutes post-launch, on their first pass over the Pacific.






Also shown in these diagrams are Kwajalein (Marshall Islands), where the US DoD is to build its new Space Fence radar mark II; and Hawaii, where the USAF maintains a major optical tracking facility on Maui (AMOS). Such US assets would not be able to detect and track all of these putative satellite launches on first pass.

In the lower map on the preceding page I have stepped forward 60 minutes. The tracks show how two of these spacecraft/rockets, if they had a hostile intent, might have attacked the east coast of the US, or Europe.

Stepping forward another 40 minutes (i.e. a little more than two hours post-launch) the satellites have passed again through the putative radar coverage available from Invercargill, Auckland and Avarua, as shown in the map below. One (the green track) is heading fairly centrally for the US and yet has not been within the range of the US Space Fence on Kwajalein, nor AMOS. It should be apparent from this that there is a need for suitable radar coverage in the southern Pacific, not just the north.





It would be appropriate here to indicate the type of radar system that is being mooted. The first thing to make clear is that the radar systems involved here are entirely different from the Australian OTHR JORN system, which operates on completely different principles, uses much lower frequencies (MF/HF), and has entirely different intended targets (slow-moving ships and aircraft).


The original Space Fence, spread across the Continental USA, operated in the top end of the VHF band, at frequencies near 217 MHz, corresponding to a wavelength near 1.4 metres. Due to the scattering properties of small objects, this was relatively insensitive to the weak echoes from objects much smaller than that, whereas most space debris fragments are of 10 cm sizes and smaller. Consequently the new Space Fence will be operated in the S-band (circa 3 GHz; decimetre wavelengths). This is quite a different technology to the previous Space Fence, and hugely expensive.

From the perspective of NZ's possible role, it is the early identification of intact (therefore large) satellites that is important, and so a VHF radar operating between 200-300 MHz would seem appropriate. The detection and tracking of smaller debris items, as the US will be accomplishing from Kwajalein, is a different task that speaks to spacecraft safety. Of concern to NZ should be potentially-hostile or dangerous satellites passing above the nation, and its realm, and posing a threat to its allies.


In the three-dimensional graphic that follows I show the form of the radar coverage that could be delivered by radars located as in the preceding maps. Each radar I have modelled as having an upward-directed broad cone of coverage, which I have cut off at altitude 2,000 km simply because that is the conventional height limit of satellites classified as being low-Earth orbiting (LEO). The opening angle of each cone is 150 degrees (i.e. each radar delivers coverage for all elevations more than 15 degrees above the local horizon). This produces a 'base' to the cone (i.e. at the 'space' end) that is about 3,000 kilometres in radius (6,000 km wide).




In the graphic below I have shown the four model satellite paths described earlier, as they emerge from the coverage from these three radar sites. The satellites with inclination 14 degrees and 41 degrees would have been detectable only from Avarua; those with inclinations 52 and 55 degrees would have been detectable from both Auckland and Invercargill. In all cases the satellites remain within the coverage of at least one radar for a minute or two, enabling orbit determination on this first pass, and therefore prediction of their paths over the next few hours.



The three radar locations as modelled above would be adequate to cover satellite passes over the whole Realm of New Zealand. However, additional coverage/additional sensors are always a good idea. In the graphic below I show the coverage for five model radars (the two added being located in Niue and Tokelau), but in a different way. Now I have shown the radar coverage limits as circular 'fences', the bases of the fences being each located 1,500 km from its radar site, and extending over an altitude range from 200 km (no satellites stay for long below that height, due to atmospheric drag) to 2,000 km (the top of the LEO altitudes). With suitable radar equipment any satellite passing through any one of those fences would be detected, and tracking would continue during the two or three minutes the satellite was within that fence, enabling orbit determination and hand-over to other sensors in a Five Eyes network.







## **Arguments in favour of such a Defence capability**

There are numerous arguments that could be put forward which would support the concept of developing a Defence capability for New Zealand along the lines of that proposed above. The following list is by no means expected to be complete.

### **1. National Security**

The week before this text was being written there was a large out-of-control Russian spacecraft passing over New Zealand twice a day at an altitude below 200 km (i.e. closer than the lateral extent of NZ's EEZ). Towards the end of its orbital lifetime it dipped down to 100 km. It eventually re-entered over the eastern Pacific on May 8th, but if that uncontrollable event had been delayed by four hours then it would have occurred as the spacecraft was crossing the South Island from NW to SE; another six hours later and it would have been passing over the length of NZ from SW to NE.

It seems that no-one in New Zealand (apart from myself) had any definitive knowledge or understanding of what was going on, with the local media simply copying what they were told by overseas sources. I see no evidence of the NZ Government having any capability to assess such threats. New Zealand has no space data sharing agreement with the US, unlike Australia (plus Japan, South Korea, Canada, France, Italy, the UK, and ESA), so that quick access to vital information (generally through Defence rather than civilian channels) cannot be obtained.

This is a startling situation, inappropriate for any developed nation. The Space Age is more than half a century old. Space is a burgeoning sphere of military activity. New Zealand is at most 45 minutes from any launch site on Earth. Thousands of orbiting objects pass over NZ every day at distances less than that between Auckland and Christchurch. This is the reality of the modern world. The requirements of National Security demand that NZ has at least some awareness of what is going on in our skies.


### **2. Contribution to Global Security**

Consider New Zealand's position in terms of its contribution to global security in the context of various multi-national agreements (e.g. ANZUS; Five Eyes [US, Canada, UK, Australia, NZ]; Five Powers [UK, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, NZ]). As recent experience indicates (cf. sending of advisors and security forces to Iraq) there is widespread domestic disapproval with regard to New Zealand sending its armed forces to serve in conflicts in faraway places. This limits the contributions that the nation can make, and yet we would rely upon other larger, better-equipped nations for our own defence if there ever were a threat to NZ territory and interests.

What contribution might NZ be able to make that does not involve marked domestic opposition? The answer lies with benign activities where a special case can be made for New Zealand's involvement. As I have indicated above, NZ's geographical location provides such a special case; and monitoring of space surely represents a benign activity in itself. The US radar system used to patrol the high frontier is called the Space Fence; as the saying goes, good fences make good neighbours.

### **3. NZDF and radar**

The needs of the New Zealand Defence Force with respect to radar systems is obvious. The project mooted here will lead to much upskilling, and potentially the domestic development of other types of radar system with military applications. This is what has occurred in Australia as the result of the JORN OTHR project.



#### **4. Involvement of the Realm of NZ nations**

The same geographical arguments as those raised above also apply to the Realm of New Zealand nations: the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. Although I have in diagrams above placed monostatic radar systems in each of these nations, note that bi-static or multi-static systems are feasible, even desirable, as was the case in the original US Space Fence. That is, there might be a transmitter in Avarua but receiver sites in Niue and Tokelau.

Such a network of radar systems, including sites in NZ itself, lends itself to many benefits, including international collaboration on both the military and civilian fronts, economic stimulus, upskilling of local populations (e.g. local staff being sent to NZ to obtain university education and training), and so on.

#### **5. Involvement of the friendly neighbouring nations**

Precisely the same arguments as made above for the involvement of the Realm of NZ nations can be made here for other friendly neighbours, for example Tonga, Samoa, and Fiji.

#### **6. Inspiration and motivation for NZ students to study STEM subjects**

The US is still benefiting from the *Apollo* space program of the 1960s, which inspired and motivated many students to enter the STEM fields (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics). This echoes on in US industry. Perhaps a similar program here, on a much smaller scale, could have a similar effect.

It is well known that there is a shortage of students entering New Zealand universities to study the STEM subjects, starving local industry of the technical talents that are needed, whereas there is a huge surplus of students taking courses for which there is no direct career path. How to motivate students to study the 'hard' sciences and numerate subjects has been a long-term problem for many Western countries, whereas in Asian nations the industries and militaries are well-supplied with suitable graduates, providing major economic and technical advantages.


In New Zealand there have been few career paths for STEM graduates, and many of them depart overseas, never to return. This project would assist in reversing that trend, with widespread benefits.

#### **7. Stimulus for NZ industry and universities**

The project as envisaged would provide a major stimulus for NZ industry. If the radar systems in question were to be sourced and built locally, there would be a substantial requirement for R&D both on the hardware and the software (e.g. signal processing) fronts. That such projects do result in boosts for local industry is evidenced by the Australian experience over recent decades, where the needs of radio astronomy have led to technological advances largely accomplished by the CSIRO Division of Radiophysics which have had substantial commercial outcomes (e.g. better airport approach radars); similarly the JORN OTHR radar developed through the ISR Division at DSTO has led to many commercial applications.

#### **8. Overlap into other scientific and commercial fields**

Whilst the stimulus envisioned under the preceding heading was limited to radar systems, it should also be anticipated that the technological developments and weight of experience gained will lead to other benefits in separate fields. Clearly, building and operating space radars of the type envisioned would lead directly to capabilities in similar activities (e.g. satellite ground station design, construction and operation) but also a wide range of other fields such as signal processing, short- and long-range communications, plus others yet to be identified.



## 9. History of NZ research in radar

New Zealand has a proud and prominent history of research in radar which can be tapped. The writer is a PhD graduate of the atmospheric radar research program at the University of Canterbury, which has been in operation since the mid-1950s. Other universities and research institutions also have well-established research programs that are directly relevant, in engineering, physics, and mathematics.

## 10. High-profile status of space-related activity

No-one could doubt that space activities are high-profile, and generally meet with public approval. This again points to the potential of this overall capability project. NZ is too small to be involved in space in a big way, but there are niches that it can fill, to advantage. This is one of them.

## 11. Space-based internet

Australia is currently spending several billions of dollars on a fibre-based national broadband system. New Zealand already leads the way in terms of broadband connectivity, although there are many NZ residents not yet able to connect.

The reality is that within five or six years everyone worldwide should have broadband through satellite-based WiFi. The graphic at top right on this page shows my visualisation of a satellite constellation as proposed by Google, and presently under development. That constellation consists of only 180 satellites; SpaceX is proposing to build and launch a constellation of over 4,000 satellites to provide WiFi broadband globally.

Such connectivity must revolutionize communications in the same way as the internet itself and smartphones have in recent years. Very soon the connected population of the world will double, as more than three billion people in developing countries get broadband access. Once that connectivity is achieved, the world will be a different place in many ways. It would seem incongruous were this to occur and New Zealand not even have a domestic capability to monitor what is flying through our skies.

## Conclusion

Any and all space-linked activity such as that outlined in this submission must help New Zealand to position and prepare itself for the world's space-linked future. Current estimates of the annual turnover of the global space industry put the figure at close to \$1 trillion [sic], once one realises that the GPS systems that guide cars, jet aircraft, and trampers in the NZ bush, are all based on a satellite constellation thousands of kilometres above our heads; and that constellation is operated by the US military.

Space is the Fifth Domain of Warfare. That is inevitable, and it's already begun. The militaries of the world largely depend on space segments for communications, for ISR, for weather forecasts, and so on. Whilst the militarisation of space is largely forbidden by UN agreements, the reality is that aggressive acts have already occurred in space; ICBMs would transit space during flight; and attacks on the ground by orbiting assets, and satellite-against-satellite attacks, may well be inevitable.

As I have shown above, New Zealand's geographical location happens to place it under the flight path of newly-launched spacecraft from Asian nations, which will be a major concern for NZ's allies, especially as these countries boost their space activities. The fact of this is apparent from the new arrangements between the US and Australia for space-related collaboration from a military rather than civilian perspective. North Korea and Iran have both put satellites into orbit, which is proof-positive of their long-range missile capability. Other potentially-hostile nations will surely follow.

My submission, in essence, says simply that New Zealand should recognize this fact of the next several decades, and take appropriate steps to develop a domestic Space Situational Awareness capability which would contribute in a vital way to the major facilities now being brought on-line by this nation's core allies.

**Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

The South West Pacific should remain the main area of focus for the Defence Force. A combination of fragile and unstable governments, poor infrastructure and civil resilience, weak institutions, corruption, communal violence and climate change means that although it is on the surface stable there is very little real societal progress being made.

Of note here is that in the entire BIM there is no reference to climate change at all.

This is of huge concern to Pacific nations and the Defence Force response should acknowledge it and accept that events such as Cyclone Pam will become more frequent and more destructive across the region.

Tension in the South China Sea from the PRC enforcing its nine-dash line and the Asian Pivot of the US allied to the fact that as a global trading nation freedom of movement is an important issue to New Zealand.

The Southern Ocean/Ross Sea are becoming even more important as nations jockey for fishing resources and ensure they are in place if mineral extraction is ever allowed.

Regardless of the official line, the patrol of HMNZS Wellington was not a success and demonstrated significant capability gaps in the ability to remain on station long enough. Is it true that the OPVs have no RAS capability?

As well as a failing from a CCAMLR perspective it also failed in that it was highly likely that there was slave labour on board. As a signatory of the 1926 Slavery Convention it was a poor show.

The DPRK, which some people continue to see as a 'cartoon baddy' nation is, I believe a serious issue. As a founder member of UNCMAC it is important to take these responsibilities seriously and that we are able to respond appropriately.

Islamic extremism is a threat and it is important that New Zealand supports UN and other contributions, however this should not divert too many resources from providing an effective response in the South Pacific. Dealing with issues on the Pacific before any extremist Islamic issue embeds itself would be a better use of resources.

**Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

Climate change and the effect it will have on Pacific nations cannot be underestimated as a source regional instability and it is an area that I believe the Defence Force has not properly investigated or planned for.

Severe weather episodes will get worse and more regular and it is important that we have a force fit to deal with them.

Relations between the PRC and other ASEAN nations will not improve. As the PRC attempts to divide and conquer with bilateral agreements, for New Zealand being seen as a committed

UN member, preferably a committed UN Peacekeeping contributor and ensuring that the FPDA remains an important regional entity should be priorities.

Wider Pacific engagement is vital and setting the right conditions for the continued rehabilitation of the RFMF.

More, longer and possibly more sophisticated exercises and engagements in the SW Pacific are important. Should the Defence Force consider permanent forward basing of supplies/personnel/material in Pacific nations?

Engagement with FANC could be of great value and should be reinforced wherever possible. Perhaps utilising the Defence Reserve more in Southern Cross exercises?

**Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

SOF

Manoeuvre warfare

SASO

HADR

NEO

Defence Diplomacy

Fisheries Protection

SAR

ISTAR

MACP/Civil Defence

**Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

The failure of HMNZS Wellington in the Southern Ocean - and it was a failure regardless of what the Navy said - demonstrates a significant capability gap and lack of credibility of New Zealand being able to manage its responsibilities and international obligations in the Southern Ocean.

Increased global population and increased demand for protein will see the fishing resources of this area come under increased pressure from legal, semi-legal and IUU fishing fleets.

The poor showing of HMNZS Wellington may give fishing fleets of whatever legality and flag the confidence to push back more be more aggressive in 'chancing it' in the New Zealand EEZ.

Therefore there is a requirement for a far better fisheries protection capability. More durable, able to stay on station longer, better ice protection and generally far more resilient than the current OPVs.

For the Pacific Realm Nations the encroaching soft power of the PRC needs to be dealt with by projecting the Defence Force as an effective partner which has the capability to reach to support the entire Realm as and when required. Hence the consideration of forward basing.

**Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

To be able to deliver as appropriate it is vital that the Defence Force can initially operate as a standalone entity within defined parameters. Sending components piecemeal is not effective. Is Australia really the ally it used to be? The advances, capabilities and technology of the ADF are well above what New Zealand can hope to deliver. Has the Defence Force fallen too far behind the ADF to be truly interoperable?

The ADF has spent a decade in an intensive kinetic environment in Uruzgan, totally opposite to the New Zealand Afghan experience. I am sure they look more towards the US than they do New Zealand especially with the USMC rotation in the Northern Territory.

New Zealand Defence Force contribution to UN Peacekeeping is woeful and should be given far more importance.

We should be looking more towards the likes of Canada, Eire, Denmark, Belgium and The Netherlands on what they do, insofar as they deliver effective formed units to UN missions. The lack of any New Zealand involvement now and for many years previously is embarrassing especially as a founder member of the UN and a current Security Council member. The odd UN LO/Staff officer does not count. I am talking about effective formed units.

Additionally there is the possibility that involvement in missions such as UNDOF would be opportunities to improve defence engagement and interoperability with RFMF and other troops posted there which will have a beneficial effect for potential future South Pacific missions.

**Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

The DJIATF should be fully operational and truly joint as quickly as possible. Instead of passing the buck as the Navy did regarding the HMNZS Wellington mission saying that they were only following orders from MFAT and MPI there is a need for a proper, owned, fisheries protection speciality as in the Royal Navy. It is a key area and dealing with aggressive fishing fleets legal, semi-legal and IUU is not going to go away.

Land-wise effective HADR and NEO missions require a seamless AoG response. From a Defence Force perspective it demands a proper CIMIC response. Not a handful of Gunner officers who have done a course. Why CIMIC is with 16 Fd Regt in the first place is a mystery. In the rest of the world CIMIC is an Engineer capability.

It all comes back to having an effective Civil Affairs/Cultural/Influence capability. A massive capability failing for the NZDF. This should be embedded in HQ DJIATF.

The Defence Force needs to understand and adapt to the same decision-making process as MFAT and ensure MFAT understands fully the timings of the Defence Force.

The Defence Force needs a full time MFAT LO and likewise MFAT needs a full time NZDF LO at HQ DJIATF.

**Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

As in any advanced nation, the Defence Force should be expected to provide basic support to the civil authorities as and when required, engineering assets, boats, personnel and resilient communications etc. This should be of short duration.

The Civil Defence organisation in New Zealand is highly advanced and more than capable of managing and dealing with most events.

It is a commitment but not a massive one.

Reserve forces should be integrated into any resilience training and planning, but not at the expense of supporting Defence Force missions. Manning cordons for months on end is not best use of military personnel, regular or reserve.

**Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

With a Defence Force that operates under such a tight budget, I don't believe that the current Youth Development programme is the best use of limited resources.

I believe that the money would be better spent by being invested in reinvigorating and boosting facilities, opportunities and capability of the Army Reserve.

Any social youth scheme should be operated with no Defence Force financial involvement as an arms-length charitable trust, possibly using retired Defence Force personnel and no longer part of the Defence Force core business.

As it is not core business.

**Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

This is a key question. The Defence Force has a barely capable force with many aspects of what you would expect in a modern military missing, underutilised or soon to be obsolete.

The Defence Force simply not big enough for a start. It needs to be bigger. There is only so much that can be done with the size it is. Regardless of the whole mantra of working smarter not harder, in the complex human and political terrain it has to operate in and the tasks it has to carry out, the Defence Force today is just too small.

As Stalin said, 'Quantity has a quality all of its own' and the Defence Force simply needs more people to operate effectively in the complex contemporary environment.

Look at comparable countries such as Denmark, Eire, The Netherlands and their expeditionary capabilities. Time after time it shows that the NZDF is just far too small.

It needs more depth in numbers. Whether these numbers are made up of regular or reservists is an interesting proposition. See the British Army. I suggest a small RF increase (Medical to deliver a Field Hospital, an extra Cavalry Sqn, and extra CIMIC Engineer Sqn) and significantly more specialist reservists.

There is no doubt that significant funding is required to ensure appropriate capability, relevance to the missions required and interoperability with our international partners.

The Army needs to be able to field an expeditionary Brigade. A proper doctrinal expeditionary Brigade, not just an administrative headquarters to manage a mismatched collection of RF units - which is what 1 (NZ) Brigade currently is.

The Joint Amphibious Task Force is a misnomer. It is a Joint Sealift Task Force. This needs to be communicated as otherwise we are setting ourselves up to fail again. The JATF cannot effect an amphibious landing. It can move by sea NZDF units into a benign environment. This is not amphibious.

We need to look wider for inspiration such as the Dutch *Korps Mariniers* as a balanced structure, not comparing to a USMC MEU or 3 (Cdo) Bde as this is, at best, totally unrealistic.

It needs cavalry, infantry, engineers, gunners etc. Obviously

It still needs artillery, let us be perfectly clear. Any plans to get rid of the artillery would be a disaster and relegate New Zealand to having a Defence Service. If you cannot provide indirect fire to support your troops, give up.

The capability to deliver a fully deployable field hospital RF/Army Reserve combined staffed. Therefore the Otago Army Reserve medical squadron needs re-establishing ASAP. Increased HADR focus without having a Field Hospital is unacceptable.

For a Defence Force that takes so much stock in its cultural resonance in the region it is unbelievable that there is no formed Influence and Inform Activity/Information Operations formation. The retort that everyone puts is that it is done at Staff College so everyone knows about it. When something is everyone's responsibility, it usually ends up as the responsibility of nobody. There is no planning or approved doctrine and no capability. This needs to change. The Defence Force need a formed IO/Psyps capability. Not just high level planning but an actual Psyps capability such as 15 (UK) Psyps Group, 1 Int Bn (Aust Int Corps) etc. A unit that has the Psyps infrastructure to deliver messages by loudspeaker, print, handbill etc in all spectrums from HADR to general war.

Psyps, cultural awareness, influence etc are crucial in OOTW/SASO/HADR/NZO. This is a massive capability gap and no, 16 Fd Regt is not delivering in this area.

### **NZ Army**

The Armoured LOV is an obsolete deathtrap. How this ever got approved is a mystery.

Replace with Foxhounds/Ocelots immediately.

Pinzgauers are tired and obsolete. NMVs reinforce the mindset of a garrison army.

Could the Defence Force not leverage off the ADF LAND 121 Phase 3A (Lightweight and Light Vehicles and Trailers) project and tap into replacing the obsolete Pinzgauers with an appropriate number and style of G-Wagens to meet NZDF requirements without starting an expensive, duplicated and wasteful procurement process from scratch, we are close allies after all?

SOF and Artillery could both utilise Supacat HMT Extendas similar to the Australian SAS.

For 16 Fd Regt they could not only tow artillery pieces carry ammo, be used as mortar baseplates, but also be effective vehicles for CIMIC and Psyps dissemination tasks.



**RNZAF**

Unlike the Defence Force I do not see having 50 year old aircraft as a source of pride. I also do not see the C17 as being the saviour the Air Force. The poor track record that the MoD has in defence procurement, equal parts byzantine complexity, massive overspend and political expediency are not helpful

It would seem that we will soon to be entering a perfect storm of every operational aircraft becoming obsolete.

The C17 has finished production. It is far too big and too expensive for New Zealand requirements. Worst case I predict the RNZAF ending up with one or two C17s of which only one can fly at any one time, at great expense, limited utility and great international embarrassment.

Why not get in on the ground floor as key partner in an active and ongoing development instead of coming at the end?

Get rid of all the C130s and both 757s and consider the Embraer KC-390 as meeting the needs of both cargo and passenger variants as well as improving relations and interoperability with a host of South American partners.

In partnership with the RAF - if it makes up its mind - consider the Kawasaki P1 to replace all the Orions and be on the cutting edge of maritime reconnaissance. We have big oceanic responsibilities we need a cutting edge platform

**RNZN**

The Navy is not set up for the tasks it will need to carry out. The IPVs are worse than useless as it is operations deep in the Southern Ocean and the South West Pacific that are required in the future, not pootling around the New Zealand coast.

The inshore of New Zealand is well managed by other agencies and there is no role for the Navy here.

I would immediately get rid and gift 1 x IPV each to Fiji and Tonga. There you go, Pacific Patrol Boat replacement achieved, better defence engagement with our regional partners, better fishery patrol capability for our partners which is better for the entire region. One more can be utilised by the Naval Reserve and one mothballed.

The Anzac frigates are not really capable or useful for what is required in the future. Their warfighting role is at odds with what New Zealand really needs and they seem to spend most of their time in the Arabian Gulf or in refit. Replace them with three Absalon-class support ships. Their multi-role utility is far more valuable in the long run. No more glorified car ferries or fruit haulers.

Operating in big oceans the RNZN needs a big logistics capability to sustain ships and land operations for a long time something along the lines of the Type 702 Berlin Class replenishment ship/Queenston-class auxiliary vessel. We have a relationship with Canada through Anzac upgrades, expand this relationship further and get in at the start on the build of the Queenston class.

**Joint**

That the Defence Force possesses no UAVs of any description is quite unbelievable. Even the Bangladeshi Navy has UAVs! A combination of unarmed IAI Heron sized and RQ7-Shadow sized UAVs should do the job for all sorts of missions.

16 Fd Regt is probably not the right place for them anymore, if it ever was. A joint RNZN/RNZAF unit that could operate land and sea based UAVs would probably be best.

Investment in real basics, secure protected Bde HQ deployable accommodation, a mobile bath and laundry unit as part of the proposed Field Hospital.

Effective training for the new joint MP unit in forensics, war crimes identification.

Better biometrics for tactical intelligence exploitation.

**In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.**

I am extremely concerned about how the Defence Reserve, especially the Army Reserve has been run down. This makes absolutely no sense, fiscal or operational, when every other allied nation is doing its utmost to boost reserve numbers. The reforms of 2012 were an incoherent disaster.

Even this Defence White Paper Consultation Document gets it wrong. The Army Reserve is far more than three understrength infantry battalions as is stated.

What about 11/4 Bty? WMR Sqn? All the other reserve components that have been absorbed into their RF counterparts? Has 11/4 Bty been disbanded without publicity as has happened to 1 Fd Sqn?

This is a very bad move as RF will always look after their own first and as a result ARES training will suffer. The obsession with Infantry when HADR ops are most unlikely is difficult to understand.

Yes New Zealand is small, yes the Defence Force is very small so why are the few remaining reservists simply duplicating very basic RF outputs?

Why are there no specialist reserve units? With a HADR, OOTW focus it is scandalous that 1 Fd Sqn has been disbanded and merged into 2 Fd Regt. Even more so that this was never publicised.

The bar in reserve recruitment is set far too low. The offer is very poor. No direct officer recruitment, no appreciation of what niche skills could be developed for the benefit of the Defence Force. The Defence Force should be recruiting specialists in niche skills as every other nation does, not just riflemen and the odd CMT.

Currently, this would not seem to be the case.

The publicised changes to engagements in late 2012, with the merging of the six existing reserve infantry battalions into three, together with the integration of all other Army Reserve units into their parent RF unit and the announcement of the creation of Stand-by and Ready Reserves now seem to have been kicked into the long grass.

Post this announcement there has been no substantive follow-up or effective communication, indeed at the time these proposals were not communicated particularly effectively.

The rationale behind splitting the command of infantry from other units was never satisfactorily explained and the whole focus of the Q&A's published at the time being more aimed at demonstrating how easy it was for Army Reservists to transition into the Regular Force rather than any information on what a Reservist who didn't want to join the Regular Force could expect.

There has never been a clear narrative on what the rationale was for this move. What value did it add? Did it make C2 more effective and dynamic? Did it improve the training resources and opportunities open to these units and why was it just the infantry that was moved to TRADOC whilst all other units were not?

Since 2012 there has been little in the way of updated public information released on how this initiative has progressed and what it actually means as regards outputs:

- Is the standalone (Infantry) model better or worse than the integrated (Corps) model?

- Have RF parents embraced this change and taken an active role in management and support of their Army Reserve components or have Army Reserve formations been left to their own devices?

Additionally, from the outside looking in, the 'so what' factor around Stand-By and Ready Reserve would seem to remain unanswered:

- Can individuals join the stand-by reserve 'off the street' or is it for ex Regular Force only?
- What roles are available?
- What skills and trades are required?
- What are the success stories of this initiative, indeed are there any?
- Has it made any difference?
- Has it just withered away as a concept?

The Defence Careers website does not make the picture any clearer and fails to mention any differentiation between stand by and ready reserves.

Defence Careers is extremely difficult to navigate for any individual casually interested in learning more about joining the Army Reserve. Pages regularly revert back to RF content and apart from very broad geographical information there are no addresses, contact e-mails or phone numbers of any Army Reserve location, or times when they parade.

Overall perception of the contemporary Army Reserve can be gauged from its public profile. There are relatively few stories in Army News about Army Reserve unit activities - which is a message in itself.

Those that do get in are usually basic 'shooting and marching' stories or attendance in ceremonial events. Undoubtedly, all good initiatives in themselves, but when this is accepted as all the reserve can do it sends a clear message about how the wider Army views the reserve contribution to defence, namely as being able to deliver rudimentary civil defence assistance capabilities only.

To be a more focused and enable delivery of a value added Army Reserve it would seem that these concepts need to be refreshed and better communicated both internally and externally.

Additionally since 2012 there has been a shift towards integrated regular-reserve forces.

Whilst this makes for very neat looking orbats, giving Regular Force counterparts responsibility for reservists is a bit like leaving the fox in charge of the chicken coop.

Although 'One Army' is an excellent concept, the reality is that on a BAU basis regulars and reservists seldom meet.

Obvious issues are that bases mainly close down at weekends, and are some distance from the main population centres where most reservists live. If reservists are completely absorbed into their parent RF unit, who is their point of contact? How and when do they access DIXS?

Reservists operate outside of normal working hours. Basic questions that make a big difference to perception and retention.

The example of the ARES component of 2 Fd Regt basically been told to do whatever they like for an AFE when the RF personnel who were meant to be training them went to Vanuatu shows how little worth is placed in the ARES and how little understanding the RF has in effectively managing ARES.

So although it is all very well to say on the Defence Careers website that there are opportunities in Palmerston North for reserve riflemen, gunners, field engineers, combat

medical technicians, movement operators, drivers, signallers and intelligence operators, this is clearly not based on reservist requirements in the locality.

Where is the evidence, analysis and clear rationale - other than that it is the location of Linton Camp - that there is the capacity in the Manawatu to recruit individuals of a suitable calibre to fill these trades in the required numbers? The underlying message would seem to be that, if you want to join, come to us as we are not going to come to you.

There is also the possibility of regulars resenting limited resources being expended on part-timers, especially if they are simply duplicating Regular Force outputs.

If the fiscal axe did fall again and further efficiencies were required of the Army, it is far easier to jump straight to cutting resources from 'out of sight out of mind' reserve components instead of regular formations having to feel the pain.

In order to be effective the Army Reserve need to be located in the main population centres where it recruits from, not where it is most convenient for the Regular Force to administer, tucked away in Burnham, Linton or Waiourou.

### **Efficiency and conditions of service**

Questions of efficiency and administration also seem to have gone unanswered. For example, if someone was in the stand-by reserve but never called upon or were required for just a few days a year, would they still get a positive annual report and in the long term would they still be eligible for the Efficiency Medal?

If they did not receive a positive report or were refused their medal why not? It could be clearly argued that lack of activity on their part should not be a barrier, after all they have delivered on their part of the contract by being available as and when required - which could potentially be never.

To be disadvantaged because they were never called upon should not be grounds for disqualification and could potentially set up an unequal and discriminatory underclass of reservist, ironically of those personnel with the most highly sought after specialist skills.

### **Refreshing the Reserve**

So where should the Army Reserve fit into the contemporary Defence Force?

The NZDF has to operate in a 21<sup>st</sup> century contemporary operating environment comprised of an extremely complex human terrain. This could include failed and failing states, corruption, communal violence and extreme natural disasters due to climate change - all of which could possibly lead to NZDF involvement in a range potentially challenging tasks. If this is accepted as being likely, then it seems somewhat incongruous that the bulk of the Army Reserve and the focus of the Defence Force still remains concentrated into three infantry battalions.

The Regular Force has clear direction and is trained and resourced to carry out a wide range of tasks that are needed regardless of the type of operation. But is there really the need to have so many of the current 1,623 members of the Army Reserve duplicating the outputs of their regular counterparts by delivering - in the main - riflemen?

In a world where budgets are tight and efficiency is key, would it not be more effective to use the Army Reserve to complement Regular Force outputs through owning and developing niche capabilities, being used more for experimentation and defence engagement?

### **A proposal for the future**

To ensure that the Army Reserve is in a position to remain relevant and add real value to Army outputs it needs to look at the complex human terrain where it is highly likely that the Defence Force will have to operate in the future and make reservists work for the Army, not the other way round. The most likely utilisation of Army Reservists is probably not as regular augmentees of existing capabilities, but involvement in EC2 HADR ops.

For example, if you consider Wellington. Home to the most highly paid, well educated workforce in New Zealand. Here is a community of ICT professionals, policy analysts, government experts, communications professionals, engineers of all persuasions, administrators, academics and managers and the only current option in joining the Army Reserve is either as a rifleman or CMT.

Instead of rolling out the old argument that every soldier is a rifleman first would it not be better to tap their civilian skills from the outset? This would ensure better throughput, less wastage of potential recruits and immediate utilisation of their skills.

To have them swiftly and effectively engaged in the Army Reserve in a range of niche roles would offer the Army a significantly bigger toolbox.

It is worth noting that the Naval Reserve has already seen the wisdom of this approach and actively seeks out individuals with relevant government agency, analytical, IT, GEOINT and project management skills for its MEO positions. It is not surprising that the aforementioned offer of rifleman suddenly doesn't look that appetising in comparison.

In the UK, back in 1998, the Strategic Defence Review identified that specialisation was the way forward and subsequently cut the reserve infantry from 33 to 15 battalions. The rationale being that as the requirement to defeat 3 Shock Army had diminished, then if people wanted to join the Territorial Army it would be far preferable from a military perspective to utilise their specialist civilian skills.

It would seem that a similar approach would be beneficial in New Zealand and that consideration is given to the wholesale reorganisation of what capabilities the Army Reserve should deliver revolving more around what Army wants, in terms of highly specialised capability rather than a generic infantry-based civil defence support.

- Niche expertise that can support Army involvement in peace support, NEO and HADR missions should be actively sought.
- Significant changes to the overlong and inflexible initial training requirements. Apart from students, who can afford to spend this amount of time away from home and work? Although government departments may be supportive, it currently discriminates against anyone in the private sector where such a break would be highly unlikely to be approved.
- Consideration should be given to a more flexible system such as in the British Army Reserve. After selection, initial soldier training is carried out over six weekend sessions every other week over 12 weeks. This is followed by a 15 day AFE to deliver a trained soldier. Trade training is then tailored accordingly once they are integrated into their unit.
- Ex-Regular Force personnel should be encouraged to join but not at the expense of 'walk-ins'. New perspectives and experiences can invigorate the Reserve. Making it a closed shop of ex-regulars is unhealthy and limiting in scope and output. Reservists

should be looking at problems from a fresh perspective and not just replicating what the RF does.

- A significant refresh of Defence Careers website. It is currently confusing and difficult to navigate, offering no definitive answers for joining the Army Reserve or any local, face-to-face opportunities to discuss opportunities.

Continuing the Wellington analogy, Trentham-based HQ DJIATF would be ideally placed to tap into local talent in order to deliver a reservist staffed CIMIC/Psypops/Security Capacity Building output similar to the recently reactivated British Army 77 Brigade.

Such a formation could leverage off the pre-existing private and public sector civilian skills of reservists in order to support EC2 HADR and NEO operations.

Taking it a step further, combining it with Navy MFO personnel from HMNZS Olphert would make it a truly joint reservist organisation able to effectively support a Joint Headquarters and provide expert niche skills at minimal cost.

As HQ DJIATF would own these troops administration would be far more responsive and dynamic in ensuring best outcomes for all as it promotes Wellington as the reservist hub for specialist reservists.

To expand this premise even further it could be argued that HQ DJIATF is a far better home for the management of Army Reservists than the current - never adequately explained - organisation of splitting it between TRADOC and parent RF units.

Analysing niche requirements that would benefit support DJIATF can provide some innovative opportunities for existing Army Reserve units. For the purposes of this discussion RNZE could provide CIMIC support, 11/4 Bty could provide Tactical Psypops Teams, WMR Sqn support to Combat Logistics Patrols and the three infantry battalions could utilise Navy and Airforce expertise to be increase their utility by improving their force protection and maritime operation skills. As the reservist Falkland Islands Defence Force does with the Royal Navy for example.

## **Defence Engagement**

Away from these specialised niche requirements, engagement and defence diplomacy remain important components of the overall NZDF strategic narrative and an area where the Army Reserve could deliver a significant effect. It would be possible for units to make a valuable contribution in this area, not as individual reinforcements, but as formed units.

Exercise Tasman Exchange is a good start and definitely play a part in retention and expanding on the reservist offer.

Army Reserve units have the potential to further increase effective engagement in the South West Pacific whilst reinforcing this offer to reservists by expanding the range of overseas exercise opportunities.

It seems incongruous that the extremely effective National Guard State Partnership Programme, which former EUCOM Commander, Admiral James Stavridis said was, “dollar for dollar, my best investment,” can effectively and formally link the Nevada National Guard with Tonga’s HMAF and conduct *four to six exchanges a year*, improve training opportunities, cultural understanding and HADR preparedness.

At the same time New Zealand has no such initiative and no such reservist linkage with its nearest neighbours in the South West Pacific, the area clearly identified as our main area of interest.

Geographically and culturally the opportunities to reinforce and renew working relationships with counterparts in Tonga and Fiji for example would seem an ideal fit for the Army Reserve.

To link 3/6, 5/7 and 2/4 Battalions in a similar nature as the National Guard State Partnership Programme would seem to be an ideal way to build valuable working relationships with partners. It is highly likely that the NZDF would operate with in any future HADR operation. That the ADP recently worked to transport RFMF troops to Vanutau shows that this is actually happening at an RF level. Is it possible that in a few years Army Reservists would be as equally used to exercising at Fiji's Black Rock Integrated Peacekeeping Centre as at Waiouru?

This would also have the additional benefit of significantly improving the reservist offer by facilitating regular overseas exercises to improve working relations and inter-operability as well as supporting the 'recruit, retain, reward' ethos which is fundamental to all effective volunteer management.

<b>Unit</b>	<b>Possible specialisation</b>	<b>Admincon</b>	<b>Training provider</b>
2/4 RNZIR	APOD force protection	TRADOC	RNZAF Base Woodbourne
3/6 RNZIR	SPOD force protection and boarding	TRADOC	HMNZS Philomel
5/7 RNZIR	HQ DJIATF force protection and logistic support	TRADOC	HQ DJIATF
Waikato Mounted Rifles Squadron	Combat Logistics Patrol support, SASO, route recce	QAMR	2 CSSB
11/4 Battery	Tactical Psyops Teams Female Engagement Teams	16 Fd Regt	HQ DJIATF
2 Engineer Regiment Army Reserve	Specialist Works Groups RNZE specialising in airfields, fuel, power, water, ports.	2 Engineer Regiment	HQ DJIATF
2 Health Support Battalion Army Reserve	NEO medical management, support to a Full Field Hospital	2 Health Support Battalion	HQ DJIATF/2 Health Support Battalion

## Conclusion

It would seem that the Army Reserve is currently not a key NZDF priority, the lack of any coherent policy, RF disinterest, very poor communications, poor investment, a poor offer, an old-fashioned approach to what it should be delivered, obsession with infantry in the face of clear overseas evidence in the better utility of specialists, the retreat of ARES units from the High Street to out of the way RF locations and unclear management would indicate that a rudimentary civil defence response is all that is really wanted or expected.

Training to supplement RF units fits well into the RF comfort zone, but is it really relevant? Is it genuinely delivering an employable output and does it deliver value for public money?

The lack of up to date information in both the defence and public domains of any evidence of transforming the reservist offer to the fact that reserve units didn't receive MCU until two years after their regular counterparts can be seen as a clear indication of where priorities lie. There is a difference between having people on the books and utilising them in an agile and innovative way. It would seem that this is not happening and is hampering potential initiatives to make best use of reservists as specialists, joint enablers and effective contributors to a complex and ever adapting environment.

Subsuming most Army Reserve units under Regular Force commands has not made it more effective, far from it. Number have dropped contrary to the rest of the world and it has just meant less administration for the Regular Force and more evening work for reserve SNCOs and officers.

Overseas examples show that a well-resourced, active and engaged reserve component can be a significant force multiplier in the highly complex world where it is necessary to operate.

The New Zealand Army Reserve is an extremely valuable resource, but that one that is not being utilised to best effect for the benefit of NZ Inc. One thing is very clear is that once you lose a reserve capability it is extremely difficult to regain it and I believe this moment is not far away if no action is taken to address these issues.

Please consider the Official Information Act 1982



**Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

Traditional threats come from the increased risks towards overfishing globally (and the impact it has on our EEZ) and our dependence on the importation of non-electrical energy.

Emerging threats come from increased dependence on - and integration with - information systems domestically and internationally. Our ability to minimise disruption will be dependent on how quickly we become aware and respond to an attack, with critical nodes being international links and backbone infrastructure.

**Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

As developing economies emerge they may seek to assert their influence relative to other states which could lead to confrontation with existing powers who may pursue a strategy of containment in response. Having New Zealand forced to make a tradeoff or choice between such states could significantly damage our future economic and diplomatic standing.

Instead of choosing sides, we should strive to maintain and encourage participation with multi-state institutions (such as the UN, WTO, IMF and future investment banks) rather than attempt to force change upon a state without sanction from such institutions.

Conflicts within states may increase regional radicalisation and instability. Defending venerable institutions and populations who are facing insurgent threats can be a very difficult and costly exercise - demanding large troop numbers and sophisticated surveillance to respond effectively. Therefore engagements in such conflicts should be multilateral and include all of government to build intra-state institutes.

**Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

We should pursue joint fishery and security management with our Pacific partners to ensure consumption of our maritime resources remains sustainable and that the economic benefits are returned to the states who depend on them.

Globally, we should ensure trade routes are kept open and maintain a joint capability with Australia in reacting to full spectrum risks further abroad.

**Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

Over fishing, violation of territorial sovereignty and potential oil disputes near Antarctica. Further, climate change may prove challenging to our pacific partners.

**Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

Within the South Pacific (Oceanic) region, our posture should be of a protective nature. In this role, the navy and early warning air force forces would consist of patrols to ensure fishing quotas and sovereignty are respected.

Further abroad, we should maintain dual defence directives:

- An autonomous force that can sustain long term peacekeeping missions
- The ability to integrate into a joint task force for large or specialised engagements

**6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

Training between police and armed forces should be maintained:

- Special Tactics Group requires experience/training dealing with armed offenders
- Peace Keeping forces require experience/training upholding civilian law

Work with Customs (domestically and with our Pacific partners) should be maintained and increased to advance the interests of the nation and our allies.

**7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

In a national disaster, special protocols should be established (beyond simply declaring a state of emergency); where the defence force integrates into the police force to maintain order.

**Law enforcement**

New Zealand already has laws and police already have experience maintaining them. The consequence of a national disaster is that the number and magnitude of offences against existing law increases, not necessarily that existing laws are inadequate. Therefore it would be useful for police to draw on defence force resources and work with officers to establish calm and restore order.

**Disaster Recovery**

Search and Rescue and humanitarian aid to those who have lost homes and family will help the civilian population to recover until insurance and rebuild work begins. In this way, the Defence Force should act as a buffer to absorb disasters until traditional economic mechanisms can work to rebuild and recover.

**8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

Potentially working with Work and Income and Department of Corrections on a voluntary basis.

Looking for (and failing to find) jobs can be an exhausting and demoralising process. A defence force program need not be seen purely as a means to give discipline to those who have none. New entrants to the work force may lack the ability to work as part of a team, follow instructions or understanding how to respond in new situations.

The Defence Force could create structured learning modules with participants able to choose a specific role and develop the skills necessary to perform that role in a variety of situations. Different roles should demand different skills, such as:

- Initiative
- Teamwork
- Leadership
- Comprehension
- Resource Management

**9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

- Active patrolling over our (and pacific partners) EEZ.
- An expeditionary force able to be supported with heavy munitions
- The ability to land and sustain peacekeeping missions

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# Submission Form

Please send your submission to: **Defence White Paper 2015, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 12703, WELLINGTON, 6144**

You can also make your views known by submitting written comments either using the online submission form on the Ministry of Defence website at <http://www.defence.govt.nz>, or by uploading or emailing completed submission forms to [DWP15@defence.govt.nz](mailto:DWP15@defence.govt.nz)

**Deadline for submissions:** To ensure views expressed through the consultation process can be considered in the Review, a deadline of 22 June 2015 has been established for receipt of formal submissions:

## Contact details \* = Mandatory

*Name:
Group (if applicable):
Mailing address:
Contact telephone number:
Email address:

## Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

<p>1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* ISIS / Islamic state</li> <li>* Chinese incursion / expansion in the Pacific</li> <li>* Threats to NZ's EEZ</li> <li>* Global terrorism</li> <li>* Piracy</li> <li>* Local terrorism (NZ)</li> <li>* Religious extremists</li> <li>* NZ'ers fighting for ISIS and other terrorist organisations</li> </ul>
<p>2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Closer relations with USA welcome in general - although it may make NZ a target, too.</li> <li>* Increasing partnership w/ Asia-Pacific neighbours - a positive thing</li> <li>* Beware of PROC - at the moment they do not see NZ as a threat, but this may change in the future.</li> </ul>
<p>3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* The Reserve Forces (particularly Navy) should be given opportunities to upgrade their skills and chances to deploy on short missions (local and overseas)</li> <li>* Assist with allies in intl' peacekeeping missions and HADR.</li> <li>* Liaison roles in overseas military forces.</li> <li>* Training roles for local military forces in Asia-Pacific.</li> <li>* Servicing treaty obligations, e.g. ROK corridor.</li> </ul>

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

- \* Poaching in EEZ (natural resources)
- \* Espionage
- \* Terrorism - political + religious extremists
- \* Illegal migrants / boat people

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

- \* NZ should be seen to take a more active role in international affairs, take proactive steps and not just 'waiting on the sidelines'
- \* Give more weight to the role/importance of the Reserve Forces, particularly the RNZNVR - the Maritime Trade Operations (MTO) branch.

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

- \* NZDF should work closely w/ Ministry of Internal Affairs - information sharing / matching.
- \* NZDF should offer its specialist services to other arms of government.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

- \* Increasing awareness of these potential crisis without being alarmist.
- \* Involve the Reserve Forces in Civil Defence work - untapped potential

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

- \* Closer supervision of the Cadet Forces - remove nepotism and favouritism - equal opportunities for all cadets
- \* Establish + maintain 'training camps' for troubled youth

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

- \* Increased seagoing capability
- \* Better weapons and aircraft
- \* Improved kit and better equipment that can be available to all NZDF personnel, including the Reserve Forces
- \* Rapid deployment groups for HADR and peacekeeping.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

Please be aware that all submissions are subject to the Official Information Act 1982. Please set out clearly in your submission if you have any objection to the release of any information in the submission. In particular, please indicate which part, or parts, you consider should be withheld, together with your reasons for withholding the information.

# Defence White Paper 2015

Defence White Paper 2015, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 12703, WELLINGTON, 6144

## SUBMISSION TO PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS

New Zealand armed forces have a justifiably proud and deserved history of participation in armed conflicts overseas for well over a century and nothing should be done to diminish that heritage.

However the challenge presenting modern New Zealand is to ensure that limited resources are deployed efficiently and effectively. Traditionally emphasis has been placed on the Defence Forces being prepared and equipped for armed conflict offshore, or foreign military invasion of New Zealand, with minimal roles within the territory for civil defence.

The cost of this overseas orientated strategy has to be considered in the context of the current limited capability of protecting New Zealand's own shores and zones of responsibility, and its citizens within from more foreseeable threats.

These include :-

- illegal immigration and uncontrolled economic refugee migration
- bio-security and health incursions
- foreign commercial incursions e.g. fisheries and resource exploitation
- natural and man-made disasters
- public order

Equally the cost of the current defence strategy has to be considered in the context of the fact that the New Zealand's civil defence capability relies significantly on public donation and volunteer participation.

This includes :-

- Rescue Helicopter Service
- Coastguard Service
- Fire Service (both urban and rural)
- Ambulance Service (including Life Flight)
- Search and Rescue Service
- Civil Defence Service
- Fisheries Protection

In many other jurisdictions similar to New Zealand the defence forces take the lead role in these front line interfaces with the communities within their borders.

There is a strong case for a quantum change in New Zealand's defence strategy from preparation for offshore deployment towards effective protection from threat of incursion of the country's own shores and the civil defence of its citizens in their own environment.

The Defence Forces provide a readily available resource of personnel and equipment that could take the lead role in territorial and coastal defence, civil defence and civil emergency response on a day to day basis, not just as a force of last resort.

This model would ensure enhanced operational coordination and effective deployment of resources whilst limiting duplication of effort and funding wastage.

It is envisaged that most New Zealanders are more likely to support and appreciate a Defence Force in a role that directly and visibly involves their protection and emergency relief within their own country than a limited involvement and capacity in an offshore conflict.

This may well enhance recruitment and retention within the Defence Forces and boost employment and training / youth development opportunities.

In conclusion the paramount purpose of the New Zealand Defence Forces must be the protection of this country's shores and the population contained within as a priority before all other theatres of operation.

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## Background

1. As a background to this 2015 Defence Review, in preparation for this submission I have read the most recent Defence White Paper, the Defence Act 1990, the Defence Force Capability Plan 2014 and the background papers to some of those public documents. My start point comes from the Defence Act 1990 which states “the prime reasons for maintaining a defence force remain securing New Zealand against external threats, protecting our sovereign interests, and being able to take action to meet likely contingencies in our strategic area of interest.” In my view, this remains the “raison d’être” for the New Zealand Defence Force. I do have a fundamental criticism of the Public Documentation that attempts to sell the fiction of a New Zealand Defence Force capability that by 2020

“(the) NZDF will have enhanced its combat and combat support capabilities on maritime, land, air and joint warfare operations, including the capabilities in the evolving information environment. The NZDF will also have enhanced its ability to: support other New Zealand government agencies, both domestically and as part of all-of-government operations overseas; and operate credibly alongside our international partners in the contemporary environment. The NZDF will remain an expeditionary force able to project and operate on its own or as part of a coalition. By 2020 the NZDF will have further developed its Command, Control, Computers and Communications/Intelligence Reconnaissance and Surveillance (C4ISR) and littoral capability. These capabilities will enhance its ability to conduct reconnaissance and environmental assessment.”

2. These words from the 2014 Defence Capability Plan are hollow, as the indicated capability procurement plan will not permit the Defence Force to Defend New Zealand. The Defence of New Zealand depends on our ability to use a Foreign Policy to ensure a commitment from like-minded friendly countries to come to New Zealand’s aid in the event of a threat to its sovereignty or an attack on its realm. The combat capability of the Defence Force both now and as planned for 2020 at present levels of expenditure will not provide the sustained combat power needed for the Defence of the Realm except under the lowest category of operational intensity. This is an objective assessment from a lifetime spent looking at the needs for New Zealand’s Defence by a former professional Officer in the Armed Forces no longer constrained by personal inhibitions, military etiquette, nor Political constraints. The people of New Zealand must know the truth about the state of our Defence Force.

### Some Home Truths

3. I contend the following assertions to be essentially true in all aspects:

- a. A raid by a single unescorted bomber could destroy the Parliamentary structure without any deterrent being provided by the New Zealand Defence Force. There is no contingency plan to take account of this situation. Alternatively, choose your own target of interest.
- b. New Zealand has no air defence capability.
- c. No aircraft used by our Air force are combat capable without escorts or defence provided by others. Every deployment into a combat zone is at a risk.
- d. Our Naval combat capability is extremely limited, an investigation into our Navy’s vessels expected combat lifetime in a medium intensity conflict would be in minutes, not even hours.



e. New Zealand does not have a War Plan. Nor does it have a designated War Reserve of weapons, ammunition and other war-like material. The implications of this to the integrity of the Defence of New Zealand are serious.

f. The Army's combat capability has become focussed on a Special Forces capability and the despatch of small-scale task forces of about Company-size at the expense of training and preparing for the Defence of the Realm. It has become a sort of asset for political PR, in pursuit of short-term Foreign Policy objectives, not a Force for the Defence of New Zealand.

The 2016 Defence Review : My Considerations

4. The purpose of raising and maintaining Armed Forces by the Government of New Zealand is to carry out the most important duty the Government of New Zealand has which is to preserve the Sovereignty of the Nation State by making adequate provision for the Defence of New Zealand. Before the US suspended security obligations to NZ on 11 August 1986 (CIA World Handbook 2015), New Zealand Governments of all political colours permitted the run down of the capabilities of the NZ Defence Force sure in the knowledge that the US was duty bound to consult on the Defence of New Zealand should its sovereignty be threatened. This undertaking has now gone, and there is nothing but political platitudes about the US support that is fundamental to the Defence of New Zealand. Why the US? Who else has the Military capability in our region to provide the combat power needed to Defend New Zealand?

5. In looking at Defending New Zealand, strategic geographical, economic and trade factors are pre-eminent. New Zealand, as we all know, is entirely dependent on external trade links for its survival. To protect those trade links we need first class intelligence on the Ideological, Political, Economic, Social, Cultural, Military Capacity (Combat Power) and Religious factors for all countries in our trading links, as well as potentially hostile countries, so as to be able to assess the strategic threat to the realm of New Zealand. For this purpose, I consider that the GCSB should return to being part of the New Zealand Defence Force and the NZSIS should be a separate branch of the New Zealand Police. This would avoid the claims of political bias that have recently affected the quality of strategic Military Advice to the Government, and encouraged negative political activism from those whose motives are suspect in terms of support for the Defence of New Zealand. Because of the nature of the work undertaken by these agencies, there must be a return to absolute silence on all aspects of their operational work, and a clear statement in intelligible terms of the limits of their activities, and their purpose for the Defence and Security of New Zealand that will reassure positively minded New Zealanders. Some very blunt speaking in Parliament will help shut the noise up.

6. By comparative standards, New Zealand is way behind most other Western nations in its per capita expenditure on Defence. 1.13% of GDP is wholly inadequate to meet the costs of resurrecting Defence capabilities so diminished in Combat power by Government policies that have sacrificed short-term political gains; cf China's recent increase of 10% of GDP for Defence. This disparity cannot be allowed to continue without serious consequences given the significant deterioration in Strategic Outlook in our Area of Strategic interest. A detailed discussion of the extent and nature of the threat to New Zealand over the next ten years properly belongs in a classified Annex not available to the General Public. The conclusions that such an assessment should come to is that there is both internal threats as well as external threats to the realm of New Zealand and its primary area of strategic interest. The internal threats come under the headings of ideological based religious-terrorism and pseudo-Independence terror based on ethnic gangs determined to defend their criminal empires for

financial gain and the exercise of power. The external threats come from competing states attempts at hegemony in our areas of strategic interest. The Islamic States of the South-East Asian regions are already involved in support of Islamic terrorists including providing funds under guise of contribution to Da'hwah or proselytising of Islam which are extracted from all Western Trading nations through the device of charging for provision of Hal Al certification (a matter of fact which demands International exposure).

7. The current situation in the Pacific is much more threatening than ever since the end of WW2. The New Zealand Community at large have forgotten or never learnt the lessons of that period of major threat. The Chinese moves towards influencing economically and politically the small island states in New Zealand's area of strategic interest is not in New Zealand's best interests. Fiji's present administration is setting a poor example to other small states of the Pacific with its negative attitude to New Zealand and Australia and needs to be responded to. Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific is an area of confrontation and hostility that has altered the strategic outlook in those areas. A recent US based assessment on the situation is a relevant summary of significant changes in the strategic outlook of those areas of vital concern to New Zealand viz:

In April 2015, "... Thailand's navy requested funding for a submarine program which, when finalized, will make it the region's eighth submarine-equipped nation—joining Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, India, and Australia. The Philippines, Thailand, and Bangladesh, meanwhile, have all [expressed interest](#) in acquiring submarine fleets. As tensions in the South China Sea continue to escalate, this arms race poses a significant threat to the security of the region.

The rapid improvement of military capabilities in Southeast Asia has not deterred China, however, which continues to construct man-made islands and runways on partially submerged coral reefs. In response to the naval build-up in the region, Beijing, which boasts the world's largest submarine fleet, has begun to double down on its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Take, for instance, the recent addition of the GX-6 anti-submarine aircraft, which will [enhance](#) PLA maritime patrols and reconnaissance while expanding China's ASW capabilities by over six-hundred miles. China is also investing heavily in sea-floor mapping and sonar technology to improve its intelligence and tracking abilities, part of an [announced](#) 10.1 percent increase in its 2015 defense spending, bringing its total defense budget to \$145 billion dollars.

In turn, neighboring countries are scrambling to enhance their naval and air capabilities with the help of the United States and its allies; last week, the United States [approved](#) a \$130 billion deal to upgrade Singapore's F-16 program; the State Department recently approved missile sales to Indonesia and Malaysia, worth \$47 million and \$21 million, respectively. Japan is in the process of selling some of its submarine fleet—one of the greatest in the world—to India and Australia; the Philippines are moving to procure stealth frigates, anti-submarine helicopters, and guided missile fast attack craft (FAC) to deter "[Chinese aggression](#)" with the help of U.S. foreign military financing; and Taiwan just [announced](#) that it will deploy its P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, recently acquired from the United States, to conduct operations in the South China Sea...." (Extract from "Defence in Depth" article in Council of Foreign Relations blog- site 19 May 2015, author Sean O'Connor)

8. As pointed out by a colleague, the New Zealand economy would grind to a halt if our hydro and national grid assets were persistently sabotaged. There is, at present, little we could do to protect those essential resources. For example, 20 men with access to bulk quantities of Semtex, or fertiliser based high explosive mixtures could bring the country to its

knees in two days and keep it in that state without significant offshore support. It is idle to dismiss this sort of threat as being inconceivable.

9. There is no Defence Plan for the Realm of New Zealand, nor is there in place the appropriate laws governing mobilisation as well as plans for the provision of weapons and armaments in case of War. This is an investment in considered thought on how to create, in the most practical way, a force structure for the Defence of the Main Islands of New Zealand and subsequently, the rest of the Realm of New Zealand. This force could be made up of a Militia raised to defend the local areas within a properly coordinated Command Control Communication and Intelligence Organisation.

#### An Extreme Alternate View

10. Some may ask wouldn't it be better if we replaced our Defence Force with Armed Coastal Customs vessels, the Army with a Construction Corps primarily Engineers and Medical Support unit for support to Civil Defence emergencies, put our Special Forces Capability under Police control as an Armed Constabulary, and equip our Air force with armed maritime reconnaissance and transport aircraft including helicopters, and do away with the farce that we possess and can maintain a viable force for the Defence of New Zealand because we don't want to pay for it or can't? Tell the truth about our Defence Capability. Time for the Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals to grow some balls.

11. Alternatively, why not negotiate a Treaty arrangement with the USA along the lines of the commitment the USA has with Israel, and outfit an enhanced Defence Force with 'hand me down' mothballed major equipments from the US and staff them with conscripted servicemen and women with the consequential advantage of exposing our youth to a disciplined environment which focuses on team work and concern for others. As suggested by a colleague whose judgements I value, the idea of conscripting all New Zealand young people for a couple of years of their life, beginning with six months of military training has obvious merits, as the country could afford such a concept. When they had completed their service to the nation by way of involvement in military, police, nursing, teaching, construction, railways, coastal shipping, forestry, freezing works, farming etc etc, they could elect to continue as fully paid folk in that field of endeavour or not. If they did this training, then they could anticipate that they could receive a full salary, not just board and pocket money they would get as trainees. They could also get to vote! However, the greatest value would lie in inculcating real Kiwi values of community support and commitment and team work.

Unless otherwise stated the time frame for my outline is the next 10 -15 years. My submission will offer a broad look at the subject matter covered by the 2015 Defence White Paper. The need to stay topical means I will only touch upon on the reasoning behind international events.

For instance China's recent history ( the Chinese civil war , WW2 and the Boxer Rebellion) are all the key to understanding Chinese foreign policy. Yet for my purposes of this submission I must leave it to the reader to consider such factors in greater depth. I welcome any correspondence from the reader (see above for contact details).

Below I chosen to classify the central pacific as the general region Philippines , Wake , Guam and Borneo. I feel the strategic importance of this area to New Zealand justifies my decision. Further breaking down the central pacific and Asia as a whole would have served to bog down the reader.

Under the General Conclusions sub heading I will round out my thoughts on most of the sections below.

*What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?*

The Defence Assessment 2014 correctly identifies the challenges to New Zealand Security. The Assessment is incorrect in its assessing the threat of New Zealand facing global conflict.

*What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?*

**Note to the reader**

I have chosen to structure the following section around Geography. Structuring this section around geography avoids it becoming a jumbled mess.

My methodology is to forecast a likely role for the NZDF around the global. This will allow me to make a reasonable projection of the capabilities the NZDF will require in the coming years. In some cases the NZDF will need to acquire new or past capabilities.

**Broad Global Outlook**

The United States is retreating from its responsibility as the last super power. As the USA further retreats in a 21<sup>st</sup> century version of isolationism the international situation will continue to deteriorate. Non State and State actors are filling the vacuum left in the wake of isolationist

America.

By 2020 the full extend of cutbacks to the US military budget will be in full force. The full effects of the cutbacks are in the public domain. The NZDF force structure and doctrines will need to reflect the new reality of greater global instability , American Isolationism and greatly reduced US military capabilities. More on this below.

The so called Rules Based International Order is failing to either contain or stop the spread of Islamic extremism in the Middle East , a resurgent Russia and keep Chinese territorial claims in check. The Rules Based International Order will fail leaving New Zealand to stand alone to face global conflict.

### **Geographic Strategic Assessment Asia**

Broadly speaking the aim of Chinese foreign policy is to implement its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. The implementation of this doctrine requires the removal of US influence and presence from the Asia Pacific region. A part of this doctrine is settling regional territorial disputes in there own favour.

China doesn't recognise the Rules Based International Order. As such As such the Chinese see military force as the foremost means of resolving territorial disputes and implementing their foreign policy. Trade/commerce takes part between nations for reasons of mutual convenience. New Zealand's trade/commerce relationship with China is in no way a guarantee of security.

The Chinese perceive Australia and New Zealand has being a part of the US sphere of interest. As such they will not hesitate to declare war on Austral (a and New Zealand.

The NZDF needs to be prepared three scenarios in Asia. The first is a medium intensity/limited war breaking out. Such a conflict could take place in the next 3-5 years. The participants would likely be China and Vietnam. The NZDF role would be to protect commerce in the area of conflict. In effect New Zealand would be practising Armed Neutrality.

The second scenario is the Chinese launching an invasion of the central pacific. It is probable that the Chinese southwards military drive would include Indonesia. The role of the NZDF would be the defence of New Zealand , Australia and the South Pacific. Look for this to occur around 2025-30.

North Korea's nuclear and missile testing programs are continuing unabated. North Korea aims to use a nuclear weapon as a precursor to invading its southern neighbour. Any NZDF personnel/equipment deployed in South Korea would be at risk either from nuclear fall out

The evacuation of New Zealand citizens and other nationalities as per international agreements Emergency logistical/resupply of South Korean and US forces would be the NZDF primary roles at the onset of the war.

### **Geographic Strategic Assessment South and South West Pacific**

I ask the reader to forgive me for diving into a possible scenario involving East Timor. I have chosen to take the risk of going beyond the scope of the question in order to raise , what I feel is a matter that needs more discussion.

The risk of East Timor falling prey to Non State actors is an unforeseen risk. East Timor's proximity

to Indonesia could deter any would be terrorist organisations from entering the country. I believe that if East Timor ever was in danger of becoming a terrorist haven Indonesia would not hesitate to reoccupy the country.

This must be balanced out against how East Timor's growing pains make the country an attractive target for Non State Actors. In the event East Timor became a target for Non State Actors (likely Isis) Australia and New Zealand would assume responsibility for security in East Timor. The NZDF would assume a front line combat role along with a training and mentoring role like the ADF undertook in Afghanistan.

Islamic extremists attempting the take over of East Timor may not be as likely as other events in New Zealand's immediate backyard. Coups , civil unrest and civil wars could lead to a failed state in the South/South West Pacific. Logic follows that if the NZDF acquires the capabilities to combat Non State Actors in East Timor it will be able to deal with lesser eventualities.

Looking closer towards 2040 rising sea levels (assuming current trends remain) will continue to overtake vulnerable nations. The NZDF would be at the forefront of evacuating people from the effected areas.

Logistically the NZDF could be called upon to support the transportation of 10,000 people or the equivalent of an army division. Such an operation would be done along side civilian agency's. This would be akin to how the NZDF takes part in disaster relief at home and abroad.

### **Geographic Strategic Assessment Europe/NATO and Central Asia**

A resurgent Russia is fulfilling the role Nazi Germany played in WW2 . Between now and 2020 the Russian's will complete the take over of the Ukraine. The Baltic States will fall to the Russians via peaceful means (agitators and low voter turnout at referendums).

Russia will deploy land forces to Central Asia (commonly known as The Stans). The Russians will use Central Asia as a barrier between them and the Middle East. The Barrier will serve to keep Isis and other Islamic extremist groups away from the home land.

In between 2020-25 Russia will launch a war against NATO. I have documented the economic background to the war elsewhere . The land component of the war will see the Russians invade Western Europe. The Russians will look to shut down the Atlantic.

New Zealand would look to send non lethal aid and supplies of food to the UK. The RNZN and RNZAF could be called upon to escort the shipments of food and aid. The UK government would request direct military assistance from New Zealand. The UK will be screaming out for any ASW assets.

Whether or not the NZDF will be in a position to take part in the Third Battle of the Atlantic or should do so is open to question.

### **Geographic Strategic Assessment Middle East/North Africa**

Isis and Iranian backed Islamic extremists groups like Houthi are in a race to make territorial gains in the Middle East. By 2020 Houthi and any other Iranian backed elements will either completed the take over of Saudi Arabia or be in the process of doing so. The same goes for Isis and Jordan.

From a strategic stand point the closure of the Suez Canal is to be expected. The causes of the closure may be due to the risk posed by Islamic extremists to ships. Alternately a future Egyptian government run by Islamic extremists may close the Suez Canal outright.

The closure of the Suez Canal would see commerce exposed to greater distances/time at sea when travelling to the UK/Europe. The closure of the Suez Canal has the potential to apply more demands on the NZDF resources. In the event the RNZAF and RNZN is called upon to escort our sea bound commerce to Europe the distance travelled will be much greater. The longer distance increases the risk or exposure to the events outlined in this submission.

Iraq will disintegrate along tribal and religious lines. Isis and Iranian backed militias will contest the real estate. The Iranian backed forces will come up trumps . The Iranians are supplying them with arms and training. Republican Guard units virtually serving in the open will be acting as advisors/trainers to militias. Isis doesn't enjoy any such backing from rogue regimes like North Korea.

Iran's nuclear weapons Program just like North Korea is continuing unchecked by the international community. In the time frame covered by this submission Iran will gain Nuclear Weapons. Iran's aim is the annihilation of Israel via the use of Nuclear Weapons. Iran will also go to war against secular Turkey.

After the fall of Saudi Arabia and before the outbreak of the wider war in the Middle East , what might be the NZDF role in the region? The probability of the NZDF deploying the region in this time period is low. The US will pull out of the region as isolationist sentiment will demand.

### **Geographic Strategic Assessment Sub Saharan Africa**

Islamic extremist groups like Boko Haram and Al Shabaab will continue to grow in strength. Al Shabaab will continue to threaten Kenya. Al Shabaab is operating from neighbouring Somalia.

The growth of Islamic extremism and the presence of UN peacekeepers may open up a training role for the NZDF. Despite having the highest numbers of peacekeepers worldwide deployed to the region , violence and instability is ongoing.

The NZDF may be called upon to train peacekeepers in the region. This would be part of a multinational coalition efforts to improve the level of peacekeeping operations as a whole. The same kind of mission may be undertaken in countries like Kenya or Nigeria Instead of training peacekeeping forces the NZDF and coalition partners would working with the Army in question.

On going multi national efforts to combat piracy (Combined Task Force 150) off the Horn of Africa will be on going. It should be noted the People's Liberation Army Navy is a participant in Combined Task Force 150. The People's Liberation Army Navy is using its role in Combined Task Force 150 to further develop their Replenishment at Sea capabilities. The deployment also offers the

Chinese a chance to collect intel on the USN and other navies in a fairly benign environment.

In the past the RNZN has been unable to participate in Combined Task Force 150. The reason for this was the unavailability of the Navy's Two Anzac Class frigates. As the RNZN displays its weaknesses the People's Liberation Army Navy will continue to mature.

### **Ross Dependency/New Zealand area of Antarctica**

The Chinese have an active Antarctic Program. Establishing bases in the Australian and New Zealand area's of Antarctica is on going aspect of the Chinese Antarctic Program. Indicators point to the Chinese are planning to undertake mining in the Antarctic.

The NZDF may have a role in representing the New Zealand government's official protests at the Chinese violating the Antarctic Treaty (mining is outlawed in Antarctic by the treaty) . An outside chance exists that the NZDF could be called to evict the offending elements from Ross Dependency/New Zealand area of Antarctica.

### **General Conclusions**

A number of global hotspots are going to flare up into a fire storm. The fire storm will be global conflict on a scale not seen since WW2. The scale of the coming conflict will mean that New Zealand will be fighting for the survival of western civilisation. Fighting for democracy and our fundamental values will replace looking after our overseas interests.

The opening act of the coming fire storm will probably be Russia's moves against NATO. Iran may trigger a wider war in the Middle East around the same time. The US will initially sit out the conflict. Various factors that fall beyond the scope of this submission , will see the US enter the conflict on the side of NATO.

The eyes of the world will be fixated on events in Europe and the Middle East. The US will withdraw forces from Asia to meet the crises in Western Europe and the Atlantic. The Chinese will take advantage of the situation to launch their southward military drive.

*What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?*

At present the roles assigned to the NZDF are appropriate.

*What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate' territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?*

Like above I will split this section into Geographic regions.

### **Exclusive Economic Zone/Continental Shelf**

Chinese Anti Access/Area Denial operations will be the main threat to New Zealand and the South



West Pacific.

## **Ross Dependency/Antarctica**

Chinese mining in the Antarctic (see above).

*How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?*

I have chosen to structure this section in four parts. I will rank the NZDF roles in providing security and maintaining relationships with allies and partners into 2 category's. The category's will be based on the importance to New Zealand 's security.

In category 3 I will look the NZDF relationships with the UK and the USA. Category 4 will look the foundation of the doctrine the NZDF should adopt out to 2040.

### **Category 1**

The fundamental duty of the NZDF is the defence of New Zealand, Australia and the South West Pacific from any threat from the threat of a State Actor/Non State Actors who would pose a threat to security.

Also the NZDF needs to be able to support natural and man made disaster relief and recovery in New Zealand , Australia and South Pacific and the South West Pacific.

Following on from this the NZDF relationships with its counter parts in Asia : Singapore , Japan , Indonesia , Republic of Korea , and the Solomon Islands are the most important to New Zealand's security. Note this list is indicative and not exhaustive.

Strategically any convention military threat to New Zealand from a nation state will come from Asia and the South West Pacific. This is why I believe the NZDF most important ties are with Australia and figurative speaking with nations in our backyard and local neighbourhood.

### **Category 1A**

The importance the NZDF ties with the ADF warrants its own sub category in this submission. A number of factors has seen New Zealand neglect its defence relationship/alliance with Australia.

Successive governments over the past 20 – 30 years have reduced the size and capabilities of the NZDF to its present scope. The consequences of this from the stand point of Trans-Tasman defence relations has been a greater reliance on Australia for capabilities the NZDF is lacking. New Zealand's influence on Australia's defence posture has declined or remained the same.

As a response to rising tensions in Asia , Australia is shifting its defence ties and relationship's towards Japan. Australia is moving away from its traditional partnership with New Zealand . In order for New Zealand to have more influence on Australian defence posture we have to bring more to the table in terms of capabilities and integration with the ADF.

The goal of the New Zealand government should be to align Australian defence policy with the South West Pacific. In other words in a worst case scenario (read China's South ward's military

drive) it is in New Zealand's interests for ADF to withhold its forces from the Central Pacific.

By doing so the ADF will stand a higher chance of preserving naval and air units. The reader needs to consider the implications of this Chessboard move. Australia will abandoning the Central Pacific and Japan in the short to medium term.

The reader may be asking the following: Should the NZDF and the ADF not try and prevent a would be enemy from reaching the South Pacific by engaging them in the Central Pacific? In brief the concentration of enemy forces would make this unwise. The enemy also enjoys the advantage of operating fairly close to its logistical base. Once the enemy moves towards the South Pacific they will stretch their logistical supply chain.

#### **Category 1B**

As a part of its military build up China is developing disaster/humanitarian relief capabilities. Ensuring interoperability with the People's Liberation Army, Navy and Air Force disaster/humanitarian relief capabilities is a sound objective. NZDF planners and senior commanders will need to bear in mind how China is a future adversary.

#### **Category 2**

New Zealand's ties with NATO were facilitated because of the NZDF role with the International Security Force in Afghanistan. The NZDF ties with NATO will continue to be important.

#### **Category 3**

In the area of natural disaster and humanitarian relief the NZDF ties with the UN and international NGO will remain important, until the failure of the Rules Based International Order. New Zealand's bilateral relations with Australia, United States, UK and other partners are of greatest importance to the NZDF. New Zealand's ties with the UN are of a secondary importance.

#### **Category 3A**

The value of the NZDF ties to the British Armed Forces will continue to be as outlined as below. For this reason I have placed the NZDF ties with the British Armed Forces in its own sub Category.

The nature of the NZDF relationships with its UK counterparts is unusual in that it isn't necessary dictated by geography or joint operational deployments around the globe. The NZDF has historic links with the UK armed forces. The NZDF will continue follow the structural and operational handbooks of the UK armed forces.

The effects of budgetary cutbacks to the UK armed forces will need to be taken into consideration by NZDF planners. What affect will the RN reduced presence in the Indian Ocean have on New Zealand's interests?

What effects have budget cutbacks had and will have on the British Armed Forces handbooks as I term it?

#### **Category 3B**

Valid arguments exist for placing the New Zealand's defence ties with the United States of America

in Category 1 or 2. I decided against doing this because of the US retreat from global affairs and defence cutbacks that I have previously mentioned in this submission.

Participation in joint exercises with the US military will continue to test, develop the NZDF capabilities and interoperability. In spite of cutbacks considerable scope still exists for the NZDF to participate in training exercises with the US military.

The New Zealand government aim should be to maximise the number of opportunities the NZDF has to train with Marines ( Marine Rotational -Darwin) and other US forces that are stationed in Australia. The same goes for any US forces that arrive in Australia for training purposes.

In the same vein the NZDF should be in a position to train with US forces that are stationed in the likes of the Philippines. These mostly naval forces have been deployed as part of the US pivot to Asia.

Historically the US has offered logistical support to Australia and New Zealand military operations. The effects of cutbacks on the US military capacity to provide logistical support to the NZDF operations will need to be examined in depth.

The US will remain an important supplier of military hardware to both the NZDF and ADF. As such the New Zealand government focus should be on taking chances to secure US military hardware as circumstances arise. Securing the hardware at reasonable or affordable price should be the other goal.

Its not certain if the US government and relevant agency's would be willing to deal with New Zealand in good faith. The cancellation of the planned purchase of F-16's for the RNZAF by the last Labour government may have caused a level of distrust towards New Zealand.

In summary the US will continue to provide the NZDF with training opportunities , doctrinal knowledge and (hopefully) military hardware. New Zealand Defence and diplomatic ties with the US still hold great value.

#### **Category 4**

**Note to the reader:** The capabilities referred to in Category 4 are covered below.

Will the NZDF be deploying stand alone or along side coalition partners and allies?  
Excluding training exercises and short term disaster relief. Will the deployment place the NZDF resources outside of Asia ,South Pacific?

Who will the NZDF be deployed along side?

Would the deployment come at the expense of developing and improving the capabilities outlined below?

The NZDF will rarely deploy overseas as a stand alone force without coalition partners because of its small size. For instance the NZDF was a part of the International Security Force in Afghanistan. The reader shouldn't confuse the NZDF having its own area of operations (As was Bamiyan for NZ PRT in Afghanistan) with a stand alone deployment without any coalition partners and allies.

Beyond 2020 the NZDF would be better to maintain its resources close to home , so to speak. This would ensure the NZDF is more able to meet its fundamental obligations as the international

situation unfolds as outlined above.

Priority is to be given to continuing to develop and upgrade the NZDF new and existing capabilities. Training exercises with the US, Australia and partners in Asia/South West Pacific may be the most beneficial to the NZDF.

Australia should be the first preference as a partner in any joint task force. If Australia isn't taking part in (enter mission here) the next preferences are the USA and the UK.

Greater care and consideration is required when considering the impact would be coalition partners would have on the security of NZDF forces in an overseas deployment.

In Afghanistan Kiwi troops were exposed to greater risk of casualties by Hungarian forces in a neighbouring province. How the Hungarian troops didn't patrol at night was well documented. The NZDF relied on our coalition partners to provide air support to our troops on the ground. The NZDF must never be placed in such a situation again.

*How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?*

The NZDF should operate with the capabilities and doctrines outlined in this submission.

*What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?*

As it does now.

*What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?*

This area is in conjunction with recruitment (see below). New Zealand will benefit if a greater number of young people enlist in the NZDF. The pressures on the NZDF manpower resources will be eased. After the people in question leave the military for civilian life they will have a skill set/qualifications that will leave them in good stead.

*What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?*

By having the capabilities to counter Area Access/Area Denial operations the NZDF will be able to operate effectively in the years ahead.

Anti Submarine Warfare , Mine Clearance Warfare and Amphibious capabilities will replace peacekeeping as the NZDF core missions. Small to medium sized militaries tend to specialise in selected capabilities. Providing sound decisions are made based on New Zealand defence requirements , specialisation can be an asset to the NZDF.

Below is the kind of force structure/capabilities the NZDF will need to adapt to meet its new roles. Also I will take a glance at the doctrines the NZDF will need to develop with Australia.

### **Royal New Zealand Army**

Base the structure of the army on Multi-role Combat Brigades (See *Plan Beersheba*) would ensure the Army is an integrated force. Integration with the Australian Army naturally comes with the

Multi-role Combat Brigades model.

In general the Army would look to emulate the capabilities of the United States Marines Corps. All the Army's equipment including tanks and artillery would have to be suitable for transport by a C-17 or equivalent aircraft.

### **Replacing the IW Steyr Assault Rifle**

The operational experience from the NZDF and our partners and allies in Afghanistan and Iraq must factor in the replacement of the IW Steyr Rifle. The salt water environment's of amphibious operations should factored in.

### **Tanks**

A medium size Amphibious tank design. A gun carrier than can plough through jungle and support infantry.

### **Reconnaissance vehicles**

An Amphibious reconnaissance vehicle.

### **Army equipment and other vehicles**

I hope the reader will forgive me for not including a complete list of equipment the Army would need to acquire (such anti tank and aircraft weapon systems e.t.c) under my ambitious plan. I am doing this because of space constraints and the need to stay topical.

### **Royal New Zealand Navy**

The RNZN Off Shore and In shore patrol vessels withdrawn from service. The crews can be transferred to help man the navies new frigates. HMNZS Canterbury to be withdrawn from service and replaced by a more suitable vessel.

### **Anzac Class Frigates replacement**

Building the core capabilities around Anti Submarine Warfare ;Mine Clearance Warfare; Air/ Missile defence and Anti Surface Warfare would provide the core of the future RNZN.

In total 6 high end frigates or destroyers would serve as replacements for the RNZN Anzac Class Frigates.

### **HMNZS Manawanui and Off Shore Patrol Vessels replacements**

A vessel capable of Anti Submarine and Mine Clearance Warfare in Littoral Waters. A multi role vessel capable of Mine Clearance Warfare and acting as a Off Shore Patrol Vessel.

### **HMNZS Canterbury replacement**

A Landing Helicopter Dock Ship with the capacity to transport a Multi-role Combat Brigade. The vessel will need defence measures against torpedos and anti shipping missiles .

## **HMNZS Endeavour replacements**

2 vessels capable of replenishment at sea and providing logistical support to amphibious operations.

## **Royal New Zealand Air Force**

### **Tactical/Strategic Air lift**

The reach and capacity of the Air Force's Tactical/Strategic Air lift capabilities will need to expand. Now is the ideal time with the RNZAF C-130's due for replacement. As an estimate 10 -12 aircraft will be required. By expanding the RNZAF will be able to resupply NZDF forces stationed overseas and have greater role in disaster relief.

### **Air Combat Wing**

What is commonly referred to as the RNZAF combat wing is to be resurrected. The RNZAF and the New Zealand government shouldn't be afraid to think outside the square (*example*) when rebuilding the foundations of the combat arm of the RNZAF.

The aircraft's capabilities would be to provide air cover for the RNZN. As such the aircraft will be "ship and missile killers." Sufficient Air to Air combat capabilities to ensure survivability in a high intensity combat environment is also a fundamental requirement.

The design could either be vertical/short takeoff and landing or a conventional aircraft. By design any conventional aircraft will need to be able to operate from rough air strips.

Two possible design variants come to mind, Close Air Support and Dedicated air to air combat .

### **P-3 Orion replacement**

An aircraft whose primary mission is anti submarine warfare/Anti Surface Warfare . Maritime patrol would be the aircraft secondary role.

### **Unmanned Vehicles/blimps**

A number of roles exist for Unmanned Vehicles Anti Submarine Warfare/Maritime patrol , Close Air Support and a general reconnaissance role.

Unmanned blimps could fill the role of monitoring New Zealand's Exclusive Economic Zone. Tracking Submarines and illegal fishing vessels.

### **Close Air Support**

Close air support capability could be performed by Manned Aircraft , attack helicopters, Unmanned Vehicles or a mixture of these platforms.

### **Doctrine and other Notes**

In size the Royal Australian Navy's surface fleet will shrink . By 2020 the RAN surface fleet will be build around 8 Anzac Class Frigates and 2 Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers . No direct

replacement for the Adelaide Class frigates exists (A total of 4-6 Adelaide Class frigates are being replaced by 2 AWD)

The RNZN will need to cover the gap left by the reduction in the RAN surface. By including the missile/air defence role in the Anzac Class Frigate replacements will plug the capability gap. The RNZN will have 3 frigates available for operational service at one time.

The NZDF doctrine is to be based on amphibious operations and protecting commerce. A key part of this doctrine is that the NZDF shouldn't deploy ground and naval forces without native (RNZAF) air cover.

Resurrecting the convoy system is the basis for defending sea bound commerce. The RNZN partners with the RNZN in defending New Zealand's commerce. By adopting the convoy system the NZDF will be better prepared than the RN and USN for future conflicts/sea warfare.

A joint amphibious task force with Australia serves as the bedrock of amphibious doctrine. New Zealand has a unique opportunity to develop a refined amphibious doctrine. The US Marines concept of Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea is the basis of the Anzac amphibious doctrine.

*In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.*

#### **Recruitment in Universities and other higher training providers**

The way the NZDF recruitment operates can be refocused to reflect today's society. Today many people who would be an asset to the NZDF escape the net, so to speak. Many people are also very unfamiliar with military life.

The Limited Services Volunteer scheme provides the basis for the new direction in recruiting. Adopting the scheme as a way of introducing military life and fitness standards to would be recruits.

Integrating the scheme to universities, polytechnics and other training providers is the new focus of recruiting. The aim of the scheme is to target people who will have suitable backgrounds/qualifications for service in the NZDF, after they have completed their course of study (see below).

Students would enter what is akin to the current Limited Services Volunteer scheme. If they find military life is to their liking they are given the option of enlisting as a Army or Navy reservist or in the regular full time military. The people who opt to become a reservist's would enlist before they have graduated.

To ensure they meet the NZDF fitness standards the trainees would be placed on a fitness program before they enter basic training. Additionally screening and testing of officer candidates would take place as per the current NZDF practices.

By taking a more direct approach in recruiting the NZDF can go a long way to filling in man power shortfalls. A career in the NZDF would provide a greater number of young people with a sound career track.

## High Schools/ Charter Schools

A based on the former Australian Army Apprentice scheme (See [info](#)). The scheme would encompass all three services. The scheme would also be open to Adults and youth who are currently unemployed.

## General Conclusions/Notes

Dedicated Charters schools devoted to a NZDF Apprentice scheme would be cater for the blue collar trades. They could also cater for electronic , IT qualifications e.t.c geared towards the NZDF requirements.

Recruiting from the Universities/other training providers students allows the NZDF to recruit people with suitable attributes and qualification's. For instance someone with a law degree may have the "right stuff" to become an Army officer. Seen at face value the Army wouldn't have a great need for law graduates amongst its ranks and the person would be overlooked.

Someone with industry IT qualifications (e.g Cisco Career Certifications) would make a logical recruitment target. The person in question already has a suitable skills to enlist as a Communications Warfare Specialist in the RNZN.

Bean counters will argue that my plan for NZDF recruitment may not be justifiable on the grounds of cost. My answer is short and simple. The cost should be weighed against the social and economic costs of New Zealand's high youth unemployment rate. New Zealand can't afford to have the NZDF facing a manpower shortage. The issue of manpower cannot be disputed.

## Private Military Contractors Post War Construction and miscellaneous thoughts

The NZDF is presented with the opportunity to study the use of American Private Military Contractors (PMC) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Adjusting the NZDF force structure based on the lessons from the US military experience with PMC is one of the most important policy shifts that can take place , over the next 10 years.

The policy shift would see the use of civilian contractors/private sector phased out from roles within the NZDF. Repairing or build infrastructure after a future war has finished is the correct role for private sector contractors.

I have been unable to locate a single comprehensive resource on this topic. I will include a couple of sources below for the reader who is seeking a starting point in this area.

## Future Reading

PMC and Nation Building  
[A look at PMC](#)

## General Conclusions

PMC will remain a main stay of the US military. The role of PMC in the US military will be a contributing factor to its ill preparedness for coming wars.

In summary the monetary investment that would be required to bring up individuals in the private



sector to the standard where they could operate in a war zone , would make PMC uneconomical. The New Zealand government would also incur a number of legal headaches relating to the legal status of PMC.

The role of the NZDF in the coming global conflict will be the outright defeat of our enemies in ultra high intensity inter state warfare. Reconstruction of the defeated nations will only begin after their unconditional surrender.

After the Surrender the NZDF will assume responsibility for security (enter location) while private sector contractors begin the work of nation building (AKA the Marshall Program and Post War West Germany and Japan MK2). By accepting the fact that reconstruction can only take place after an enemy has been defeated the NZDF will be able to focus on its core mission.

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Summary of Facts

Since the local government reforms 1989, all of the councils have fail to look at Otago Southland, Canterbury as one, for the centralization of government resource as the last part is completed for cost saving and reduction in funding.

The New Zealand Defence Force should make submissions for the long term plan "Central Otago District Council" to build private public partnerships, to rebuild the bridges as most if not all councils have closed their doors on the residents and ratepayers in supporting a neutral board that would facilitate economic development, for all.

As the Defence force moves its resources northward, the Integrated Expansion Group should be considered, based on the end of the school term, for all ages. People should have the change to put forward there interest as a cor-ord centre works through the application's. Combined service should get support to build a network of former professional's service personal, all ages and build a 1000 man camp at Tekapo military camp as a base for a main five year exercise.

A pager should be used to muster the key staff as an exercise 10 week training exercise programme in developed to teach, train, and evaluate the end of exercise

In this process could the working group consider the older generation of the Clyde Township as they have never had a say for the direction of the Clyde Township. This town needs a plan to empower, and allow the people to Have A Say, as we welcome all service groups to support the community rebuild that benefits all.

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

With this restructure of the defence force as mentioned in the white paper all threat and challenges will be meet. Border entry, changes in community demographic, population changes.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

The Defence force will need to be integrated, "The Integration Expansion Group" all ages based on the end of the school term.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

Be a world leader, Preparation, Planning, Time and Space.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

Events that require resources and manpower to support, security, earthquakes, fire storms, floods, ect. Reactions at a local level

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

Review its structure, goals, objectives yearly, But What if?

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

Have across party policy, agreed at all levels, a plan, the white paper.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

The Integrated Expansion Group, all ages, based on the end of the school term. Be welcomed to be part of the long term community plans.

The Clyde Community plan welcomes all combined service group, as a means to support the centralisation of government services.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

To serve the Country, The Integrated Expansion Group, all ages, based on the end of the school term. Industry, Councils, all service groups, corrections departments, police, Rural fire services, health board, doctors, nurses, others.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

Role: To seek out, kill and capture, repel attack both by night or day, regardless of weather, season or terrain. Base training on this with gallery shoots, for weapons training, once trained. To be integrated.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.

The Defence white paper has outlined the pathway the combined services should take as it becomes a world leader, towards its policy, plans and outcomes. It should include all ages, as it takes ten years to train a defence person? I.e What do you want to do at the end of the school term, (To become a better person)

# The Future of the New Zealand Defence Force

What does New Zealand want and what does it need from its defence force?

Most if not all would agree that no New Zealand political party or any influential group would advocate for initiating any kind of offensive military action in the near future. New Zealand would have no reason to do so: it has no disputed borders, or hostile neighbours. It has plenty of land and resources for all citizens to exist comfortably.

It seems that the only reason New Zealand would require a defence force at all is for exactly what its name suggests – defence. It is in an enviable geopolitical position for that. As above, its neighbours are its allies, and the entire land mass is surrounded by an expanse of water which would be difficult, if not impossible, to cross without detection. The Royal New Zealand Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Navy can be focused on air defence and coastal/naval defence respectively to combat any attempts by aggressors to enter New Zealand's lands unlawfully. The threats from terrorist or insurgent activities within New Zealand would be defended against by both the New Zealand Police Force armed offenders squad and the SAS D Squadron commando unit, the same as it is under the current system.

The New Zealand Army will not be required to protect New Zealand's airspace, coastal borders or extensive marine resources. The nation will always require an army, even if it is perhaps not to be used in the traditional idea of defence. It will be needed to protect the citizens, whether from internal political forces or from natural disasters. The current structure of the Army, however, is not the most efficient or effective for its potential future use. The proposal here is to convert the New Zealand Army into an engineering-based army.

The first argument against this concept that some would make is that while New Zealand may not act as an aggressor or initiate military action itself, its allies may call in its help for future military actions of their own. Surely New Zealand would need to maintain the Army to be battle-ready for that eventuality? The fact is that the New Zealand Army cannot make a real impact with its current structure. It would be much more useful as an engineering-based force.

Why can the New Zealand Army not make a real impact? Unfortunately, the Army will never be large, as New Zealand's population is not large. The Army can only provide a relatively small amount of assistance to other nations to help with various peacekeeping operations from time to time, as has been its standard practice in recent decades. These deployments keep the soldiers busy, and keep New Zealand in good stead with its political allies and other members of the United Nations. However, due to the Army's limited size (rather than any fault of the soldiers themselves) New Zealand's deployments are only marginally effective.

Also, some divisions of the Army have become woefully obsolete, only remaining due to a lack of modernisation of the Army in recent years. One example is the Artillery component, not deployed to use their artillery since the Vietnam War, forty years ago. The world is different now. Modern warfare is changing rapidly with increasing advancements in technology and a focus on remote-operated weaponry rather than the traditional approach of troops on the ground. With its meagre defence budget, New Zealand will only be left further behind.

The purchase of the Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) is a prime example of an expensive government purchase not used to its full capacity and not providing value for the New Zealand taxpayers. The New



Zealand Government agreed to purchase 105 LAVs for NZD \$680m in 2003. Since then only five of these vehicles have left the country to see active service. This cannot be seen as a sensible purchase that provides value for money and useful service to the New Zealand people. The initial cost of purchase is not the only cost either; there is an annual cost of approximately NZD \$14m to keep these machines running and for the soldiers to train to use them effectively. Not only are the LAVs a waste of money, they are unsuited to the kind of work that the New Zealand Army usually undertakes. Armoured vehicles can be intimidating and as such are inappropriate for peacekeeping duties, which rely heavily on maintaining good relations with the local population.

Instead of having such large-scale spending on useless machines training for a war they will never see, would it not have been better to have bought plant machinery and transport planes that could be in use all over the world year round – making a real difference not only in New Zealand but worldwide? Imagine if the New Zealand Army could have been on the ground helping the people immediately after the Christchurch earthquake. Without the red tape of organising tenders for repairs from different companies, the process of cleaning up could have gotten under way almost immediately. What a difference that would have made. New Zealand is always expecting the next big quake – wouldn't it be so much better to be prepared?

Surely it would be better to restructure the New Zealand Army into a modern engineering-based force, well equipped and trained, as a ready reactive force that could be deployed to anywhere in the world. In the wake of a major natural disaster, the Army could be sent immediately as an outside force which is equipped to handle what needs to be done in such an emergency. As for being battle-ready, the engineers and logistics staff would be trained in basic warfare (as they are with the current Army model) and so would be ready to assist as and when the need arose.

The nation would still need a fighting force to protect New Zealand citizens on land. However, instead of having hundreds of averagely trained infantry soldiers, a restructure could expand the SAS and downsize the existing infantry battalions into a compact and extremely well-trained and well-equipped fighting force, focused solely on modern urban warfare. The current training model of fighting large scale battlefield type engagements which required large quantities of resources and a clearly defined enemy are no longer viable as the modern enemy is hidden within the population of the people that the Army is mandated to help and protect.

The remainder of soldiers would be incorporated into the existing engineer regiment and be trained in trades such as construction, plumbing, electrical work, civil engineering, plant operations, and firefighting. Officers could be trained with degrees in civil engineering and project management to provide the necessary command structure. This would build the New Zealand Army up to be a premier engineering force focused on reconstruction activities.

As the world gets more densely populated and global warming takes hold, there is very likely to be an ever-increasing need for emergency management not only in New Zealand but around the world. Particularly at risk are those in the Pacific Islands, where tropical storms and rising sea levels are threatening livelihoods as well as the having the potential to displace entire nations which aren't given assistance to upgrade sea walls and put in place other preventive measures.

The money offered in general aid to other nations could be discontinued, and instead New Zealand's services could be offered. This would further improve the Army's usefulness and experience, as well as reassuring New Zealand citizens that the resources given to these foreign nations are being used in the most efficient and effective way possible.





If there was any point that the Army was not required overseas for their assistance, it could be used domestically for a range of purposes. Road building, upgrading and maintenance could be undertaken and state-owned housing could be built to cover the ever increasing shortfall.

The army could assist the conservation department to help with all manner of conservation projects that could return New Zealand to the '100% pure', green country that its citizens want it to be. With a literal army of support, predator free zones could be constructed and large scale pest eradication undertaken. The Army would not only be protecting the people of New Zealand but the flora and fauna as well.

The Army could also expand its relief services to logistics, and medical assistance, with trained Army personnel supplying medical relief, humanitarian aid and temporary accommodation.

The best flow-on effect of all this? The majority of the servicemen and servicewomen who leave the New Zealand Army will enter the civilian world with useful and relevant skills and training – giving New Zealand a fantastic boost for its workforce.

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DWP-0147  
(addition to DWP-0004)

## Addendum

An unorthodox defence posture, as advocated in the above submission, should not be costed according to the criteria applied to the current conventional defence budgets. Expenditure could be managed to fit whatever budget was allocated, according to how many of the age catchment were actually called forward; the duration of the call-up term; the frequency with which reservists were called back for top-up training, and how much they were paid. Not only would the hardware requirements demanded by the present conventional and overseas interoperability posture, be reduced (at least until, as it can be expected to in the future, the threat situation deteriorates further) but there would be significant savings to be offset against the budgets of other ministries.

Unemployment would be reduced; the crimes of bored-youth would be reduced; the nation's fitness and long-term healthiness would be increased. Importantly, given the increases in multicultural migration and the widening of social divisions between New Zealanders that will follow on from the current rapid growth in wealth inequality, the experience of shared national service would increase social cohesion - or at least slow down the emergence of social stratification in which the parties drift ever further apart. In an emerging crisis, a nation, which can rely on itself for its defence, rather than be dependent on others, will benefit from increased self-confidence and morale.

Another way of looking at the proposal's feasibility and asking whether it would place too heavy a strain on New Zealand society, would be to look at Israel. New Zealand, with its GDP of \$200 billion and a population around five million, currently supports 9,000 regular defence personnel and 2,000 reservists. With a population of eight million, a GDP of \$290 billion and a per capita GDP \$7,000 less than New Zealand's, Israel, supports full conscription: 160,000 regular forces and 630,000 well trained reservists. It has developed a significant nuclear warfare capacity, a powerful air force and navy, which together with the army, conduct regular mobilizations and warlike operations on land, sea and air. Israel's air force maintains more than 600 modern aircraft, its Navy, 6 submarines, 48 patrol boats, 8 missile boats and 3 corvettes. Its Army is equipped with 4,000 modern tanks and about 10,000 other AFVs (armoured fighting vehicles.) Of all the above accoutrements of an effective defence policy, the only thing that New Zealand would be called on to match would be the ratio of reserve forces to overall population.



Dear Tony,

It was a pleasure meeting yourself and Debbie at the White Paper meeting held in Auckland on Tuesday.

I will follow up and write to the correct email address shortly, but to briefly outline my comments they are:

To provide a combat capable Air / Sea/ Land Defence Force, able to operate and lead independently within our region, or to provide a component as part of a coalition force.

To increase Defence Spending as a proportion of GDP to a closer alignment with our key allies. The increase to be gradual over a number of years.

To ensure Defence procurement leverages its spend to ensure local jobs that are sustainable. For example aircraft purchases could include offsets to manufacture or service commercial aircraft parts.

OPV and IPV vessels could be built in NZ using a rolling procurement programme to avoid the "Valley of Death" that often occurs in NZ and Australia in terms of job losses at the projects end.

We have the talent in New Zealand to do these things, we just currently lack the opportunities.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

The current threats now include instability in the world such as the South China Sea, illegal fishing in NZ EEZ, Antarctic territory and Cyber security. These are the major ones that directly impact NZ. Overall world wide instability impacts NZ such as what is occurring in the middle east and Ukraine. This impacts trade significantly. An example of this is dairy products a key export.

In the future with the increased competition for resources, the world will become a far more unstable place. Our EEZ and Antarctic territory will become under increased direct threat from illegal access of our resources such as fishing to the real possibility of countries or groups challenging our sovereignty. NZ Antarctic territory sovereignty could be challenged with the result of NZ losing our territory and respective rights, ownership of the resources. Our EEZ and Antarctic territory hold vast resources, oil, fish, water and minerals, that must be defended, our sovereignty must be maintain and enforced or we will lose our rights. Look to the South China Sea for an example of what happens if you do not defend your territory through a lack of investment and expects that the international community and the UN will protect you.

The South Pacific and Asia will be very stressed and becoming unstable. I doubt they have the resources to cope with climate change and to defend their territory from theft and illegal activities.

There is a big challenge and risk in the USA and China relationship which will impact NZ. We must manage this carefully. Both countries are important to our wellbeing. Our interest is best served by supporting the rule of law and the international community. We are a small country we need frameworks more than the big countries.

Overall the UN and other associations will become less effective. They are not particularly effective now and can not be relied on. They have not resolved the issue in the South China Sea or the Middle East.

Cyber security and the protection of NZ Intellectual Property and our businesses and facilities, electricity and water as examples, is crucial. Distance does not protect us.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

Asia will become less stable now that the security guarantor of the US is not effective. China will revise the current status to ensure a more favourable one for itself, as is China's right. All Asian states are in an arms race, this will increase. USA and China will put more pressure on NZ, this presents an opportunity for NZ but also risk. We must be wise here.

The South Pacific will become less stable as mentioned above. This could lead to alliances which do not favour NZ traditional point of view and reduce our influence in the region. We need to support our neighbours territory from illegal activities. This requires investment for us to maintain our influence.

The Middle East will not settle down for quite a time at least 10 years.

Russia will continue to make some noise which will result in changes in European posture.

The changes have already begun.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

The NZDF needs to be able to deliver:

- a safe and secure New Zealand, including its border and approaches, this is all of our EEZ and Antarctic territory;

- influence a rules-based international order which respects national sovereignty;
- have a network of strong international linkages; and
- secure and support a sound global economy underpinned by open trade routes.
- Help to stabilise a country such as our mission in Afghanistan

NZDF needs to be able to contribute to war type activities, peace-keeping activities and also disaster relief. The focus needs to be on war activities. The other activities are secondary.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

I have covered this previously

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

We prioritise in the order as described. NZ and Australia should be seen as one strategic entity.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

The NZDF should work with other government departments to deliver whole of government outcomes, but this is not their primary task. A great example is the Navy and Maf working to monitor and enforce fishing restrictions in Antarctica. This is a key role for the NZDF to support NZ law and sovereignty. Their primary role is still war and defence of our territory.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

NZDF should take a lead in supporting large disasters as they did in Christchurch. They have manpower and machinery, trucks and planes, which can be tasked to particularly activities. But this is a secondary role for the NZDF.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

The role should be similar to what it is today.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

I will talk about 4 areas of capability. Air force, Navy, Army and Cyber defence. Where possible we should standardise the equipment we use across the forces. The equipment should be multirole as well.

#### Cyber defence

I am not sure if this needs to sit in the NZDF, but NZ requires a capability to protect and respond to attacks against our critical infrastructure and large businesses. As a country we

have IP which is valuable we need to protect this. We need to be able to detect and stop an attack and identify who is attacking and be able to respond appropriately.

We also require a capability to attack and disrupt another country. Cyber attack in my view would be more like to occur than an actual physical attack. It has no chance of loss of life by the attacker and it is hard to prove immediately, most attacks takes months to detect . Hence in my view it is highly likely. We already have instances of this occurring with other countries and companies trying to steal NZ information.

Cyber attack is likely in my view to be a first step in an escalation of a disagreement or conflict with another country.

#### Airforce

##### Land and Maritime patrol

Need to increase our ability to monitor our EEZ, this will come under increasing pressure and we need to be able to monitor it effectively not just guess from a few flights a year on what is happening. Increased use of the Southern Ocean will also result in an increase requirement of SAR activities.

We require enough coverage to know what is happening in our EEZ. It is likely we will require multiple types of capabilities to ensure effective use of resources.

High end, capable for high end war fighting and information gathering such as a Poseidon P8. This would be the main asset for deployment to overseas missions and the defence of NZ.

This vehicle will need to be equipped with advance sensors and have a ability to respond to threats and to destroy targets as it patrols an area.

A lower tier would be for surveillance and search within the EEZ only. A CASA c295 would be ideal for this. This would be fitted with commercial off the shelf technology. This would operate in benign environments only.

Drones, we should obtain drones to provide surveillance of our outer EEZ at extended ranges. This need to be able to be deployed overseas on missions. In the future a drone which is able to also attack targets should be obtained. At least 3 to ensure we have availability for surveillance of our EEZ. I would expect a level capability similar to a Global Hawk/Triton. This type of capability provides extensive range and the ability to cover a huge area which in my view NZ requires.

Overall a mixed force capability to ensure a cost effective solution to the requirement. The overall requirements are surveillance, attack (including electronic) and communication.

Navy helicopter assets should be maintained and be deployed on frigates, patrol vessels, littoral warfare vessels and transport vessels.

##### Air lift

We require a two tier system. Heavy and Light. Heavy to be able to lift our largest equipment to theatres of operations and a light option to carry smaller loads in a more cost effective manner. The heavy option should be able to effectively support our Antarctic operations. I see a light option with an ability to be multi-role and tasked to maritime patrol or light lift missions as cost effective for a small force.

Both options need the ability to land and take-off from unprepared run ways to ensure goods and people and be transported where needed.

Rotary assets should follow a similar mix of high and low. I think the NH90 and a109 seem appropriate. We should have enough to support a full deploy battalion as well as rotation and training of assets in NZ.

##### Offensive

The air force requires the capabilities to deploy weapons to destroy targets, it is likely this requirement can be filled by drones so that dual use of surveillance and attack can be

achieved. This needs to occur across all of the operation environments. A country should be able to provide a more complete range of options to achieve the desired outcomes. If drones are not mature enough then renting/purchasing a squadron of fast jets is desirable, F18 etc. This capability adds additional options and shows the world we are serious about defending our EEZ and territory.

#### Army

I believe the ability to deploy a battalion to a combat zone as critical while also supporting a company on a UN peace keeping mission at the same time. We need to be able to deploy a battalion independently. There should be 3 battalions fully resourced in personnel.

The army should be equipped for conflict. I believe a medium weight forces (armoured) is appropriate with full supporting units. Supporting units include artillery, air defence, recon, communications, engineers, mortar and rocket protection etc. The army should be modelled off the capabilities of the US marines as this is the likely environment we will operate in.

I support maintaining special forces as well as higher readiness and trained units such as the enhanced infantry companies.

#### Navy

The navy should have a range of capabilities including:

- Combat
  - o 3 modern frigate capabilities that can do area air defence, hunt and attack subs, attack sea and land targets. 3 is required so that we have one deployed on a task, one training and one on maintenance.
- Littoral and mine warfare
  - o 2 vessels specialised in this task. So there is a back up. Can also perform patrol vessel tasks.
- Transport, fuel, supplies and troops.
  - o Be able to transport a battalion of troops and their equipment, trucks, helicopters etc
  - o Be able to transport fuel and stores, this needs to be ice strengthened to support all of our territories.
- Patrol
  - o Vessels to patrol, provide surveillance and enforce our rights of our EEZ and territories. These should be ice strengthened, on board helicopter/drone, conduct boarding activities, have a gun that can be used for intimidation of fishing vessels. The number should be driven from the complete surveillance. At the moment I doubt we have enough.
- Surveillance
  - o Drones that can operate off the ships. On the air, on the water and under the water.

NZ should make full use of drones as we have challenges with manpower and they are expendable.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.

The NZDF requires increased funding to achieve the required output. I would expect an increase to 2% of GDP. This should be phased in over 10 years once the govt books get back into the black. We can not rely on others supporting us if we are not prepared to invest in our

own security proportionally then why should others. All countries struggle to pay for defence forces. I would prefer money to go to NZDF, Cullen fund, Infrastructure, Research & Development than to have tax cuts.

I fully support deployments to UN missions and HADR activities, including our current Iraq deployment. Our service men do an amazing job and deserve our respect and praise for what they do in our name.

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*Submission for Defence White Paper 2015*

“What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand’s security now and in the future?” (I wish to address only this question. I refer to an attached 16–page requisition for funds to file a writ, dated June 12.)

On May 27, 2015, The Telegraph reported on a speech given by President Obama to the US Coast Guard Academy in Connecticut, in which Obama outlined some reasons for thinking that global warming and climate change have become threats of a kind unparalleled in the history of civilisation. Let us grant the Obama ranking of these threats and contemplate that we in New Zealand can expect them to impact increasingly on our prospects. Let us pretend that we are physicians examining a patient, when we consider the Earth in its troublesome climatic state of recent years. Before knowing how to treat the patient’s problem, we must have a correct diagnosis. Casting our attention on the methods being used to arrive at the popular diagnosis of ‘greenhouse effect’ we should find much cause for alarm, indeed a compounding of the threat of climate change with the trauma of a potentially corrupt analysis.

Yours truly has jumped to act against this, as witness the enclosed requisition for funds for a writ of mandamus, so there is at least a one-man dad’s army at work on the flight-path correction we will probably need for a safe passage in the future. That being so, the problem is of such order that more personnel and resources should be applied as soon as possible.

One might see a precedent in how it panned out for New Zealand at the end of the second world war. New Zealand may have been part of Japan except that contemplation of the law of Total Energy had led to a letter being delivered to US President Roosevelt who was in a frame of mind to act upon it. The circumstances surrounding the invention of the atomic bomb will always be steeped in drama, much more so than our current circumstances. However there remains the fact that contemplation of the law of Total Energy can lead to some game-changing awareness. Information about relevance is included in the enclosed requisition.

How will it pan out for New Zealand if global warming is caused by the conversion of the energy of tidal motion while the latter maintains its elitist status? A case can be made that we will fare very badly; that we will be locked in a downward spiral of poverty, unrest and madness, taking us to lows of condition previously unknown in the history of the nation.


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*Urgent Requisition for Funds to Writ the  
New Zealand Government's Conservation Department*

You've discovered your brand new automobile has a fatal flaw in the chassis and should never have been given a warrant of fitness. What do you do? We know the answer to that question, of course, but now instead of an auto, you've bought a marine turbine especially built to be bolted to the sea floor and the flaw is not in the engineering but in the warranty of fitness pertaining to its process of operation.

People often associate the civil law with fights. One party sues another to put right a wrong. However the civil law is not only concerned with wrongs alleged against a single individual or group. It can also be concerned with the wrongs that affect civilisation quite generally. In that sense the law can be regarded as a toolbox of solutions.



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## CONTENTS

1. **Requisition** pp 3 - 7

Styled as an essay without section headings. The operation of a certain class of marine turbine is alleged to be the principal cause of our current anthropogenic global warming and climate change. Recent developments in my understanding of the case have indicated a way of convincing the Court that this is so. New Zealand has approved the use of these turbines and the regulatory approvals should be withdrawn as soon as possible.

2. **Commentary about Atmospheric Physics** p. 8

Readers may be aware that popular thought puts the greenhouse effect as the cause of our current anthropogenic global warming and climate change. In seeking some understanding of the theory of the greenhouse effect, I was motioned towards a certain textbook by Professor David Frame of the New Zealand Climate Change Institute. The commentary criticises this book for teaching an unscientific method. My knowledge of the position taken by the International Governmental Panel on Climate Change, as outlined in *2007: The Science Basis* has added to the sense that this book's teaching represents a widespread idea set.

3. **Lesson Sampler & Copy of Feeler Letter** pp 9 - 16

It will be quite impossible to keep questions of science out of the Court, if the Court is to hear a writ of the kind I propose. There must be some kind of entrance for these questions. Lesson One of *Grumpy Morepork's Lessons in Mechanics*, in draft form, is included herein at least to set the tone of the pre-hearing deliberations. It takes us through a brief conventional fundamentals concerning the work-energy theorem to a point where we may ask meaningful questions about the capacity of Apollo 11's Saturn S-IVB rocket to feed the gravitational potential energy. In 1969, with astronauts Armstrong, Collins and Aldrin on board, the rocket was purposed to put the Command Service Module and Lunar Module into lunar orbit, starting from a parking orbit around the Earth. Did it have enough fuel on board? Without answering the question, the lesson sets the stage for the answer to be given and for some inferences to be drawn.

Consider the bouyant mood of the following photo from 1969. How long has it been since our leaders were able to project such relaxed optimism? Quite possibly Man has a sixth sense. Much of the extremism and loss of scruple we have seen develop in world affairs since this photo was taken could be due to an increasing sense that we have embarked on a final bender; therefore there is nothing left to lose; end-of-world ethics are called for.



Nixon at the Washington Senators' 1969 Opening Day. Next to Nixon is Senators owner Bob Short (with arms crossed), then Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn (wearing glasses), and Jack Brennan (in uniform) sits behind Nixon.

"Protecting the environment became a part of Nixon's attempt to unify the country. John Ehrlichman, who'd been picked by the President to coordinate domestic issues, persuaded Nixon that fighting pollution was both the right thing to do and politically popular among young voters. Nixon gave Ehrlichman and his staff tremendous freedom to draft environmental policy."

by Living on Earth's  
Terry FitzPatrick (9/8/1996)  
[www.loe.org](http://www.loe.org)

According to the Japanese research organisation, Fujita Research, the first substantial electricity generating plant to rely on the pull of the Moon was constructed in the mid 1960s. It has continued to operate and has been joined since then (mostly since the 1990s) by a number of other reasonably large plants. I have been unable to determine how many are now in operation, but by trawling the internet looking for generating-station websites, I have guessed that there are still less than a dozen the world over. I have also had to guess that the approval processes have, without exception, failed to address the issues in science arising from the existence of our gravitational basin.

To some, the predictable recurrence of tidal motions implies there is value in the enterprise of converting the motions' energy into electricity. To me, by contrast, the existence of Earth's gravitational basin is given from a careful evaluation of all the evidence. The role of the basin and the purpose of its energy must therefore be taken into account.

Is the gravitational basin a permebasin, in the sense of that it is defined in the magnetic permeability of space? Probably it is, but for the purposes of the writ, if we think *Permebasin*, we can be thinking *Theory & Evidence*. *Perme* is the theory, *basin* is the evidence. In the end, the semantics should not matter all that much. The writ plan (as so far conceived) is to begin with a spotlight on the Apollo space program, to proceed through an enumeration of appliances that connect the force of gravity with the energy industry and to reach a mid-point whereupon it will be evident that a special moral responsibility befalls a regulator who would approve the application of an inductive loading to the tidal motions.

Whereas draining the energy of the basin may be a bit like broaching a fundamental protective mechanism, so it is possible that a sixth sense of Man has indeed kicked in. The law of the conservation of energy implies that if Nature has a purpose for the basin's energy then that purpose will be compromised by reassigning the energy to electrical ends. I have tried to put this point in many ways, over the last three-and-a-half years, in letters to New Zealand officials. They appear somewhat hung-up on a conjecture that the energy of tidal friction is equivalent to the energy that will be converted by the turbines. This is scandalously loose of them. They appear reticent to supply any technical analysis or suitable references to evidence in support of their hypothesis and I am wondering whether the officials have the right kind of background to be certain, on behalf of the public interest, that their position is correct.

I am a person nearing the end of his working life, a man with a passion for mathematics. I have a degree in mathematics from Victoria University of Wellington and I have never in my whole life received any grade less than A for a course in formal mathematics. In the office worker sense, I have risen to be highly regarded in relation to questions of exact science and mathematics in certain areas of my interest.

Sawmilling and engineering are related to the construction industry. They were indicated for me possibly because as a young man, I worked in construction. Summarising a certain aspect of the life in these industries, we may draw attention to an essential employee attitude with the following injunction: *Please tell me if I am making a mistake*. Certainly I cannot think of a single durable employee in the line-up of thirty or more working for my employer of late in engineering who would not have this attitude. Things would not work very well if it were otherwise. Pressure is a constant companion and it is only human nature to make mistakes under pressure. One therefore earnestly desires to have any mistakes brought to one's attention as soon as possible, for with time undiscovered mistakes can become threats. Moreover with this attitude in tow, other things being equal, one will rise in one's industry to a position where one is comfortable in the sense of being confident that one's mistakes will be relatively rare.

Possibly you will have some appreciation yourself for the essential employee attitude above-mentioned. However we may reflect that the attitude is not so very relevant in connection with one aspect of a government agency's workload. Questions of civic utility may be often be decided almost completely without reference to exact science. The idea of a dangerous mistake almost does not apply. For example, if a community is building a swimming pool, how long will be the lanes? Will we have a sauna on the side? Such questions can often be addressed by almost anyone in the community, with or without any technical expertise, because within reason the relevant technology can be stretched to fit safely with whatever is determined.

The New Zealand law pertaining to turbine approvals is divided into, on the one hand, a responsibility allocated to the Conservation Department and, on the other hand, a responsibility allocated to Regional Councils. Without there being any crystal clear prescription in the law, it seems natural to assume that any underlying questions of science will be addressed by the Conservation Department in fulfilling its responsibility, leaving any tamer questions of civic utility to be addressed by the relevant Regional Council. That being so, when Mr and Mrs T. of Eltham requested information under the Official Information Act about the Conservation Department's approval of the tidal turbines planned for Pouto Point, what they received back was a reply indicating that there had been only a perfunctory consideration of the underlying science. It appeared rather that methods appropriate for

deciding the tamer questions of civic utility were the only methods the Department had employed. When the Department further refused to act on my submission that a grave mistake had been made, it became clear either that the Department could not discern between questions of science and questions of civic utility or that they felt no responsibility in relation to questions of science. At this point my solicitor and I did not see any criminal culpability, although we did begin to talk about a writ of mandamus.

Mrs T. spent a week in New Plymouth base hospital shortly after receiving the reply from the Conservation Department. She had an intense migraine headache. I cannot help feeling some responsibility for this. Mr and Mrs T. had listened to my complaint about the tidal turbines. They had followed my enumeration of Mankind's technological reliance, in the energy sector, on the force of gravity. Almost anyone can see the point that I made to Mr and Mrs T., namely that in every other case of such reliance, corresponding to energy taken out of the gravitational field there is energy put in. Seeing the case of the tidal turbines to be therefore somewhat exceptional, in that there is no putting in to compensate for the taking out, they agreed to help me by writing away for the Official Information. However they expected a reply that would come from a stature level in technical competence at least equal to or exceeding my own level of stature, something to put worry to rest. When they received instead an indication of empty-headedness, I imagine the come-down was quite awful and headache-inducing.

With the development of my understanding of the case, indeed through discussing various aspects of the case with others, I decided that the chief manifestation of the energy problem above-mentioned would be in global warming. With this realisation my attention turned to evaluating the popular belief that global warming is being caused by the greenhouse effect. The relevant government office changed from the Conservation Department to the office of the Minister for Climate Change Issues.

If I had just been writing to officials, then I could have been much speedier than I was. Somewhat miraculously, as I strove to put my thesis into the form of written discourse, things emerged from the mist. I began to see something very tight and beautiful, accounting for every commonly known aspect of scientific evidence that had formerly been attributed to the theory of Special Relativity. Although I was not an expert in General Relativity, I could see that the tensor equation of General Relativity might not be inconsistent with the new picture. I was seeing a comprehensive new foundations in which the tensor equation might still be quite all right, except it would not mean exactly what it had hitherto been taken to mean.

Sometimes I felt that Albert Einstein himself was standing by me. We solved an inconsistency in the foundations that had been there for all to see if it was zeroed-in upon, a matter concerning the derivation of the law of Total Energy. This is one of the matters I have commented upon on the website recently at [www.skybicycle.biz](http://www.skybicycle.biz). Click on the Power Discernment link at bottom left of the homepage and follow some links above a picture of sheep.

In due course, I found a sloppy and poorly argued case in the theory of the greenhouse effect. Over the period of a few months, I changed from someone willing to believe on faith that the greenhouse effect was among the causes to someone who believed that it probably was not at all among the causes of anthropogenic global warming. One of the key moments was connecting with a certain commentary of the renown American scientist Judith Curry and realising that the persistent disagreement she was commenting upon should operate to kill

the theory of the greenhouse effect. The measured temperature of the atmosphere has been coming in at average levels consistently and appreciably lower than the theory predicts.

After toying with the idea that the theory of the greenhouse effect might rebound with some adjustments to the parameters of the models used to support it, I decided that its premises were too clumsy and one-eyed for it ever to become a sound and abiding artifact of science. This was after reviewing a textbook used in a university course on atmospheric physics. I have made some specific comments about this book on p. 8.

Possibly you may recall the situation as it was about eight or nine years ago in connection with global warming. The world over there were many business leaders prepared to swear in public that the case being built against the greenhouse gases was a fraud. Unfortunately too many went further, adding that there was no anthropogenic global warming. With the evidence of the years since then, most of these leaders have fallen silent. Could there have been some basis for the claim of fraud, even though it is now quite certain that anthropogenic global warming is in fact occurring? Fraud is probably too strong a word for it, but it certainly appears that a comprehensive basis exists for naysaying the theory of the greenhouse effect.

On April 8, 2015, the Hon Tim Groser, Minister for Climate Change Issues, wrote in a letter to me the following dismissal:

*Ministry for the Environment Officials have advised me that there is no evidence to support your proposition that the conversion of tidal motion into electricity is the principal cause of climate change.*

Surely they must have ignored at least that the take-up of tidal turbines occupies exactly the right time slot to be the cause. They probably have ignored the gravitational basin entirely, including that the special class of turbine deployed in the conversion is the only appliance that takes energy out of the gravitational field without any corresponding putting-in. Surely that should rank the conversion among perturbers. Surely the science of climate change must consider a full range of perturbers. In so far as the Hon. Tim Groser's letter above-mentioned represents a more-or-less final dismissal, I believe he may have crossed the line of criminal negligence. With this change, I now feel I am fighting to minimise the eventual damage to the minister's reputation and prospects, as well as to bring a bad technology to justice.

My solicitor has mentioned the figure of \$250,000 as an approximate cost of a writ of mandamus. The idea is not so much to writ the Hon. Tim Groser for his failure to be appropriately concerned on behalf of the public interest, but rather to writ the Conservation Department seeking withdrawal of the consent it has given for the operation of the problem turbines in New Zealand. The light-shedding of this writ should serve to release Minister Groser, at least to the extent that the writ can be heard without delay.

We shall allege a lack of objectivity and honourable discernments in the position of the Conservation Department, citing at least the failure to discern the existence of Earth's gravitational basin and a failure to understand the invention nature of the inductive loading to be used in extracting the tidal energy. Invention nature means that if Nature had been left to herself there would have been no inductive loading. There is a moral responsibility attaching to the use and deployment of an invention, corresponding to a need to discern the possibility of a dangerous mistake, and the Department has been lax.

We may compare an inductive loading with natural forces possibly arising in the course of

time, e.g. comet hits Pouto Point, volcanic eruption makes wall across harbour, etc. It will be important to ensure that the Court understands that a basin holding its energy over billions of years is probably made such that transactions between atomic mass and the energy reserve are primitive. This way, the energy of the reserve will be kept safe from all natural forces. However such an impregnable fortress can yet be powerless against an inductive loading.

After establishing that a special moral responsibility befalls any regulator who would approve an inductive loading for the tidal motions, we may compare the two theories of the cause of global warming, i.e. the theory of the greenhouse effect and the theory of the sick basin. According to the latter, while the basins of the heavenly bodies are propelled in the universe under the force of gravity that draws them together, the mass inside is hanging on for dear life (see pp. 11-16). The energy of the basin is thus skin-of-teeth as it were for the mass. As the energy is drawn down without replacement, so there is less skin-of-teeth to go around. This points to a warming mechanism that enjoys a quite complete fit with the known evidence of trends in atmospheric temperature relative to surface temperature. In other words, where the theory of the greenhouse effect fails to fit, the theory of the sick basin does fit very nicely.

While Grumpy Morepork's *Lesson One* (see pp. 9 - 16) or some similar introduction to the relevant gravitational physics will be necessary, I am currently unsure how much more of the lesson set will be required. Possibly we will need only lesson one, possibly not. The other lessons are also ready in draft form for examination by the reviewer. The feeler letter of p. 9 and the draft lesson one have been distributed to a number of heads of university departments and institutes in Australasia with the hope of finding some openness and willingness to help.

A certain YouTube video (URL: <http://youtu.be/baGrtqyWSRM>) suggests there is 230 feet of sea-level rise locked up in the ice attached to the terra-firma of Antarctica. It briefly outlines how scientists have determined this and it seems on the level. Other learned publications have been referring to global warming effects for some time, including effects that are already being felt in the cruelty of the weather. For example, at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/indicators/> we may read "... the number of extreme climate events (those which place among the most unusual of the historical record) has been rising over the last four decades (data from the U.S. Climate Extremes Index)". Similar data is available from Australian sources indicating that weather associated with high fire danger has shown a rapid increase in South Australia since the 1990s. It is quite clear then that much is at stake, associated with the clear upward trend in Earth's surface temperature.

A study that should favour the sick basin theory quite nicely would involve comparing the developments over time shown in some of the relevant indicators (e.g. the Climate Extremes Index) with the global annual draw from tidal energy sources. This study may have to be commissioned on the hop by an order of the Court, to ensure that information is taken from authoritative sources and is subject to a thorough analysis.

Thank you very much for your time and patience.

## Commentary

### *re: An Introduction to Atmospheric Physics by David G. Andrews*

Cambridge University Press ISBN 978-0-521-87220-1 (published 2010, copyright Andrews)

In Section 9.1, p. 215, Andrews gives us the following nugget about the hierarchy of atmospheric models:

*The physical intuition provided by the simplest models helps us interpret the intermediate models and the intermediate models help us interpret the complex models.*

Upon touching this nugget, I found myself in a pretend conversation with Andrews. "I see you're really up in the air." He replies, "It is atmospheric physics, after all. What do you expect?" Why do I see him up in the air? His project of adding-in mathematical representations for more and more physical processes has been shot in the foot at the word "go" with the concept of a planet's effective emitting temperature. I had been holding my breath since getting the low-down on this concept in section 1.3.1, p.5. "Surely this is not going to be something of any abiding significance," I had been thinking. By the time I got to section 9.1, I believed that he really did intend some significance for the concept.

On p. 5 above where Andrews introduces the concept of effective emitting temperature, he proposes we make an assumption that must certainly be false, namely that the power of the Earth's black-body radiation is given by multiplying the Stefan-Boltzmann constant by the fourth power of Earth's temperature. Given the origin of the formula, it is likely to be a long way off in this context. Add in a few facts and out pops the value of 255 degrees Kelvin for the effective emitting temperature of the Earth. Apparently the physical intuition apropos the simple Andrews models requires us to believe that the existence of Earth's atmosphere is responsible for the raise of temperature. If instead of 255 degrees we measure about 288 degrees, then the atmosphere is what has made the difference.

In science we cannot normally forgive false premises simply because they can be made to weave a picture bearing resemblance to an observed reality. Andrews leaves the impression that an over-riding concern motivates his procedure. Indeed shortly after introducing the atmosphere as the difference-maker above-mentioned, he has us thinking that the power of the difference-maker is what leads to the greenhouse effect. The emphasis on the greenhouse effect begins with his definition on p. 7. The greenhouse effect somewhat hovers over the entire text as a necessary consequence waiting for its ultimate justification.

In section 3.7.2 on p. 84 Andrews recites the mantra of the IPCC where he states:

*The net upward long-wave irradiance ... must balance the incoming unreflected shortwave irradiance.*

Contrary to popular myth, there is no proof of this contentious idea. As far as I can work out, some scholars have acquired this idea by treating as inconsequential any conversion of sensible heat or radiation into enthalpy. How they got permission for this treatment is possibly not so mysterious if one feels the necessary consequence hovering above, waiting to be justified.

Andrews apparently good credentials - he boasts a position at Oxford University - yield the thought that a whole fraternity has been sent out on a wild goose chase. Scruples that are ordinarily the hallmark of good scientific argument seem to be missing. The only excuse the reader is offered is that atmospheric physics is a special case in science. The unstated addendum is possibly that global warming must be explained.



- Released under the Official Information Act 1982
- a sampler
  - some lessons in mechanics for the planet on a bender

To Whom it May Concern

Herein contained please find the first lesson packaged together with a foreword in which there appears a place for a reviewer's or co-author's name.

We would like to make the acquaintance of a co-author for these lessons. We envisage a lesson-by-lesson commentary. There is some scope for rearranging content but all lessons are now ready to go to final editing phase. Lesson one is hereby presented as evidence that we will have a decent tack. The reviewer may write under a bird's name if they so wish, but we need to be able to characterise the reviewer in truth as someone with appropriate skill and awareness. In concept, the reviewer is holding hands with Mr Grumpy Morepork on the right, with a keen but unknown student of physics on the left.

*The Lessons of Grumpy Morepork in Mechanics* will contain a treatise of some significance in relation to our common global security interests. We are hoping therefore that some natural shyness may be overcome and that goodwill towards our efforts can prevail. The title is not necessarily fixed for publication.

## *The Lessons of Grumpy Morepork in Mechanics*

### *Foreword*

Is global warming caused by the greenhouse effect or rather instead by the conversion of the energy of tidal motion? If the latter, then indeed Mankind is barking up the wrong tree in a very sad way with all the hoopla about cutting back on our greenhouse gas emissions. By comparison the kerfuffle needed to stop a small handful of modern electricity stations would be mild and enlightening. The question is raised only in relation to marine turbines that would stop working if the Moon were to be stuck over one place on the globe. They are usually bolted to the sea floor in places of special seafloor geometry. So they are a small special class, but they attract a raft of fundamental questions in physics.

Grumpy Morepork was schooled in Christensen's solution to the fundamental paradox of logic known as Russell's Paradox. It is acknowledged that the two-set theory of Christensen's solution is only one among four or more different claimants. There is at least intuitionism, Russell's type theory and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory among the other theories that claim to contain a solution to the paradox. We may observe however that there cannot be too much difference between what the various foundations portend for the laws of mechanics. Two-set theory has advantages in calculus, through the distinction between logical and material implication and it allows us to develop a non-tensorial approach to space-time curvature. In the sphere of elementary physics however, indeed in the region to which most of these fifteen lessons relate, no respectable foundations will repudiate the kind of laws that dominate.

We will begin the lessons of Grumpy Morepork by putting the spotlight on Surprised Owl of [www.workenergytheorem.com](http://www.workenergytheorem.com). The Owl and the Morepork had an interesting conversation recently. The Owl's parting line was a summing-up of the Morepork's position and it went like this: *Your attitude is that of a rebel but you are a royalist through and through. The crown may not have your best interest at heart and so, enjoy the same fruits that the King has always provided.*

A cryptic Owl? A reference to the longbox of the law may have arisen because global warming threatens sea-level rise and because sea-level rise may not always be easily contained to a gradual creep. Grumpy Morepork's lessons are herein given with a bit of the Morepork's warbling-on about writs. Commentary appearing at the end of each lesson has been graciously supplied by (reviewer) and has largely ignored the topic of the writs.

Copyright Guff

## Lesson I

The theory behind the message of Al Gore's *Inconvenient Truth* is that the Earth would be considerably cooler were it not for the greenhouse gases in our atmosphere. One may nevertheless pour cold water on the idea that the greenhouse effect could have any appreciable effect on Earth's surface temperature. Possibly we need some fresh understanding on the manifold nature of enthalpy.

Enthalpy in the wider sense includes thermodynamic potential attributed out of faith in the law of the conservation of energy. If a quantity of sensible heat energy is converted to another form of energy then even though the route back to heat may appear convoluted and uncertain, yet we may attribute thermodynamic potential to the new holder of the energy. In this sense, wind has enthalpy. We may suppose the thermodynamic potential, or enthalpy, of the wind is garnered from the translational kinetic energy of molecules of gas in the atmosphere after such energy passes through a phase in gravitational potential.

Translational kinetic energy is however a concept with hooks. Therefore let us begin by putting the spotlight on Surprised Owl of [www.workenergytheorem.com](http://www.workenergytheorem.com). The Surprised Owl has made an eloquent case for mechanical energy to be measured in an unconventional way. His case for the measure of bobs is replete with mathematical equations. Understanding the case is nevertheless quite easy. To go from an understanding of Owl's case to an understanding of why Owl is wrong and why the conventional wisdom is right, we need to revisit certain experiments which laid the foundation stones for our science of energy. Surprised Owl offers us a way to cut our teeth in the mode of a public defender.

An inspector of a works, for example, must approach certain arguments with a generous measure of critical scientific thought. An inspector of works is a defender of the public interest by ensuring that appropriate standards of science are truly at work in the design and execution of a project.

Before the foundation experiments of Joule, Newton had left us, on the one hand, his three fundamental laws of motion and, on the other hand, his law of gravity wherein masses do attract each other. Joule's experiments sought to put diverse forms of energy on a common footing. He set about converting them to heat energy in water. It worked for the conventional mechanical energy we measure in kilograms-metre-squared-per-second-squared because doubling the mechanical energy input would double the heat energy output, and so on. These and many subsequent experiments have ensured that conventional mechanical energy is indeed involved in the conservation of energy principle so widely acknowledged in science.

Do all the forces of mechanics pertain to the work energy theorem then? Let us initially take in just one of my points against the argument of the Surprised Owl. Let us assume we have graduated to an understanding of the conventional work energy theorem wherein the force of attraction or repulsion between two bodies is integrated over a distance rather than multiplied by a distance as in Owl's elementary level summation. Then let us ask whether the Moon's force of gravitational pull on a molecule or volume element of tidal water is one force or whether instead rather it is

the resultant of two or more forces. For if it is the latter, then it may be that our experiments to date have only connected one of the them with the ability to do work and deliver energy.

***Work-Energy Theorem (In the Dimension of the Line between Two Bodies)***

$$W = \int_{x_0}^x F dx = \int_{x_0}^x mv \frac{dv}{dx} dx = \int_{v_0}^v mv dv = \frac{1}{2} mv^2 - \frac{1}{2} mv_0^2$$

Could the  $F$  here be the resultant of two or more forces? But if one of them were to be incapable of doing work, then the integration of  $F$  entire would not be true enough for most energy contexts and we would have to separate out the component forces before getting a meaningful integral.

One of the pointers that suggest two or more rather than one: we have not been able to detect the transmission of gravitational energy in the deep space of which there is plenty enough between the Moon and the Earth. This and other pointers suggest the existence of an envelope around the Earth, let us say about coincident with the tropopause for the sake of the argument. The tropopause is indicated by the fact that the atmosphere is well-mixed in the troposphere but not well-mixed in the stratosphere above. However let us not be too certain about where it is.

Surprised Owl likes a reader to meander through the whole of his argument about the beauty of bobs in measuring mechanical energy. That's why he's arranged his website so that only one succeeding page - the next one he wants you to see - is linked from where you are. Eventually you can make it to the page on the Cart Experiment where the Owl asks a question about kinetic energy in relation to chemical energy. So much chemical energy makes the cannonball go so fast. You can turn the cannonball speed into its kinetic energy using the standard formula (involves cannonball mass and square of speed) but if you fire the cannon from a moving platform (the Cart) then the cannonball's change of kinetic energy is greater (c.f. when you fired the cannon from a stationary platform) even though the chemical energy converted by the cannon is no different. Owl wants one to think that this result makes nonsense out of the conventional formulae for mechanical energy.

To answer Owl one may firstly observe that the underlying study for the work-energy theorem is a study of two bodies under the impact of a force that either pushes them apart or draws them together. One concludes then that transformations placing multiple bodies in an arbitrary coordinate system will introduce some notional kinetic energies. Assuming one wishes to read meaning generally into the quantity that is half-mass-times-speed-squared, one may have to allow that part of the kinetic energy of a mass is only notional energy.

Leaving to one side the translational kinetic energy of molecules in heat, for this may be an exception to the need for the notion of kinetic energy to have a two-or-more-bodies-in-a-system context, we must yet encounter the principle of centres of mass to

clear up a conundrum further on down the road from Owl's Cart Experiment. In another cart experiment, the cart may have two cannons. Cannonballs may be fired simultaneously, one in the forward direction and one in the rear direction. If the cart is moving to begin with, let us suppose from the application of a motive force, then this subsequent experiment is also a multiple-system context. One system involves the cart and the rail. We may wish to know the effect of the cannon firing on this base system but its elements have come apart with the firing. Some of the weight of the cart has been sent forth as cannonballs flying.


The analysis of the base system may naturally set the rail speed as zero m/s. The rail is then stationary and so the kinetic energy in the base system is given by the speed and mass of the cart including its cannonball freight. If we treat each part of the cart's mass separately to its own kinetic energy calculation, then add them up to get the total, we will find that cart in the base system has gained energy by the dual cannon-firing. However, this is not the result we want and so we come to the principle of centres of mass. We apply the work-energy theorem as between centres of mass, so it is the speed of the centre of mass that counts.

Using the principle of centres of mass, the base system in the above experiment has gained no energy by the firing, assuming the cart centre of mass continues moving along the rail with speed unaffected by the firing. Each of the cannons and their cannonballs represent additional systems in which chemical energy has been converted into kinetic energy. Each defines a relative displacement - projectile relative to launch means - for the work-energy theorem purposes.

In Owl's Cart Experiment, the cart goes off to the left and the cannonball to the right. Analysing this in accordance with the ideas outlined above, there is one system in which the rail relates to the centre of mass cannonball-cart. There is another system in which the cannonball relates to the cart. How do we know where to pin the hypothetically stationary point in the latter system? This is a matter for an apportionment of work.

Owl's cart is not fixed on the rail and so we expect there will be motion of the cart on the rail after the cannon firing as well as motion of the cannonball. Work will have been done both on the cart and on the cannonball. Indeed the coordinate system for the work-energy theorem is not just any coordinate system, but one for which the place of the stationary origin is decided by apportioning the relative velocities of the bodies, so that work, if necessary, can appear to have been done on them both. Of course in a case where the cart is fixed on the rail, we may well decide that no work will be done on the cart and so all of the relative velocity of cannonball will appear in the coordinate velocity of the same.

Turning now to the Joule experiments, we may seek to find an application for the work-energy theorem in considering how much energy is imparted by a falling weight.



From this archive drawing, we may guess that Joule calculated the gravitational energy given by a mass in falling through a height  $h$  as  $mgh$ , where  $g$  is the acceleration due to gravity and  $m$  is the mass in kilograms. (The  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  variables of the drawing were dimensioned in newtons force.) This formula assumes that  $g$  is constant over the height of falling and while that is not strictly true, the deviation is small enough to make such an assumption workable.

Now equating  $mg$  with Newton's gravitational force we have as follows.  $G$  is Newton's gravitational constant and  $M$  is the mass of the Earth.

$$\int_{r_0}^r mgdr = \int_{r_0}^r \frac{GMm}{r^2} dr = -\frac{GMm}{r_0} + \frac{GMm}{r}$$

As  $r > r_0$ , this expression for work done is inevitably negative in value. This reflects the convention that the force of gravity does negative work on an object that is lifted against the force. In falling from radius  $r$  back to radius  $r_0$ , a weight would receive positive work from gravity and with suitable allowances for losses this work could be made to reappear in the heat energy of water. Applying the law of the conservation of energy leads to the view that the negative work of gravity in the lifting phase represents an investment of energy in the gravitational potential.

Now let us consider an example application. Let us analyse the third-stage Apollo 11 Saturn Rocket with Lunar Module and Command Service Module - total weight 165,800 kg. The rocket fires firstly to increase the orbit radius from the parking orbit radius and secondly for the translunar injection. The rocket is discarded when the radius achieves about thirteen thousand kilometres. These radii are measurements to the centre of mass of the Earth and the parking orbit radius is the orbit altitude plus the radius of the Earth, a total of approximately 6590 km. In this example, we seek to calculate the negative work of the force of gravity whereupon questions may be posed about the investment of real energy it may or may not represent.

Let us confine our attention to the negative work of gravity on the combination of Command Service Module and Lunar Module. Let us forget the work done on the rocket. The two modules together weighed approximately  $46.8 \times 10^3$  kg. Let us

consider the negative work done on these modules over the distance between the parking orbit and the Moon. (I have used the figure of 380,000 km for the distance from Earth's centre of mass to the Moon. Readers will see that an approximation is in order; the lunar orbital radius of the Command Service Module is of little account.)

$$GMm = 6.67 \cdot 10^{-11} \cdot 5.98 \cdot 10^{24} \cdot 46.8 \cdot 10^3 \text{ joule - metre}$$

$$GMm = 1.87 \cdot 10^{19} \text{ joule - metre}$$

$$\therefore \frac{-GMm}{r_0} + \frac{GMm}{r} = \frac{-1.87 \cdot 10^{19}}{6.59 \cdot 10^6} + \frac{1.87 \cdot 10^{19}}{3.8 \cdot 10^8} = -2.79 \cdot 10^{12} \text{ joule}$$

How much weight could be lifted to the tropopause with this amount of energy? Neglecting air resistance, it turns out about  $1.38 \cdot 10^7$  kg, i.e. about two hundred and ninety times the combined weight of the modules. It is quite a substantial quantity of energy. After considering the energy-releasing capacity of the fuel on board the S-IVB rocket and weighing-in the energy wastage to heat, we may well pause to wonder about the two-part force theory for gravity. It proposes to develop the above-mentioned distinction between notional and real energies by adding the following hypothesis: the kinetic energies of the heavenly bodies in the frame of the fixed stars are notional only and accordingly the gravitational potential energies are notional only in so far as they add to and subtract from such kinetic energies. Real energy investment in gravitational potential runs out, when body separates from mother body, after the energy basins of the bodies have separated. Each heavenly body has a local basin. It contains the energy that is available to fund the actions of gravity.

The existence of such a basin and the consequent division of the long-range gravitational force into two parts has no doubt played upon the imaginations of many scientists in the past. The force of the Moon upon the volume element of tidal water is accordingly the sum of (1) a force representing the tendency of the basin envelope to accelerate towards other envelopes of its kind in the frame of the fixed stars and (2) a force representing work upon the mass inside the envelope. In a planetary system, because the direction of the latter force is always changing, although it may be capable of delivering energy nevertheless it can also be conservative. If nature has arranged for the energy delivered to be returned, then energy deliverances can be kept up ad infinitum, from a store of energy that is strictly limited.

To be sure, science has moved on from the Joule experiments. However it has not killed off the two-part force theory pertaining to the long-range gravitational forces. Marine turbines that rely on the Moon's pull of gravity have been pumping energy into the electricity grids of Man. Where indeed has it all been coming from?

In the next article we will consider a new version of the two-part force theory in which the envelope for each heavenly body is the periphery of the permebasin for the body. A permebasin is a region of space in which the magnetic permeability basins out and makes a bond between the space-time curvature and the mass inside. Without being the agent sole, it fits. The orbital process of an electron around a nucleus can be understood as embodying a response whereby the net external gravitational pull on the permebasin becomes a signal inside the atom. Atoms free to follow their own

signals will respond more easily to the permebasin work than atoms which are bound to others and hence must compromise with the others bound. Tidal water responds more easily than the terra firma underneath.

This new theory introduces the possibility that physics may finally part with the Einstein symmetry principle, without necessarily repudiating the tensor equation of General Relativity. We will see that the Schrödinger variation problem does not require the Lorentz transformation invariance that sent the wave function into the abstract in furtherance of Einstein symmetry. There will be many further delights for theorists that have grappled with the paradigm of Special Relativity but we will try to keep to the pace of a general readability, to go for something reasonably easy to assimilate. Part of the target audience is a group anxious about global warming and very keen for officials to be motivated, inspired and keen.

In relation to the merits of the proposition that the greenhouse effect is causing global warming, I write as one who sees two theories about global warming. Each claims a cause in the error of Man. The theory of the greenhouse effect requires that a tiny portion of the atmosphere is playing catastrophic havoc with the climate. As a punting bird placing a bet, if my own feeling has anything to say about it, I will back a more cogent theory if there is one available.



## 2015 NZ Defence White Paper Public Submission

## 1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

To be blunt, perhaps the greatest threat to New Zealand's security is the complacency of our politicians with respect to Defence. Not any particular person or party, but in general. They simply fail to think or act strategically in the country's best interests; too often they put their own short-term interests first. The subject of Defence receives little attention (and perhaps attracts even fewer votes): for such an important function of government, it doesn't even merit its own select committee (having to compete for oxygen with Foreign Affairs and Trade). Major decisions seem to be made based on 'sticker shock' rather than any sound policy or grand strategy.

It's now gone beyond simply bad management, now words such as incompetence & negligence seem more appropriate. I think that if the politicians were supervising children or animals, they would likely be in jail. The problem goes right to the top, to cabinet & ministerial level. The advice from the Defence Force & Ministry of Defence usually remains sound enough, but is ignored. Too much reliance is placed on Treasury advice considering how unreliable their forecasts are. The Ministry of Defence though, is often guilty of providing solutions to match the money rather than the requirement, compounding our problems when the solutions fail to last or to meet our needs. In addition, our politicians are partial to tokenism (for example: the recent commitment of troops to Iraq. We couldn't have made a worse decision if we had tried).

Underfunding continues to be a major problem. We have been underspending on Defence for the last 25 years. Looking at the state of our Defence Force today, it is plain to see that spending of the order of 1% of GDP has never been enough (even that figure is inflated by the Capital Charge). Our major equipment is old & worn out. Yet we nearly broke the Defence Force after the last White Paper looking for further 'savings' so that the government could try to claim a surplus (it failed), even though we already spend much less on Defence per person than other nations (about half of what Australia & the UK spend, a quarter of the US). Things have been allowed to glide-along, much as the EQC fund was allowed to glide-along for too long. When we need to make a claim on our Defence Force, it is likely we will find ourselves under-insured, just like we have found with EQC in the Christchurch earthquake.

We face a worse (and still worsening) global strategic situation compared to five years ago. A major feud is developing between the USA and China (one, our region's military hegemon for the past 70 years, and the other now our greatest trading partner). We no longer can claim that we live in a 'benign strategic environment'. Our trade routes through Asia have seen much re-militarisation recently – while not a full-blown arms race, there is plenty of cause for concern (eg. the region is now teeming with submarines).

While NZ faces a very low probability of a direct military threat, a serious challenge remains our unpreparedness to withstand an economic shock which may come through a disturbance in the globalised maritime trading system. This shock may be caused by something that NZ has no part in or control over. We are a maritime nation, almost all of our trade comes and goes by sea. However, little tonnage is directly under NZ's control. Much of it passes through the South China Sea, an area now under increased tension. Our strategic oil reserves held in-country are less than the recommended levels (I believe 6 weeks as against 3 months supply), with much of the rest in Japan (not well placed). This situation needs to be rectified. We should increase our oil storage within NZ, and look for ways to boost control over local shipping. Protectionism is probably an anathema to the current government, but consider this: The USA still has its Jones Act (1920) protecting its

local shipping & shipbuilding industry; Britain owes her naval strength to the protection her merchant fleet received as far back as the days of Oliver Cromwell (the Navigation Ordinance of 1651). Perhaps we should emulate what other maritime nations do rather than follow free-market ideology.

We have allowed ourselves (yet again) to get into a desparate position where we require a major Defence re-equipment programme (most of our Air Force & Navy requires replacement over the next 15 years) at a time our economy is struggling, rather than maintaining a steady spend over say a 30-year cycle. Such a significant programme compressed into such a short timeframe may very well fail, due to the short-term thinking and election-cycle focus of our politicians. It is now likely that another major capability loss will occur. The situation facing the Defence Force now is worse than the one it faced in the late 1980's with the block obsolescence of our frigates or the late 1990's & early 2000's, which led to the disbandment of the Air Combat Force and the cancellation of the third ANZAC frigate. Any economist will tell you that Defence inflation is higher than normal inflation, so postponement in Defence procurement actually puts a future government and the country in a worse position.

There is a growing need for EEZ enforcement. We have a very large area to patrol, but only very limited resources and a small population to fund our efforts. There is a need to keep on top of Illegal, Unreported & Unregistered (IUU) fishing. It is only in the last ten years that EEZ enforcement has been taken seriously, considering that the EEZ was declared in 1978.

The threat from illegal immigration to NZ (ie. boat people) is probably overestimated (although it is commonly used as a political scaremongering tactic). Generally the boats don't seem seaworthy enough to reach NZ.

Destabilisation in the South Pacific & South-West Pacific continues to be a concern. We should be prepared to mount another operation the size of the one to East Timor, and be able to sustain such an operation.

Related to increased globalisation is the now elevated need for cyber-security. Much trade & infrastructure now depends on the internet. The physical security of the submarine communication cables that support this are also of increased importance (before you laugh too hard, bear in mind that submarine cables have been attacked in the past, most sucessfully: probably the most famous incidences are the actions of the United States Navy auxiliary cruiser St Louis, isolating Cuban communications in the Spanish-American War of 1898).

Recent government intelligence actions have eroded NZ's independence and harmed our good character with both China & the Pacific Islands. There is now an increased terrorism risk, particularly 'home grown' terrorism, as recently seen in Australia, due to the government commitment of troops to Iraq. It is disappointing to see NZDF troops used as political pawns like this, to curry favour with trade partners (whatever country they are deployed to seems to be of little importance). Worrying from a terrorism perspective is our now complete inability (without using a frigate) to deal with an air threat: the Mistral surface-to-air missiles have been removed from service; we don't even have the Aermacchis anymore. It would be prudent to have at least a basic air-policing capability (even if just for security when we host major international sporting events).

Finally, global warming is an increasing threat. This will result in more dynamic weather systems & sea level rise, leading to an increased frequency of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions, mass migration, and a higher probability of failed states. Already in the Pacific there are issues eg. salt-water contamination in Bougainville.

2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?
- The Defence White Paper Public Consultation Document and the recently released Defence Assessment do a good job of covering this topic. However, I feel it is important to point out that these changes are mostly unpredictable – it is the ones you don't see coming that cause the problems. For example, a year ago who would have said we would have a company-size force in Iraq? Or, in 2000, who would have believed we would have had a commitment in Afghanistan for more than 10 years?
  - Overall, the global strategic situation has worsened since the last Defence White Paper in 2010. Particularly worrying has been the recent militarisation of the dispute between China & the USA. For example:
    - China building military defences on atolls in the South China Sea
    - US provoking China with flights & freedom of navigation passages
    - China declaring an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), and the bullying tactics of her coastguard forces
    - the rhetoric from the US Pacific fleet, and the US Air-Sea Battle strategy.
  - There are very nationalistic tensions between the nations in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. It could easily spill over into violence. At the heart of the dispute is the ambiguity in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) where so many nations have overlapping EEZ claims. The Mediterranean Sea must have similar issues – how did those nations sort it out?
  - North Korea remains a dangerous wildcard
  - A resurgent & militaristic Russia will increase tensions, primarily in Europe, but perhaps also in East Asia & the Arctic.
  - Piracy will continue to be a problem (although it seems to have eased somewhat in the Malacca Strait).
  - Failed States continue to be an issue eg Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, Libya. Interventions from Western forces have initially been successful in removing the incumbent leadership, but lack of follow-on support (exacerbated by financial woes) has led to chaos and often made things worse. Now there is fear amongst the major powers of committing ground troops and a belief that somehow the problems can be bombed into submission (they won't).
  - NZ's seat on the UN Security Council is already having an effect on our government. For example, our commitment of troops to Iraq. This mission seems to combine the worst aspects of the US intervention in Vietnam, circa 1964 (ie advisors only, a policy that more bombing is the answer) and our commitment to Bosnia in the mid-1990's – a time when we also held a Security Council seat (we sent under-equipped troops under the pretence that we 'felt we needed to be seen to be doing something').

As to what this means for the NZDF, I think it highlights the need to be flexible and well-equipped. We have a tendency to commit forces too quickly and under-equipped for the situations they are placed in (eg. The obsolete radios & the M113 in Bosnia; having to use Humvees in Afghanistan; no mine-protected vehicles for Iraq). Sometimes our people have been under-trained as well (ie some of the later rotations to Afghanistan, trying to save money). As we are generally under-equipped, we should try to avoid being first in, we should wait until the situation has cooled to a level best described as peace-keeping, not peace-enforcement (ie UN Chapter VI, rather than Chapter VII). If we must go in to a peace-enforcement situation, the government should maintain a sizeable fund for Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) equipment. Each mission is different, it is unlikely we will have the correct gear on hand. The ability to adapt is the key. We also need to ensure that the NZDF

maintains sufficient mass to sustain missions.

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3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

In general, I am happy with the roles that the Defence Force do now, as they are currently defined. The major problem is that the Defence Force has lost the critical mass it needs to perform them. Our forces are under-manned and under-equipped for the roles expected of them. There is much made in Ministry of Defence documents of maintaining credible combat capabilities (the so-called 'credible minimum'). I'm sorry, but combat credibility left the building some time ago. If the recent Vanuatu operation is anything to go by, serious questions need to be asked about our ability to perform even the HA/DR role.

Even since the last Defence White paper, some roles have disappeared, for example, the Army's Air Defence function. Others have been or soon will be 'gapped' – e.g. the Navy's hydrography & diving support. In many roles, expected performance targets have not been met – due to lower aircraft or ship readiness because of maintenance, upgrades or personnel shortfalls (eg. Hercules, Orions, Seasprites, NH90 all below targetted flight hours, IPVs & OPV laid-up, HMNZS Canterbury remediation, Frigate upgrades). Reserve forces have also been severely downgraded.

Following are my thoughts on the roles NZDF should perform:

In Peacetime:

- HA/DR work within NZ & the South Pacific (using HMNZS Canterbury). Small contingents may participate in HA/DR operations further afield.
- Antarctic support
- Training & Exercises with allies and regional partners
- Assistance to other government departments eg. SAR helicopters, maritime patrol, EEZ monitoring, Customs & Police support.
- Assistance to other governments, particularly in the South Pacific, for resource monitoring.
- Maintain Reserve forces.
- I would like to see a basic air-policing role restored (ie a jet-trainer with infrared missiles, something like the Korean KAI TA-50 would suit)

Peace-keeping

- our larger missions have tended to be bordering on UN Chapter VII (peace-enforcement) rather than Chapter VI (peace-keeping). Our forces have been found to be often under-equipped for such missions (eg. Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq). Either we need to pick the missions we contribute to more carefully, or we need to upgrade our forces
- We should keep our commitments aligned with the 'concentric ring' plan (as outlined in the Public Consultation Document). It seems too often this plan is ignored – lately our major commitments have been in the 'global' category (Afghanistan, Iraq).
- We should try to make sure our forces are more self-sufficient, especially regards protection. This may, to take an army example, be as simple as ensuring a company group carries it's own artillery (60mm mortar), direct fire support (some form of recoilless rifle), and protected mobility (MRAP vehicles).
- In terms of a maximum effort, a sustained commitment of a battalion group like we sent to East Timor seems appropriate.
- Our smaller missions (less than company size) continue to work well. Generally these are genuine peace-keeping (UN Chapter VI).

War-fighting:

- NZDF are no longer prepared for this role at all. We remain woefully under-equipped. Our

Forces are not credible. Even Reserve forces have been decimated. I would estimate that, even under conditions of total war, it would take several years to train & equip NZ forces to a sufficient standard for combat.

- Roles that need improvement for NZDF to undertake a war-fighting function:
  - Naval Combat Force: At least 3 frigates, each with anti-ship missiles, a towed array sonar & an anti-aircraft missile of Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) capability or better.
  - A combat support vessel, similar to the Royal Australian Navy vessel HMAS Success (ie. An AOR).
  - Mine warfare & anti-submarine vessels (these are still the most likely threats in home waters).
  - Armour & Combat Engineering capabilities to provide close support to the Army (of the order of 3-5 tracked vehicles per infantry company). To be successful, a combined-arms capability is required.
  - Expanded Artillery capabilities.
  - A real Air Force. Currently we have only an Air Service (I'm not trying to be rude or offensive; it is what it is).

In the last couple of years the NZDF has developed a new strategy, principally under the auspices of former CDF Lt. Gen. Rhys Jones, based around a Joint Amphibious Task Force role. I think it is an excellent strategy, but I feel I need to raise a warning. There appears to be a growing gap between the stated strategy and the funds, resources & equipment being provided by the government to support it. If we are going to stick with this strategy, we need to buy gear that will do the job. If not, maybe it's time to find a new strategy. Specific examples where the JATF is failing:

- the centrepiece of the JATF is the amphibious ship HMNZS Canterbury. Yet, due to the design compromises made as a result of the meagre budget allocated to purchase this vessel, it can only operate its landing craft and helicopters in very sheltered conditions. To me, it is a vessel that is quite likely to let you down when you most need it. Perhaps in the recent Vanuatu operation we saw just such a failure in the operations around the Shepherd Islands, Makura & Mataso. A vessel with a well-dock, and that can operate medium helicopters (of SH-60, NH90 size or larger) at sea should have been procured. A vessel similar in design to HMAS Choules (perhaps slightly smaller) seems appropriate. Considering the valuable cargo the HMNZS Canterbury is to carry, a minimum defensive armament of a CIWS seems sensible.
- The Naval Combat Force frigates have been assigned a convoy escort role in the JATF. The selection of the Sea-Ceptor missile is not an acceptable choice for this role. Sea-Ceptor is an excellent anti-missile defence for self-protection of the ship mounting it, but the role requires the frigate to provide protection to other vessels as well as itself. A longer ranged missile (such as ESSM) is needed. Additionally, the frigates lack modern ASW systems such as a towed array sonar, and will have no anti-ship missile other than the helicopter mounted Penguin (a rarity itself in the USN now). This is a ridiculous state of affairs for a 21<sup>st</sup> century navy (anti-ship missiles have been a standard armament on frigates for 40 years). Even the 3rd-rate frigate of the French Navy (the Floreal class) is better equipped in this regard than our navy.
- Too greater demands have been placed on the single future Littoral Operations Support Capability (LOSC) vessel. Not only is this vessel expected to conduct both local hydrographic & diving support missions (previously separate vessels), but also expected to be available to dash across the ocean to support the JATF. I feel this is unrealistic – one ship can only be in one place at a time.
- The specification issued for the Maritime Sustainment Capability (MSC, the HMNZS

Endeavour replacement) in the recent tender calls for only a fleet tanker (an AO). This will supply mostly fuels (and a very limited number of goods in containers). This would appear to be the wrong type of vessel. To support the JATF, a combat supply vessel (an AOR) similar to that specified by Australia under its Project SEA1654 Phase 3 is warranted. This type of ship will supply also dry cargo & armaments in addition to fuels. We should join the Australian project. The MSC vessel is probably the most important vessel in our fleet – logistics support is the key ability required in the Pacific.

Finally, Defence documents state that compatibility with Australia is a key consideration for NZDF procurement. Recent evidence (eg frigate weapons upgrade selections, Seasprite helicopters) would seem to contradict this.

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4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

Immediate Territory:

- increased demand for HA/DR missions due to global warming ie higher frequency of flooding, drought, bushfire.
- increased need for cyber-security
- challenges brought on by underfunding & loss of capability ie high personnel attrition, the gapping of hydrography & diving support. I would also like to see a basic air-policing capability restored.
- Possible 'home grown' terrorism. This should remain the responsibility of NZ Police, but NZDF support may be required eg. Armoured vehicle support to siege in Napier, special forces counter-terrorism squad.
- Possible, but very unlikely, illegal migration issues (ie boat people).

EEZ & Continental Shelf:

- increased IUU fishing & other resource management enforcement
- protection of offshore facilities (ie oil platforms)

Territory of the Realm (ie Cook Islands, Niue):

- increased IUU fishing
- a need for increased NZ presence (OPVs & maritime patrol aircraft) & HA/DR work.
- Assistance with Australian run Pacific Patrol Boat programme. Should we consider basing our unused IPV's in the Cooks? They would probably need to be subsidised by NZ.
- Loss of NZ Influence due to influx of Asian development aid & recent actions of the NZ Government (ie Five Eyes) that have broken trust.

Ross Dependency:

- increased IUU fishing. Note, this area is outside of our EEZ, we would only have jurisdiction over vessels flagged to countries subject to the CCAMLR treaty.
- increased marine traffic (fishing, tourism) leading to higher demand for Search & Rescue (perhaps an icebreaking capability required)
- Access to McMurdo & Scott Base. Currently this relies on a single 38-year-old USCG polar icebreaker. Replacement is as yet unfunded (US 1 billion per vessel).
- Need for a longer ranged aircraft to support Antarctic operations (eg. A400M or C-17) if a policy of avoiding a point-of-no-return is adopted. Such an aircraft should have some form of tactical landing capability in case it needs to land at an alternate airfield.
- Given US economic woes, should a lesser US presence in Antarctica or perhaps even a complete pull-out be planned for. There have been several instances since the sequestration where this has nearly occurred. Such an eventuality would undoubtedly see NZ Antarctic operations collapse as well.



5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

I think the concentric circle model as outlined in the Defence Assessment is the correct one. Primary focus should be NZ, then Australia & the South Pacific, Antarctica, then the rest of the world. Unfortunately this seems to have been ignored, even turned on its head by recent governments. For example, in the last 10 years our major commitments have been to Afghanistan & Iraq, and our major foreign policy achievement has been a seat on the UN Security Council.

That said, the NZDF is an expeditionary focussed force. We live in a maritime nation in a globalised world. The best way for NZ to help maintain peace is to be proactive and engaged (call it a forward defence model if you like). What we do need to avoid is becoming entangled in a situation too big for us just to please a friend, partner or ally. Looking for opportunities where we can commit naval forces rather than army might help (it being much easier to just sail away).

I would like to see more focus given to preparing NZ to withstand an economic shock. For example, a larger in-country oil reserve, perhaps incentives to have more shipping in NZ ownership and a more vibrant shipbuilding industry (concentrating on fishing vessels & maybe in time OPVs).

We have been guilty of letting our capabilities slip below an acceptable standard, both internationally and domestically. Internationally, reasonable deployment efforts would be up to an army battalion group (as a maximum), one frigate always available, and the air transport capability. For that we need 3 infantry battalions, 3 frigates (with a proper weapons fit too), and at least 3 strategic airlift aircraft (A400M or larger). Domestically, we need to rebuild lost capabilities, eg. The Reserve Forces, the hydrographic capability, and to field a replacement for the Andover tactical transport aircraft.

We claim that Australia is our most important defence partner / ally. My impression is that Australia no longer values NZ's contribution – because it is so weak. In a recent book by Australian National University academics on Australia's future defence (Australia's Defence: Towards a New Era?), NZ barely rates a mention (and then only disparagingly cf. The Road to Wellington - “security through obscurity”). It seems NZ is now lumped in with the lesser South Pacific nations in Australian eyes. If we are looking for priorities, perhaps we need to work on this relationship.

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interest?

I am pretty happy with what the Defence Force does already in this respect. Most of the NZDF's equipment (and often personnel) has been pressed into service in all-of-government support roles at some stage. What should not be forgotten is that such usage is not the primary purpose of the people or equipment, though it may be the most common one, and the most familiar to the wider public. The Christchurch earthquake showed the NZDF's value in HA/DR operations. What is worrying is the decline in availability in Defence Force equipment in recent years due to the age of the equipment, gapping of capability, reduction in number of platforms – it doesn't help them to support all-of-government taskings. The Navy has in recent times taken on a lot more of this all-of-government work (something that was well overdue), but the Air Force seems in desperate need of a boost to continue it's work in this area.

The Navy's role in EEZ management is finally getting sorted (which should have been done properly when the EEZ was declared in 1978). The National Maritime Co-ordination Centre (NMCC) is still fairly new – it needs more time to bed in. I think that the requirements for the naval patrol fleet, as laid out in the Maritime Forces Review (2002), should be seen as a wish-list. In the current economic climate, the needs seem to have been scaled back substantially.

The P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft are nearly 50 years old. Recently, they have been struggling to meet their targetted hours for EEZ Patrol. When the Andovers were retired in 1998, the tactical transport capability wasn't replaced. To assist with all-of-government / paramilitary tasks, a single aircraft type (ie a medium twin-turoprop such as an Airbus C295 or Alenia C-27J) could be acquired and put to good use in both these roles – as a 'jack of all trades'. Primarily such an aircraft would be used for shorter-range coastguard-style maritime patrol, but if it had a modular fitout, the same aircraft could have a secondary transport role. It may even be possible to have a third fitout – that of firefighter / waterbomber – but only if it doesn't detract from the other fitout options. A further benefit would be as a backup option during the inevitable availability reductions that will occur as the Hercules & Orion squadrons replace their aircraft in the 2020's.

With the retirement of the UH-1 (Huey) helicopters, I believe that the Air Force no longer has enough suitable helicopters to properly support all-of-government work. The A109's cabin is too small to be useful for Army work and the fleet of 5 is only really large enough to support the flight training programme; the NH90 is too big, too expensive to operate, and there are too few; the Seasprites will likely be consumed by naval taskings (a useful rule-of-thumb is that you want 3 helicopters per active tasking – so a total of 8 Seasprites will only allow 3 to be sustained at-sea at one time – we will have at least 6 helicopter capable ships in the Navy fleet). I suggest that to support all-of-government taskings (ie assistance to NZ Police, SAR, DoC) we should raise an additional helicopter squadron (say 6-8 aircraft, in most Air Forces it would be a flight rather a squadron) with an intermediate-size helicopter (4-6 tonne maximum takeoff weight) To be useful to army it needs to carry 4 crew (2 pilots, 2 crewmen) and up to 6 fully combat equipped troops & their gear (ie. a small patrol or a specialist weapons team) or alternatively, 10 passengers. It should be twin-engined, have a weather radar (we live in the land of the long white cloud), a rescue winch, glass cockpit, and to ease logistics it should be the military derivative of a common commercial helicopter. The new squadron should be based at Christchurch Airport (so that it can work closely with 2/1 Battalion at Burnham, there being no NZDF helicopters based in the South Island anymore). Ideally, it would also have a marinised airframe, wheeled undercarriage, a harpoon system to help with deck operations, and arrangements already made for arming with machine guns, light cannon or rocket pods. It could also supplement the Seasprites for OPV work as required. The Airbus AS565 Mbe Panther or Agusta-Westland AW139M (or AW169M) would be suitable candidates.

Now I would like to reverse the question and ask perhaps a more important one: how can the whole-of-government support the Defence Force?

One of the things that nations like the UK and the USA do much better than us is to ensure that there is in civilian hands equipment that it can call upon in an emergency. This equipment will be operated commercially until called upon. In addition to the civilian-manned Royal Fleet Auxiliary to support the Royal Navy Fleet, the UK also has ships in commercial service that it can call up – the Point class RO-RO ferries being a current example. These Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) were most famously used in the Falklands War of 1982. Similarly, the USA has a standing arrangement to use civilian airliners to transport its troops overseas – the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). NZ could make greater use of these concepts.

Currently the NZ government owns the KiwiRail Cook Strait Ferries. It has been fairly evident from the initial design requirements for the HMNZS Endeavour replacement that NZDF doesn't feel it has enough sealift capacity with just HMNZS Canterbury, yet it cannot justify the expense of another sealift vessel for the RNZN. Extra capacity could be provided by chartering a vessel from overseas, but that could take as long as 6 weeks to just get to NZ. A cleverer more strategic choice would be to have that extra capacity operating in NZ waters. The most obvious candidates would be to have one or more of the Cook Strait Ferries assigned to this role. Interestingly, a former Wellington-Lyttelton ferry (the SS Rangitira) actually served as a STUFT ship in the Falklands campaign (although it didn't arrive until the war was over).

This is something of a mad idea, but if taken to the extreme it might be an idea to actually design some amphibious features into the next new-build Cook Strait Ferry. For example, by taking a vessel like the HMAS Choules (a Bay class Landing Platform Dock) and civilianising it. It could retain the well dock and it's single landing craft. The superstructure would need major redesign but I wonder if it could be done. Ideally, it would have quick-change features. For example:

- a helicopter deck /sundeck (ie seating that could be quickly removed to create a flight deck)
- day cabins with hammocks for troop sleeping arrangements
- containerised extra toilet, shower & laundry facilities, along with extra fresh water generating capacity.
- Movie theater / briefing room.

In another example, the government could maintain extra airlift capacity by encouraging some of the smaller air freight operators (such as those operating old Convairs, Friendships etc) to adopt the same twin-engined turboprop that I proposed for the NZDF (the C295 or C27J). The encouragement would probably take the form of a financial incentive – the idea would be to avoid the Defence Force having to pay the Capital Charge on these extra aircraft. The advantage would be a larger pool of such aircraft and shared support costs. It could be possible to form these aircraft into some form of Air Force Reserve tactical airlift fleet (something sort-of halfway between the USA's Air National Guard and their CRAF) by requiring the pilots to undertake a few weekends a year of tactical training. It would only be expected that their aircraft would be required in the event of a domestic emergency.

Finally, if NZDF acquires a new strategic air transport capability (ie A400M or C-17), that will probably see the end of the Boeing 757s, and with it the end of the responsibility for NZDF to support VIP international flights. In which case, a CRAF-type arrangement for VIP travel and troop transport should be contracted with Air NZ. Domestic VIP travel can remain the duty of NZDF with the B200 Kingair and the A109.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

The NZDF provide the country's most readily available pool of manpower & equipment to assist in HA/DR missions. They have done excellent work in this capacity eg. The Christchurch earthquake response. But, it is not the NZDF's primary mission.

Roles that the NZDF can provide:

- air transport (rotary & fixed-wing)
- helicopter SAR
- engineering equipment & expertise
- amphibious ship
- surveying
- security & medical support
- logistics
- extra manpower (especially from reserves)

In some of these roles the NZDF's capacity must now be questioned due to under-resourcing (eg. The number of helicopters, loss of hydrographic capability, reserves decimated by restructuring, logistics support contracted-out)

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8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of NZ's youth?

I am happy with what the NZDF does now. I don't see a need to enhance such services as the Limited Service Volunteer scheme. I would like Cadet services to be maintained.

Finally, it is no good if the Defence Force is woefully underequipped – that's not going to inspire anyone to join.

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9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

In general, the NZDF needs equipment that is up to the task, and for that it needs proper funding. We need to stop buying one-offs and run-out specials that don't last or don't work properly (eg Seasprites, HMNZS Canterbury, the armoured Pinzgauer). For the future, NZDF needs to grow to gain critical mass – we have sunk below an acceptable minimum. If the government can remember one thing from this submission I want it to be the number 3 – we need 3 battalions of infantry, 3 frigates, a minimum of 3 strategic airlift aircraft.

#### Army

- 3 battalions infantry + reserves
- Infantry should be light infantry. If they have to have a specialisation they should use the Royal Marines as a model.
- The Infantry Company is likely to be the smallest combat formation we deploy. We need to make it as self-sufficient but also as foot-mobile as possible. We should adopt some US Army-style organisational structures within the company:
  - eg. a pair of general purpose machine-gun teams (with tripod for static fire) in a heavy weapons section at platoon level. Perhaps a RPG or Carl Gustav team in this section as well.
  - eg. a pair of 60-mm mortar teams in a Mortar section at Company level. These would mainly be for smoke, but could provide some HE if required. A 60-mm commando mortar should also be carried by Platoon HQ for emergencies.
- At Company level, I would like to add an Anti-Structure weapons section. This section would be equipped with a pair of recoilless rifles (perhaps resurrect the Korean war era 57mm M18A1, with a new HESH round & modern sights).
- Adopt an Anti-tank weapon designed for operation in enclosed spaces (to help with ambushes)
- the Grenade Machine Gun to be restricted to vehicle mounts and static emplacements. It is too hungry on ammunition, and both the weapon and it's ammunition are too heavy & bulky for dismounted use. Similarly the 12.7mm HMG should also be a vehicle-only weapon.
- Mine resistant vehicles for Chapter VII operations. To replace armoured pinzgauer. Probably need a smaller 4x4 scout (eg. Bae RG-32) and a larger 4x4 or 6x6 (eg Thales Bushmaster).
- Tracked amphibious vehicles as an alternate to the LAV III. Eg Bae Viking or ST Kinetics Broncho. It would seem a better vehicle for use in the South Pacific.
- On the wishlist: Tracked combat engineering / fire support vehicles, a modern version of the US M728 or Sherman 105mm tankdozer from Korea, but hopefully under 40 tons. Probably based on a IFV chassis eg CV-90. Bulldozer blade & maybe a crane. Slat armour. A medium-barrelled gun (75mm or larger, with excellent HE performance for use against buildings & troops), or maybe a 120mm mortar that could be direct-fired. As this would be the only real armoured vehicle in NZ service, it will have to take on anti-tank duties, so add a ATGW launcher like on the M2 Bradley, or if it has a 120mm mortar, STRIX ammunition. The role of this vehicle is to provide close-support to infantry, one troop (3-5 vehicles) per infantry company. The CV-90 prototype with the AMOS twin-120mm mortar would be a good starting point, with an accompanying automatic-cannon-armed variant to act as ammunition hauler.
- An Armour & Artillery school established (at Waiouru) to keep combined-arms skills up.

#### Navy

- Urgent: Adopt ESSM for frigate upgrade, even if only by installing the manually-reloaded Mk29 launcher abaft the 5-inch gun. An alternative would be to retain the Mk41 VLS. There needs to be a split in air defence between anti-aircraft and anti-missile missiles. Surface

combatant vessels need both types (as has already been seen on the German Type 123, and the Australian Perry class upgrades).

- Urgent: Join Australian SEA1654 Phase 3 project. We are buying the wrong ship under the MSC project to replace HMNZS Endeavour. We need an AOR, not just a fleet tanker. It needs substantial internal cargo space for fleet stores, food & ammunition – these preferably should not be in containers. In fact containers should generally be avoided (as they are difficult to unload without port access).
- Navy needs a larger helicopter than the Seasprite, in the ship-shore logistics & vertical replenishment roles, for the HMNZS Endeavour replacement and the HMNZS Canterbury. These need to be able to be embarked and operated at-sea. Government should investigate expanding 6 Squadron, with about six 10-15 ton helicopters. Either MH-60S, Merlin HC4 or NH90 (if it works).
- As a gap filler, ask the Royal Navy if 6 Squadron can host a flight of their soon-to-retire Sea-King HC4, similar to what is being done by the RAF under Project Seedcorn with 5 Squadron. Hopefully it could instill a little 'Junglie' ethos into our Air Force.
- Probably we will only get 10 years service from the new Seasprites (how old are the avionics?). I don't think it will be cost effective to upgrade the avionics for such a small unique fleet. Look to Agusta-Westland AW-159 Wildcat or Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk as a replacement.
- Purchase an additional ice-strengthened OPV for Southern Ocean patrol. Very strong consideration should be given to a much larger vessel (preferably bigger than a frigate) with excellent endurance and a light icebreaking capability (eg Norwegian Svalbard class, Canadian A/OPS, at a minimum Danish Thetis class). The ability just to maintain a presence would achieve a lot. The sea conditions in the Southern Ocean alone merit something larger than the Otago class OPV. It should be helicopter capable. Such a vessel would also have great potential as an emergency towing vessel.
- Purchase anti-ship missiles & towed array sonar for the frigates.
- Consider supplementing (or replacing) the LOSC vessel with two 1200 tonne minor war vessels. These would be for local hydrographic & diving support work. They would have modular payloads so that each vessel could take on either role, and together would provide a year-round capability for both roles. These ships would also double-up as mine-warfare training (not expected to be able to do the real thing) and seamanship training vessels (with an accommodation module). These would look like a cross between the French Navy's La Perouse class hydrographic vessels and the Canadian Kingston class MCDV. They would have the diesel-electric azipod propulsion, de-gaussing equipment & aft cargo deck of the MCDV, with the bow, hull, multi-beam echo sounder and bow-thruster of the La Perouse class. A pair of retractable fin stabilisers would help seakeeping during transits (though at approx 15 knots top speed the ship would only just cruise fast enough for them to be effective), and they should also have a tank stabiliser for when they are at anchor. NZ has had good value out of this size of ship in the past, from the Bird class minesweepers in WWII, through Bathurst class corvettes, the oceanographic ship HMNZS Tui and latterly the dive support vessel HMNZS Manawanui.
- Purchase boats for the Naval Reserve units of a similar size to the old Harbour Defence Motor Launch, and base them in each unit's local harbour. Reservists would start on the these boats, then fill positions on the IPVs and OPVs.
- If the 2 unused IPVs are not to be sold, consider basing them in Wellington, or the Cook Islands. The IPVs should concentrate their patrols in the arc from the Bay of Islands to the Bay of Plenty, and in the Wellington-Picton-Nelson triangle. This is where the majority of small craft operate. If Wellington, re-open Shelly Bay or consider relocating HMNZS Olphert to Queens Wharf.
- Three frigates to replace the ANZAC class by 2030. Preferably around 5000t full load

- displacement. Perhaps based on German Navy's Meko Type 123 hull.
- HMNZS Canterbury to be replaced at end of life by a Landing Platform Dock vessel with a well dock and capable of at-sea large helicopter operations.
- On the wishlist: If we wanted a decadal aspirational goal, join the USCG polar icebreaker programme for 1 ship (at least US 1 billion per vessel) and take over the McMurdo run (for a fee). John F. Kennedy famously once said 'we choose to go to the moon...not because it is easy, but because it is hard'. Well, NZ might not be able to go to the moon, but maybe we could go to McMurdo. This ship would double as the Southern Ocean Patrol vessel, replacing the 3<sup>rd</sup> OPV mentioned earlier.

#### Air Force

- The Air Force is critically in need of 2 additional squadrons of second tier 'jack of all trades' aircraft (one rotary, one fixed-wing, detailed below) that will help it through the next few years as much of its frontline fleet is replaced.
- Urgent: Purchase at least 4 twin-engined turboprop for a coastguard-style Maritime Patrol role with a secondary role as a tactical airlifter, similar to the USCG HC-144A or the Portuguese Air Force C295. It should have a modular MPA suite, a surface-search radar & EO/IR turret, and preferably a navigation radar. If feasible, I would recommend a firefighter / waterbomber payload as well. I suggest that a new squadron is formed for these aircraft, based at Whenuapai (that is where the expertise in both roles is based). It is important to have these aircraft at full operational capability before the Hercules & Orion replacements occur in the 2020's. Suitable aircraft would be the Airbus C295 or the Alenia C-27J. The tactical airlift role would be for within-NZ tasks (where it is wasteful to use a Hercules size aircraft), and perhaps to the Chathams or Norfolk Is, although the aircraft could be ferried up into the Pacific to operate from a base there if required.
- Urgent: Create a third helicopter squadron (maybe 6-8 aircraft) equipped with an intermediate sized helicopter (roughly 4-6t maximum take-off weight), preferably a military version of a common commercial helicopter. The aircraft needs to be twin-engined, have a weather radar and a rescue hoist, be marinised and be able to carry 2 pilots and 10 passengers (or 2 crewmen & 6 fully-equipped troops in addition to the pilots). These aircraft will support all-of-government taskings and also be used by Army to transport small teams. If it has wheeled undercarriage & a harpoon system, it could supplement the Seasprite for OPV taskings. May be armed with machine guns, light cannon and rocket pods for an improvised gunship role. Based at Christchurch Airport (RNZAF Harewood) to better support Burnham units.
- Urgent: At least 3 Strategic Lift aircraft (of A400M size or larger). These should have at least some tactical landing capability so that they have the option to land at alternate airfields in Antarctica. Replaces the Boeing 757s. Suitable aircraft include the Boeing C-17 ER, the Airbus A400M or the Kawasaki C-2. Needs to be able to lift the LAV III, and the NH90.
- At least 4 large tactical airlifters (eg C-130J or A400M). Preferably a turboprop (ie avoid C-390). I think going below C-130 size would be a mistake. There is a 1000nm first step (unless you count Norfolk Is) to overcome to reach Australia & the first set of islands in the Pacific.
- Air NZ to be contracted to provide international VIP services & charter flights for troop deployments if required (replacing Boeing 757).
- Ensure all helicopter pilots are trained for deck operations.
- Based on the 2011 Evaluation Report on the Seasprite, it seems there is a reluctance amongst 6 Squadron staff to serve aboard ship. Perhaps we need to instill a culture change (see 'Junglie ethos' above). Operating from a ship or out in the field should be second nature.
- I'm undecided on what the P-3 Orion replacement should be. Key requirements are long



range, a good cruise speed, and the ability to patrol economically at low level (it will most commonly be used for SAR). I would like to see it have Anti-Submarine & ISR capabilities. I'm not convinced on the P-8 Poseidon, Sea Hercules, or UAVs. Perhaps the Kawasaki P-1? Would prefer a new Orion.

- If the twin-turoprop tactical airlifter mentioned above is acquired, then create an incentive scheme for the smaller civilian air-freight operators (ie those still using Convairs & Friendships) to also adopt this aircraft, in order to create a larger support base. I'm not sure what form such an incentive should take, but the goal would be to avoid the NZDF having to pay the capital charge on the aircraft. It may be possible, as a conditon placed on the pilots that accept the incentive, to build these aircraft into a reserve tactical airlift fleet. I envisage something halfway between the US Air National Guard and their civilian reserve air fleet, for use in national domestic emergencies.
- Investigate forming a small jet-trainer squadron (with a aircraft like the Korean KAI TA-50) to do basic air-policing, and for training with Army & Navy.
- No more A109s (the cabin is too small). Keep the current ones for training, liason work and VIP transport.

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## **DWP-0152**

Buy C-17s

## **DWP-0153**

Not such a grand idea...most people havnt a clue over Defence issues unless you have actually served.

## **DWP-0154**

Being back Fighter Jets Harriers would be ideal the marines are getting new planes they will probably give us the old ones, and a Amphibious Tracked Vehicle sell those useless LAV's

## **DWP-0155**

Our woman and our guys need more money new gear to protect them .there would be more money around if parliament stop giving them self pay raise . Spend more money on nzdf and new gear

## **DWP-0156**

I think that our army could change its focus from the roll of peace keeping to that of a civil defence army that is gear with a primary roll of engineering. We could not only be of huge help in our own country but we could offer a rapid response force to places like Nepal that need our help as well as helping our friends on the islands of the Pacific who are going to need more and more help with the sea level rising. We are naturally defended by distance and the forces that we send to help other countries with peace keeping a tiny on comparison with the US etc. It's like pissing on a forest fire. Would make nz look good too so that wouldn't hurt.

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## **DWP-0157**

NZ I believe needs to increase its Defence spending on its RNZN, ARMY and RNZAF to combat aggression in Russia, China, North Korea, Iran who have nuclear weapons at their disposal and they will use them to achieve their aims. One has only to read between the lines to see what those Countries already mentioned will do to those who are weak in defence. Join with the Australians on this and get modern equipment so that NZ can play it's part in defending it's shores and island territories!

## **DWP-0158**

MayB the Government do want to delete the Armed Forces & now the 2015 Defence White Paper has reappear/surfaced again! dam Pity could b to do with ALL the formers Cabinets Ministers (on both sides of the house) ALLOWED to take those trips round the world, which would mean NO money left

## **DWP-0159**

Well I know we want a lot of things but cant afford it. Why dont we merge our defece forces with Australia

## **DWP-0160**

How about actually spending some decent money on our defence...

## **DWP-0161**

Some New Rifles wouldn't go amiss. How about L85A2. change our marksmanship while we are at it

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**'How Dangerous is New Zealand's Strategic Environment & Does it Really Matter?'**

I would like to see the New Zealand government's 2015 Defence White Paper make at least nine major points about our strategic environment.

The **first** point is based around an argument from the 2014 Defence Assessment whose recent release is an important step in bringing transparency to this current defence policy making process. This is the argument that the chance of war in Asia has risen. As the Defence Assessment says accurately, however, this increase in probability is from a low base. Since the wars in Korea and Vietnam, Asia has experienced a remarkable period of four decades in which significant war involving one or more of the major powers has not been occurring. But the shifting distribution of power in the region, as China rises, America responds, Japan becomes nervous, and India also grows stronger is being accompanied by a greater risk of major power conflict. Such an event, which might be associated with problems on the troubled Korean peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait, in the East China Sea or further south in the South China Sea, could cause very serious damage to New Zealand's diplomatic, economic and strategic interests.

The **second** point means avoiding something in the same Defence Assessment where there is a fairly lengthy discussion about whether economic interdependence will be enough to prevent this growing chance of conflict from becoming a nasty reality. This poses a question we cannot hope to answer. Moreover if war is to be avoided, more than this interdependence will be required. And in any case the region does not face two clear alternatives: an Asia which successfully manages to avoid great power war and one which does not. Instead the White Paper needs to focus on the many uses of armed force which are occurring short of war, and which if mismanaged, could lead to conflict. This is the heavy reliance on coercion – displays of potential force of various kinds to achieve political influence.

I would like to see some direct coverage of the various versions of the phenomena. By this I do not simply mean China's greater ability and willingness in recent years to push its territorial case in both the East China and South China Seas through growing maritime deployments, the shadowing of other armed forces, and the pressure it has placed on Vietnam and the Philippines. Other are signaling too: the array of exercises which are occurring, including some lead by the United States (including some in which New Zealand has been involved) and the continuing surveillance of maritime environments close to the Chinese mainland. A good deal of the US pivot to Asia carries some of these

characteristics. We see it in Japan's offer to assist the Philippines with its growing maritime patrol requirements with a clear South China Sea context. It includes the increasing competition between China's steps to raise the costs of American military actions in North Asia, and US steps to counter this with the capacity to fight what has been called an air-sea battle. Correspondingly it is seen also in the strategic signaling going on as a range of regional countries, in Southeast Asia as well as North Asia and South Asia, and across the Tasman, build their capacities to project force above on and below the sea.

I would like to see in the White Paper a clear New Zealand statement of concern about this growing trend in what Thomas Schelling once called the diplomacy of violence. I would like to see a New Zealand commitment to support efforts toward regional risk reduction and conventional (and not just nuclear) arms control. This means a clear comment expressing concern about developments in the South China Sea. But we still need to express these concerns in a more inclusive way than some of our close partners are inclined to do. This is not just about what China is doing.

A **third** point is a reflection of the upside of the growing strength of a number of the countries of Southeast Asia. Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia, for example, have an increasing ability to influence the regional strategic situation, although each is still sensitive to the larger abilities of the major powers to do so. New Zealand's traditional point of entry into the Southeast Asian defence environment has been the 1971 Five Power Defence Arrangements. Strikingly, and perhaps surprisingly, the Defence Assessment claims that the FPDA is of declining strategic relevance as a defence arrangement. Whether or not this is the case, it is time for New Zealand to spread its wings in this part of the region. As well as the long-standing links with Singapore and Malaysia, it is time for New Zealand to make some clear noises about Indonesia's positive contribution to the regional strategic environment. After all it is a country which now regularly enjoys peaceful transfers of power following democratic elections. New Zealand should indicate that building a closer strategic partnership with Indonesia is an important priority, including through growing defence links. And despite and perhaps because of some sensitivities in Indonesia-Australia relations, New Zealand should also be looking to invest in stronger triangular ties between the three countries.

**Fourthly**, I would like to see the White Paper acknowledge that while many Pacific countries continue to experience political, social, demographic, economic, resource, environmental and climatic challenges, there are also some points of relative good news in New Zealand's Pacific neighbourhood. The Defence Assessment is right to indicate that over the next 10 years New Zealand should expect to be required to make a deployment to a South Pacific contingency that is beyond the demands of a natural disaster. But it is also the case that in 2015, unlike the situation 10 or 15 years ago, we do not face the dual challenges of a serious political crisis in Solomon Islands on top of the demands placed on our forces by the deployment to Timor Leste. The situations in Tonga and Fiji are today rather less unfavourable than they have been in some fairly recent moments. This may change again, of course, but in the White Paper it is

important to note where things may be slightly better than they once were as well as where they may have been deteriorating.

Looking forward I do not think New Zealand should give too much weight to the notion of being a Pacific leader. Instead the focus should be on being an important Pacific partner. We should also, within reason, be generally welcoming of the closer links that Pacific countries are developing with larger partners, whether those are long-standing players such as the United States and the EU, or newer partners such as China or India or Indonesia. Above all we need to look beyond an era where there is an assumption that the Pacific countries will chart their destinies together with us and the Australians.

**Fifthly**, speaking of Australia, I believe we need to acknowledge, as the Defence Assessment does, that the gap between some of the major capability emphases of our respective defence forces continues to grow. As it should, Australia looks at its defence needs and its strategic environment in different ways to us. In the White Paper we should acknowledge that Australia continues to be more directly concerned than we are about any changes to the broader distribution of power in Asia than we are. It should note that Australia is more likely than we are to take particular stands on strategic issues involving major power competition. But we should not at the same time retreat into the position, sometimes created for us in Australian White Papers, (and adopted by the recent Defence Assessment) where the cooperation between us, and the common interest between us, consists of our responses to security events in the South Pacific. If we state, as we should, that our alliance with Australia is the most fundamental strategic relationship we have, this has implications which go beyond the South Pacific. It means we need to be prepared to offer some form of defence assistance to Australia at times when it is being challenged by developments in its maritime approaches further to the north.

We also need to be explicit about the fact that we share with Australia, Indonesia, our FPDA partners, India, the United States, Japan and China a clear interest in the maintenance of secure and open sea lanes, including through and around the Malacca Strait. We should also say, as the Australians are often more keen to than we are, that New Zealand's strategic interests benefit from a favourable equilibrium of regional power which helps provide a disincentive to interstate conflict. This means saying that we welcome a strong United States presence in the region, and that we see China, Japan and India as important parts of that evolving balance of power.

The **sixth** point is the final part of our regional environment, and one that we have tended to overlook too often and for too long. Looking ahead it is not difficult to see changes and challenges to the south of New Zealand involving Antarctica and the southern oceans. We need a clear statement in the Defence White Paper acknowledging the reality of increasing strategic competition in this more icy part of our world, and noting the strains that may well be coming for the Antarctic Treaty system and which are certainly arriving for fisheries and other marine resources. This does not necessitate gloom and doom thinking, but

it is something which we need to depict clearly as an area of significant and direct strategic interest for New Zealand.

There is a **seventh** point to make which takes us well beyond our part of the Asia-Pacific region. We cannot ignore the serious patchwork of crises and conflicts which are ripping through significant parts of the Middle East. This is not to suggest this part of the world is as important to us in long-term defence terms as our own regional neighbourhood which already stretches north and south east and west. But going back to the early part of the twentieth century we can find several occasions where New Zealand has deployed forces to wars great and small, and to peacekeeping efforts too. We need to signal, at least to ourselves, that it is not just the recent deployment of our forces in Iraq, primarily for training purposes, which indicates the possibility of us remaining connected to this troubled part of the world. By the same token I would recommend very measured statements about how important the Middle East is to our direct interests. And we need to take care in what we assume about the longevity of ISIS. This is a very fluid situation, and I also think we may be in danger at times of overstating the threat posed in our own country by individuals who choose to align themselves to the goals of this and any similar groups. That said, we need to be conscious of the concerns that some of our larger regional neighbours have, including Australia and Indonesia.

My **eighth** point is that there is no need to picture a world that has been completely altered by the information revolution. Many of the cybersecurity challenges for the operation of armed forces are enhanced versions of older information security challenges. Cyber options would be an important early part of many military actions, and we already see cyber attacks as part of operations short of war itself. The growth of cyber activities does not render geography irrelevant, but it is a significant part of the security landscape, and it poses challenges not just to the information systems of government agencies, but to significant parts of the private sector as well. Partly because of the ubiquity of these challenges, and the fact that we all of us depend on a cyber-commons that is open as well as secure, this is an issue that goes well beyond the remit of defence policy.

A **ninth** point is a plea for some clarity around something mentioned in the 2010 Defence White Paper which argued that the international system of institutions and values which has benefited New Zealand is coming under growing challenge. If that was the case five years ago, it will be even more the case in five or ten years from now as the relative power of the western countries who established these rules is challenged. The 2014 Defence Assessment refers to the challenge that Russia's actions, including in regard to Ukraine, have been posing to this system of rules. But I think our approach needs to appreciate that regardless of this particular example, it is not wise for New Zealand to position itself simply as a defender of the status quo. The ground is shifting and we need to be clever about the way we articulate our preferences. I would find it very interesting to see the White Paper tackle in a direct sense our preferences in terms of the freedom of navigation, the norms of intervention and non-intervention (including as it applies to the use of drones) the efforts which are going on



artificially to build physical features and claim exclusive economic zones around them, and the question of restraint over some of the uses of force short of war which I have already discussed.

### **So What?**

What then would my White Paper do with these nine points? It would be too easy to assume, in a cause and effect manner, that it is from judgements about the strategic environment that we derive the defence force that New Zealand needs and the resources we need to devote to it. This is an especially important question to ask in the context of a Defence White Paper which after all is not principally about an assessment of the strategic environment. It is about instead guidance on decisions and choices regarding defence capabilities. And these cost serious money.

In thinking about these decisions we should be aware that a host of factors intrude. Assessments about how the environment is changing can take second and third place in the pecking order. These other factors include the sunk costs of previous commitments, bottom up pressures from existing ways of doing things, the limited availability of funds to allow for major force structure changes, as well as sheer chance and accident.

To observe a deterioration or improvement in some aspect of the strategic environment is not necessarily enough to bring a change in the way that New Zealand uses its armed forces in response to a problem in a particular part of the region or the wider world. That probability depends on a whole range of factors including:

- the location of the security development
- how the problem is seen to affect New Zealand's interests and the interests of its close partners
- whether it is amenable in general to the application of armed force and in particular to the capabilities of the NZDF
- whether New Zealand's view is that the armed forces of other countries are likely to have the issue in hand without our contribution, or whether it is an issue on which we would want to be involved or even take a lead
- how it compares to other important priorities of the time
- and the particular preferences of governments and ministers of the day

Still less is it the case that changes in the security environment will translate into changes in the overall capabilities of the NZDF and the willingness of governments to fund these. This is not just because some there are questions about the suitability of a military response to some security issues, and it is recognized that other government agencies may be able more likely to provide suitable responses. It is also because there is still quite a high threshold for changes in the strategic environment to translate into major changes in the way New Zealand thinks about the capabilities it has and the resources it wishes to commit to them.

Over the last decade and a half there have been changes to some NZDF capabilities. In lieu of a third frigate, for example, we have the multi-role Canterbury, which in tandem with the offshore patrol vessels has extended New Zealand's ability to respond to a series of problems short of war in our neighbourhood. But rather than a response to major changes in the strategic environment, this decision might well be treated as a case of filling a long-recognised gap in the suite of options which can be provided to New Zealand Ministers.

Moreover that choice has still left New Zealand with two frigates which are part of the largest long-standing capability challenge for present and future Ministers to consider. This challenge is about our three most expensive platform replacement questions: what shall succeed the ANZAC frigates, the C-130 Hercules airlift aircraft, and the P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft; and how can the chosen successors be afforded alongside all of the other demands on the defence budget.

The issue then is whether changes in the strategic environment have any affect whatsoever on this decision-making process. My own view is that the strategic environment as I have depicted it here today does not significantly reduce New Zealand's need for these three capabilities. They are partly functions of the tasks that most New Zealand governments would want a defence force to be able to undertake. And if the 2015 Defence White Paper argues that the strategic environment features a slightly greater increase in the appearance of conflict, it is hard to imagine a government then being able to explain why any one of these three capabilities will not have a successor.

The question may more be whether the strategic environment is likely to worsen enough for New Zealand to take its overall combat capabilities, which it must be said are rather modest, to a new level. My own bet is that the 2015 White Paper will imply that this bar has not been crossed.

But what method can be used to determine whether this necessarily has happened? One way is to consider the capabilities New Zealand will require from its defence force to adequately respond to the circumstances in which a New Zealand government would be considering the use of force. In refreshingly direct fashion, the 2010 White Paper listed these as follows:

1. In response to a direct threat to New Zealand and its territories;
2. In response to a direct threat to Australia;
3. As part of collective action in support of a member of the Pacific Islands Forum facing a direct threat;
4. As part of New Zealand's contribution to the Five Power Defence Arrangements;
5. If requested or mandated by the UN, especially in support of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region

And one more is mentioned: 'ad hoc coalitions prepared to use force' to which 'New Zealand might be asked to contribute.'

This list is *most* specific, ie direct threats to New Zealand and Australia, where the rising risk of conflict noted in the Defence Assessment seems *least* likely to have its biggest implications. And it is not clear either that this rising risk affects the countries of the Pacific Islands Forum that much either.

It is in the context of the wider and vaguer statements of intent about New Zealand's use of force where the main alterations in the strategic environment are likely to be found. These include the strategic pressure being placed on Southeast Asian countries and the chance of armed conflict involving the major Asian powers. But how much would New Zealand really want to get involved here? Is the price of admission, in political, defence capability and dollar terms, too high for us? And if the regional strategic environment worsens further, are we actually going to be even less inclined to want to be ready to respond? In other words, if the chances of conflict in Asia grow, is it actually in our national interests to keep our head down? This is the bigger debate that New Zealand needs to have. It is a real "so what" test for our defence policy.

\* \* \*

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

My concern is very brief, regarding New Zealand Navy frigate strength. . I see that in 1980, NZNavy had four frigates. There are now only two.

Is that one frigate defence one North island and one for South Island?

Obviously the combat capability of two-day's frigates is vastly superior. If only one of them is disabled, we are left with just one.

Does this mean that not far ahead we will have none? My interest is purely a private one, as a concerned citizen.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Firstly, please have as many departments as possible of all New Zealand Defence Forces, Army, Navy and Air Force, and as many individuals at decision making level as possible read all that I have written up in my web site and to get as many reactions to this information and proposal in my submission as follows.

The web site Home page, New Zealand Fishery Quota Management System and Commercial Natural Wild Fish Harvesting sections have been online since 5 th August 2014 on the Home page and the ' About Kansai ' second page more recently.

Where I am going with this, by bringing to New Zealand Defence attention, is making known the unforeseen consequence of malicious and deliberate ' Elimination ' ( by MPI and Fisheries ) blind scorched earth policies of eliminating professional and qualified individual owner operators in favour of company owned fisheries operations resulting in diminished coastal eyes, ears and coastal protections for New Zealand now that so many have been eliminated out of the industry and catching sector by.

MPI and Fisheries ( now seemingly also being reinforced in elimination culture ) by Maritime New Zealand as well recently.

Much of what I have already said, and want known, is within my web site pages and will need to be read many times to fully allow the whole circumstances of fisheries, and MPI miss management, since the QMS introduction to be realized by most if not all that are not actually involved in the industry.

Where this is all going at this point is a scenario, as I envisage, that should interest all of the Defence Services and even allow MPI and fisheries to ' save face ' should my proposal find the right decision making people in Defence to adopt.

The original purpose of my web site was to promote and market a specialized Offshore Tuna Troller fishing vessel design, of my own architecture, which was developed up over many years, sea miles and thousands of hours at sea. A vessel for Offshore blue water work and long duration at sea, safely, economically and efficiently.

I propose that the defence sector consider supporting of this design of vessel for constructions in New Zealand ( Shipco – 360 . Whangarei ) in construction batches of five vessels per run to replace the huge hole in our economic zone coverage left by the malicious and intentional fisheries prosecutions and persecutions of so many qualified and professional fishermen by their ' management ' of the QMS since inception.

I see so many advantages in hands on Navy training of crews and in Army training too. That Navy recruitment would rise in popularity if individual Command positions where much more frequently on offer and sea time days available offshore.

These vessel would weaponize easily if required. So much more potential here in Economic Zone coverage, self supporting too, with fast deployment to Pacific Island situations and also in these vessels blending in a non – threatening manner on arrival as well.

I look forward to acknowledgement of this submission and proposal for consideration and to further expanding at a later date on a very much a win – win for all concerned should this proposal find the right people in New Zealand Defence Forces.

## Some Thoughts on Matters That Might be Considered During the 2015 Defence Policy Review

### Preface

This paper is fundamentally an ideas paper. For reasons of brevity, a number of debatable assertions are stated as facts. I am quite prepared to flesh out detail and engage in debate at another time. I have limited discussion to the broadest outline of ideas that I think offer promise as a way of part-fixing long-standing problems. I do recognise that there are many who will insist vigorously that the problems that we are facing are not of youth's making and that they should not therefore be the ones who meet the cost of fixing them. To them I say with profound regret that, if the problems are going to be fixed, yes they must. Every so often a generation has to do the hard yards and it has been quite some time since the youth of New Zealand has had to do anything that was hard. And that is part of the problem that we, the elder generation, created.

### Defence Considerations

**Past Expressions of Defence Policy** In my experience, Defence Policy white papers have invariably been written against a back drop of 'no discernible threat', or no threat that HM's NZ Government wished to acknowledge. And successive governments have escaped any immediate consequence for their reckless gambling but now the chickens are coming home.

**Policy Imperative** Now, we have hardly any military capability left upon which to build a credible defence against even a modest threat. This shortcoming is compounded by rapidly rising explicit and demonstrable Chinese hegemony. The publication of its multi-tiered Defence Strategy demands sober consideration by all Pacific states, New Zealand included.

**The Threat** China has substantial investments in business enterprise, industrial plant and, perhaps more importantly – a rapidly expanding Diaspora in New Zealand and the island nations within our immediate sphere of interest. Such 'assets' are explicitly identified in its Active-Defence narrative as representing PRC sovereign interests that would demand a post-emptive 'defensive' response if threatened. Moreover, any such effort that was made could escalate so rapidly (as was done in the Crimea by Putin) that a major counter offensive would be required to dislodge it. This is presently well beyond our unassisted capability.

The likelihood of the US going to war over what, globally, would amount to a very low-level protective move by China, is remote in the extreme – unless NZ were to be found in possession of resources of strategic interest to them. Worth a moment's thought are:

- NZ has access to an abundance of pure water in essentially limitless quantities that is pouring into the Tasman off the Southern Alps.
- The fish stocks in our economic zone are among the best in the world. and
- There will come a time when securing the fossil fuels and minerals beneath the floor of the deeper parts of the Tasman Sea will become an economically feasible proposition.

The above factors have global significance. Measures to ensure our continued ownership of these resources require urgent evaluation. Most of the detailed discussion should be conducted away from public scrutiny and the eyes of potentially unfriendly interests. The time is well past due when some hard thinking about the realities of the modern world is required. By all means, let us have something happy, inclusive and glossy to mail out to the world, but behind that, let there be some real thinking and rock solid resolve to remedy the consequences of decades of cheap feel-good puffery in our expression of Defence Policy.

## Vestigial Defence Resources

It would be somewhat reassuring to think that the structure of the Defence Force having been systematically ground down to hopelessly ineffective rumps in all three services was not entirely serendipitous. That is to say, some intellect, something beyond political expediency, determined that we did not actually need a Navy, or an Army, or an Air Force. If that were so, that same intellect might be persuaded to reconsider and address a restorative policy. Sadly, I believe ennui, self interest and a grave misunderstanding of consequence to be more likely. This presents the current policy makers with the additional challenge of overcoming the burden of administrative inertia.

Within Defence planning circles there has quite evidently been a constant and intense rivalry for funds and status between the three services. Each has been given a turn at having a big spend, often with insanelly insular and inappropriate results. Perhaps unconsciously, service chiefs have been fighting for the very survival of their services. Maybe now is actually a good opportunity to consider that perhaps we do not need them in the form that they have essentially assumed since the Second World War.

**Army** Any realistic needs assessment will conclude that to meet New Zealand's fundamental homeland defence requirement, a land force is essential. If it is big enough, some of that force can be spared to undertake alliance-building/maintaining offshore duties on an expeditionary basis. How big is big enough? Bigger than the ragtag outfit that could not handle the only sizeable homeland security mission ever asked of it. The Army's inability to secure Christchurch against looters following the 2010 earthquakes was shameful. I suspect that it was only a less-than-frank assessment by Army Chiefs at the time that obscured the urgent need to revitalise the Army then.

Ignoring the detail of what an expanded standing army might look like, I assume that when it wakes up from its slumbers, NZ will at least have the capability to field a regular brigade group (i.e., 5000 combat ready troops) and to deploy a battalion group off-shore with limited self reliance (say 1500 personnel). Anything less is fiddling about in the same sandpit that it has played in for the past 40 years and would not be able to cope with even a small alien action group or say the deliberate and sustained revolt of one of the larger outlaw 'motorcycle gangs'.

A Reserve component to flesh out the major part of the Army would continue to be required so as to control payroll costs. I would expect that to reach a sustainable balance at about another two brigade groups. A colleague suggested that these personnel could undertake some localised militia functions, rather like the Swiss and Israelis. I think that this is a very clever idea that demands serious thought.

**Maritime** Naval organisation and procurement has been beset with commanders wanting big toys to play with but without any intention that they would ever be used in an operational role - beyond flag-waving. NZ needs small toys and lots of them! It is long past time that we came to terms with our limited capacity to buy big(ish) stuff and the fact that whenever we do, it is already obsolescent and destined not to see operational service. On those few zero-operational-risk occasions when vessels have been found fishing illegally in our waters, the Navy has been unable to detain them. This is a ludicrous situation for an island nation to be in. Keeping our trade routes safe, and protecting the resources within our economic zone is *our job* and fundamental to our continued prosperity. This task clearly requires a maritime force of some sort but one with more apply-able grunt and much more flexibility than now. Some aviation resources would be required to maintain any sort of over-the-horizon capability but I do not believe this requirement needs to be met by a discrete third force.



**Air Force** Since the unilateral disposal of the A4s and rejection of the offer of essentially free F16s from the US, the Air Force has been reduced to a flying service in search of a purpose. What remains of the Air Force is either devoted to maintenance or to an exclusively ground or maritime support function. Thus, its desire to remain in light blue, with no light blue role to perform, can no longer be justified. The purchase of massive C5s for use in a global transportation role is not consistent with New Zealand's defence needs. Neither are a few very expensive helicopters that can lift half the Army in one sortie. Again, NZ needs small toys and lots of them.

#### **Defence Rationalisation.**

- **RNZAF** Restructuring of the Defence Force could begin almost immediately, with the disestablishment of the RNZAF. Air Force assets (including personnel) should be transferred to the Army (Air Corps) and the Maritime component (Coast Guard) as appropriate.
- **RNZN** The Navy to be re-badged as the Coast Guard comprising a fleet of relatively fast, 'punchy' littoral patrol vessels that can be in more or less constant patrol of our economic zone, backed up by rather more high speed missile attack and boarding-craft to intercept those flouting our sovereignty. The whole to be over-flown by high-endurance patrol aircraft and supported by 'ship'-borne utility and attack helicopters. Most, if not all design and construction, is to be undertaken in New Zealand. The disposal of all vessels inappropriate to its new role can proceed independently. Measures to absorb the ex RNZAF aircraft and personnel into a Fleet Air Arm division could begin with little delay. Some of the Border Security functions of the Customs Department could usefully be transferred to the Coast Guard. The Devonport Dockyard function needs to revert to Defence.
- **Army** To be based upon a Divisional structure comprising one Regular (and two or three Reserve) brigades groups. A General Staff/Divisional Headquarters will be required to command the force. An Army Air Corps needs to be re-established to accommodate ex RNZAF aircraft and personnel. If feasible, the C130 Flight should be retained in service. In due course their replacement by modern aircraft with similar characteristics, capacity and range is indicated. Otherwise, new aircraft acquisition should focus on utility and attack helicopters. The Army does not require any non-operational aircraft, except for a Training Flight.
- **Civil Defence** Notwithstanding that it did not want the role on the last occasion that it was offered, this vital and neglected function is to be assigned to the Army. The sometimes fine line between Defence and Civil Defence needs clarification and appropriate statutory provision. National and Regional Plans are required. Responsibility for the latter should be delegated to Reserve Brigades. All routine and emergency duties to be undertaken by Reserve units operating primarily within their regional areas of operational interest.
- **Operational Planning** Army HQ is to devise a national Defence/Civil Defence Plan. Reserve formations and units will be required to develop plans to secure vital installations and resources from assessed natural and military risks within their territorial regions. This is to include measures to safeguard the civil population and commerce from harm arising from those events. A military risk event is one requiring the use of armed force to counter it and would require an Order in Council for it to be undertaken. Routine practice in implementing those plans will be essential.
- **Estate** No disposals of land or facilities is to be undertaken unless and until it can be determined that rationalisation of force structure shows a clear absence of need for any particular facility. It is expected that considerable investment in procuring additional facilities will be required. All land and buildings assigned to Defence will be administered by a dedicated command within the Army.

## **Youth Issues**

**Underutilised Youth Resource** At the same time as off-shore threats gain inescapable definition, the Government has at last recognised that the policies that have unintentionally kept a very large part our youth in a state of perpetual paid unemployment, are just too costly to sustain. More than that, a large pool of unemployed, hormonally-charged young adults, is extremely volatile and we carry huge social risks in continuing policies that guarantee its burgeoning presence. By happy coincidence, this country needs the squandered hand-outs, the potential labour of thousands of young citizens and a reinvigorated Defence Force all at the same time.

**Basic Remedy.** As a means to stemming the uncontrolled haemorrhaging of the 'Welfare' budget, the burgeoning pool of youth unemployed and under-employed is to be conscripted into a variety of mainly labour-intensive publicly funded organisations for a period of two years. During which time they are to be given full board and lodging and in addition paid an allowance sufficient to provide for their personal necessities, and a just a little more. At the conclusion of their training, applications will be encouraged, from those considered suitable, to join the regular work force in their field of specialised training. The scheme could be called something like Training Towards a Citizenship Contribution (TTCC). And the term "Trainee" could be used to soften the blow to the sensitive of being called a 'Conscript'. But, they would necessarily be conscripted.

### **Training for Citizenship**

**Indoctrination Training.** For the first (say) four months of their service, all Trainees will be required to complete a basic training period aimed essentially at inculcating 'good citizen' qualities. This phase is to be based on a 'Boot Camp' model with Trainees housed in barrack-like communal accommodation. It will include modules to develop physical fitness, self discipline and self reliance; teamwork; personal hygiene and advanced first aid; civil obedience and respect for the law; basic small arms competency; and an understanding of our participatory democracy. Irrespective of race, religion or gender (apart from their obvious physiological and accommodation needs, and physical capabilities), all Trainees will be treated the same.

**Vocational Training.** Following the initial indoctrination phase, Trainees will disperse to undergo specialised training in, the field of their choice wherever possible, otherwise the field for which they have been selected. For most, this vocational training phase will comprise a specialised training phase of two months followed by on-the-job training in their field of employment, with the latter continuing for the balance of their two year full time commitment.

### **Organisations Included in Scheme**

There are a number of state funded organisations and service that could benefit from having an ongoing pool of young able workers who's remuneration is essentially 'off-books'. However, without care being taken to ensure adequate preparation for their reception, most (if not all) existing agencies would quickly become overwhelmed by the annual output from the Indoctrination Training Centres. For reasons of limited capabilities and capacity, the scheme will make only limited vocational opportunities available initially. And, Trainee induction will be spread over two or three intakes each year. These considerations require that the scheme be introduced in phases.

## Phase 1

- **The Army** In addition to furnishing the combat ready component of a Brigade Group, with spill over into the Reserve Brigades, training for the first several years could otherwise focus on the trade training of the core trades of the construction and transportation industries. Later, as the present construction shortfall is overcome, this aspect could be reduced to a maintenance level. There would be an ongoing benefit from including specialist training of drivers and electronics technicians.
- **Regular Army Cadet Scheme** The Regular Force Cadet School operated for over 40 years. It attracted young men from all walks of life, with quite a few being encouraged by the Youth Courts, to seek a military career. It provided nearly all of the tradesmen required by the Army. Apprenticeships begun while at the school were completed to Trade Qualification standards while serving as adults. Quite by accident, as it was not within its charter, the school over time became the point of entry for nearly all who rose to Warrant rank. In addition, a large proportion of young men offered Commissions also began their careers as Cadets. This was possible because it also functioned as a secondary school, to Stage 1 University level at times. At the time of its disestablishment, no one had the wit or span of influence to perceive or care about the long term *national* consequences. I suggest that the re-establishment of the Regular Force Cadet School should be undertaken as a matter of urgency in parallel with, or even preceding, the TTCC.
- **Coast Guard** Even with the transfer of all remaining Naval personnel to the Coast Guard there will be a significant shortfall in the numbers of ratings required to crew an expanded fleet of small boats, staff the dockyard and attend to facilities security. Additionally, a Vocational Training facility, targeting those trades required by an invigorated boat-building industry (including marine engineers), would be required. Coast Guard can be expected to be a significant end user agency for TTCC output for many years.
- **Police** Presently the NZ Police force lacks sufficient manpower or a concept of operations to control the activities of even one of the several gangs responsible for the growing problem of organised crime in this country. TTCC trainees could make good that manpower deficiency (as probationary Constables), while at the same time the force should revert to a Constabulary and a separate Traffic Department, with the latter being outside the compass of the scheme. Its venture into the role of a Gendarmerie, or armed constabulary, has been an ineffective and wildly expensive drain on resources. The Armed Offenders Squad fiasco in the Uruera was an extraordinary demonstration of its hopeless incompetence. This role (shorn of the obscene black suits and face masks) should be transferred to a specialist unit within the Army along with the appropriate legislated authority to do the job.
- **Teaching** Teaching is a profession that is critical to the future prosperity and well being of New Zealanders. To that end it should be a profession attracting among the best native talent that we can produce, A more attractive salary structure would serve to raise both its standing in the community and encourage competitiveness to gain entry. We can only afford this if those attending to the extra-curricular activities that we lumber onto our schools are substantially less well rewarded than fully qualified teachers. Enter the Trainee Teacher Aid. Apart from entering the teaching hierarchy on the bottom rung, TTCC Trainees, when qualified to teach, should be (in lieu of a Student Loan) assigned for a bonded period to those schools having the greatest difficulty in attracting and keeping quality staff. These are often country schools.

## Phase 2

The following agencies could usefully join the scheme as and when the infrastructure, within which Vocational and continuing training can be conducted, becomes available.

- **Hospital Services** To achieve the full socializing benefits of compulsory training, at least part of an individual's specialised training needs to be made in concert with others undergoing similar training. Nurses Homes' on campus provide for their trainee nurses' accommodation and collegial support. Similar facilities would again be required if these health care trainees are included in the scheme. After a period of initial training, Trainee Nurses might be assigned to a variety of facilities to complete their obligation. This could include standing hospitals, the care of the very young, the elderly and the terminally ill.
- **TTCC Trainees** electing or being selected for medical school for Vocational Training, might on graduation be assigned to country service for (say) 2-4 years to work off a bond in lieu of a Student Loan. The OUMC if not currently active should be re-established as a unit of the Army Reserve to conduct the required Vocational Training.
- **Comment** Public hospitals exist as a place of refuge and to provide treatment for sick people: they are not created to provide a revenue source for doctors. Waiting lists are currently mismanaged to optimise Doctors' earning opportunities. To obviate this propensity their state sector salaries should be increased dramatically to really attractive levels, no private work allowed to be undertaken in public hospitals and Doctors' on-site hours of work to be the same (approx 40-50 per week) required of any other salaried professional. Private Hospitals should lose any public funding, except for when their facilities are leased by the state. Some sector opposition to this tap being closed could be expected...
- **Forestry** This industry tends to use machinery in lieu of expensive manpower. Supply the manpower, park up the machinery and save the planet! A rotating pool of Forestry Trainees could make a massive impact on detailed forest management including: possum and rodent control and the containment/eradication of other noxious flora and fauna presently paid lip service to by DoC for want of the resources. Some linkage between Forestry and DoC or a merged entity seems to be indicated.
- **Transportation** NZ is deficient in high quality heavy-rig drivers that could be supplied by Trainees emerging from their TTCC Vocational Training component. Consideration could also be given to including the Railways in the scheme.
- **Off Shore Fishing** A significant factor in the use of foreign flagged vessels being contracted to fish our waters is the cost of NZ labour. These vessels are difficult to police and seem habitually to abuse the third party crews engaged. Much of this problem might disappear if TTCC Trainees were able to complete their obligations in this activity.

## Fiscal

A large portion of our GDP is currently devoted unintentionally to keeping youth out of work. Such funds are presently padding the budgets of:

- WINZ Student loans, Unemployment, Domestic Purposes and Sickness benefits for the unqualified temporary unemployable;
- Obligatory secondary schooling for a number of unwilling, unmotivated and unsuited students aged 16 and over;
- Tertiary loans for incompetent and direction-less 'scholars', seeking to find themselves and after failing to do so in the first year or so, dropping out and taking up a position on the dole;
- The Courts. Considerable time and resources are frittered away finding, assembling and

conveying unmotivated, uncooperative young people to work sites where they can lean on a shovel for two hours on a Saturday morning.

Funding which can be identified as being used in such unproductive ways could be transferred to the budgets of the TTCC training services and pinned to the collars of the folk assigned there. This funding could be reduced as initial infrastructure needs were satisfied.

### **Conditions of Training**

**Call-up Age** Except for those with an exemption, all young New Zealanders (including migrants) will be scheduled for entry into a mandatory training facility in the calendar year following their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday. Under certain circumstances a deferment will be possible, but not later than the year following their 25<sup>th</sup> birthday. Aliens who enter on a temporary visa that continues beyond their 25<sup>th</sup> birthday, and who are subsequently granted citizenship, will be required to complete their TTCC.

**Board and Lodging** For the duration of the two year training contribution, Trainees would be provided with free accommodation, rations, clothing, health care (including dental) and periodic transport to and from their homes. Considerable investment will be required in construction (or the repair) of military barracks, nursing schools as adjunct to training hospitals, teachers' training college accommodation, forestry camps and the like. Additionally, many Defence houses, barracks and administration buildings will be required throughout the country to meet the needs of regular staff assigned to the command and administration of regional Reserve units together with Trainees completing their full time commitment.

**Remuneration** Trainees would receive a stipend set somewhat below the minimum wage, with small increments payable for those appointed to positions of responsibility. Trainees could not be expected to have saved any significant capital during their period of training but might be sensibly awarded a significant tax-free 'graduation' gift of say \$10000 from the state. This figure might be represented by a portion of the difference between their stipend and the "dole". Trainees assigned to remote locations would require special provisions for their support and/or transportation. Trainees who apply for and are accepted for entry into the 'regular' workforce in the field of their training may do so after the Indoctrination phase of TTCC. Persons in this position are to be transferred to the regular payroll and subject to an appropriate bond period to obviate exploitation.

**Statutory Basis** There would need to be a statutory basis for the necessary limitations on the Trainees' civil liberties. Some modification of the Act presently governing the Armed Forces would seem appropriate for armed forces Trainees. The rules governing other disciplines need further thought. The graduation nest egg might be considered as a suitable source of funds from which deductions could be made as a lawful penalty to motivate the recalcitrant.

### **Social Considerations**

**Citizenship** Since trainees would not be considered to have earned their full citizenship until they have completed their Contribution, they would not enjoy the right to vote until then. For the same reason they would not be required to pay taxes during their two year contribution period. These provisions exclude those transferring to the regular work force.

**Solo Parents** To remove the option of sole-parenting becoming/remaining a career choice for single parents, they should not be exempt from the scheme. Deferment would be the first option for a single parent with a child under three years in the January following their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday. Should a further birth to that mother or father occur in the following 12 months, one further deferment would be entertained. Beyond that, if the parent concerned cannot make alternative arrangements, the

children in his or her care will be placed in facilities selected by the State. Normally sole care parents in this situation will be offered TTCC Training in a facility most compatible with their continuing parental responsibilities.

Great care is required to ensure that solo mothers (in particular) are not treated insensitively and their children are not disadvantaged. Having said that, a policy to discourage young girls and women from *electing* to bear and raise children alone without input from an identified partner is an essential element of any programme aimed at improving the life opportunities and productivity of *the children* so raised.

**Caring for the Elderly and/or Incapacitated** Young people in the unfortunate position of having to care for elderly or incapacitated kin may also be considered for deferment of their TTCC obligations up until the January following their 25<sup>th</sup> birthday. After that, and failing alternative accommodation being found, their relative will be placed in a State facility and they will (where possible) be offered TTCC Training in a facility compatible with their continuing kinship responsibilities.

### **Public Resistance**

In running these ideas past a very well educated young man of 29 who has never had a full time job, it would seem that considerable resistance will attend the introduction of any form of conscription anywhere, anyhow. His notion is that as they did not create the problem, youth should not be required to fund, find or provide, the solution. This is inevitably self defeating. Demanding that 'the rich' foot the bill is equally invalid, for they are (with few exceptions) only rich when their cash is in a heap: spread all over the country they are as cash strapped as the rest of us. The solution requires the investment of *all* citizens.

Resistance can also be expected from those with a vested interest in the status quo. This would probably be any Corporate enterprise (including the Medical Association) that could argue that their 'turf' being intruded upon by low paid labour amounts to unfair competition and/or an erosion of their profits. Insofar as it would be in the best interests of the nation, rather than an elite few, it would amount to an overdue restoration of balance. How can that be unfair?

17 June 2015

The Asia New Zealand Foundation is a non-partisan and non-profit organisation dedicated to building New Zealanders' knowledge and understanding of Asia.

Established in 1994, the Foundation is a partnership between the public and the private sector.

The Foundation is overseen by a top-level board of trustees drawn from business, community, academic and leadership backgrounds. Our board of honorary advisers is made up of distinguished public figures from throughout the Asian region.

As the leading non-government organisation on Asia-New Zealand relations we work in five main areas – business, arts and culture, education, media and research. In addition, we run a Leadership Network and take a lead role in Track II (informal diplomacy) bilateral and multilateral dialogues in the Asia-Pacific. The Foundation leads New Zealand's Track II engagement with Asia and regularly holds dialogues with partners in Taiwan, China, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, Australia, Myanmar, Viet Nam, Indonesia and India.

Our programmes enable scholarships, seminars, internships, educational support, special events and exchanges, Track II diplomacy, in-house and commissioned research - all designed to equip New Zealanders with firsthand experience of Asia and to forge valuable links to the region.

*Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?*

New Zealand occupies a largely benign geographical environment. It is distant from the tensions that are a feature of the South China Sea, North Asia and the Middle East. Nonetheless, the challenges of these regions, and the way that the countries of these regions and external powers address them, is relevant to New Zealand for the following reasons: New Zealand's deepening economic links with the Asian region; the high level of its trade that passes through the maritime choke points of the South China Sea; the centrality of ASEAN to New Zealand's engagement with the region; and the importance of a stable region to New Zealand's own security. While the Asia Pacific region has been largely stable for the better part of four decades there is no certainty that this will continue and the heightened levels of engagement and assertive behaviour by a range of countries challenge that certainty further.

Closer to home, New Zealand's Pacific neighbourhood is a mix of stable and less stable states. It has also, traditionally, been a region in which New Zealand – with Australia – is the country of first response. The instability of

the Pacific is both political and climatic. NZDF personnel have served in Bougainville, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, and elsewhere in the Pacific, playing a restorative and protective role in rebuilding states. This will inevitably continue. Several recent severe natural disasters remind us of the vulnerability of Pacific states to climate change and the need for New Zealand, with others, to be able to respond quickly and effectively with aid and rebuilding. New Zealand itself is not immune from natural disasters.

Cyber-security is an emerging threat, and not just to New Zealand. The interconnectedness brought about by the ubiquity of technology, especially in its use by government and business, creates whole new areas of vulnerability. This is further reinforced, arguably, by a general naiveté by the New Zealand public about the likelihood and serious consequences of cyber-security attacks. This is likely to be a growing threat in the period considered in this white paper.

*Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?*

We can see the role of non-state actors in international affairs in the destructive and insidious actions of ISIL. There are genuine and legitimate concerns among New Zealand's Southeast Asian neighbours that terrorist cells sympathetic to ISIL could sprout in their own countries. If this was to occur – and it is reasonable to assume that it might – this would bring the terrorism threat closer to New Zealand and to New Zealanders travelling in Asia.

The relations between states in the Asia Pacific are the perennial issue of our Track II dialogues, not least the bilateral relationship between the USA and China. This is arguably the most important relationship to get right as the consequences of it failing are severe. Several countries in the Asian region are hedging their relationships between these two states, especially countries within ASEAN. The diametrically opposed pull on these Southeast Asian states has the potential to destabilise ASEAN as a regional institution and to weaken the central role it plays in regional security architecture. Such an outcome would not be in New Zealand's national interests. New Zealand, through its defence force and other agencies, would want to encourage and ensure stability, cooperation and security in the region.

Australia is and will remain New Zealand's most important bilateral partner. With Australia, New Zealand participates in many of the regional security initiatives and institutions in the region. It is in New Zealand's interests to ensure that that continues, and that Australia does not advance its interests in an institution, such as joining ASEAN, without New Zealand there too. Both countries also have strong interests in the stability and the security of the Asia Pacific region and their interests converge more often than they diverge. That said, the tonality, if not the substance, of the relationship each country has with, say, China and the USA is different. Increasingly New Zealand may



need to ensure, as it already does, that there is daylight between its position and those of Canberra in Washington, DC and in Beijing. At the same time it needs to ensure the priority and importance of the trans-Tasman relationship while strongly conveying to the Australians (as it may to other friends and allies) that there are occasions where New Zealand will not partner with them.

*Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?*

The role of the NZDF will, by definition, be different to that played by defence forces of other countries. The NZDF is smaller, more nimble, and less well resourced than forces of New Zealand's friends and allies. It means that, particularly in large, complex engagements, the NZDF will need to – and may be asked to – partner with others. That said, its first responsibility is inevitably going to be to its near neighbourhood rather than to the far abroad. In any event, the NZDF will not be able to do all its wants to, or its allies want it to, and tough decisions will need to be made about what role it can play, and to what extent. This will particularly be true in 'traditional security' engagements where there is no perceived direct threat to New Zealand's security. The NZDF already plays a role in rebuilding after natural disasters and in protection and restoration after political upheaval. This will inevitably continue.

*Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?*

The challenges that New Zealand will face in its territories are more likely to be 'non-traditional' but will nevertheless be important. These will include over-fishing, increased interests by external states in the Antarctic and its resources, and the effects of climate change. With the exception perhaps of the Antarctic, most other countries will not prioritise these regions as New Zealand will, and it will need to maintain at least a watching brief on its own backyard. On the Antarctic, New Zealand will want to take a leading role to ensure its interests are met and maintained.

*Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?*

New Zealand's priorities will to a large extent be driven by forces beyond its control. Responses to international terrorism and to natural disasters, for example, may be planned but it will be unknown when they will be executed. As an international citizen, especially now as a member of the United Nations Security Council, New Zealanders' friends and allies will look to it to play a role in the international arena that otherwise it may not have. Woven through this is New Zealand's bilateral relationship with Australia. In most cases the

interests of the two countries will converge, though not always, and the responses to challenges they each faces may be different. That is a political reality, if not sometimes a necessity.

*Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?*

The NZDF already works with foreign affairs and intelligence agencies, and across the wider scope of government as required, to protect and advance New Zealand's security and stability. Inter-agency cooperation is necessary but it does not happen without effort and hard work. New Zealand does not have the large resources of other countries and so for it to make an effective contribution on the international stage it requires its agencies to work collaboratively and in one direction.

*Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?*

The NZDF is one of the best resourced agencies to respond to natural disasters here and abroad and it will – and should – continue to play that role. The realities and the vulnerabilities of the Asia Pacific region make it more, rather than less, likely that the NZDF will contribute in this way going forward.

*Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?*

The NZDF is one of a multitude of agencies concerned with developing the youth of New Zealand. Where it is relevant to NZDF is in building and equipping a new generation of New Zealanders to work in and with the NZDF, to understand its needs and requirements, and to build capability and ensure succession planning.

*Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?*

The NZDF is not as well resourced as it could be, nor as much as its friends and allies would want it to be. That is a political and economic reality shared by many other states, particularly those most severely impacted by the Global Financial Crisis. With few exceptions, defence forces in most Western countries have been diminished. This is happening, however, at the same time as there is a significant increase of expenditure among defence forces in Asian countries, and there are serious extant threats to international security and stability, not least through ISIL and its sympathisers.

Prepared by : Dr Andrew Butcher, Director, Research



10 June 2015

Defence White Paper 2015  
Ministry of Defence  
PO Box 12703  
WELLINGTON 6144

Dear Sir/Madam

### DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2015

Palmerston North City Council welcomes the opportunity to make a submission on the Defence White Paper 2015. With Linton Military Camp and the Hokowhitu Base<sup>1</sup> located within the city boundary and the Ohakea Air Force Base located near the city, the Defence Force makes a significant contribution to the local economy and the well-being of Palmerston North and the surrounding region.

The Council accepts that the primary mandates for the Defence Force are for the defence of New Zealand and the protection of its interests, and the contribution of forces internationally in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Council does not have the expertise to comment on the primary mandates for the Defence Force but has focussed its submission on two of the nine questions identified in the Defence White Paper 2015 Public Consultation Document:

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?
8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

### Background

The Defence Forces make a significant contribution to the Manawatu region economy (covering Palmerston North City and Manawatu District), with 2,300 personnel at Linton Army Camp (and Hokowhitu) and 833 personnel based at Ohakea. The 3,133 Defence Force employees in the region account for nearly 6 percent of the total workforce in the Manawatu region. Salaries and wages paid by the Defence Force in the region are \$182 million on an annual basis, contributing 7 percent of total earnings (salaries, wages and self-employment income) in the region. The higher contribution for earnings reflects the low part-time share among the Defence Force workforce, with 4 percent of defence employees working on a part-time basis at the time of the 2013 Census compared with 24 percent of the overall workforce in the region.

<sup>1</sup> The Hokowhitu Base is home to: Land Operations Training Centre (HQ); Defence College; Army Staff Tactics School; Logistics Operations School; School of Military Intelligence and Security.

The direct contribution of the Defence Force to GDP in the region is estimated to be \$241 million, 5 percent of total GDP. While this is lower than the contribution to regional earnings and employment, the lower GDP share reflects the challenges with measuring the output of the defence sector and the reliance on a production measure of GDP. The direct Defence Force employment of 3,133 personnel is estimated to have resulted in the creation of an additional 2,850 jobs in the Manawatu region.

Palmerston North City Council works hard to ensure new residents are welcomed to the city and made aware that there is a range of leisure, environmental and cultural opportunities offered by the Council. Defence Force personnel and their families are being warmly welcomed by the Manawatu business community with an extensive discount scheme. The Manawatu Defence Hub (MDH), a defence and security industry group, promotes the discount scheme in collaboration with the Manawatu Chamber of Commerce, Vision Manawatu (regional economic development agency) and the Palmerston North City Council. The Defence Hub sees the discount scheme as an important component of relationship building with Defence and a great opportunity to recognise the input that the NZDF and its personnel have into the local economy.

The strength of what the region also offers for Defence Force families is increasingly becoming recognised within the region and at a national level. These strengths include the wide range of education institutions based in the City and the affordable housing available within the City and wider region. The City's central location, extensive sports and recreation infrastructure, significant regional health hub, and major regional shopping centre are among the range of factors which are contributing to the City becoming a major destination for domestic tourism spending.

The Council welcomes the family friendly initiatives which have been introduced by the Defence Force, which are consistent with active consideration being given by the Council on further initiatives it can take to support neighbourhood wellbeing. The Council is also working with Linton Military Camp on the development of a cycle path and bridge connecting the camp to the City and has recently advocated to Horizons Regional Council for the introduction of public transport services to connect both the camp and Air Force base to the City.

The importance of the Defence Force to the region is recognised in a draft Statement of Intent between the New Zealand Defence Force, Palmerston North City Council and Manawatu District Council which records the intention of the parties to work together to:

**What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

The Defence Forces play an important role in local civil defence and rural fire fighting coordination and support roles in Palmerston North and the wider Manawatu-Wanganui region. The Council wishes to ensure that current strong relationships between local, regional and central government agencies are retained and the importance of these relationships is recognised in the Defence Review.

The local Emergency Management Committee includes government and non-government representatives (such as the utility companies) and has representatives from the NZ Army and RNZAF bases in the Manawatu. The scale of the Defence Force support was very apparent in the February 2004 floods in the Manawatu-Wanganui region. The New Zealand Defence Force Annual Report for the year ended June 2004 noted:

*NZ Army and RNZAF personnel supported declared Civil Defence emergencies (Operation Awhina) in the Lower North Island and Picton area during Feb 04. Support provided included searching for missing persons, rescue evacuation, sandbagging, water distribution, emergency service vehicle meals, transporting gravel for stop bank repairs, house content removal and clean up assistance. A total of 1,616 man-days were expended, 12,339kms travelled providing this logistical support. NZAF Iroquois helicopters also flew 48.5 hours in support.*

There are also strong relationships in the training of personnel between the Civil Defence Unit based at the Council and the NZ Army and RNZAF bases in the Manawatu. The Council has been assisting with Defence Force personnel training and makes use of facilities at Linton Military Camp for the training of civil defence volunteers. There are also close links between the Defence fire team and rural fire fighting services. The Defence Forces have off-road capabilities for assisting with rural fire fighting and have assisted with vegetation fires in the region so contribute an important complementary role to the New Zealand Fire Service.

**Recommendation:** Palmerston North City Council believes that the Defence Forces should continue to have a valuable role in supporting civil defence activities and rural fire fighting.

#### **What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

Palmerston North City is well resourced in the area of skills development and training, with a comprehensive range of learning opportunities provided for local residents. Key tertiary education and training institutions based in the city include Massey University, the Universal College of Learning (UCOL), International Pacific College, Te Wananga Aotearoa and a broad range of industry training organisations. The benefits of this availability of skills development and training opportunities in the city is reflected in Census data which shows a higher level of educational qualifications for the population resident in Palmerston North compared with the national population.

The Defence Sector profile published by Palmerston North City Council in January 2009 noted the Defence Force establishments at Linton and Ohakea play important roles in the growth of the region by bringing recruits into the Manawatu region. Training offered varies enormously from trades skills and logistics through to Defence Studies at the Massey University Palmerston North campus. As such, the two bases are an important component in the development of skills for the wider regional economy, especially once Defence Force personnel end their period of service and move across to jobs outside the defence sector. Businesses, local government and other central government employers all benefit from the training provided.

Census data also shows that the Defence Force plays a major role in the training of Māori and Pacific peoples in the region, particularly through the Army. Census 2013 workplace data shows that 30 percent of the Linton Military Camp workforce identify with a Māori ethnicity and 6 percent with a Pacific peoples ethnicity. Comparative numbers for the overall New Zealand workforce were 11 percent identifying with a Māori ethnicity and 5 percent with a Pacific peoples ethnicity. In 2013 10 percent of the Māori workforce in Palmerston North was employed at Linton and 10 percent of the Pacific peoples workforce in the City, significantly higher than its 4.3 percent share of the overall workforce in Palmerston North.

The proportion of Māori and Pacific peoples in the overall New Zealand workforce is expected to grow because of their higher fertility rates and younger populations. In 2013, the median age for the Māori population in New Zealand was 23.9 years and the median age for Pacific peoples was

22.1 years, both significantly lower than the median age of 38 years for the overall New Zealand population. Although they have improved markedly over the past two decades, unemployment rates for Māori and for Pacific peoples are higher than the average for the overall population, and labour market participation rates lower than for the population as a whole. Further improving those rates has been identified by the Government as a priority for the economy and for employers, given these likely demographic changes.

While the quality of training and skills development at Linton plays an important role in overall skills development in the City, there is potential to further expand this role through engagement with young people in the wider Manawatu-Wanganui region. Defence Force personnel already visits schools and other organisations in the region and participate in a wide range of events outside of the base, so play an important role in the development of New Zealand's youth outside of the confines of the army or air force base.

**Recommendation:** Palmerston North City Council believes improved skills for the Māori and Pacific peoples are a part of the complex mix of solutions required to improve labour market and social outcomes for Māori and Pacific peoples and explicit recognition should be given to the role the Defence Forces are playing in this.

Yours sincerely



Paddy Clifford  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE

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# Submission Form

Please send your submission to: Defence White Paper 2015, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 12703, WELLINGTON, 6144  
You can also make your views known by submitting written comments either using the online submission form on the Ministry of Defence website at <http://www.defence.govt.nz>, or by uploading or emailing completed submission forms to [DWP15@defence.govt.nz](mailto:DWP15@defence.govt.nz)

Deadline for submissions: To ensure views expressed through the consultation process can be considered in the Review, a deadline of 22 June 2015 has been established for receipt of formal submissions.

## Contact details \* = Mandatory

*Name:
Group (if applicable):
Mailing address:
Contact telephone number:
Email address:

## Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

Technology, I.T. advancements, Cyber threats

2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required. *As attached*

Please be aware that all submissions are subject to the Official Information Act 1982. Please set out clearly in your submission if you have any objection to the release of any information in the submission. In particular, please indicate which part, or parts, you consider should be withheld, together with your reasons for withholding the information.



## SUBMISSION TO DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2015

### TERRITORIAL ARMY BASE - NELSON

I have read that the Nelson Territorial Army Force property was sold last year and in 5 years they will need a new base. A recent news item said that work to identify a new facility has yet to begin.

Why not look at shifting the Territorial Army base to join with the Army Base at Woodbourne Defence property in Marlborough?

This would result in a huge cost saving as it would not require a purchase of land and buildings.

Blenheim has for many decades provided a good military defence base with an excellent relationship with the Marlborough District Council and general public.

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**Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

1. Climate change.
2. The widening inequality of income in our society and its resulting instability.
3. Youth disenchantment with older generations, lack of trust in those in power.
4. Disinformation by the media, shortage of truly independent information.

**Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

1. Lack of transparency in trade agreements such as TPPA.
2. Dealing with states and institutions where corruption is rife.
3. Manipulation of finance by external players.
4. Demands imposed by the International Monetary Fund and acceptance of their formulas for recovery in exchange for loans
5. Sale of assets and privatisation of key services such as power and communications leave New Zealand unprotected at the mercy of players with their own agendas rather than the welfare of New Zealanders.

**Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

- participation in conflicts abroad will save money that can be used instead to strengthen Civil Defence at home. Any participation abroad should be of a peacekeeping nature. In conjunction with the United Nations.
2. Promote human rights in countries where they are not observed.
  3. Assist abroad and at home with education and social services that create and maintain peace.

**Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

1. Climate threats with massive dislocation of people especially from our Pacific neighbours.
2. Food security increasingly compromised as NZ imports continue to grow.

**Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

New Zealand should keep an independent stance on security matters and stay on the path that started with saying no to nuclear weapons in our territory. Keep an independent voice on human rights issues. Share expertise in creating and maintaining institutional and organisational models in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that all nations have signed. Monitor their compliance at home and abroad.

**Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

There is an assumption in this question that the Defence Forces have a role in advancing New Zealand interests. Rather it is the role of t

**Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

Fund and support community services and organisations that will be central to the survival and recovery of those affected by events and natural disasters. The Defence Force could play a role assisting in the education and training of civilians in preparation for unforeseen events.

**Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

1. There is scope for the Defence Forces work with youth on conflict resolution and training for community assistance in case of natural disasters.
2. Assist the Police establishing and maintaining strong Neighbourhood Support groups and initiatives that involve youth and families.

**Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

1. Small units capable of fast response patrolling New Zealand territory, policing fisheries and conservation areas adequately and enforcing maritime conventions New Zealand has signed.
2. Units capable of operating on Antarctic ice.

**10. In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.**

1. The New Zealand Defence Forces have a responsibility to inform the public about their actions. They should be accountable and transparent. The recent revelations in the media of the lack of transparency and censoring of video footage regarding the battle and death in 2012 of two New Zealand soldiers from the Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan is of grave concern.
2. It seems to us that this is a critical time in the world for an ethical and independent stance that addresses the root causes of conflict: injustice and oppression, a continually widening gap between rich and poor, and an increasingly resource-constrained world which is calling for a paradigm shift in corporate policy and practice.

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DWP-0170

**Defence White Paper 2015  
Fixing Anomalies in New Zealand Defence Policy  
and Planning?**

6/19/2015  
Massey University  
Centre for Defence and Security Studies

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# Defence White Paper 2015

## *Fixing Anomalies in New Zealand Defence Policy and Planning?*

*A public submission from the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University<sup>1</sup>*

### Introduction

The premise of the Defence White Paper 2015 is to establish how the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) will operate in the strategic environment looking out to 2040. Looking through a sharper lens the Defence White Paper should consider how future investment in the NZDF, to establish the future 'shape' of the NZDF, will contribute to the management of identified risks to New Zealand's national security.

The *Defence White Paper 2015 Public Consultation Document* invites New Zealanders to 'give their views on the future security challenges facing the nation; the appropriate roles for our armed forces in responding to these challenges; and the capabilities that are most likely to be required to fulfil these'. In his ministerial foreword to the consultation document, Gerry Brownlee emphasises that since the promulgation of the *Defence White Paper 2010*, the NZDF has:

- been involved in the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan;
- contributed to, and led, international counter piracy and regional stability operations in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden;
- contributed to international missions to maintain stability and peace, in such areas as Korea, South Sudan and fractious parts of the Middle East; and
- provided training to other militaries, especially those in the South Pacific region (and now also in Iraq).

This is clearly an eclectic, if not schizophrenic, range of missions for a force numbering just over 9,000 personnel. Resultantly, this submission contends that **the NZDF is presently trying to be all things to all people and, at worst, is at risk of being nothing unto itself.**

The central theme to this submission is that the overall orientation of Defence, including with regard to financial investment in shaping the NZDF and training and development, is anomalous. Defence has become preoccupied with making commitments to collective security operations on the premise that the NZDF can 'punch above its weight' and achieve impressive results despite the size of its contribution to a mission as a whole. This submission acknowledges and lauds the incredible effort, commitment and sacrifice of NZDF personnel and their families. However, NZDF commitments to theatres like Afghanistan, for example, only address a very small part of the identified risks to New Zealand's national security. Such international commitments may enhance New Zealand's reputation and have some positive effect upon the external threat of terrorism-- but these outcomes are impossible to measure, and the focus and investment in projecting land forces into far-off theatres at the behest of allies is difficult to justify in a holistic context. To achieve a more comprehensive management of the identified risks to New Zealand's national security, this submission suggests that the Defence White Paper and future defence spending should be clearly focussed on **prioritising maritime and amphibious force capabilities** for securing vital interests in the country's EEZ, the South Pacific, and Antarctica.

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<sup>1</sup> All contributors to this submission are affiliated to the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS) at Massey University. However, this submission is made in their personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect or represent the policy or position of CDSS or Massey University.

The comments which follow are not structured according to the nine basic questions posed in the public consultation submission form. This is because all the questions have already been answered in some way by the NZDF and/or the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in several recent policy documents that are summarised to a greater or lesser degree in the *Defence White Paper 2015 Public Consultation Document*.

Instead, the **aim** of this submission is to **critically examine** the extant policy documents from the perspective of conceptual coherence and logical robustness, in order to **highlight obvious anomalies** which need to be resolved in the *Defence White Paper 2015*. The documents reviewed include: the *Defence White Paper 2015 Public Consultation Document* (May 2015); *New Zealand's National Security System* (2011); *Defence Assessment* (2014); *Future 35 : Our strategy to 2035* (2011); *Defence Capability Plan* (2014); and the Cabinet Committee *Minute on Decision of New Zealand Peace Support Operations Review* (2013).

## **New Zealand's National Security System (NSS)**

The New Zealand National Security System (promulgated by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in May 2011) provides a comprehensive overview of New Zealand's security interests and how the 'whole of Government' will respond to national security issues. This is the blueprint upon which New Zealand focuses its efforts, whether that is in relation to Foreign Affairs, Primary Industries or Defence.

The NSS defines national security as '*the condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business confidently free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life. It encompasses the preparedness, protection and preservation of people and of property and information, both tangible and intangible*'. It sets out seven key objectives that underpin a comprehensive concept of national security, namely:

- Preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity: *Protecting the physical security of citizens, and exercising control over territory consistent with national sovereignty*
- Protecting lines of communication: *These are both physical and virtual and allow New Zealand to communicate; trade; and engage globally.*
- Strengthening international order to promote security: *Contributing to the development of a rules-based international system, and engaging in targeted interventions offshore to protect New Zealand's interests.*
- Sustaining economic prosperity: *Maintaining and advancing the economic well-being of individuals, families, businesses and communities.*
- Maintaining democratic institutions and national values: *Preventing activities aimed at undermining or overturning government institutions, principles and values that underpin New Zealand society.*
- Ensuring public safety: *Providing for, and mitigating risks to, the safety of citizens and communities (all hazards and threats, whether natural or man-made).*
- Protecting the natural environment: *Contributing to the preservation and stewardship of New Zealand's natural and physical environment.*

More specifically, the NSS identifies a number of specific risks to national security (affecting society or the State). These are presented in Table One overleaf.



**Table One: Specific threats to national security**

<b>Overlap with Personal Security</b>	<b>National Security</b>	<b>Overlap with International Security</b>
Systemic corruption	<i>Sovereignty threats</i>	Extremist ideology
<i>Significant natural disasters</i>	<i>Epidemic</i>	<i>Regional conflict</i>
Regional power outages	Espionage	Global pandemic
Identity theft	<i>Trafficking</i>	<i>Supply chain security</i>
Contamination of water supply	<i>Major civil disorder</i>	<i>Border violations</i>
<i>Mass gatherings</i>	Cyber attack	International transport
Organised crime	<i>Marine oil spill</i>	<i>NZ reputation</i>
Food safety	<i>Resource protection</i>	NZ'ers' safety abroad
	<i>Critical infrastructure</i>	<i>Terrorism</i>
	Bio-security threats	
	<i>Supply chain threats</i>	

The NSS recognises that national security policies have moved away from the traditional focus on protecting the State against military threats or political violence. Modern concepts of national security include the management of civil contingencies and societal risks. Nevertheless, defence and more particularly the NZDF has an integral role to play in the chosen risk management approach to national security. The risks highlighted above (in italics) are indicative of where the NZDF can make a significant contribution either in isolation or working in conjunction with other agencies.

Before turning to the NZDF, it should be acknowledged that the NSS is due to be reviewed, updated and, one hopes, transformed into a cogent National Security Strategy document that more fully reflects a whole of government assessment of the strategic environment etc. It is increasingly commonplace for States that generate national security strategies to do so on an annual basis. In reality this often means that little has changed in the strategic environment or in the documents themselves. But it does allow flexibility to respond to seismic or unexpected events – for example the rise of Islamic State or significant natural disasters or weather events. Consequently, it is submitted that **a National Security Strategy should be generated** that operates in conjunction with the generation of the Defence White Paper. At present, the government is relying upon less comprehensive national security *statements*. These statements may be timelier and more cost efficient than an over-arching strategy. But recent examples have demonstrated that such statements are

little more than announcements of intended policy or new legislation. They do not equate to strategy or a strategic assessment of the security environment.

## Defence Assessment 2014

In preparation for the Defence White Paper consultation process, the Defence Assessment 2014 was generated. This reasonably comprehensive document explicitly states in its introduction that the international environment is one “shaped by action and reaction, dialogue and dispute, coercion and cooperation”. As such, it is “important that all elements of national strategy are examined regularly and systematically”. The Defence Assessment 2014 thus provides an “assessment of the strategic environment out to 2040”.

This statement of intent raises a few pertinent issues; namely:

- **Prioritisation** – To what extent should the Defence Assessment 2014 be regarded as a substitute for or supplement to the current NSS or a future national security strategy? (For example, according to DPMC, it is expected that *New Zealand's Security System* will be reviewed from time to time, to ensure that it remains current and relevant to the security risks confronting New Zealand.)<sup>2</sup>
- **Leading Reference** – To what extent should the Defence Assessment 2014 be regarded as ‘core material’ that will impact upon and/or shape a future national security strategy?
- **Relevance** – To what extent is an assessment of the international environment that looks over the horizon to 2040 (mid to long range) considered to be of utility to a *contemporary* national security strategy (short range) and as a justification for in-train defence capabilities projects?

In the absence of authoritative answers to these questions, the Defence Assessment 2014 should only be regarded as a long-range perspective of the international environment; to assist in the decision-making process with regard to future defence procurement and capabilities acquisition projects. On the strength of this perspective, New Zealand will only have one chance in the next 25 years (up to 2040) to ensure that the correct capital investments are made. It is therefore essential that before the Defence budget is committed to ‘headline’ capabilities or platforms, a decision must be made on the **country's security focus and priorities** so that Defence spending and the shape of the NZDF accurately supports the objectives implicit within the extant NSS. To cite the NSS, it is important that any Defence spending provides “value for money”. Value for money can only be provided if plans for the NZDF demonstrate the following performance indicators:

- *coherence* - across all elements;
- *connectedness* - between elements, and with other systems;
- *completeness* - so every significant element is included;
- *clarity* - of understanding about the total system; and
- *consistency* - in terms of processes and standards applied.

The relevance of these five “Cs” to the investment in and development of the NZDF underpins the arguments made in the remainder of this submission.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/node/930>

## Future 35: Our strategy to 2035

Future 35 is an unabashed strategy document for NZDF with short, mid, and long-term objectives focused upon delivering a Joint Amphibious Task Force (2015); enhancing combat capability (2020); and having an integrated defence force (2035). Future 35 recognises that primary tasks for the NZDF include securing the EEZ, supporting the pursuit of national interests in Antarctica and security responsibilities in the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. This is reflected in the supporting assessment of the strategic environment with an emphasis upon peace and security in the Southwest Pacific but also further afield to Southeast Asia.

Of note, Future 35 highlights the need to protect the New Zealand's maritime domain. It holds that New Zealand is likely to have one of the world's few remaining sustainable fisheries, with a continuing need for monitoring, control and surveillance regimes; the impact of climate change, particularly to the people of the South Pacific. It notes further the increasing pervasive influence of outside countries and non-government actors in the affairs (and resource allocation and distribution) of the Pacific, which will test the ability of NZ to "remain at the forefront of international efforts to support Pacific Island states".

As envisaged in Future 35, the key enabler to achieve the primary tasks of the NZDF in this strategic environment is the Joint Amphibious Task Force (JATF). However, the strategy document is silent on the essential details that would drive the operationalisation of the JATF. For example:

- Are the Navy, Air and Land integrated, indoctrinated and equipped to achieve amphibious operations in the South Pacific and within a coalition?
- Is the spending on HMNZS Canterbury value for money, i.e. is it genuinely multi-role and capable of operating effectively in the amphibious environment?<sup>3</sup>
- If HMNZS Canterbury is inadequate to achieve the strategic objectives of Future 35, should NZ commit to a lesser version of the Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) procurement process adopted by Australia, or will New Zealand be dependent upon Australia for this capability?

According to the Defence White Paper 2010, continued and close interaction with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) at all levels is important to ensure that levels of interoperability are sustained. Close interaction with the ADF also offers potential efficiencies. Much is already done in this area through the mechanism of Closer Defence Relations (CDR). The commitment to CDR will require sufficient investment in the NZDF for it to keep pace with relevant aspects of the (r)evolution in military technology over the next 25 years.<sup>4</sup> Beyond the issue of funding levels, commitment to CDR raises a further important question, namely:

- If the NZDF is reliant upon the CDR in order to provide expeditionary capability – particularly with regard to helicopter lift and landing craft capability – to what extent could a JATF actually operate independently of the ADF in the South Pacific?

Future 35, at W4, refers to **regenerating Navy and Air capabilities**. It is opined that this is paramount. In the maritime arena, for example, the RNZN is limited in its reach and effectiveness. It is also highly questionable if the Navy has the requisite capabilities to adequately protect the EEZ, even when operating in conjunction with aviation assets. The RNZN might be able to detect illegal fishing, piracy or trafficking in the region – but in the

<sup>3</sup> The answer to this question will depend on what is expected of the vessel. It appears to be less than fully mission capable for amphibious operations. The Canterbury does have the capability to support across-the-beach operations in a benign, post natural disaster environment (this is critical in the Pacific, where many small islands cannot be accessed by fixed-wing aircraft.)

<sup>4</sup> New Zealand Government (Ministry of Defence), Defence White Paper 2010, p 38.

absence of **available and effective assets** and **robust policies** and **directives** that allow Captains the fullest range of actions, recent examples of failed interdictions have demonstrated that the Navy's enforcement capability is increasingly moribund.

Future 35, at M10, highlights equipment deficiencies and the need to 'enhance the availability of key platforms'. This is logical, but the impetus must be on the identification of the key platforms (means) to achieve the strategic objectives (ends) of New Zealand, particularly in relation to the EEZ. In this regard, Future 35 refers to 'more than 10 different operational missions' with different demands on force elements. The intent is to maximise the effectiveness of operations and to achieve the following effects:

- Increase our engagement and security cooperation in the Southwest Pacific;
- Ensure we have capable force elements able to respond outside of the Southwest Pacific; and
- Have a comprehensive approach to securing our EEZ against future threats.

Each of these 'effects' deserves further elaboration. Firstly, increasing engagement and security cooperation in the Southwest Pacific places demands upon diplomatic and international relations. From a military capability perspective, this effect should fundamentally be the preserve of the JATF.<sup>5</sup> However, if the recent cyclone in Vanuatu demonstrated anything, it was the inadequacy of the NZDF's capabilities to respond to such an event quickly and effectively. Island nations, whether beset by natural disasters or hostility and belligerence, are rarely suitable for strategic airlift. The shortage of sufficiently long and load-bearing runways or strips is exacerbated by a dearth of helicopter lift. This is a serious shortcoming because an effective task force operating in this region must have the capacity to be entirely self-sufficient in terms of lift, manpower, logistic supplies and generation of drinking water. Although HMNZS Canterbury is a bespoke multi-role vessel (MRV), the shortage of helicopters on or under her decks places unrealistic demands on this asset. Troops may be able to get ashore through the use of her landing craft and rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB), but how do they then penetrate beyond the littoral without adequate lift or, alternatively, deploy to various locations at the same time?

Secondly, the stated need for capable force elements to be able to respond to contingencies outside of the Southwest Pacific raises the fundamental issue of necessity. In the contemporary security environment, why is it essential for the NZDF need to respond to threats beyond the EEZ or the Southwest Pacific? This question would best be answered through New Zealand's yet-to-be articulated national security strategy, rather than the Defence White Paper 2015. In the absence of an authoritative answer to the question of necessity, it might be argued that the rationale for the capability to respond to events beyond the Southwest Pacific is based on a perceived need for force projection and maintenance of influence in the wider region, for example, Asia Pacific. However, is this logic not placing an unrealistic demand upon the NZDF and New Zealand in general? 'Penny-packeting' limited capabilities is not the best way to achieve a positive strategic effect. Indeed, it may be argued that minimal contributions are – aside from the diplomatic rhetoric -- widely regarded as 'token contributions' and more 'hindrance than help'.

When analysing this effect, reference is frequently made to Australia's extra-regional roles as a relevant comparison. But this is disingenuous. In terms of population size, land mass, GDP, and resources, Australia clearly has a massive advantage in every regard. So whilst there may be good historical reasons why New Zealand and Australia stand side by side, New Zealand should rather look towards nations with similar components of national power

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<sup>5</sup> Although not exclusively. The Offshore Patrol Vessels have been specifically designed with additional berthing space to accommodate diplomatic missions in the Pacific.

when assessing the baseline for its contribution to collective security and its defence priorities. It is time for realism to take effect.

The third 'effect' to be achieved through Future 35 – having a comprehensive approach to securing our EEZ against future threats – makes eminently good sense. In fact, it could be argued that the **EEZ** should be **the focus** of the Defence White Paper. Frequent mention is made in the various policy documents of trade, sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and natural resources. , But New Zealanders are left with the question of what is *actually* being done to ensure that the NZDF can secure the EEZ of their maritime nation? This submission avers that with the limited maritime and aviation patrol assets available, the EEZ is fundamentally insecure, and that – because the EEZ is so central to New Zealand's economic security -- much more could and should be done in this realm.

Future 35 emphasises that the NZDF is expected to remain within its appropriations and not be seeking extra operating funding until at least 2016. It must also deliver savings of \$350-400million by FY14/15. These savings will be reinvested. This level of investment in the NZDF, particularly with respect to maritime and associated aviation capabilities, is highly unlikely to be sufficient to 'secure' the EEZ. Thus, the Defence White Paper needs to address the issue of what alternative capabilities – within budget limitations – might deliver the desired core effect?

### **Defence Capability Plan 2014**

The preface to the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) states that the NZDF must be 'expeditionary' in all respects; that it must have 'reliable, sustainable and high quality equipment that is both effective and safe'. This brings into sharp relief the need for strategic airlift and maritime assets that are capable of operating in difficult environmental conditions. Reliable support for an expeditionary force demands a degree of robustness and utility.

The DCP identifies the role of the NZDF as multi-faceted, including:

- Defending New Zealand's sovereignty;
- Discharging our obligations as an effective ally of Australia;
- Contributing to and, where necessary, leading peace and security operations in the South Pacific;
- Making a credible contribution in support of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region;
- Protecting NZ's wider interests by contributing to international peace and security, and the international rule of law;
- Contributing to a whole of Government efforts to monitor the international strategic environment; and
- Being prepared to respond to sudden shifts and other disjunctions in the strategic environment.

The starting point for the development of military capabilities to undertake these tasks is New Zealand's maritime domain and the South Pacific. Ironically, it is in this area that this submission avers that New Zealand is still **underequipped, underprepared** and is being **distracted** by attempts to simultaneously achieve the other tasks mentioned. This is the case despite the notional establishment of the JATF.

The DCP highly commends existing NZDF combat capabilities. For example, in the maritime area, the RNZN frigates are described as “integrated capability systems [which] represent the only maritime force element capable of operating across the spectrum of operations from constabulary and humanitarian tasks to combat roles as part of a multi-national response”. Moreover, naval helicopters provide “extended reach, surveillance and air-delivered capabilities for the frigates”. This unqualified and rather lavish praise provides a thin disguise for a number of thorny yet essential issues that must be confronted in the Defence White Paper 2015.

A Navy with only two frigates, one of which is almost always in refit, replenishment or repair, is bereft of a contingency capability. If one of the two frigates is tasked to participate in a multinational operation, for example Operation OCEAN SHIELD,<sup>6</sup> it is highly improbable that the RNZN could respond effectively to a second, simultaneous tasking. Aside from refit, replenishment and repair, given that the JATF is inherently scalable in nature, it is important that the RNZN has a contingency in place should two frigates be committed to operations with the task force. Furthermore, due to the likelihood of committing forces to coalition operations, the contribution of combat capable vessels should not be underestimated.<sup>7</sup> Even if a second task arose in the guise of a humanitarian mission, for example, New Zealand may be caught short. Although the HMNZS Canterbury could be deployed in this role, it could not operate safely in a hostile humanitarian assistance environment without the support of a frigate.

In addition, whilst the current naval helicopters may add reach they **do not add lift**, again exposing the limitations of extant maritime combat capabilities and the notional JATF. It is acknowledged that the recently procured NH90 helicopters will add to the available tactical airlift. But open source reports suggest that a number of nations have experienced ‘problems’ with their NH90, including limits on take-off weight. Further, the DCP refers to the NH90 being used to conduct ‘limited operations from HMNZS Canterbury’. However, it is understood that whilst the NH90 is currently configured to be transported on-board HMNZS Canterbury it can only operate from land with a hardstand. Until it is reconfigured to have full operating capability from a ship, the lift issue for the JATF remains.

The Capability Plan stresses that the importance of the combat capabilities of the NZDF cannot be understated, and that the NZDF “must have the combination of personnel, equipment, training, and experience of working with other forces to allow the Government to make a credible valued contribution when it needs or wishes to do so, including in higher intensity environments”.<sup>8</sup> This begs the obvious question: a credible and valued contribution to operations of what magnitude and duration? A 24-hour hostage rescue operation involving a handful of special force operators may be undertaken in a ‘higher intensity environment’. So might a full-scale conventional military operation that endures for several years and requires full-scale military mobilisation on a national level. The types and scales of combat capabilities required for each type of operation are fundamentally different. In fact, the Capability Plan, as well as the other policy documents underpinning the White Paper 2015 process, is quite silent about probable or even conceivable military operational scenarios.

Axiomatically, if the emphasis at lower levels of military planning is upon scenarios that would require **specific niche military capabilities** and a ‘boutique’ combat-capable force, then this should be clearly articulated in the Defence White Paper. At present, it is implicit in

<sup>6</sup> The international counter-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa.

<sup>7</sup> The contribution of HMAS *Anzac*, an *Anzac* class frigate, during the 2003 Iraq War, which included naval gunfire support, is a notable example. If the Australian Government pushes ahead with the plan to replace the Royal Australian Navy’s recently upgraded *Anzac* frigates early, they would represent an opportunity to supplement, if not replace, the RNZN’s variants.

<sup>8</sup> *Defence Capability Plan*, p 24.

the Capability Plan which states, under the rubric of “credible combat capabilities”, that “[o]ne infantry company will be held at a higher state of readiness for employment in a range of short notice contingency responses, including support to special operations. Currently the capability is able to provide a Headquarters Element, two platoons and enabling elements. It is expected that the full capability will be able to be delivered by January 2016”.<sup>9</sup> However, if defence thinking anticipates the necessity for capabilities suitable for extended conventional combat operations, then this also needs to be specified – backed by a comprehensive capabilities expansion and force mobilisation plan.

The bespoke skills of NZ’s small numbers of ground troops are recognised and well-deserved. However, in a hostile combat situation they are entirely reliant upon an allied nation to provide any form of **close air support**. Thus unless air superiority (and preferably air supremacy) has been established (or the ‘opposing forces’ have no air assets), current defence capabilities leave ground combat forces vulnerable to degradation from the air. This may not be considered relevant in the South Pacific. But if the NZDF is to deploy further afield where the air picture is unresolved, it cannot operate independently of an allied nation. This submission, reluctantly, but pragmatically, does not advocate the reintroduction of fast/strike air assets. Instead it advocates a **reassessment of the realities of the tasks** asked of the NZDF, some of which are entirely unfeasible unless operating in a coalition; at which point one has to question the risk/reward assessment.

The DCP also refers to future **air mobility**. It accurately identifies the need to quantify the size of the NZDF’s airlift requirements as the first step to replacing the C-130H and B757. There will be a number of alternatives including ‘off the shell’ options – for example, the A400M.<sup>10</sup> It is noted that the Future Air Mobility project will consider all options to maintain “the current range of capabilities”. This is reasonable in tasking terms, but the essence of a Defence White Paper process should include a reassessment of strategic objectives.<sup>11</sup>

In terms of **personnel numbers**, the DCP refers to the occasional requirement to deploy ground forces of a number equivalent to a Battalion Group. As it is uneconomic to sustain the number of personnel needed to staff a battalion group deployed on a long-term basis, mention is made of recruitment to cover subsequent rotations. However, there is scant information on how the acquisition of deployable and supporting personnel would be accomplished. In the event of heavy casualties, it is unlikely that NZDFDF recruitment appeals would attract many new Army recruits to serve in combat roles. In this scenario, might a form of conscription be considered? If so, what is the anticipated training margin and has legislation has been drafted as a contingency? If not, and the emphasis remains on a volunteer force is it envisaged that one will rely upon reserves? If so then ‘recruitment’ is not the appropriate terminology to be used. The emphasis would be upon the mobilization of reserves, and the size and readiness of such reserves must be factored into comprehensive defence capability planning.

### **Peace Support Operations Review 2013**

The New Zealand Government has publicised four criteria on which to base decisions about future deployments to peace operations. These are:

- strategic implications of the operation, including its effect on security, the humanitarian situation and New Zealand’s relationships with other countries;

<sup>9</sup> *Defence Capability Plan*, p 28.

<sup>10</sup> Albeit a recent fatal crash during testing has delayed its roll out to various European air forces.

<sup>11</sup> If NZ intends to continue ‘force projection’ beyond the Southwest Pacific region it should be considering larger aircraft more suited for strategic lift, for example the C17 or equivalent sized aircraft.

- the nature of the mission – the legality of the proposed mission and mandate under international law;
- implications for NZDF and other contributing New Zealand agencies, including risks involved in the mission; and
- whether or not there are opportunities for New Zealand to provide other forms of assistance.<sup>12</sup>

These criteria were approved by Cabinet in 2009. Following the draw-down in 2013 of New Zealand's three long-term peace support commitments in Afghanistan, Solomon Islands and Timor Leste, there was an inter-agency review of participation in peace support operations. The review recommended and Cabinet agreed in October 2013 to a set of "Refreshed Guidelines for the Assessment of Proposed New Zealand Contributions to Peace Support Operations". The guidelines are grouped into four sets of considerations listed under the following headings:

- Foreign policy/national interest considerations;
- Nature of the mission/mandate and New Zealand's possible contribution to it;
- Operational risk and risk management strategies; and
- Implications for the NZDF and other contributing agencies.<sup>13</sup>

Both the 2009 and the 2013 guidelines provide a rationale for deciding on future deployments that require contributions of significant human and other resources by New Zealand and/or a decision backed by the executive and supported by the legislature. However, the guidelines do not provide appropriate guidance or explanation for decisions to send two or three military officers to serve in faraway UN missions.

The term Military Expert on Mission (UNMEM) is currently used by the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to designate all military personnel engaged for UN peacekeeping service to undertake 'observer', 'liaison', or 'advisory' tasks in support of mission mandate implementation. These personnel are commissioned officers (ranging in rank from army captain to colonel (or equivalent)) and may be categorized as UN Military Observers (UNMOs), UN Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) or UN Military Advisers (MILADs).<sup>14</sup>

New Zealand has deployed hundreds of UNMEM to 27 different peacekeeping operations since 1948 – in Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East (see Appendix A for a list of these missions). Most of the New Zealand soldiers serving on UN missions since 2003 have been UNMEM. The 10 NZDF UNMEM deployed on two missions (in Africa and the Middle East) were New Zealand's most visible contribution to UN peacekeeping in the final year of its campaign for a 2015/16 seat on the UN Security Council. It is likely that New Zealand will continue to deploy UNMEM for decades to come, on UN missions launched in deteriorating or fragile security environments in far-away locations.

Yet the full value of deploying UNMEM and UN staff officers abroad has not been realised by New Zealand – mainly because the deployment of NZ UNMEM is neither conceptualised nor

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/International-Security/4-Peacekeeping-Operations.php>

<sup>13</sup> New Zealand Government, Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, Minute of Decision on Peace Support Operations Review, ERD Min (13) 11/3, 23 October 2013.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations DPKO/DFS, *Roles and Training Standards for UN Military Experts on Mission*, 1 March 2009, p.2. Available at <http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Guidelines%20on%20Roles%20and%20Training%20Standards%20for%20Military%20Experts%20on%20Mission.pdf>



managed within a deliberate, strategic context. The Government's stated criteria as well as the public debate on peacekeeping focuses on New Zealand's contribution to international peace and security in the host country or region, and on the risks to New Zealand of involvement in particular operations. Little, if anything, is said about the potential benefits to New Zealand to be derived from certain types and areas of deployment – beyond the current superficial assessment of the supposed nexus between commitment to peacekeeping and 'good international citizenship'.

This is not the same as determining the more enduring and real value to New Zealand to be gained by deploying military experts to participate in certain types of UN operations. In short, the 'value proposition' behind UNMEM deployment – the political, strategic, and operational value to New Zealand of having UNMEM and UN staff officers deployed in particular missions – needs to be determined and stated in the Defence White Paper.

## Conclusions

This submission has argued that the overall orientation of Defence – including financial investment, the 'shape' of the NZDF, and training and development – is anomalous, and that the wisdom of continuing to make commitments to collective security operations on the premise that the NZDF can 'punch above its weight' needs to be challenged. Moreover, this submission raises a number of issues and questions that need to be addressed in the Defence White paper 2015 – for example:

- Is the spending on HMNZS Canterbury value for money, i.e. is it genuinely multi-role and capable of operating effectively in the amphibious environment?
- If not, should NZ commit to a lesser version of the Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) procurement process adopted by Australia?
- If the NZDF is reliant upon Australia in order to provide expeditionary capability – particularly with regard to helicopter lift and landing craft capability – to what extent could a JATF actually operate independently of the ADF in the South Pacific?
- Without sufficient airlift capabilities, how would NZDF troops deployed on operations in the Southwest Pacific, penetrate beyond the littoral or, alternatively, deploy to various locations at the same time?
- Why is it essential for the NZDF to respond to threats beyond the EEZ or the Southwest Pacific?
- What is actually being done to ensure that the NZDF can secure the EEZ of our maritime nation?
- If the approved level of investment in the NZDF's maritime and associated aviation capabilities is not sufficient to secure the EEZ, then what alternative capabilities – within budget limitations – might deliver this core effect?
- What are the likely military operational scenarios for which NZDF combat capabilities are being developed?

This submission has pointedly focused upon the contradictions and discrepancies in New Zealand's defence strategy and plans, as articulated in the *Defence White Paper 2015 Public Consultation Document* (May 2015); *New Zealand's National Security System* (2011); *Defence Assessment* (2014); *Future35* (2011); *Our strategy to 2035* (2011); *Defence Capability Plan* (2014); and the Cabinet Committee *Minute on Decision of New Zealand Peace Support Operations Review* (2013).

For the sake of expediency and brevity, we have not addressed some glaring gaps in the documents with regard to the necessary defence capabilities to deliver certain other of New Zealand's strategic objectives. However, our own omissions should not also be those of the

Ministry of Defence in the process of drafting the Defence White Paper 2015. For example, we feel strongly that consideration is required with regard to:

- The establishment of a dedicated Coast Guard capable of maritime policing roles in the EEZ; and
- Military Aid to the Civil Authorities/Power – the implications of the over-reliance upon the NZDF of multiple civilian agencies for ongoing training and operational capability support. In addition the NZDF is committed via MOUs to a support role in the emergency response plans of the majority of the civilian agencies.

This later aspect in particular cannot or should not be overlooked in the process of developing a Defence White Paper that balances NZDF future commitments with capabilities.

## Recommendations

Given that the stated aim of this submission is to highlight obvious anomalies which need to be resolved in the Defence White Paper 2015, it is fitting to conclude with several recommendations which might contribute positively to the resolution of the noted inconsistencies in extant policy and plans. The list which follows is not extensive, but it covers some of the most salient issues raised in our submission:

- The NSS (National Security System) should be transformed into a comprehensive and cogent National Security Strategy that is regularly reviewed, or at least updated in conjunction with the generation of future Defence White Papers.
- Before the Defence budget is committed to 'headline' capabilities or platforms, a decision should be made on the country's security focus and priorities, so that Defence spending and the shape of the NZDF accurately supports the objectives implicit within the extant NSS.
- If Defence planning anticipates the necessity for capabilities suitable for extended conventional combat operations, then this should be specified in the White Paper – and backed by a comprehensive capabilities expansion and force mobilisation plan.
- In the absence of close air support and other essential combat enablers, we recommend a thorough reassessment of the realities of the tasks asked of the NZDF – particularly those that are entirely unfeasible unless operating in a coalition.
- The 'value proposition' behind UNMEM deployment – the political, strategic, and operational value to New Zealand of having UNMEM and UN staff officers deployed in particular missions – should be stated in the Defence White Paper.
- To achieve a more comprehensive management of the identified risks to New Zealand's national security, we recommend that the Defence White Paper 2015 and future defence spending guidance should be clearly focussed on prioritising maritime and amphibious force capabilities for securing vital interests in the country's EEZ, the South Pacific, and Antarctica.

Finally, it is recommended that sincere and serious consideration be given to two specific areas of **capital investment/acquisition**, namely *amphibious platforms* and a *third frigate*. In particular, consideration should be given to the acquisition of an amphibious assault ship/amphibious landing operations ship capable of carrying and deploying helicopters of various sizes and capabilities (lift and personnel), as well as carrying and deploying Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel or hovercraft. Such a platform enables greater reach and capability

with respect to amphibious operations – including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance – and enables enhanced capability for operating in the littoral.<sup>15</sup>

This submission has referred to the necessity for a third frigate to mitigate the potential risk posed by simultaneous operations. This need was confirmed by Rear Admiral Jack Steer, Chief of Navy, who stated in a recent interview with *Defence News* that:

*“I would like to think that whatever we get, we get three of them. ... With two, you might get two available – but you might get none as well. ... Three slightly used combat platforms is fine; three brand new ones is fine. I just think we need to get away from two”*<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Examples of such vessels include HMS Ocean, an Invincible Class amphibious assault ship due to be retired from service in 2018; and HMAS Canberra. In terms of tonnage and capability both ships may be perceived as excessive for New Zealand's stated strategic. Thus smaller versions of the LHD might be sourced and considered. In keeping with the DCP, procurement of such a platform should be approached as an 'off the shelf' option (presumably a decommissioned ship from another Navy).

<sup>16</sup> The full text of the interview is available at <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/leaders/interviews/2015/04/20/interview-rear-adm-jack-steer/26070851/>

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19 June 2015

Defence White Paper 2015  
Ministry of Defence  
PO Box 12703  
WELLINGTON 6144

Dear Sir/Madam

I am delighted to make this submission to the 2015 New Zealand Defence White Paper public consultation process. Northrop Grumman is a Global Defence company, headquartered in the United States, with strong interests in the Asia Pacific region. New Zealand and Australia are both very important markets for Northrop Grumman, and we are keenly interested in the future direction that both countries take to address their security threats and challenges over the next 25 years.

The 2015 White Paper will be a pivotal policy document which will help guide New Zealand in the management of its international relationships. These relationships will be critical in the coming years, both with Australia and the US, and within the regional contexts of the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asian regions. New Zealand's significant maritime responsibilities may also require it to adopt a more outward focussed national security policy to ensure that it has some capability to influence matters in its immediate maritime area of interest and across its growing economic region of interest.

To help meet this challenge, this paper discusses a number of key issues surrounding information security, advanced technology, force integration and maritime surveillance. Our objective is to assist in the development of policy and programs that will lead to a more effective whole of Government national security capability.

The submission is structured into two parts: Part One of the submission is unrestricted. It broadly overviews the higher level strategic considerations that might be relevant to New Zealand's future national security policy. Part Two of the submission is Commercial-in-Confidence and caveated as Northrop Grumman Proprietary Information. It offers selective comment on specific capabilities and technologies, the detail of which might be of interest in the future development of New Zealand's national security capability.

We respectfully request that Part Two be withheld from open publication, however we would be pleased to receive enquires from any New Zealand government agency regarding this submission. We also seek to engage with local industry in areas of common interest and are actively pursuing partnerships in a wide range of capability areas.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions on our submission.

Sincerely



Ian Irving  
Chief Executive, Australia  
Northrop Grumman

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

**The New Zealand 2015 Defence White Paper  
Public Consultation Process  
Submission by Northrop Grumman**

**Part One  
New Zealand's Evolving Strategic Interests**

**New Zealand White Paper – Public Consultation**

On 5 May 2015, New Zealand Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee opened the public consultation process for the New Zealand 2015 Defence White Paper which provides for the tabling of a range of perspectives so as to inform New Zealand's defence policy and planning process.

The last New Zealand Defence White Paper was published in 2010. This White Paper, to be published before the end of 2015, is intended to be the blueprint for how the New Zealand Government seeks to address the security threats, challenges and opportunities facing New Zealand over the next 25 years.

More specifically in responding to these threats, challenges and opportunities, the 2015 Defence White Paper will outline the roles and tasks that the New Zealand Defence Force should undertake as well as outlining the specific capabilities and resources the New Zealand Defence Force will need to carry out its roles and tasks.

The New Zealand 2015 Defence White Paper public consultation process provides an opportunity for Northrop Grumman to submit some views which might prove helpful in determining how New Zealand should shape its future defence capabilities. Accordingly, the submission is structured into two parts:

Part One of the submission is unrestricted. It broadly overviews the higher level strategic considerations that might be relevant to New Zealand's future national security policy.

Part Two of the submission is caveated Commercial-in-Confidence. It offers selective comment on specific capabilities and technologies, the detail of which might be of interest in the future development of the New Zealand Defence Force.

**New Zealand's National Security Environment - Geostrategic and Economic**

New Zealand's 2010 Defence White Paper provided a useful summary of New Zealand's geostrategic and economic interests. Using that policy paper as a basis, it is only necessary to update the various factors that should influence New Zealand's 2015 Defence White Paper. Notwithstanding its location in the South Pacific, and small population of 4.5 million, New Zealand still has significant security interests, the most obvious of which relate to its extensive maritime responsibilities extending from the Southern Ocean to the dependent territory of the Tokelau Islands, some 1,600 nm north of New Zealand. New Zealand is also responsible for the defence and foreign policy of the Cook Islands and Niue – both independent nations but “in free association with New Zealand” – with both Niue and

the Cook Islands situated east of Tonga, some 1,500 nm from New Zealand. These geostrategic factors involve long distances and large maritime areas and are enduring factors that should play a major part in shaping New Zealand's national security policy.

New Zealand's economy is an open economy with a competitive agricultural base. It also has open access into the Australian economy. Over recent years New Zealand's economy has proved quite robust having recovered quicker than many other "first world" economies from the economic disruption of the 2008 global financial crisis. Indeed, since the 2010 Defence White Paper, the New Zealand economy has benefitted considerably from a significant expansion in New Zealand's international trade, which in turn has expanded the scope and depth of New Zealand's relationships with its international trading partners.

As a consequence of these economic developments New Zealand's GDP per capita has been enhanced and the value of the New Zealand dollar has strengthened. In summary, New Zealand's open economy and expanded participation in international trade has made New Zealand not only a wealthier country, but also a country that is now more dependent on its major regional and global economic interests; and from these interests, significant national security implications flow. It is therefore timely that New Zealand considers its need to further invest in its national security and defence capabilities.

### **New Zealand's National Security Environment – Australia, ANZUS and the Asia-Pacific**

New Zealand has a long history as a significant player in global affairs with an influence well beyond its size and shores. But over the period 1984 to 2009, there was significant erosion in New Zealand's defence capabilities, and a large gap in both quantitative and qualitative terms, emerged between Australian and New Zealand defence capabilities. This under-investment in national security has limited New Zealand's ability to contribute to both regional and global partnerships especially with its long standing partners and allies.

But since 2008, there has been substantial effort in reconstructing New Zealand's links with its long-standing traditional partners, which have gone a long way to remediate the difficulties of 1984 when the US formally suspended its ANZUS obligations with New Zealand. The 2010 "Wellington Declaration" between New Zealand and the US was a major step forward aided also by the publication in 2010 of a Defence White Paper – New Zealand's first Defence White Paper in 25 years.

The past 25 years have also seen substantial adjustment in the growth and balance of power between nations in Asia and on the Pacific Rim. Notwithstanding the US "pivot to the Asia-Pacific", these developments suggest that Asia-Pacific nations need to be cognisant of the growth in national power and of the increase in military capabilities in the region, and for Asia-Pacific nations to review the depth and effectiveness of their investment in their own national security capabilities.

All these changes over the past quarter of a century suggest the time is right for New Zealand to look further beyond its shores in addressing its future national security requirements. Certainly increases in the national defence budget seem justified, and while New Zealand's traditional regional geographic focus should remain the basis for its defence capabilities, there seems a clear need for New Zealand to expand its national security interests further afield.

## **New Zealand's National Security Environment – Advanced Technology and Key Shaping Factors**

Notwithstanding New Zealand's small population, New Zealand has some advantages in developing a small but capable defence force. New Zealand has access to "first world" educational resources; it is a rapid adopter and adapter of new and evolving technologies; and it has a track record of productive innovation.

These factors, suggest that New Zealand's national security policy should exploit the virtues of advanced technology and innovation, rather than rely on dated-technology or manpower-heavy national security solutions.

Advanced technology is also particularly appropriate for New Zealand's maritime-focussed national security environment and for acquiring the essential intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities without which a national defence force cannot successfully operate.

## **New Zealand's National Security Environment – Conclusion**

In conclusion, New Zealand's policy focus should emphasise:

- a commitment to New Zealand's regional geographic environment;
- an unequivocal commitment to the defence of Australia, its long standing partner and ally;
- a commitment to preventing instability in the South Pacific; and
- in recognition of the importance of trade to New Zealand, a commitment to the security of international trade routes.

But all these considerations must also be placed within the context of New Zealand's international relationships with Australia and the US, and within the regional contexts of the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.

New Zealand's significant maritime responsibilities also suggest that it needs an outward focussed national security policy to ensure that it has some capability to influence matters in its maritime area of interest and across its growing economic region of interest.

New Zealand also has a long tradition of supporting just, global causes and if it is to play a positive role in future world security affairs, then it will need, in conjunction with international partners, to develop and retain a significant national defence capability.



Introduction

The opportunity to make submission on the White Paper is appreciated.

Summary

My main concerns are that firstly, that the White Paper accepts without question that New Zealand needs armed forces and overlooks the extent to which military activities and costs can militate against security and the wellbeing and prosperity of our nation; secondly it overlooks the deleterious effect of militarisation on the environment here and overseas and thirdly, that an assumption is made that the armed forces can play a role “in the development of New Zealand’s youth”.

Need for and costs of militarisation

For many years successive governments have said that there are no immediate military threats to this country. Our forces have been mainly used as an expeditionary force for overseas deployments and humanitarian work rather than for the defence of New Zealand.

The real threats – of cyber-attack or terrorism - are not best addressed by military action and in fact military deployment overseas could be seen as adding to terrorism threats rather than addressing them.

Demilitarisation and releasing the resources traditionally put into maintaining military forces to be used for fighting the injustice and inequality that give rise to terrorism would seem to be a better way for us to go as a country. The money released could also be used to reduce poverty and disadvantage in our country and overseas.

Humanitarian assistance could be more effectively and more cheaply undertaken by civilian agencies.

Militarism and the environment

There is an abundance of evidence that military activity contributes to climate change and a degradation of our environment.

The role of the armed forces in ‘developing NZ youth’

Youth camps can be held and youth given physical challenges without youth being introduced to military training – predominantly training in violence. We need training in non-violence rather than violence. Some of the most successful revolutions in world history have come about through non-violence. Again and again it has been shown that violence tends to breed violence rather than reducing it.

I hope that the Government will seek to address these concerns and initiate a wider consultation that takes these factors and alternatives to militarisation into account.

Kia ora and welcome,

The outlook for the next 25 years is becoming more challenging as state and non-state actors begin to exercise their power. Currently there are 41 active conflicts<sup>1</sup> of which a significant majority of them are intra-state conflicts. While the likelihood of major inter-state conflict remains low, the tensions between States have been rising in Eastern Europe and Asia-Pacific. Currently we are witnessing conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia; land reclamations in disputed areas by China in the South China Sea; the Islamic State occupying an area that covers Syria and Iraq; and crises in Libya and Yemen.

Over the last 25 years we have witnessed the revolution of technology and the coming of age of threats to our national security that did not exist before, such as cyber threats and climate change. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has reported a big jump in documented cases, of cyber-attacks, from 90 in 2011 to over 210 in 2013. Climate change is increasingly becoming a threat to New Zealand's national interests. The real impact of climate change will be felt in the low-lying Pacific Island States where entire populations will have to move to another country to find higher ground, or the aftermath of a national disaster could further exacerbate the situation by spreading disease more quickly.

Closer to home, many New Zealanders believe that we live in a benign environment, in part because of our geographical isolation and the good relations we maintain with our neighbouring countries. However with globalisation becoming ever more apparent, a security situation far from our shores could have an affect on New Zealand's national interests. Approximately 99 percent of our goods are exported via maritime means to markets around the world. New Zealand is reliant on the freedom of navigation and commerce to continue our prosperity.

The New Zealand defence organisation will also have a difficult time ahead due to the financial environment. Over the next ten years major capability equipment needs to be replaced and unfortunately the equipment will require significant investment and commitment from the government of the day.

### **1.0 New Zealand:**

In October 2014, New Zealand raised its threat level from very low to low, due to the threat from non-state actors being possible but not expected. To mitigate this threat the New Zealand Defence Force (Defence Force) should support other government agencies when required and share intelligence.

However, the main challenge to our country will face is a significant natural disaster. The Defence Force should be prepared to be part of a whole government response and plan for all contingencies. The value of such a contribution was witnessed in the response to the 2011 Canterbury earthquake.

The Defence Force should continue to support other government agencies in carrying out their objectives. Whether it is to support the New Zealand Police in counter-terrorism operations or explosive ordinance disposal; supporting Department of Conservation programmes or the Antarctic Programmes of both New Zealand and the United States; or to support search and rescue operations.

#### **1.1 Patrolling our Exclusive Economic Zone:**

At the moment the Navy is having trouble manning the Inshore Patrol Vessels and can only put two, out of the four, to sea at one time. This problem has the potential to create gaps in

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<sup>1</sup> Data according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies. <https://acd.iiss.org/>

our safety net. Thus vessels who are over fishing could exploit this gap. This will result in low fish stocks, with the replenishment rate becoming unsustainable. In certain species this is already the case. This means the government will miss out on potential revenue.

New Zealand must keep an eye on the Southern Ocean as there is potential for a maritime disaster to happen. Not only is Japan restarting its whaling programme, but there is also the illegal plundering of Antarctic tooth fish by other parties. Sea Sheppard are shadowing these fleets and are putting themselves and others at risk with their tactics. For example the collision between MY Ady Gil and the Japanese whaling vessel MV Shōnan Maru followed by the subsequent sinking of MY Ady Gil in 2010. It takes one wrong decision to cause a disaster and Defence Force assets should continuously patrol the southern ocean to ensure this scenario does not occur.

### **1.2 Community and youth development programmes:**

Programmes that support a higher standard of living and health should continue and possibly be replicated in other areas that are remote or have limited facilities. Operation Wisdom Tooth, which was carried out by the Defence Force in 2014, is a good example of community engagement with the response from the community being highly supportive. It also helps our service men and women by creating opportunities for them to maintain their skills, as well as upskilling them in a real environment. It also prepares them for operations like the Pacific Partnership and Tropic Twilight.

However, when it comes to youth development and limited service volunteer programmes, success will vary depending on the Government's objectives. With the onus very much on the individual, it becomes very challenging. The Cadet Forces are a great organisation for those that volunteer to join, and greater awareness of the Cadets should be promoted through schools and colleges.

Limited Service Volunteers come from backgrounds where there is no order or regimental lifestyle. The individuals that take part in the six week programme have a high chance of reoffending when they return to their communities due to the lack of support afterwards. If the government chooses to continue this programme then there should be greater co-ordination with other agencies or non-government organisations, to make sure these individuals stay on track after completing the course.

### **2.0 Australasia and the South Pacific:**

Australia has been our 'ally' since our forces joined together for the Gallipoli campaign of the First World War, and New Zealand will likely respond to an attack against Australia by a state actor should it occur. However, in the years to come, most conflict or instability will occur in the Pacific Island region.

Several Pacific Island nations have weak civil services and low socioeconomic status, where corruption and a youth population with high youth unemployment exists. This can result in civil unrest and criminal activity that will affect New Zealand. To mitigate corruption and civil unrest will require staff exchanges. Members of the civil service, police and military will come to New Zealand for education and training purposes. We would also send our own civil, law enforcement and military officials there, to advise the said officials in their own home country.

Partnering with other government agencies to create development projects that support all areas of society will also mitigate civil unrest, from empowering women to participate in small business, to

building classrooms that are environmentally-friendly to decrease the Pacific Islands' reliance on petrol generators for electricity.

Climate change's effect on weather events and rising sea levels should be considered a threat to New Zealand's national interests, because severe natural disasters could increase the strain on already fragile Pacific Island governments. Humanitarian and Disaster Response (HADR) operations are becoming more regular. Recent operations include Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. The Defence Force should continue to support operations like Pacific Partnership and Tropic Twilight, as they help to build up the capacity and capability of host nations to respond to such events.

It is important for the Defence Force to maintain and maximise interoperability with the Australian Defence Force and the French Armed Forces stationed in the Pacific, through the Closer Defence Relations (CDR), FRANZ (France, Australia and New Zealand) Agreement and the Status of Forces agreement with France.

### **2.1 Illegal fishing in the South Pacific:**

For most Pacific Island countries the fishing industry is the primary pillar of their economies. The Pacific Island states do not have the capability to effectively patrol their Exclusive Economic Zones. Thus it is imperative that the Defence Force works with partner governments. Positive steps taken since the last White Paper in 2010 include the resumption of basing a P-3K2 maritime patrol aircraft in Fiji and various law enforcement agencies sea-riding when a Royal New Zealand Navy vessel is in the area.

If the New Zealand Government were to consider illegal fishing as a serious problem, then they should reconsider basing an Offshore Patrol Vessel in Tonga. While this was previously ruled out due to problems over accommodation and the standard of fuel, a joint NZAID/Defence Force programme could construct shared facilities with the Tongan Maritime Forces, which could address these problems.

New Zealand in the past has provided support for Australia's Pacific Patrol Boat programme. However these boats are coming to the end of their operational lives. The replacement programme calls for a larger more capable vessel and New Zealand could support the programme. The Royal New Zealand Navy posts a non-commissioned officer as a Pacific Patrol Boat technical adviser to the Cook Islands Police, and this posting could be expanded for other countries.

### **3.0 Asia and a world on edge:**

New Zealand should continue to be an active supporter of a rules based international system. However, over the last 5 years this system has been increasingly tested and while the threat of interstate warfare is low, the likelihood should not be ruled out. Russia's annexation of Crimea, Syria's use of chemical weapons in the civil war, and China's land reclamations in the South China Sea are all seen as violations against the system.

As a good global citizen New Zealand should voice concern when a crisis or a potential conflict arises. Our men and women who serve around the world are known for their humility and as a force for good. New Zealand as a whole supports a resolution to a crisis that is fair and reasonable and is supported by the United Nations. However, in the years to come this idea will be challenged.

With New Zealand having been elected to the United Nations Security Council, we have the ability to raise concerns over potential crises. This will have to include holding talks with permanent Security

Council members about their use of the veto. The responsibility to protect individuals from extreme violence, for example genocide, should be in the interests of every nation. Without the removal of the veto, or the reduction of use, by permanent members of the Security Council, the United Nations will continue to be side-lined.

### **3.1 Asia and the rise of an economic superpower:**

Currently in Asia we are witnessing an arms race, with multiple nations reinvesting in their armed forces. The proliferation of submarines and stealth warships poses the greatest threat to regional security, especially as they become harder to detect.

China's rise has been a great success story due to the hundreds of millions of people being lifted out of poverty. As we know, increased economic power comes with an increase in military clout. With China building aircraft carriers and artificial islands in the South China Sea, they are the lead cause of this arms race. New Zealand should urge restraint by all parties, and the building of artificial islands to cease.

The Senkaku and Sparty Islands are claimed by multiple nations, due to the large deposits of natural resources around them. New Zealand should remain neutral and not support a particular country's claim, because it is in our interest to ensure that the freedom of navigation remains.

In approximately 10 years Taiwan has the potential to be a conflict zone. China is in the process of acquiring the Russian made S400 missile system, which has the capability to cover the entire island of Taiwan. If China were to invade and annex the island the system will be able to keep the United States, and other coalition forces away from mounting a possible support mission with Taiwan.

It is important that New Zealand supports the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) with Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom. What will be important in the future is when Defence Force assets are deployed to and around the region as they promote New Zealand Inc. With the Treaty of Waitangi settlement process coming to a close for historical grievances, we could promote it as an example of peace and reconciliation between different parties.

### **3.2 Middle East peace and the rise of non-state actors:**

The Middle East remains a volatile region. The Arab Spring brought people the hope for democracy. Unfortunately Tunisia is the only country that has remained stable throughout the transition. Egypt was taken over by the military after an Islamist government, and Libya became a broken state not long after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi.

The reconstruction and stability operation in Afghanistan provided vital experience to all. Afghanistan also exposed major gaps in our capability that increased the risk of harm to our servicemen and women. It will be important that the Defence Force maintains the knowledge of operating in such an environment should there be a need to serve in another Middle East country.

The flow of arms in the region has become of major concern, especially if there is a future civil war. The conflict is being fought on two fronts. On one front you have an on-going conflict between the Sunnis and Shia. The second front is the geo-political conflict between Saudi

Arabia and Iran. The flow of arms has also contributed to the rise of the Islamic State, due to the lack of controls on such aid from Arab nations.

Globalisation has also contributed to the rise of the Islamic State and other terror organisations, as any individual from any country can support such an organisations. Islamic State is the first terror organisation to be effective in using social media and alternative means of communication, to recruit and rule by fear.

To reduce Islamic State and non-state actors in the region will require major social change. The Arab Spring was one of the first signs of such change. Unfortunately, the moderate opposition were not prepared, and organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamic extremists were. Another change will need to be education because a vast majority of the adult population in the Arab world is illiterate, and in some countries they are taught to hate certain religious or ethnic groups.

To unlock the Middle East peace process New Zealand should support education initiatives and continue involvement in the United Nations Sinai monitoring mission. The two state solution in the Middle East is the only option for success. Unfortunately the only way forward will be when a majority of the population on both sides support it, instead of relying solely on diplomatic means to entice both countries to the table.

#### **4.0 Cyber warfare and security:**

Technology advances every two years has helped people to interact with one another more easily. Unfortunately, this has also increased our vulnerability to cyberattacks from either state-backed or non-state actors. New Zealand is also considered an easier target when it comes to cyber warfare than Australia, the United States or Europe. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has reported that attacks on New Zealand's cyber network have doubled and will keep increasing, with most of these attacks originating from China. The cyberattack on Spark's internet network in 2014 is a good example of the effect of such an attack.

On a national level New Zealand will have to increase awareness of cyberattacks and will need to invest more in its cyber security infrastructure, mainly through the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB). To reduce the cost, the GCSB should work with other partners of the AUSCANNZUKUS agreement.

Since the early 2000's the battlespace has changed, from attacking the command network of a foreign military to jamming networks in areas where there is a potential roadside explosive device. The Ministry of Defence should be wary of cyber warfare and its future implications when implementing its network-enabled army programme, and other programmes that rely on Information Communication Technology.

The government should also consider acquiring offensive cyber warfare capabilities, either by developing our own or in partnership with Australia. The Defence Force should also post a liaison officer to the United States Cyber Command to ensure co-operability and to keep up with the latest developments in cyber warfare.

#### **5.0 Our service men and women and future equipment:**

Over the last seven years we have seen our Defence Force scaled back, civilianisation in certain areas, and morale hit record lows. During tough economic times it is usual to see the budgets for the armed

services cut. A challenge for the next 15 years will be to increase capital expenditure to cover replacement programmes for platforms that are integral to the operation of the Defence Force.

It is important to remember that the men and women who serve in our Defence Force also have to put their lives on the line when called to do so to defend our country and values. When recruiting, and to mitigate the shortage of personnel in certain trades, more emphasis should go into the promotion of lifestyle in the Defence Force and the benefits the Defence Force can provide the recruit.

The amalgamation of the health services and military police is to be commended. It has enabled greater efficiency and cost savings, supporting the relationship between the three services, while maintaining the specialist medical care provided by the Navy and Air Force. Future joint activity between the three services should be encouraged.

Future equipment procurement must retain capability and in some cases also expand them. As outlined in previous defence discussion papers there should be expansion of the airlift and maritime patrol aircraft fleets, the helicopter fleet and the naval combat force. The recapitalisation of the Army's Light Armoured Vehicles, should include more variants, and the truck fleet should maintain the combat effectiveness and support the land forces need when deployed. This will be more important if our forces were to be deployed on independent operations.

Acquisition of new capabilities should include unmanned air vehicles to complement the maritime patrol. A feasibility study should also be conducted to whether the Defence Force should acquire a small fleet of tactical armoured vehicles, to ensure our servicemen and women are protected properly should they come across a roadside explosive device in future operations.

## **6.0 Conclusion**

Personally, I believe that all diplomatic channels should be tried and exhausted before the use of military force. I am proud of the work our service men and women do, from representing New Zealand overseas to responding to calls for help in times of crisis at home. They are a force for good. However, over the next 15 years there will be a need for capital expenditure that will no-doubt face opposition. The 2015 Defence White Paper should be part of the conversation that New Zealand has about defence now and in the future. I thank you for giving me this opportunity to present my view and I look forward to reading the White Paper when it is published.

## Background

Over the years I have contributed to many defence reviews, publications and related forums. Plus invited to address a Victoria University defence seminar. After a career balanced by operational, command, training and staff experience in many locations and situations my last NZDF appointment was Director of Defence Force Development, prior to taking early retirement in the mid 1980s.

Rational discussion on defence policy is a rare event in NZ. The public has been conditioned to appear not interested. And governments keep it ignorant of reality. The middle ground is seldom covered effectively. With offered views tending to be relegated by government agent decision makers to the extremes - Left and Right. While pretence maintained the hope that the soft options will never be challenged. And appeal to the public because they are cheaper. While the small relevant academic community remains conscious of who pays the piper.

The closely integrated issue of intelligence gathering and processing rated glaring prime time attention in the past year because certain folk switched off. Resulting in the public having their noses rubbed in what had previously been a black art. Our 'allies', in spite of Snowden etc, must have more than winced at this contribution to a precarious but essential internationally linked task.

The website lists three purposes for the Defence White Paper - the first two are not readily measurable by the public. The last one is the kicker. "provide appropriate signals to other countries about NZ's perspective and priorities on defence and security issues" This is a new act of desperation on our part. And revelation of this motive will surely reinforce what other nations concluded about us long ago.

But the 2015 public engagement exercise is little different from the 2010 effort with much the same 'key questions' posed. A breakthrough could have been made if MOD/NZDF had filled in the blanks this time and asked the taxpayer to rate progress since achieved? Rather than repeating my earlier comments or simply addressing your same key questions I will pose some of my own:

## NZ Defence in 2015

Where are we? There are many issues but here are a quick handful of examples:

### *Operational*

a. Requiring six months preparation the NZDF eventually managed to deploy 16 basic trainers to Iraq. Misplaced security cloaked their departure. Accompanied by approximately 120 national supporters lodged in a 'military city' base providing further infrastructure, security and mission delivery functions. Passive 'self defence' being the maximum combat capacity. Four six month sub-unit rotations being the two



year continuity plan. At \$65 million. Our track record and capabilities have reduced us to this token negotiated limit? A 'below the line' effort anyway.

(Earlier strategic errors from US policy makers causing a 'no-boots-on-the-ground' mindset to again resort to the perilous and questionable local force training option in Iraq. Stated, or otherwise, NZ's choices being limited to fronting up – with anything - or having related trade, economic, political or diplomatic doors slammed in our faces? With our fourth tour on the Security Council now additionally challenged by having to keep both China and the US simultaneously satisfied with our inputs?)

b. After many years in the same area the NZ Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan – one of 26 in the country - was ambushed on a security patrol. The loss of life and other casualties sparked justifiable media and public interest. Then and recently. TV coverage suggests significant basic operational soldier skills and command limitations exist within the NZDF?

c. The preceding East Timor NZ commitment also took many months to mount and was limited to a two company tactical element. With an operational capacity limited to an armed constabulary role. A hostile gunfire incident resulted in the abandonment of a fatal NZDF casualty for over 7 hours! (No NZ casualty had been abandoned in Korea, Malaya, Borneo or Vietnam) Faulty contact and subsequent drills suggested severe training deficiencies? The NZDF refused to release the reports. The NZ Army Chief stated the six six-month rotations had "exhausted" the army.

d. Fundamental command and control errors appeared central to a fatal air accident during a routine ceremonial flypast. Deficiencies in basic weapon handling and driving skills have resulted in far too many fatal accidents. Ships and aircraft being idle because of extended crew limitations and availability. All examples of deliberate unchallenged cost cutting directives reducing previous capabilities, processes and standards to now ineffective, but still expensive, levels.

e. Rather than maintaining trained, ready, and adaptable formed units and sub-units it seems that whenever a deployed operational role emerges – or even overseas exercise participation - the NZDF is limited to cobbling together groups. With perhaps priority regard to gaining 'favourable' tri-service profiles and gender balance? An ongoing focus at formed troop unit level for lessons learned, readiness, and testing for evolving standards seems missing? Ongoing and organic teamwork factors are downplayed? Indeed larger troop units seem to be regarded as simple manpower pools from which to draw individuals for the three dozen or so UN type non-combatant micro detachments scattered and busy 'showing the flag' throughout the planet in recent decades? What foreign policy and defence goals are really addressed?

#### *Organisational and Accountabilities*

Until the 1990s we had a fully joint and integrated tri-service military and civilian headquarters and policy-making organization located in Stout Street. Sure, it was not without its faults. But Quigley entirely dismantled it. And the interested taxpayer noticed things falling apart – with some extraordinarily inept and expensive equipment purchases – LAVS etc. Successive governments have persisted with this folly. The collapse of 'jointery' eventually forced corrective redress. Resulting in the

establishment of a two-star led HQ Joint Forces in Trentham. But this was and remains the wrong answer to the wrong question?

The operational, doctrinal and policy objectives suffering parallel confusion by the forced/chosen (?) exit from Stout Steet and the need to find/build another building in the city with the overflow being located in Trentham. What decision making process caused this? And what were the aims? Alternatives? After remaining empty for years the perfectly viable and refurbished Stout Street building is now occupied by another government department. Albeit with somewhat more lavish tastes.

The split between HQJF and individual service chiefs seems ineffective and counter productive. To model the midget NZ capacity on the structures applicable in larger countries seems a delusion. The overseas style of assigning fully formed, trained and equipped formations, units and elements to the operational responsibility of a Joint Command, then held accountable for deploying them autonomously is inappropriate to our scale and horizons of influence? After all it took at least a three-star to micro-manage the assembly and commitment of just 16 non-combatant trainers to Iraq.

Under this structure who is responsible for collective training and standards? Who determines priorities? What authority and resources has say, the Army Chief, in answering the objective of “.....exercising, extending, testing and evaluating infantry units and subunit groups in the following combat scenarios .....”? When was this last done and to what results? If this is a function of individual services then what is the training role of the HQJF and vice versa? Who decides?

Resulting from a spate of weapon losses and accidents the media asked how many weapons were in stock. Defence chiefs admitted they did not know as they had contracted out weapon storage and maintenance tasks! It being ‘cheaper’.

The 2010 Review imposed additional civilianisation goals. In forcing early retirement on hundreds of trained and experienced uniformed staff it seemed that NZDF did not know the optimum military personnel scale and shape necessary to perform the Defence task. Of all state functions, it then took the Auditor General to pronounce upon NZDF operational readiness and capability! Adversely.

Trained, equipped, motivated and well-led personnel have been at the heart of conflict capabilities since we first started throwing rocks at each other. But on 30 May 2015 an advertisement stated a Director of HR Strategy role had been created to ‘make a positive difference to the world’ in the new ‘Chief People Office’ of the NZDF!!! The unique challenges of gaining success on the battlefield have created a specialised social structure – the military - in which the personnel function was an inherent responsibility of commanders supported by some specialised military staff. But this is no longer applicable in NZ? What failings emerged in the NZ military capacity that are now best met by qualified civilian solution from someone with ‘at least 10 years residence in NZ or an ABCA country’? Who, or what, is now responsible for NZDF personnel? How does the function work? How will it work in future? Why?

## *The Defence Task and Government Responsibility*

The origin of the nation state was the defence of its people and assets. The NZ islands were exceedingly fortunate in that both waves of settlers, Polynesian and European, had the benefit of being associated with the worlds first industrialised state, In aggregate this engineered a lift from stone-age technology, social behaviour and standards of living to second or third in the world. In not much more than half a century! A pace unmatched in human history? While our commodity based economy had an insatiable and guaranteed market. The defence and security of our home and standard of living rested within the reciprocal factors of imperial origins and obligations. But in recent decades NZers have been led to believe that such historic alliance links as a means of defence were unnecessary? And somehow shameful?

For 200 years our standard of living has been based on what other countries want to buy from us. Although all our assets have alternative sources of supply. And we have persisted in adding little extra value to the raw exported product. But imperial trade preference protected and sheltered us. From the 1940s to the 1980s we had the additional privilege of defence links with the most powerful state the world has ever seen. Even though there were pluses and minuses in the relationship - we had effective defence on the cheap. We coasted. But the ex-imperial and then US alliances gave us access to forums and trade considerations denied such similar states as - say Uruguay. We were perceived to have punched above our weight and thus earned seats at top tables. And without such links there would have been no Rutherford, Freyberg, Elworthy, Hillary or even All Blacks? No need for cringe here – just gilded doors opening, welcoming and enabling us!

For states of our size there are two basic courses of action for the provision of viable national defence. Formal alliances – and we were once part of two of the worlds historically strongest. Or arm ourselves to the teeth. Such as Singapore, Israel or Switzerland. In the mid-1980s without reference at all to an informed NZ public our government decided to do neither!! At the height of the Cold War we chose to poke the US in the eye and expected others to follow us. In one petulant action we shot ourselves in both feet. Military mates rates and all sorts of advantages were then denied us. We ceased having preferential access in trade circles. While the economic competition intensified. Ever since then our modest Vote Defence has been under pressure and central to all recent Defence Reviews has been myopic cost cutting? Inevitably leading to even more problems. And massive avoidable waste.

The NZ public was brainwashed by emotional factors. That the government commissioned 1991 Somers Report concluded that Auckland Hospital puts out more – but harmless - radiation in one day than the the entire US Navy does in a year is swept under the carpet. We trumpet being nuclear free but ignore smoke alarms, hospitals and research clinics? We claim to lead world opinion – but ignore the reality, that not even Japan followed our 'lead'. The sole followers in banning nuclear powered and armed warships are both landlocked! Constitutionally neutral Austria and ex Soviet Mongolia.

And we will probably end up relying on nuclear power anyway. Because it is 'greener'. While our gross environmental pollution rates remain unsustainable.

The silliness of all this started to dawn on us more recently and the NZ public is being led to believe that alliance status has been restored with the US. It hasn't. While our defence capacity has been hugely eroded. Self inflicted from an already parlous base in the 1980s. We send out glossy brochures extolling micro contingents of basically non-combatant observers and modest support elements and suggest to the taxpayer and citizen that this is providing for the defence of New Zealand and our interests. While still costing over \$3billion every year. Our erstwhile allies have not forgotten and remain unimpressed. No matter what international post exercise PR may proclaim.

## **The Future**

It will take a brave government to admit to itself the NZ public has been hoodwinked about defence and security for decades. And then do something about it. But a very powerful vote winner will result when people begin to switch on. (As would balanced race relations trigger strong, expectant and understanding support.) Just for starters a few points are made below:

### *National Service*

In addition to the vacuum we created for defence and security there is no denying a major social problem has been growing in NZ in recent decades. As long ago as the 1970s some commentators were suggesting forms of national service as a solution to offsetting the enormous cost and diversion of national productivity caused by disaffected youth. (Peace loving Switzerland has just again voted to retain it. Having introduced it during the Napoleonic Wars) If we wish to get real about our defence responsibility we need to address at least the points listed above. And there are many more. But a very carefully crafted application of National Service tailored to the current and emerging NZ scene and our place in the world should not be dismissed as outrageously right wing. Properly balanced and very carefully sold to an informed public such a concept could contribute towards several national goals. Only a little effort could deliver a series of models upon which to evolve a workable solution?

A well conceived and delivered national conscription scheme could contribute to moderating the severe limitations introduced below? Properly conceived, attention to this would be no more fanciful or divisive than being charged \$26million to choose a new flag that the public was told is needed.

### *New Zealand Security*

In recent decades NZ has set about deliberately demilitarising, civilianising and generally limiting the ultimate role of its defence force ability to engage, or even contribute to allies, in successful war fighting. For various reasons – no perceived threat, disagreement with the actions of allies, greater electoral appeal, that we offer no attractive gains to an aggressor, and that it is far far cheaper. After breaking with allies we have tailored public attitudes to the belief that it was the logical thing to do.

We have also stoked the myth that we can readily rise to serious challenges by rapid national mobilisation in time of need. A hundred years ago we were actually very well prepared. In 1939 we were totally ill prepared. Saved only by months of training time

in Egypt permitting junior soldiers to be better able to cope. But with few exceptions our sub-unit, unit and formation commanders were woeful. Corrected only after time, much blood and many lessons had been learned. In future we will not have this luxury. The task is now even more complex, the threat more varied and the penalties for error more rapid and lethal. It takes a couple of decades to build up a truly professional NCO and officer corps. It takes only a few short years to destroy such by poor policies and make-believe assumptions.

Very little research suggests that the NZDF now has more senior officers – It cols and above – and a more imbalanced effective troop/officer ratio than at any stage in our history. While attention to senior officer exercises, training, experience and competence in handling comparable units and formations is practically nil. This is always a problem in a small force. But the NZDF seems to have given up even trying? Political and military negligence can be expected to be the over-riding verdict on performance and results when the NZDF is next committed to any serious mission.

In the last decade the UK appears fixed on a political path to achieve that same abandonment of meaningful military capacity. But at least there the senior military and much of the establishment forcefully point out the impact. While the default setting in NZ has watchdogs that favour aiding and abetting the destruction.

One thing is sure about defence policy and that is the future is uncertain. Wishful thinking about benign strategic environments is irresponsible. It is just unbelievable that no government advisor pushed the concept of 'strategic terrorism' in the 1980s and 1990s. We have lost an enormous amount of ground since. Mastery of the military profession has become even harder. The world has moved on and challenges have escalated. Defence, security and intelligence measures require comprehensive reference. Encompassing water, resources, arable land, living space, climate change, the oceans, pollution and trade leverages. Plus race, religion, economic imbalance and non-state actors hugely complicating these challenges. In the past societies have been overthrown for just one of these causes. All these are coming together at once. Currently New Zealand is a very lonely but increasingly attractive target ripe for a too easily launched overturn of the status quo? Let alone position us for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

But it is not difficult to evolve feasible scenarios that threaten to totally change the values, ownership and operation of what we have so far taken for granted and proudly called our own. In the past we relied on others to prop and ensure our defence and security. We have squandered that luxury. And little thought is needed to show how emerging perpetrators could upend us with barely a shot? Defence and security is more than military.

We need to wake up? A realistic Defence Review would help. Plus the political and social will and courage to implement it. This will cost less than doing nothing.

20 June 201

DRAFT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION DOCUMENT ON THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER  
2015

We are pleased to have this opportunity to consult with our Government on the question of defence.

We note the 'Key Questions' and propose to respond with a general statement of principle and then respond to each of the key questions in the light of that principle.

Members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) from all around the world met as soon as was practicable after WWI had ended, to consider, following the experience of WWI, the Peace Testimony of Friends which dates from 1651. Friends collectively issued this statement at that time, and have not resiled from this position:

***Our conviction is that Christianity has this to say to the world.***

***" Your reliance upon armaments is both wrong and futile. Armaments are the weapons of organised violence and outrage. Their use is a denial of the true laws of good living. They involve the perpetuation of strife. They stand in the way of the true fellowship of men. They impoverish the peoples. They tempt men to evil, and they breed suspicion and fear and the tragic results thereof. They are therefore not legitimate weapons in the Christian armoury, nor are they sources of security". You cannot foster harmony by the apparatus of discord, nor cherish good will by the equipment of hate. But it is by harmony and goodwill that human security can be obtained. Armaments aim at security in isolation; but such would at best be utterly precarious and is, as a matter of fact, illusory. The only true safety is the safety of all, and unless your weapon of defence achieves this work, or works towards this, it is a source of antagonism and therefore of increased peril.***

***All Friends Conference, 1920***

We urge the Government of New Zealand to build upon its status as a nuclear-free country and a contributor to the peace building achieved so far by the United Nations, by undertaking full demilitarization and using the resources released to tackle the challenges of climate change, both within New Zealand, and in assisting our near neighbours in the Pacific Island region. Costa Rica has achieved full demilitarization and used the resources released to achieve carbon neutrality as a nation, so can we.

We urge the Government of New Zealand also to speak out against the development of remotely piloted weapons and remotely piloted vehicles carrying weapons; and to join the 100 nations led by Austria, seeking to legally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons at an international level.

Key questions and responses:

**What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

We believe the major threats internally arise from inequality and perceptions of corruption and lack of democratic process. These could lead to the alienation of citizens such that they ally themselves with those who seek violent means to social change.

We believe the major threats externally arise from failing to foster the best possible international relationships through the work of the United Nations and other peaceful negotiations, and instead joining military alliances. Where those military alliances become entangled with alliances for monetary gain, they also increase the internal risk of alienating citizens.

**What changes in the international environment, including the relationships between states, non state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force.**

We believe that although there is much intra and interstate violence in the world, there are also growing connections between all peoples, and a growing rejection of violent solutions by the public ( as noted in the Defence Assessment report 2014) which allows for both small-scale and large-scale peace-building activities, including addressing the issues of human rights abuses and unequal distribution of resources which are some of the root causes of the sense of injustice and of powerlessness which facilitate the choice to use violence and threats of violence ("terrorism"). We believe it is possible at this time to live as a sovereign nation without an armed Defence Force.

**What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

An unarmed force can, as now, contribute to maintaining the rule of international law, as in policing illegal and environmentally destructive fishing practices, and in gathering information which contributes to the upholding of international law. It can, as now, build good international relationships by contributing to the relief of suffering and to the building and rebuilding of resilient communities elsewhere in the world as those communities suffer natural and military disasters. It can train and demonstrate non-violent communication and relationships.

**What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

As noted in the 2014 Defence Assessment, New Zealand is highly unlikely to face military threats, and certain to face environmental threats. If we contribute to agreed global approaches to climate change, and if we support our Pacific Island neighbours with the challenges and changes that climate change is already imposing on them, an unarmed force would need to continue to develop policing skills, and technical expertise in matters such as collaboration with indigenous peoples, clean water provision, land stabilisation and conservation, and measurement and innovative planning for adaptation to climate change impacts on food

resources. We also need to develop a humane approach to refugees, and not follow the inhumane and degrading approaches used by Australia.

**How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting security of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally.**

We believe all the peoples of the world are our friends. We believe that military alliances have repeatedly drawn our country into immoral wars. We believe they have the potential to threaten our integrity with regard to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, our international reputation for fairness, human rights, and independent thinking, and at worst our sovereignty and our nuclear free status. We believe we should withdraw from such alliances, and only enter into alliances which promote non-violent responses to conflict, such as our participation in the United Nations. We believe we should prioritise security within New Zealand by promoting transparent and democratic government, achieving equality, justice and freedom for our own citizens, and we should contribute in all the ways we can to international peace and security.

**How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

We believe an unarmed defence force should be subject to cross-party governance.

**What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

We anticipate that many of the challenges arising from climate change will not be unforeseen, although many will be. We believe an unarmed defence force should have the best possible scientific advice and technological and other expertise and equipment, but should also be strongly invested in learning from and learning with our Pacific Island neighbours who are already having to tackle rising sea-levels, acidification of the ocean, earthquakes and tsunamis, which will become increasingly significant issues for New Zealand with just the impacts of our current levels of damage to the global ecosystem.

**What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

We believe an unarmed defence force should strive for gender equality, should both pay adequate wages and provide training and career pathways, and should help our young people develop skills and self-confidence in peacemaking, non-violent communication and responses to conflict situations, and building resilience, relieving suffering and working in partnership with all the diverse peoples of the world.

**What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

Our defence force needs to disarm and reorient away from the use of violence towards the building of true security through more healthy, mutually respectful and egalitarian relationships within our own country and internationally.



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*Defence White Paper 2015 Submission*

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Released under the Official Information Act 1982

**Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

Overall I agree with the views expressed in the Defence Assessment 2014. There are two issues where I think further exploration is needed is. These are:

*No direct threat to New Zealand's territorial integrity:* While I agree with the long term assessment little consideration seems to have been given to the potential to deter and counter short notice military challenges to New Zealand, Australia and the South Pacific. The military threat to New Zealand is not zero<sup>1</sup>. This will always be the case when countries possess strategic weapons, aircraft and first tier naval capabilities. In my opinion the development of strategic and long range tactical weapons renders the traditional view of a large raiding or an invasion force attacking New Zealand mostly obsolete. Should the number of countries possessing longer range missiles increase, the potential for short notices military threats increases. While such a possibility is remote it is evident from the events in Ukraine and the Rainbow Warrior incident that a nation's strategic environment can change rapidly<sup>2</sup>. New Zealand's isolation no longer affords New Zealand the protection it once did due to the proliferation of long range weapons.

In the context of large modern naval vessels like the DDG-1000, the practice and trend is to include tactical cruise missiles has part of a ships weapons outfit. This is likely to increase the number of newer and larger vessels commission into service<sup>3</sup>. For example some classes of modern warships could in theory launch in excess of 30 missiles targeting critical infrastructure, political and military targets. The reasons for any such attack will vary but the effect of such an attack could be the neutralization of New Zealand's ability to operate at the political, military and economic level.

While many may argue that such an event could never happen the experiences of the two World War Wars and the Cold War show that foreign naval vessels (both surface and sub-surface) are able to conduct naval operations around New Zealand. It is my view that New Zealand lacks the ability to counter such naval threats in terms of the number of surface combatants it possesses and the lack of a standoff anti-ship missile capability on the P3 Orion.

*The ability to reorient New Zealand's Defence priorities:* I do not agree that New Zealand will have sufficient time to re-orient its defence policy in terms of equipment and personnel. My main concern revolves around the lead time associated with the acquisition of major assets. Additionally any re-orientation is dependent upon New Zealand been able to access new equipment without risk of a de-facto arms embargo.

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<sup>1</sup>[http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/maritimepatrolreview2001/Maritime\\_Patrol\\_Review.pdf.p20](http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/maritimepatrolreview2001/Maritime_Patrol_Review.pdf.p20)

<sup>2</sup> Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 'Sinking the Rainbow Warrior', <http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/nuclear-free-new-zealand/rainbow-warrior>, Last Accessed 21 May 2015. The French Government applied economic pressure to New Zealand by threatening New Zealand's access to EEC. At the same time French naval assets including the submarine *Rubis* were involved in the operation and were therefore available to the French government should the need have arisen.

[http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=10656635](http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10656635): Last Accessed 21 May 2015.

<sup>3</sup> The DDG-1000 is capable of carrying up to 80 missiles of which only a proportion might be cruise missiles. The proposed Type 26 Frigate is reported to be capable of carrying up to 24 missiles, excluding its Local Air Defence Missiles. The Chinese Type 052D Destroyer is capable of carrying up to 64 Missiles of which only proportion might be cruise missiles.

Construction time for major assets: This mainly affects the capital intensive air force and navy. The people orientated nature of the army means re-orientation will be quicker, unless highly complex weapons are acquired. For the air force the main delay in the construction of new aircraft will be how any acquisition fits within the production rate and schedule of manufacturing companies. Expansion of the air force will also be influenced by the rate at which New Zealand can train or obtain qualified personnel.

The other issue affecting the air force revolves around the type of aircraft been acquired. While potentially New Zealand could call upon qualified civilian personnel to operate larger aircraft and helicopters in an emergency, the re-establishment of the Air Combat Force is more problematic. Regardless of whether the focus of any Air Combat Forces is on close air support helicopters or maritime strike aircraft; the length of time in training fast jet / attack helicopters pilots is a limiting factor in any reconstitution<sup>4</sup>.

The issue is more pronounced once New Zealand realises that any new pilots will need to obtain squadron level operational experience in order to deal with any opposing force; that will have far more flight experience. There may be some ability to overcome some of the time limitations that might apply in relation to any reconstitution of the Air Combat Force. This would require any weapons capability on the LUH A109 and T6C Texan to be utilised in support of training / operations in order to ensure experience with a range of weapon systems is maintained. There may also be some ability for the A109 to deploy operationally utilising these weapons in a low to medium threat environment. However the use of these options would still come with risks given those weapons New Zealand trains with may not necessarily be orientated to New Zealand's strategic or operational needs.

The ability to alter the strategic and operational role of the navy is more challenging, given the service life of individual vessels and the length of time required to acquire new vessels. Historically New Zealand may have called upon retired vessels sitting in the reserve fleets of the United States or the United Kingdom in the event of an emergency. Today such fleets are almost non-existent and where they do exist the ships are at the end of their useful life.

Consequently New Zealand will be dependent largely on new build ships should the strategic situation change. Personally I see this as a good thing, given the issues in acquiring aging / obsolescent vessels. However it poses challenges given the limited number of ship yards in the world capable of building dedicated naval vessels and the length of time of construct naval vessels, conduct trials and crew certification. Table 1 shows the construction time for two complex warships (taking nearly 6 years to construct vs the United States Coast Guard National Security Cutter with more limited capability of nearly 4 years).

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.airforce.gov.au/Our-People/Becoming-a-Pilot?RAAF-An2hMAOEEYLxIX7puIXHAd6J4qTRM7DQ>, Last Accessed 26 May 2015 – *"The fighter pilot selection and training process is comprehensive, spanning four years on average from basic flying training to graduation from either the F/A-18A/B Hornet or F/A-18F Super Hornet operational conversions."*

	HMS Dauntless	FNS Chevalier Paul	USCG Waesche
Laid Down	26-Aug-04	23-Oct-03	11-Sep-06
Launched	23-Jan-07	12-Jul-06	12-Jul-08
Commissioned	3-Jun-10	Jun-09	7-May-10
Construction Time (Days)	2107	2048	1334
Construction Time (Years)	5.76	5.60	3.65

Table 1: Construction Times for three recent vessels commissioned

Were New Zealand to return to a 4 frigate force in the event of a change in strategic circumstances, using an off the shelf design, it could take a minimum of 8 years to commission an additional two vessels once lead time for materials, training and construction are calculated. Naturally the larger the perceived force required the longer the lead time needed to bring such a capability into existence.

*Summary:* In conclusion I agree that New Zealand faces no threat from invasion or even potentiality a large raiding force in the foreseeable future. I do not however consider New Zealand immune to conventional state on state military action. The advent of long range weapons technology combined with insufficient naval and air force combat assets exposes New Zealand to a wider range of lower level military actions at much shorter notice than New Zealand would be able to re-orient its defence policy.

At the political level there needs to be a realisation that New Zealand's ability to re-orient its defence policy, and therefore its equipment, is constrained by the complexity of modern weapons systems, the length of time needed to acquire those systems and train people to a sufficient level in order operate effectively in a combat environment.

**Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

In the context of the de-facto states that have emerged out of the conflict in the Ukraine and Syria, New Zealand's ability to trade and influence events through diplomacy will be reduced. While any on-going conflicts will be a consideration in New Zealand's trade and diplomatic position, any negotiating with de-facto states outside of collective negotiations, either through the United Nations or regional powers, will in my view compromise New Zealand's standing in the international community. I would also argue that the United Nations is not necessarily the best option for resolving security challenges. While regional powers have a part to play in resolving security challenges, traditional relationships, whether based on ethnicity or from a past colonial relationships, still have an important role to play. New Zealand should be seeking the best option in resolving security challenges and not relying solely on the United Nations.

In my view the operational environment in which the defence force operates will become more complex as a result of the interaction of non-state players, state players and international organisations. It is clear that the number of non-state actors who have obtained advanced technology similar to that available to Hezbollah<sup>5</sup> has increased. If the Ukraine rebel states (with unofficial state support) and Hezbollah become the norm, then any deployed force will have to be equipped for combat, more than peacekeeping.

Based on my distant observations of the conflicts in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Bosnia and others I consider that non-state actors are more likely to exploit civilian populations and structures in order to achieve their objects. They are often prepared to do this in contravention of the rules of war<sup>6</sup>. For state actors that makes' proportional response to hostile acts by non-state actors more difficult. The only practical option seems to be the use of more flexible rules of engagement, increased surveillance and intelligence capabilities, scalable and potentially guided weapons in order to reduce civilian casualties.

*Summary:* The international environment is becoming more complex as international organisations, state players and an increasing number of non-state players influence regional security issues through the use of complex weapon systems and the illegal trade in resources. The use of more complex weapons by non-state players means that the Defence Force must be equipped for combat, but at the same time have a range of systems available that allow defence provide a proportionate response to threats.

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<sup>5</sup> Jeffrey White, *A War like No Other: Israel vs. Hezbollah in 2015*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-war-like-no-other-israel-vs.-hezbollah-in-2015>, Last Accessed 26 May 2015.

<sup>6</sup> In World War II states like Germany and Russia acted in an organised manner; more recent examples by conventional forces have tended to be due the actions of individuals rather than states. The exception being Yugoslavia and potentially the Israeli-Gaza conflict. In the Israeli – Gaza conflict, if the Palestine states are accepted as "recognised states" they are also examples of where both sides either deliberately and / or accidentally have failed to follow the rules of war.

**Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

While I support the Limited Service Volunteer program I do wonder whether it goes far enough. While some members join the Defence Force a number of others seem to complete the course and drift. In the long term I would like to see people completing the course transitioning to the Defence Force or immediately on completion starting some form of formal training. That formal training could be provided out of surplus defence training capability (which I suspect there is little of) or in partnership with Universities and Polytechnics. Personally if the Defence Force were to provide the training then I think realistically the people should be joining the Defence Force for a limited period of time either as a reservist or regular force person.

I would like to see more support for the cadet forces. As a former cadet I can recall the responsibility we were given in acting as the dawn service firing party for ANZAC day services in Dunedin. I also acted as Helmsman, Life Buoy sentry etc. on the frigate *HMNZS Otago* independently after a few days training and went into the field with the now defunct 3 Field Ambulance. While I appreciate that technology and legislation have changed how the cadet forces interact with the New Zealand Defence Force I would like to see the defence force taking a more active role in the promotion and support of the Cadet Forces. Specifically I would like to see the Defence Force enhance the development of the cadets in terms of leadership, responsibility and learning the core skills associated with their parent service. In doing so I note that of the 35 or so cadets in my unit, when I was as a teenager, at least 10 members of that unit went on to join the New Zealand Defence Force in one role or another. This strongly suggests that there are potential long term benefits for the Defence Force and New Zealand society as a whole in taking such an approach.

**Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

If my responses to questions 1 are considered correct then New Zealand must maintain a minimum level of combat capability if it is to be able to adapt in time to any changes in the strategic situation, even if a 10 year time mobilisation time frame is accepted. Personally I do not accept ten years has been a valid time frame, based on history. For example from Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in 1933 to the start of WWII – 6 years. More recently the invasion of Iraq from the initial call by the United States in late 2002<sup>7</sup> to the downfall of Saddam Hussein on 1 May 2003; a total of 8 months passed. This ability to rapidly deploy large numbers of conventional forces via strategic air lift combined with some pre-positioning of equipment, strongly indicates a greater level of military preparedness is required.

It is equally clear from my response to question 2 that New Zealand must be prepared to deploy forces into conflicts that may quickly span the spectrum of conflict. I also see the maintenance of a combat capability as critical to the maintenance of our relationship with Australia.

Constitutionally New Zealand must possess sufficient combat capability in order to ensure New Zealand has the ability to act independently with regards to the defence of Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands. An independent combat capability will also be critical if New Zealand is to have any influence on events in our immediate region, regardless of whether any operation is done with or without Australia. To that end the ongoing development of the Joint Amphibious Task Force ("JATF") continues to be relevant from a military, constabulary and civil aid perspective.

At the other end of the spectrum New Zealand must be able to support Pacific nations in protecting their natural resources as demand for such resources increase. While nations without an immediate interest in the region may adopt a military approach to obtain resources they may equally seek to undermine legitimate governments via other means<sup>8</sup>. This maybe through corruption or agitation of various ethnic groups within a society. The promotion of instability, whether from internal or external sources, could mean any number of things for the Defence Force. In its simplest form it may require the evacuation of Australian and New Zealand citizens. At its highest end; the limited or non-existent size of the Pacific Island defence force may require some form of limited armed intervention, if external military influences are eliminated.

Equally New Zealand must look to the protection of its own natural resources through a combination airborne maritime patrol, intelligence gathering and physical surveillance. I include in this the Ross Dependency and islands situated in the Southern Ocean. If the 2014 Defence Assessment is correct in its assumption regarding increasing competition for natural resources then the potential for New Zealand's sovereignty claims in the Ross Shelf been challenged increases. We are currently seeing that scenario been played out between China, the Philippines and others in relation to the Sparty

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<sup>7</sup> George W. Bush, "President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly: Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York", official transcript, press release, The White House, 12 September 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Including the Pacific Island Nations themselves, those nations with an immediate interest are New Zealand, Australia, France (New Caledonia and Tahiti), United States of America (American Samoa)

Islands<sup>9</sup>. This supports an increased maritime surveillance capability in order to meet the needs of New Zealand.

The above discussion places primary emphasis on the security of New Zealand, Australia and the South Pacific. This focus ensures New Zealand is able remain secure through a more localised version of forward defence. At its heart it requires increased maritime surveillance, naval and air combat capabilities.

The need to maintain a combat capability combined with maritime constabulary and civil aid roles are the polar opposites of each other in terms of equipment, personnel and overall costs. So how we equip the Defence Force is vital going forward, but it will not be without increased fiscal cost in an already constrained fiscal environment. Personally I cannot see the Defence Force being able to meet future operating and capital equipment requirements without defence spending increasing to around 1.8% to 2% of GDP, excluding capital charge. While many people may choke at that thought; the peace dividend that New Zealand sought to obtain at the end of the Cold War never emerged. Defence has engaged in more operations in the last 15 years than it did in the years after the Vietnam War (1973-1990); and done so with significantly less money and capability (if measured in total number of deployable units).

#### *Royal New Zealand Navy*

Overall I see the navy force structure needing to reflect the ability to meet our immediate needs across the spectrum of Naval Operations while supporting the JATF. One existing limitation exists in relation to the number of Sea Sprite helicopters New Zealand operates. Given the cost of dedicated maritime helicopters with combat capability I cannot foresee the numbers increasing over the next thirty years. A second restriction is that increases in the overall number of vessels should be limited or avoided, unless deemed absolutely necessary.

My preference is to see the regular force focus on blue water operations. The active reserve would support the manning of the OPV's and operate Inshore Patrol Craft ("IPC") again in order to undertake environmental protection, general security duties similar to the United States Coast Guard (including potentially MCM) and support to local police, customs and fisheries offices. The deployment / location of any such IPC would be centred on Auckland, Tauranga, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. The IPC would adopt a modular approach to capability. Ideally this would allow for a more rapid respond to incidents like the *MV Rena* grounding.

The Royal Danish Navy stan-a-flex modular concept allows for the re-rolling of its ships into a variety of roles as needed. The stand-a-flex modules provide for a range of combat capabilities down through to survey, storage and environmental protection equipment<sup>10</sup>.

This modular approach allows for changes in the strategic situation (assuming sufficient number of modules are held) while addressing immediate security issues around the contribution to international security through to protecting natural resources and the environment. Applied to the

<sup>9</sup> [http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/news/20150609\\_08.html](http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/news/20150609_08.html) and <http://www.marsecreview.com/2015/06/the-south-china-sea-showdown-at-shangri-la/> Last Accessed 9 June 2015.

<sup>10</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StanFlex>, Last Accessed 8 June 2015 and [https://www.navalengineers.org/ProceedingsDocs/ASNEDay2015/Technical%20Paper%20Sessions/Sorensen\\_Paper.pdf](https://www.navalengineers.org/ProceedingsDocs/ASNEDay2015/Technical%20Paper%20Sessions/Sorensen_Paper.pdf) Last accessed 8 June 2015



New Zealand situation it allows for a limited number of major surface combatants to meet immediate security challenges and international commitments while providing for a larger number of less capable vessels with the potential to be upgraded if the strategic situation required.

I believe the modular approach offers a number of fiscal advantages in that it reduces the overall capital costs associated with large number of major surface combatants fulfilling dedicated roles versus a ship required to carry out a wide range of roles. The fiscal disadvantage is that the number of modules must be sufficient to meet both immediate and future needs, thereby incurring potentially unnecessary costs if the number and balance of modules is not correct. There is also the issue that too many modules may have an impact on operational effectiveness due to the need to train personnel in the operation of each type of module. Adopting a modular approach; I see the navy being structured along these lines:

Ship Type	Number	Comments
Surface Combatant	3	Fully Armed with limited modularity
Patrol Frigates	3	Similar in capability to the Thetis Class (including ice capability) with modular capabilities for two ships consisting of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local Area Air Defence;</li> <li>- Anti-Ship Missiles;</li> <li>- Anti-Submarine capability;</li> </ul> <p>The vessel would support and supplement the Frigates as part of the Joint Amphibious Task Force, while at the same time undertaking resource protection duties.</p> <p>Both the Surface Combatants and Patrol Frigates would share the 8 Sea Sprite Helicopters. These vessels would be the only ice strengthened vessels control total acquisition costs.</p>
Ocean Patrol Craft	3	Based on the existing design they would operate A109 (M) helicopters. Modularity for two ships would consist of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Environmental Protection x 3</li> <li>- Survey x 1</li> <li>- Signals Intelligence x 1</li> <li>- Mine Countermeasures x 3</li> </ul> <p>Long Term these vessels would not be ice capable in order to keep construction costs down.</p>
Landing Platform	1	A109(M) for General Support Duties
Tanker	2	A109(M) for General Support Duties
Littoral Warfare Vessel	1	Eventually I would like to see the Littoral Warfare Role been absorbed into the Ocean Patrol Craft Role with an increase in the number of Ocean Patrol Craft.
<b>Total Number of Regular Force Ships</b>	<b>12</b>	Total Number of Modules: 14

Table 2: Proposed Future Fleet

It should be noted that the above force structure does not increase the total number of regular force vessels but re-orientates them towards blue water operations and by default coastal operations. Given the recent acquisition of the Project Protector Vessels and current acquisition projects underway it is likely that any re-orientation will be spread over the next 25 to 30 years.

One observation is that there is potential for merging the Patrol Frigate / Ocean Patrol Vessel role into a single class of vessel, with modular capability. This would offer advantages in terms of training, logistics and economy of scale in production. However the technology, and therefore cost, needed by the Patrol Frigate to support the JATF versus the technology needed by the OPV for constabulary duties may prohibit such an option. In addition there would be compromises in terms of construction standards (i.e. civilian for OPV versus a higher standard for the Patrol Frigate).

On present value figures, using publicly available information to maintain the current force structure and increase the fleet by 1 Frigate and 1 OPV, then New Zealand will need to contribute \$2,262,956,230 over the next thirty years to capital funding before spares and initial training costs are factored in.

Ship Type <sup>11</sup>	Qty	Personnel	\$NZ Unit Cost	\$NZ Total Cost	Total Personnel
Iver Huitfeldt (Denmark)	3	190	464,270,731	1,392,812,194	570
Low End OPV (UK River Class)	3	35	43,909,943	131,729,828	105
Endurance Class LPHD	1	65	198,573,626	198,573,626	65
Auxiliary Tanker	1	75	250,000,000	250,000,000	75
LWSC	1	65	150,000,000	150,000,000	65
Inshore Patrol Vessel	4	25	34,960,145	139,840,582	100
<b>Current Force Modified</b>	<b>13</b>			<b>2,262,956,230</b>	<b>980</b>

Table 3: Modified Version of current Naval Fleet

The critical flaw in the current force structure versus the future security challenges facing New Zealand in the Southern Ocean and South Pacific are the Inshore Patrol Vessels (“IPV”). Short of forward deploying into the South Pacific, the IPV are only able to operate around New Zealand. This is primarily due to their inability to carry sufficient provisions and potential damage resulting from operating at higher speeds in poor weather. Reverting to a traditional 4 Frigate and 4 Patrol Vessel structure would result in present value capital costs of around \$2,631,296,322.

Ship Type	Qty	Personnel	\$NZ Unit Cost	\$NZ Total Cost	Total Personnel
Iver Huitfeldt (Denmark)	4	190	464,270,731	1,857,082,925	760
Low End OPV (UK River Class)	4	35	43,909,943	175,639,771	140
Endurance Class LPHD	1	65	198,573,626	198,573,626	65
Auxiliary Tanker	1	75	250,000,000	250,000,000	75
LWSC	1	65	150,000,000	150,000,000	65
<b>Traditional Force Structure</b>	<b>11</b>			<b>2,631,296,322</b>	<b>1,105</b>

Table 4: Traditional 4 x 4 Naval Fleet

The above option offers improved combat capability and improved deep water and coastal patrol capability. However I am not convinced that the above force structure provides the navy with the

<sup>11</sup> Ship Prices except for the Auxiliary Tanker and LWSC are taken from <https://newwars.wordpress.com/warship-costs/> and are converted to New Zealand Dollar Values as at 13 June 2014.

widest range of capabilities to meet the increased surveillance requirements of the Southern Ocean, New Zealand and the South Pacific.

The proposed option below compensate for that in terms of the type of vessels that would be operated.

Ship Type	Qty	Personnel	\$NZ Unit Cost	\$NZ Total Cost	Total Personnel
Iver Huitfeldt (Denmark)	3	190	464,270,731	1,392,812,194	570
K130 (Germany)	3	76	150,328,625	450,985,876	228
Low End OPV (UK River Class)	3	35	43,909,943	131,729,828	105
Endurance Class LPHD	1	65	198,573,626	198,573,626	65
Auxiliary Tanker	1	75	250,000,000	250,000,000	75
LWSC	1	65	150,000,000	150,000,000	65
<b>Proposed Force Option</b>	<b>12</b>			<b>2,574,101,524</b>	<b>1,108</b>

Table 5: Proposed Naval Fleet Structure

There would be increased costs associated with the requirement to acquire naval versions of the A109 LUH in order to support any helicopter equipped low end OPV, *HMNZS Canterbury* and *HMNZS Endeavour's* replacement.

There are other potential force structure options including acquiring an Absalom class support ship instead of the Patrol Frigates and increasing the number of low end OPV. Acquiring an Absalom class ship would provide New Zealand with a degree of redundancy with regards to *HMNZS Canterbury*.

While the above force structures relies on simplistic modelling its does suggest that New Zealand will need to consider its future force options carefully and has a whole, rather than focusing on individual elements of the navy. Whatever option is pursued a three frigate force is a necessity if New Zealand is to be capable of sustaining a combat force able to respond to strategic changes and our international commitments.

Overall I believe New Zealand will have to choose between the depth of coverage (Ross Dependency, New Zealand and the South Pacific) offered by a the proposed model versus the traditional 4 x 4 structure with a more limited patrol force but more combat capable force. All options will be expensive, but past experience from the early 2000's would indicate that a naval force smaller than 12 ships would not be able to meet New Zealand's needs.

I have not included the proposed vessels for the RNZNVR in the above equipment needs analysis. Further consideration needs to be given to the needs of the RNZNVR. At present it suffers from"

- A lack of direct entry recruiting; and
- A basic training structure not necessarily compatible with the balancing of civilian vs military needs. Currently basic recruits must undergo 5 weeks basic training in one block course. While the training is necessary a split in course would be more compatible with a balancing a civilian career with a part time military one.

One final observation on the RNZN. Given the importance of the *HMNZS Canterbury* to the JATF and the number of personnel it is capable of carrying the ship lacks basic a basic self-defence capability. In particular it has no Electronic Surveillance / Radar Warning capability, passive counter measures (similar to MASS) or capability to carry a missiles based close in weapons system<sup>12</sup>. With such a capability I fail to see how *HMNZS Canterbury* could deploy outside of our immediate region without requiring some form of armed escort. This could apply equally to other ships that might be assigned to the JATF, including any replacement for the *HMNZS Endeavour* and the OPV.

*Royal New Zealand Air Force*

The structure outlined below was the official state of the Royal New Zealand Air Force in 1982<sup>13</sup>.

Number	Type	Role
16	Strikemasters	Advanced flying training, strike-role training
13	Skyhawk's	Offensive air-support operations
5	Hercules	Air transport
10	Andover's	Air transport
1	Devon	Air transport
5	Orion's	Maritime operations
14	Iroquois helicopters	Utility helicopter operations
10	Sioux helicopters	Light observation helicopter operations
3	Wasp helicopters	Shipborne helicopters
21	CT4 Trainers	Initial pilot training
3	Friendships	Navigation training
97	Total Aircraft	

Table 6: Aircraft of the RNZAF in 1982

While the past is not necessarily the key to the future two things stand out in relation to the above balanced force structure. The structure allowed for operations around New Zealand and the Pacific to be conducted, while preserving a small combat force able to address short notice security challenges. Secondly excluding the Strikemasters and Skyhawk's, 39 Aircraft were dedicated to providing the army with a general support and tactical transport capability. Only 8 aircraft were dedicated towards maritime operations. The Strikemasters and Skyhawk's supported both the Army and the Navy.

Since the disbandment of the Air Combat Force the RNZAF has not deployed a squadron level force. The trend has been for individual aircraft to deploy in support New Zealand forces and international coalition operations. At the same time the Air Force has embedded pilots / air crew into larger coalition force squadrons in order to gain operational experience.

Maritime Patrol Force: Current plans will see the Long Range Maritime Patrol ("LRMPA") Fleet reduce from 6 to 4 with the withdrawal of the Orion's. At the same time a shorter range Maritime Patrol Fleet will be acquired, preferably in conjunction with a greater tactical air lift capability<sup>14</sup>. I am not adverse to that approach but I think some issues arise out of the reduction of the LRMPA fleet.

<sup>12</sup> Defence Science and Technology Organisation, *Limitations of Guns as a Defence against Manoeuvring Air Weapons*, DSTO-TN-0565, June 2004

<sup>13</sup> [http://www3.stats.govt.nz/New\\_Zealand\\_Official\\_Yearbooks/1982/NZOYB\\_1982.html#idchapter\\_1\\_78031](http://www3.stats.govt.nz/New_Zealand_Official_Yearbooks/1982/NZOYB_1982.html#idchapter_1_78031)

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/defence-white-paper-2010/chapter5-nzdf-military-capabilities.html>

With reduced force of LRMPA the aircraft becomes a more important strategic asset whose loss will result in greater mission risks for the JATF. Equally while an LRMPA may be a suitable aircraft from which to launch weapons at targets of opportunity, they are not a strike asset. Should short notice military challenges arise within our region sending an LRMPA is not the correct response in the face of Area Defence missiles at sea. While fast jets lack range, without refuelling, they offer a superior attack capability in the maritime environment thereby reducing risk to life and strategically vital LRMPA.

**Air Combat Force:** While many doubt the need for an Air Combat Force it is my view that New Zealand would be foolish to be without one. East Timor showed some form of air strike capability is required even if only standby, in order to contribute to wider regional security in conjunction with Australia. Equally New Zealand without some form of air combat capability effectively surrenders any ability for the Defence Force to act independently in the Oceania region. This lack of "ability" can best be seen in the context of the 1973 Mururoa protests where New Zealand was dependant on an Australian tanker in order to achieve its political objectives.

The issue then arises has to cost. Within the context of the cancelled F-16 lease the size of the Air Combat Force would have doubled in size since 1982. There was no discernible increase in regional instability or threats to New Zealand, outside of operations in East Timor. Consequently a 28 plane lease could not be justified, given historically we operated with just 13 Skyhawk's. In light of the reviews undertaken into the Air Combat Force the acquisition of 18 aircraft could have been justified with the view to maintaining an operational squadron of 12 aircraft<sup>15</sup>. The benefits of this approach were summarised in the Review of Air Combat Capability<sup>16</sup>

Fast Jet training should be conducted in conjunction with Australia or outsourced to the NATO flying training school in Canada. If they were not viable options then a smaller fleet of advanced training aircraft could be acquired as an alternative option. This assumes the T6C Texan is not capable of undertaking that role.

While a fast jet capability is suitable for use in the maritime environment the army has made it clear that its preference would be for attack helicopters<sup>17</sup>. In the context of the air forces involvement in recent coalition operations and the low to medium intensity threat environment in the South Pacific dedicated attack helicopters cannot be justified. In addition the lack of range inherent in attack helicopters introduces additional strategic air lift requirements and for the navy would require a completely different class of ship in order to deploy attack helicopters operationally<sup>18</sup>. As noted earlier the A109 LUH may be able to fulfil the requirement in a low – medium intensity environment, but the same issues would affect these helicopters as would affect dedicated attack helicopters.

**Strategic and Tactical Transport:** Within the context of strategic transport there are only two real contenders the C-17 and A-400. Both can achieve the same objectives but my preference is for a single class of aircraft that covers both the tactical and strategic role. The proposed acquisition

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<sup>15</sup> Hon Derek Quigley, *Review of the lease of F-16 aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Air Force*, 2001.p.31

<sup>16</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Review of the options for an air combat capability*, Wellington 2001 p.4

<sup>17</sup> Hon Derek Quigley, *Review of the lease of F-16 aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Air Force*, 2001.p.30.

<sup>18</sup> The Navy would require a vessel capable of operating a minimum of 8-10 aircraft, with appropriate magazines for ammunition etc. At present neither HMNZS Canterbury or the OPV's possess magazines suitable for taken air to surface weapons.

of two C-17 could not in my view meet New Zealand's strategic lift capability alone. The A-400 can meet the Defence Force's strategic lift capability in terms of the NH-90 and Light Armoured Vehicle. In the context of any reconstitution of the air combat force the A-400 is certified for inflight refuelling.

The biggest risk in any C-17 acquisition is that it will lead to a transport fleet of 3 different types of aircraft (i.e. C-17, A-400 / C-130 and a smaller tactical transport to perform tactical transport and maritime patrol roles. In my view the acquisition of a smaller fixed wing tactical transport is justified in order to provide a balance in tasking and operational costs both nationally and overseas.

In terms of tactical transport I question whether the air force can meet the Defence Force's needs in terms of training the army and supporting the JATF at the same time. The first issue is the number of NH90 available for usage. If 4 are deployed with the JATF (notwithstanding their ability to deploy from HMNZS Canterbury), that leaves only 4 in New Zealand to support a range of operations. Once down time for depot level maintenance is factored in the issue becomes more pronounced. More importantly the existing NH-90 are not capable of deployment at sea except in calm to light seas. For the JATF to be viable any helicopter must be capable of operating up to Sea State 5.

Before summarising future air force requirements a comment must be made with regards to the weapons capability of the RNZAF. Firstly a replacement is required for the existing Mk 46 torpedo's which are at the end of their service life. Two options are in my view available the Mk 54 and the MU-90 torpedo. Neither are without their risks<sup>19</sup>. However current numbers, believed to have been in the around 60-80, must be maintained if both the naval combat force and the P3 / Medium Range MPA are to be capable to meeting New Zealand's security obligations<sup>20</sup>.

The second is that the Air Force must move towards the operation of standoff precision weapons in the maritime and land environment. What those weapons are needs to be considered in more detail but without them New Zealand runs the risk causing unnecessary civilian casualties and the loss of limited numbers of aircraft and their crew.

Having regard to my earlier comments I believe the following aircraft / types of aircraft, excluding the Sea Sprite, should be acquired to meet New Zealand's regional and international security obligations.

Air Craft Type	Number	Comments
Air Combat Force	18	Our maritime environment combined with the range of naval cruise missiles suggests that a long range twin engine aircraft would be the most appropriate aircraft. The size of the aircraft would also indicate that Close Air Support would not a role whereas interdiction would be.
T6C Texan Advanced Trainer	11	There is potential for use in the Forward Observation Role and Light Close Air Support.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports/2012-2013/Remediation-of-the-Lightweight-Torpedo-Replacement-Project/Audit-summary> and <http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2014/pdf/navy/2014mk54.pdf>, last accessed 20 June 2015.

<sup>20</sup> Hank Schouten, *New torpedoes may cost navy \$100m*, The Dominion Post, 27 June 2008

P8 Poseidon	4	Equipped with range of standoff weapons and torpedoes.
Long Range Strategic Transport / Tactical Transport	5	A400M
Medium Range Tactical Transport / Maritime Patrol Aircraft	6	Medium Range Tactical Transport would be acquired with 2-3 Maritime Patrol Modules. The aircraft would have a limited ability to deliver torpedoes and anti-ship missiles. The C295 would appear to be the only aircraft that offers a low risk solution.
Advanced Twin Engine Training	4	Current King Air or similar
NH 90 (NZ)	14	The existing 8 aircraft would be supplemented with 6 additional aircraft orientated towards maritime operations.
A109 LUH	11	The existing 5 Aircraft would be supplemented with 6 aircraft orientated towards general maritime support duties and limited close air support.
<b>Total Number of Aircraft</b>	<b>73</b>	

### Army

Overall I think the army as benefited from much of the re-equipment that has occurred since Bosnia and the formation of 1(NZ) Brigade. An ongoing program of modernisation will continue to support its ability to deploy into combat zones around the world.

Personally I believe the development of a third light infantry battalion would enhance the ability of the army to support operations in the Pacific and around the world. However enhancements to the three existing manoeuvre units the army current operates (1 RNZIR, 2/1 RNZIR and QAMR) maybe of equal advantage. Without a third infantry battalion an assumption must be made for planning purposes that New Zealand will deploy only company groups outside of the South Pacific.

This implies that New Zealand will operate within a coalition environment similar to Bosnia and Afghanistan. By default high end land based capabilities like Local Area Air Defence will be provided by coalition partners. Therefore deployed company groups must be capable of defeating localised threats in the form of armour and attack helicopters if they are too succeed in a blurred and complex operating environment. The key enhancements I see the army requiring in order to deploy into a conflict zone are as follows:

- **Low Level Air Defence:** New Zealand acquired 12 Mistral Missile systems and later 2 radar systems in order to provide IFF / Warning. An upgrade to the Mistral system to include a more modern missile and integrated IFF on the launcher would enhance the system and remove the need for the radar system if early warning can be provided by coalition partners. Some thought should be given to the motorisation of any air defence capability so air defence troops can change location rapidly as a countermeasure.
- **Additional Anti-Armour Weapons:** New Zealand operates 24 Javelin Anti-Tank Systems. Supporting 3 manoeuvre units requires a minimum of 36 units, based on British Army

structures<sup>21</sup>. Potentially more are necessary based on other light infantry organisations structures<sup>22</sup>. Consideration should also be given to the acquisition of other lighter man portable precision guided weapons, if available, so the Defence Force can minimise civilian casualties.

- Artillery: An additional regular force integrated Artillery / Mortar Battery is required to support the third manoeuvre unit formed with the re-establishment of QAMR as a regiment. Long term consideration needs to be given as to whether heavy artillery (155mm), towed or tracked are required given the availability of such systems to potentially hostile forces. Within the issue of artillery and by association indirect fire support is the ability of 2/1 RNZIR to train for operations effectively.

*Capability of 2/1 Battalion RNZIR:* The New Zealand Army has centralised indirect fire support (Artillery and 81mm mortars) into the 16<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment RNZA. Originally this consisted of a separate mortar company based in the South Island. It has now been merged into the two regular force Artillery Batteries and one North Island based reserve unit.

This has left 2/1 RNZIR without any ability to train regularly with indirect fire support and therefore for operational deployments given both regular artillery and armour units are based in the North Island. Given the importance of 2/1 to the overall operational capability of the army, as one of only two regular infantry battalions, I have to wonder about 2/1 ability to train and fight in a combined arms environment given the lack of the above resources to the battalion.

I would note that the majority of our allies consider 81mm mortars an infantry weapon and embed them within infantry battalions.

- Armour: I support retention of the current number of Light Armoured Vehicles ("LAV") but consider other variants are required, within the overall numbers. My reasoning for supporting the retention is twofold. The first is the vulnerability of light infantry forces to armour and artillery is well documented. Maintaining sufficient numbers of LAV will provide some protection to any forward deployed light infantry forces. Secondly in order to support a deployed company group into a high intensity environment Ambulance, Mortar and Command and Control variants are required. Based on the US Army Stryker Brigade a minimum of one ambulance, one command and control and two mortar variants are required for each company<sup>23</sup>.

*Protected Mobility:* There is a requirement for a superior Light Operational Vehicle ("LOV"). The current vehicle has known vulnerabilities highlighted by the United Kingdom National Audit Office<sup>24</sup>. Of the current LOV force of 321 only 60<sup>25</sup> are armoured and in Afghanistan New Zealand had to rely on United States manufactured HUMVEE to meet operational requirements. Consequently the LOV is not fit for purpose and should be

<sup>21</sup> Charles Heyman, *The British Army: Pocket Guide 2012-2013*, p.87.

<sup>22</sup> Major D.R.Gilding RM, *The effects of restructuring on the Royal Marines*, Qua Patet Orbis, July 2002, p.16. A Commando21 structured Battalion operates 18 Missile Launcher Units.

<sup>23</sup> United States Army, *FM3-21.11 - THE SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY*, January 2003. Chapter.1-6.

<sup>24</sup> National Audit Office, *Support to High Intensity Operations*, May 2009, p.12.

<sup>25</sup> [http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/business/goa/47HansQ\\_20040622\\_00000036/1-army%E2%80%94light-armoured-vehicles-purchase](http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/business/goa/47HansQ_20040622_00000036/1-army%E2%80%94light-armoured-vehicles-purchase), Last Accessed 13 June 2015.



relegated to the Active Reserve for training and a new more capable vehicle acquired for operational deployments into combat zones. In particular each unit should have sufficient numbers of protected vehicles to support and sustain training and combat operations.

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***In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.***

*Viability of Devonport Naval Base:* If the dry dock is to remain strategically and commercially viable then it needs to be enlarged in order to be able to service ships like *HMNZS Canterbury* (L421), any new navy tanker and the new Inter-Island Ferries currently in service. Both *HMNZS Canterbury* and the newer Inter-Island Ferries currently travel to Australia for docking<sup>26</sup>. As the size of ships increase the size of the dockyard becomes more important once you consider the potential beam of any future surface combatant may exceed the maximum permissible beam of 19.5 metres and length overall of 150m<sup>27</sup>. Any enlargement would require an extension into the harbour but the potential benefit would be to allow the dry dock to be split into two to allow for simultaneous docking of two vessels.

Setting aside the dry dock issue the other issue that needs to be asked is whether Devonport Naval Base is right place for the navy going forward. Specifically there is limited room for the navy to grow on its current site. In addition the impact on service personnel of the rising cost of private housing and the declining availability of service housing is an issue that needs to be considered given the potential to impact on future recruitment and retention<sup>28</sup>. Consideration needs to be given to whether the navy has sufficient housing for its staff in Auckland and whether there is a requirement to increase current navy housing by though sub-division of existing sections. This review should also consider Army and Air Force personnel housing requirements in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch in order to ensure a whole of force approach is taken.

*Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ("UAV"):* At present most UAV civilian systems are portable by vehicle. If UAV technology in the civilian sector evolves into UAV vehicles similar in size to the current military UAV's then consideration needs to be given to greater restrictions on the use of air space around core government, military and civilian infrastructure. Potentially a low level air defence capability will be required in future in order to protect international events (political and civilian) from extremist groups, as was seen during the 2012 London Olympics<sup>29</sup>. A lack of such capability may endanger New Zealand's ability to host events like the Commonwealth Games or APEC in the future.

One final observation into the use of UAV. While I do not oppose the use of UAV in the MPA role, I believe that manned options should be considered first so as to ensure appropriate aviation rules are in place for the operation of UAV's. Consideration should also be given to operating these aircraft from an airfield outside of the main centres in order to reduce potential risks to commercial aviation operators.

*Removing unnecessary restructuring:* While I concur that the Defence Force should make changes where it will enhance the value of the taxpayer's dollar, I don't personally see any more surplus cash in Defence. What has become increasingly clear however is that our short electoral cycle leads to

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<sup>26</sup> *HMNZS Canterbury* has a beam of 23.4 metres and a length overall of 131 metres. *MV Kaitaki* has a beam of 23.4 metres and a length overall of 181.60.

<sup>27</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Request for Information: Littoral Warfare Support Capability Project*, Wellington. p29 and; the proposed Type 26 currently has a stated Beam of 20 metres and overall length of 148.5 metres. *HDMS Absalon* has a beam of 19.5 metres and overall length of 137 metres.

<sup>28</sup> Navy Community Organisation, *Advice to Naval Housing Tenants*: The navy had 380 houses including 9 fully furnished transit flats. 8% of houses are unoccupied due to maintenance. p.4.

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/9373177/London-2012-Olympics-Government-confirms-use-of-surface-to-air-missiles.html>, Last Accessed 17 May 2015.

decisions that have an adverse effect on the Defence Force in terms of equipment and capability. While governments should and must retain control of Defence Policy and Foreign Policy making decisions I am increasingly of the view that some form of mechanism is required to avoid the apparent waste associated with ongoing restructuring. For example Queens Alexandra Mount Rifles, went from a regiment based in Waiouru to a Squadron based in Burnham to a regiment based in Linton in the space of 10 years. In the process new facilities were built in Burnham that now sit unused.

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## Introduction

### The term 'defence'?

The term was long ago twisted to include goals and actions which are more often offence than defence, an attempt to gain advantage and dominance, many times in other parts of the world beyond the home country. In this submission I will try to identify what roles are actually needed for true defence and expose misconstrued roles which are not properly defence. True defence will require very little of the military 'defence force' which seems to be the focus of the White Paper.

### What constitutes true 'defence'?

Climate change and natural resource depletion, disease, poverty, and natural disasters are and will be defining challenges moving on to a hopefully sustainable future. Putting priorities on a home, a job, health care and a future for their children are true defence requirements. Low inequality results in a greater good for all, but for 40 years inequality has risen. Old perceived threats will take a back seat, or will be exposed as contrarily contributing to insecurities, in the future. These 'defence' issues will always be defined by the larger needs of society and the globe.

## Analysis of challenges and priorities

### Natural disasters

A capability to support relief when natural disasters occur within New Zealand and the Pacific vicinity, such as at Vanuatu (Hurricane Pam) recently, should be a priority and equipment and training need to be designed for that role. For example, helicopters for observation and delivery of relief supplies must be designed for local conditions. I understand NZ helicopters were unsuitable for that emergency having been specified to fit into combat interoperability with Australian and American forces.

### National boundary protection

While it might be argued that a fighting force would be useful in repelling an invading force, there are two cautions on this. One is that the threat is extremely remote. The other is that a determined large invasion would make such a force useless. Fighting forces designed to be interoperable with a larger military force such as that of the USA will not likely be useful for such a role as the USA will not likely become involved, but worse it will make it more likely for New Zealand to be viewed as an 'enemy' with trade and diplomatic consequences such as human rights issues.

### Coastal and resource protection

Providing assistance to vessels in difficulty would be necessary and to assist in environmental cleanups after ship wrecks. Other maritime roles would include the ability to monitor and police activities of fishing vessels, oil drilling operations, etc., to protect natural ecosystems and their contribution to the health of the planet, such as to protect fish populations (sometimes in the form of strong fishing quotas) and halt illegal fishing intrusions such as whaling, and also to protect worker rights. Fishing quotas and whaling, fishing bans and employment laws are legally based on national and international law (e.g. United Nations and other treaties) and should be enforceable. Vessels, equipment and training appropriate to those roles must be available (too often equipment and training in NZ armed forces are designed for interoperability with US forces and inappropriate to the needs of real threats). These roles could be called "coast guard" duties.

These roles must not be misconstrued as primarily to protect private commercial interests. Operations like fishing could just as well be publicly run. Also these roles should not be construed as intended to restrict other peoples' and nation's customary rights or to pursue economic dominance on behalf of interests in New Zealand or its allies.

### Ecosystem destruction by the military

The first priority of medicine or aid is to do no harm. But the NZ military in its training at Rangipo which includes the Tongariro National Park and World Heritage Site where live ammo testing and armoured vehicle training destroys much potential habitat. Also the Air Force has a bombing range at Kaipara Harbour which is near the Department of Conservation Papakanui Spit Wildlife Refuge. This contradicts the roles suggested in the previous section. Participation in the RIMPAC exercises in Hawaii does the same thing and that is not even a New Zealand operation.

### Financial costs of the NZ military

The New Zealand taxpayer funds about 3.5B\$ each year (Billion!) for the NZ military. Given the many counterproductive ways it currently operates as discussed in previous sections of this submission, this amounts to another example of doing harm before actual needs are addressed. State housing could be made warm, healthy and safe for not much more than the cost of refurbishing the two frigates plus two new Hercules C-130. The total cost of all historic treaty claims is less than half one year's military budget.

### Overseas roles – United Nations

There are potential international roles to play similar to the ones described above on behalf of the United Nations, but New Zealand must be careful which ones to get involved in. Too easily the UN can be manipulated to serve the interests of the dominant nations (e.g. see "war on terror" below). Often times it is the elites in each nation who benefit from such actions. There is no future in continued widening of the gap between the super-rich, the middle class and the poor. New Zealand would do better to make a non military contribution.

### Overseas roles – "War on Terror" and "War on Drugs"

The so-called “war on terror” and “war on drugs” are lies; that is they are not what they claim to be. New Zealand must not get involved in them. The NZ involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq were destabilizing influences in those countries because the involvement was at the behest of the USA and its illegitimate intrusion there. Your consultation document says the world is a ‘more uncertain’ place, but fails to acknowledge the part NZ forces have played in this destabilization.

## Your submission outline

You have organized the submission form for certain items to be addressed. All of them must be viewed in relation to the above analysis.

*Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?*

Most of the sections in my submission address this question.

*Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?*

Your use of the term ‘interests’ is important here. Whose interests? Yes, there are circumstances relevant to our place in the Pacific which we all are part of and we should feel a joint community of interests and interdependence about them. But also we exist in a global political and economic culture and there are different ‘interests’ within New Zealand, such as the elite, the middle class, and the poor which are concerns globally. The issue of the growing income and assets gap is primary.

*Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?*

As in Q.2, what are the ‘nation’s’ ‘interests’? The concept of ‘interests abroad’ is often thought of as keeping in line with the USA. But that has got NZ into trouble in Afghanistan and Iraq through this century threatening the very priorities which this country must adopt.

*Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency*

The concept of the ‘territory of the Realm Nations’ is a risky one. There is no British Empire anymore though there seems to be nostalgia for the exploitative nature of that historical relic in today’s ‘neoliberal’ economics which New Zealand has so desperately adopted in the last 25 years; best to drop that term. The other terms should be thought of as indicator terms of the natural environment to protect the planet which we all live in, and which produce some resources to New Zealand’s benefit but not the out of date view of resource exploitation opportunities.

*Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?*

The best way to contribute to international peace and security globally is to avoid the so called “War on Terrorism” and “War on Drugs”. Working to stop climate change (‘climate disruption’) could be a focus of a ‘natural resource defence capability’ as described in earlier sections. Natural disaster response capability could be a major contributor to stability. Perhaps some form of ‘peace keeping’ activities through the United Nations might be appropriate but that would be best served with a non-military contribution.

*Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?*

As in Q.2, what are the ‘nation’s’ ‘interests’? Yes, there are circumstances relevant to our place in the Pacific which we all are part of and we should feel a joint community of interests and interdependence about them. But also we exist in a global political and economic culture and there are different ‘interests’ within New Zealand, such as the elite, the middle class, and the poor which are concerns globally. Again, the issue of the growing income and asset gap is primary. A military force which we now have and which you call the Defence Force, especially when its primary focus is on interoperability with USA forces, will not be the way to accomplish this.

*Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?*

Natural disasters and environmental damaging accidents are discussed in earlier sections. A military force which we now have and which you call the ‘Defence Force’, especially when its primary focus is on interoperability with USA forces, will not be the way to accomplish this. Equipment will need to be built to purpose and to local conditions, considering both New Zealand and the Pacific.

*Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?*

The NZ Military should not be involved at all with the nation’s youth. While it is true that some youth need assistance to develop self-discipline and a sense of responsibility doing so in a military environment will not prepare them for living in the new sustainable society which will emerge as real needs are met.

*Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future.*

Capabilities are dependent upon the challenges and priorities outlined in the above sections. A military force which we now have and which you call the ‘Defence Force’, especially when its primary focus is on interoperability with USA forces, will not be the way to accomplish this. All equipment will need to be built to purpose and today’s emphasis on war fighting will not be fit for those priorities.

## Summary



The current military with its emphasis of purpose, equipment, and expenditure, is a counterproductive influence on New Zealand's needs as described above throughout the submission. The 'Defence Force' should be drastically modified to fit real needs as described in the submission, or perhaps disbanded so that a fresh start could be made.

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# Submission Form

Please send your submission to: **Defence White Paper 2015, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 12703, WELLINGTON, 6144**

You can also make your views known by submitting written comments either using the online submission form on the Ministry of Defence website at <http://www.defence.govt.nz>, or by uploading or emailing completed submission forms to [DWP15@defence.govt.nz](mailto:DWP15@defence.govt.nz)

**Deadline for submissions:** To ensure views expressed through the consultation process can be considered in the Review, a deadline of 22 June 2015 has been established for receipt of formal submissions.

## Contact details \* = Mandatory

*Name:
Group (if applicable):
Mailing address:
Contact telephone number:
Email address:

## Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

<p>1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ILLEGAL MIGRATION</li> <li>- TERRORISM</li> <li>- CYBER THREATS</li> <li>- ILLEGAL FISHING OR RESOURCE REMOVAL</li> <li>- LARGE NATIONS IGNORING CURRENT RULES BASED CONVENTIONS</li> <li>- THREATS TO OUR ALLIES</li> </ul>
<p>2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- BREAK DOWN OF CURRENT 'RULES BASED CONVENTIONS AND LAWS</li> <li>- IGNORING CURRENT BORDERS AND ECONOMIC ZONES</li> <li>- MORE CYBER ATTACKS</li> <li>REQUIRING MORE RESPONSES FROM DEFENCE AND AN INCREASED ENVIRONMENT TO BE COMBAT CAPABLE AND SELF SUFFICIENT.</li> </ul>
<p>3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- RAPID DEPLOYMENT</li> <li>- AIR/SEA/LAND/UNDERWATER SURVEILLANCE + INTELLIGENCE GATHERING</li> <li>- ENHANCE COMBAT CAPABILITIES</li> <li>- SELF DEPLOY AND SELF SUSTAIN</li> <li>- LEAD A SMALL MULTI NATIONAL COMBAT CAPABLE FORCE (FOR PEACE KEEPING)</li> <li>- <del>BE</del> BE PART OF A COALITION COMBAT FORCE</li> </ul>

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

- CYBER THREATS
- ILLEGAL FISHING AND REMOVAL OF OUR RESOURCES
- BREAKDOWN OF CURRENT AGREEMENTS OR RULES BASED CONVENTIONS
- ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

- INCREASE DEFENCE SPENDING
- WORK WITH ALLIES TO SHARE RESOURCES AND IDENTIFY WEAKNESSES THAT NZ CAN RECTIFY

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

- ASSIST IN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF AND STABILITY
- PATROL OR EEC AND SURVEILLANCE
- SEARCH AND RESCUE

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

TO ASSIST IN DISASTER RELIEF BUT REQUIRE A CLEAR SEPARATION OF DUTIES WITH POLICE ON TERRORISM ACTIVITIES

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

- FOCUS ON JOB MARKETING TO ATTRACT YOUTH
- SMALL PROGRAM TO BRING IN TROUBLED YOUTH BUT DO NOT ALLOW THIS TO CONSUME VALUABLE RESOURCES AND DETRACT FROM CORE ACTIVITIES OF DEFENCE

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

- 3x FREIGATES, 3x OPV, 2x SUPPLY + LOGISTIC VESSELS
- INCREASED SIZE OF ARMY + SAS,
- COMBAT CAPABLE AIR FORCE, AIR TRANSPORT
- SURVEILLANCE
- ENHANCED CYBER TECHNOLOGY
- A CONTINUATION OF CURRENT PLANS BUT BRING THEM FORWARD

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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Please be aware that all submissions are subject to the Official Information Act 1982. Please set out clearly in your submission if you have any objection to the release of any information in the submission. In particular, please indicate which part, or parts, you consider should be withheld, together with your reasons for withholding the information.

**New Zealand Defence Industry Association  
Submission to the 2015 Defence White Paper**

Prepared by Rhys Jones

Reviewed by the NZDIA Board

Released by the Chair of the NZDIA, Mr Bernie Driver



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**New Zealand Defence Industry Association**  
**Submission to the 2015 Defence White Paper**

**Introduction**

The New Zealand Defence Industry Association (NZDIA) was formed to assist in the interaction between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) on one hand and New Zealand based commercial organisations on the other. Much has changed in terms of the commercial environment in New Zealand over its existence since 1993.

In the 2010 Defence White Paper Defence Industry support and integration was hardly mentioned despite a strong emphasis on civilianisation, innovation and reduction in cost. For example, it described the whole of life capability management being solely about the NZDF-MoD responsibility. Defence industry participation, advice and assistance was not mentioned at all. It will be disappointing if this occurs again, as New Zealand's civilian manufacturing, education and service sectors have much to offer in all these aspects.

In this submission for the 2015 Defence White Paper the NZDIA will not address the issues of the security environment nor the Defence capabilities that New Zealand may need in response. Instead this paper will focus its comments on the matters which the NZDIA considers itself a credible voice: the commercial support policy and capability that would be appropriate and useful for New Zealand to possess to support Defence.

The NZDIA is keen to assist the Government in ensuring that the Defence Force is able to do its tasks well. This can be done in two main ways:

- Reducing through life costs, and
- Providing strategic support capability in New Zealand that ensures the Defence capabilities are able to be maintained effectively and deployed at times of our choosing.

Over the last 7 years significant progress has been made to improve the working relationship between industry and Defence, in both the acquisition and through life support spectrums. These efforts are applauded but there is still progress to be made. New Zealand industries understand that the Government Rules of Sourcing fit within our international treaty obligations for trade and therefore are not seeking an advantage over overseas commercial providers. What the NZDIA is seeking is the ability for New Zealand companies to play to their advantages of proximity, consistency of engagement and responsiveness.

In mid 2014 the MoD Evaluation Division conducted a study into Defence Industry engagement and in August 2014 published their report "Optimising New Zealand Industry Involvement in the New Zealand Defence Sector". The NZDIA thoroughly supports the three main recommendations of this report:

- Consistently apply and continuously improve whole-of-life costing in key stages of the Defence Management process. Communicate our expectations clearly with industry.
- Continuously improve Defence procurement processes and practices to optimise New Zealand industry involvement.
- Increase Defence engagement and collaboration with the New Zealand defence industry. Increase transparency in key aspects of Defence activity that impact on New Zealand industry.

This submission seeks to highlight the directions of progress that are working well and promise further benefits to both the Defence Force and industry, as well as to point out the main areas still of issue to industry, being:

- the lack of a clear Defence Industry strategy that can guide policy decisions on industrial capability and defence industry relationships, and
- the lack of early effective engagement with the commercial sector in both procurement and operational support.

### Current Status

Progress has certainly been made over the last seven years in both the acquisition and through life support areas, but this work needs to continue. For example, the split of roles between the NZDF and the MoD still causes some frustration to industry, particularly in the transition to the introduction into service phase. As mentioned above, the MoD Evaluation Division report has highlighted the main areas where further work needs to occur, including this aspect.

Most encouragingly there is an improving 'strategic partnership' environment that is replacing the existing contractual/transactional relationship, however this has not yet permeated to all of the Defence hierarchy. There is still a strong feeling within the NZDF and MoD that industry is seeking to unreasonably maximise profits and will take short-cuts to do that. Therefore Defence will often apply a transactional management style to monitor output and financial return.

On the other side of the fence Industry find it difficult to build up trust-based relationships when the posting turbulence of NZDF people means that those with experience move on every few years, requiring the relationship to be built again. Strategic partnerships are built on trust and trust takes time to exist. The NZDF struggles to resolve this aspect and will continue to do so with its current promotion mentality that all individuals, regardless of background, need a wide range of experiences. Singapore has recognised that technical personnel do not fit well within the operational rank structure and have moved them into a separate career development line that values proficiency in a different manner. It may be time to examine this approach in New Zealand.

The New Zealand Defence Industry sector is not a homogenous body. There are few purely defence industries in New Zealand, with those being mainly branches of large international companies who are currently engaged with the Defence Force. There are some companies who frequently engage with Defence or who are strategic partners whom have been able to tailor their businesses and equipment to fit Defence's processes or operational requirements. Most of New Zealand's Defence Industry, however, either have an infrequent engagement with Defence or the Defence aspect is only a small proportion of their business. These businesses are not aligned to defence needs from the start, so need time or financial consideration to tool up, such as an advanced payment to allow re-tooling rather than anything extra. This approach was used during the Anzac Ship project by the Australian Government and provided an effective way of allowing local industry to be competitive without creating an advantage.

Finally it should be recognised that the Defence Industry philosophy is not only applicable to manufacturing and IT industries but also the conceptual, educational and research agencies. For example there is a strong call for knowledge transfer into New Zealand with large contracts. This can be done not only into a New Zealand business partner but also into training organisations. Similarly engagement with training organisations should take place not only to take advantage of existing training courses, but should also aim to shape the training to match the evolving skill needs of Defence and Defence industry.

It has been stated that considerable progress has been made in the Defence/industry relationship. This is true, but has almost all been at the initiative of a few individuals within Defence and industry. A useful Government or Defence policy has not yet been developed.

There are, therefore two organisational areas that should be addressed in both the upcoming White Paper and in practical steps in the immediate future: the lack of a formal Defence Industry strategy designed to support the wider Defence strategy and the absence of early integration of industry advice and options into Defence operational and procurement planning. These aspects will be covered further below.

### **Reducing Through Life Cost**

For some time it has been recognised that through life costs form the major expense in capability, not the up-front purchase price. As a rule of thumb purchase price amounts to approximately only 30% of the whole of life costs for a Defence capital asset. Therefore getting an understanding of the through life profile of different options and finding ways to minimise operational costs are important aspects of procurement strategy and decision making. Previous MoD purchase policy was to emphasise the best "sale yard" purchase price at the exclusion of other considerations. This has led to some expensive decisions as the through life maintenance factors were often not included in the contract negotiations. The purchase of the NH90 in that manner was a salient lesson for Defence and the processes have been radically altered since then.

Visibility of the costs and identification of options to reduce them are two aspects of procurement strategy. Through life cost analysis is best done with the engagement of the industries that are likely to be supporting the equipment once it comes into service. As a corollary to that, having capable New Zealand based partners or at least a New Zealand company as a member of a consortium, potentially will lower those through life costs as well as increase probability of availability.

The potentially lower long term operational costs of Defence capability are partially because the cost of New Zealand based support is more likely to be within the expected fluctuations of the New Zealand market, rather than dictated by overseas demand. Additionally there are benefits from spending the money in New Zealand, as the money will recycle through the economy (Appendix 4 to the MoD Evaluation Division Report covers this aspect). However the financial benefits should not be at the cost of lower quality product or significant extra up-front expense.

### **Strategic Assets.**

The DIA encourages a discussion around the value of the strategic assets currently in New Zealand that are in danger of disappearing or degrading beyond value, such as the dockyard. These strategic assets are not only facilities, but can include capabilities such as software development and codification. Currently the decision about retention of these capabilities is almost solely based on cost, whereas their value is in the ability to guarantee operational availability of the military capabilities.

It is recognised that offshore options will often be cheaper, however decisions around retaining these strategic assets should be made around guaranteeing the maintenance of operational capability. For example, equipment sent offshore for routine or emergency maintenance will need to fit into the timetabling of the offshore company, not our own operational needs. Any prioritisation that we seek to impose will cost significantly to bump other clients. New Zealand based Government owned assets, however, can have their work prioritised at short notice more easily.

Secondly long lead time maintenance or repair items will have a greater impact on a smaller military, such as the NZDF, than a larger one. One ship or aircraft out of action can be coped with for a larger military whereas it will have a much larger effect on capacity for a force with only a few such vessels.

Thirdly, the highly skilled workforce that most of these locations employ and train will have flow on benefits to the wider New Zealand economy.

It is acknowledged that retention of these strategic assets will be expensive. The discussion that NZDIA encourages is to examine the value of availability and flexibility as an aspect of cost and also to examine how that value can be spread wider than Defence to other agencies such as Air New Zealand, Customs, Police, Fire, etc., thereby making them commercially viable.

### **Procurement**

Most of New Zealand's Defence Industry is in the "selling" game, so acquisition processes are important. The MoD Evaluation Report highlighted that steps to improve awareness, understanding and access were important to optimising New Zealand industry engagement. The NZDIA looks forward to these occurring.

More important to the process, though, is the need to have an informed Capability Management Board, particularly in the areas of:

- More cross capability thinking to maximise innovative solutions
- More through life information
- More integrated with industry in examining options for both of the above

Improvements in these areas have occurred over the past 7 years and further progress is in line. The NZDIA welcomes the extra funding for resources in the capability analysis and acquisition areas to achieve these aims.

To meet the three smart business practices mentioned above it is useful to have the development concepts for the NZDF understood by industry. The NZDF long range strategy 'Future35' is a good start at getting early thinking into future capability and should involve industry input as well as military. Similarly the 2011 and 2014 Defence Capability Plans, which explained capability aspirations rather than just listing acquisition projects, were also a good progression towards this outcome.

The next stage to be developed in that sequence of planning steps should be the designing of future operational concepts so that benchmarks can be set to assess alternative solutions. This allows the acquisition and organisational change projects to be better focused on the final performance expectations but allow both industry and the military to be innovative in meeting the requirements. This approach drives improved cross domain thinking, rather than projects being solely focused on replacing a specific component of the Defence machine, which to a large extent still drives Defence capability planning.

The current Assistant Chief of Defence for Capability, Commodore John Martin, has stated that "Industry can do a lot more of Defence's thinking", not only in analysis of product options but also in the earlier stages of defining both the problem and what the solution might look like. Again, Defence Industry welcomes this line of thinking. It will allow industry to not only participate but also anticipate needs, be better prepared to offer solutions and to form industry partnerships early in the process. All of this will allow industry to create better whole of life options for Defence to consider.



Leveraging manufacturers to get the best through life support package should be done at the time of purchase but will often mean a higher up front cost compared to some other options. Tied to that is the fact that better whole of life cost analysis will occur if there is industry involvement in the planning, such as advice by the strategic logistic partners who will usually take on the responsibility of maintaining that equipment. But additionally there is expertise in the commercial sector that can help in the analyses of these options.

An aspect of reducing cost is managing technical risk in projects. New Zealand's Defence budget is small and therefore our ability to absorb large technical risk or rectification costs is limited. This reinforces the proven approach that New Zealand should seek leading but not bleeding edge solutions. This does not preclude innovation, as most innovation is derived from a unique combination or way of using things that already exists rather than the development of something new. As well as reducing project risk, there is more likelihood of New Zealand industry being able to effectively partner with the manufacturers for technology transfers, thereby raising the value of New Zealand's local input into the project.

Partnerships with big overseas companies and the related issue of whether New Zealand companies could be considered the "Prime" bidder were covered by the MoD Evaluation report, which highlights a difference of perception of the problem between Defence and Industry. The Defence perspective is that NZ companies are reluctant to step up for that role, whereas the Industry perception is that Defence has a preference for overseas companies to be the "Prime" bidder because their size and expertise allows more risk to be taken by the company (but ultimately the cost will come back to Defence). There is truth in both views that could potentially be resolved by a discussion around the development of a strategic plan for Defence Industry engagement and growth. New Zealand industry does need to grow in experience and confidence, but equally needs to be given the chance to do that.

### **Through Life Support**

From the industry perspective the through-life-support relationships have made the most progress, through the adoption of a "strategic partnership" approach, particularly with the prime maintenance contractors for the three services: Babcock for the Navy, Lockheed Martin for the Army and SafeAir for the Air Force. From these three big companies there are a cluster of sub-contractor companies that also benefit from long term stability and surety and who therefore can make better long term investments in their own capabilities. This not only reduces cost but also allows these big and small companies to get to know Defence needs and therefore respond to them better.

From the Defence Force side the creation of the Joint Logistics Command has been a great step forward. It has allowed one central agency to take a pan-NZDF approach to through-life support, such as how single service contracts can be used across the other services and agencies.

The MoD Evaluation report made good recommendations on increasing the transparency of defence activities through a number of methods. However there is still progress to be made, particularly in getting earlier engagement with industry over the activity schedule of Defence, so that better preparation can be done. This requires the NZDF to allow industry to have greater visibility and input into the NZDFs routine and operational planning.

Having the strategic partners engaged early and regularly in operational planning will aid responsiveness, offer other solutions to problems and potentially reduce cost. Concerns over operational secrecy are not considered justified. An example of where this level of integration works despite high levels of security is the UK nuclear submarine operations where the commercial logistic

support operators are informed of the outline operational schedule so that planning and stockholding can be synchronised.

Connected with this aspect is the question of commercial providers operating in the theatre of operations. Most militaries have integrated commercial providers into their logistic chains and the legal status issues of civilians in a combat zone have been resolved. There are still physical risks that need to be accepted by the commercial and military partners, but the operational models have proven to work. The NZDF operational logistic concept of operations, however, is still being developed. Industrial engagement should occur as part of that development, particularly by the major maritime, land and air logistics providers (acknowledging that Navy already work with overseas support companies for supply and maintenance).

Related to this is the reality that in-theatre support is becoming easier as modern equipment maintenance tends towards a "remove and replace" process rather than "repair in place". Modern IT communications will often allow diagnostic capability to be conducted back in New Zealand or by the original manufacturer, thereby allowing the in theatre logisticians to gain the guidance of what work is required. These factors reduce the perceived risk of having commercial providers replacing uniformed support in the Defence organisations. Commercial operators are also more likely to be able to backfill for the Defence personnel who deploy, particularly if the commercial structure and process integration already exists. It would be slow and difficult for that to occur if the backfilling process had to be established at the time of need.

There is an opportunity to use these strategic partners in an all-of-government manner. There have been some big investments by these companies and their support clusters, so maximising the benefit by widening the support they provide should be examined. An example of this is Lockheed Martin's relationship with Defence, negotiated by Army in 2009, which also includes a side contract to support the Police. This has allowed the Police to gain economies of scale that they could not have achieved by themselves. Lockheed Martin has also negotiated other independent contracts for work with the Fire Brigade and many ambulance services, which potentially could be formalised under the one umbrella contract. Opportunities for Babcock to support Customs, Fisheries and Police ships as part of their dockyard facility are likely to provide benefits for both those agencies and Babcock.

The existence of the strategic logistic partners can also be turned to advantage outside New Zealand, by Foreign Affairs using these contracts to provide support to Pacific Island government agencies, such as Police and Fire Services. The maintenance of their equipment and access to supply chains could be made available as a regional aid program. NZ Aid could fund the marginal costs of the program so that the strategic partners can still make a fair profit. NZDF transport could be used for scheduled pick-up and delivery of either equipment coming back to New Zealand or delivery of people, equipment and supplies, as part of their annual activity program. This method should be better than those Pacific countries individually negotiating contracts for logistic support where they do not have economies of scale as an advantage and where there is often insufficient local industrial support.

### **Defence and Industry Relationships**

Defence Industry recognises the commercial environment that drives New Zealand's trade policies and therefore is not seeking an advantage, but a chance to operate on an even playing field. As mentioned above industry can be provided that by the existence of strategic partnering with Defence and wider government, but the question arises, what does a strategic relationship look like

and what does it mean for both partners? This is different for the acquisition and the through life support aspects, but a theme that runs through both is the need for early engagement, exposure of industry to Defence thinking and awareness of their issues so that responses can be prepared.

Industry needs to understand and meet Defence's operational requirements while Defence needs to accept industry's need for a fair profit. Currently there is not enough trust or transparency within the Defence organisations for this to be achieved. There is clear intent from the higher command levels for this to occur, but time is needed for new processes to be put in place, for these to be shown to work and habits of trust developed. The issues of posting turbulence as an inhibitor to this has been mentioned above, however good models for how these processes can work are developing in the three prime contractor relationships, although each of these vary in how they integrate and their progress towards achieving this.

Trust can be assisted by transparency and oversight. In the United Kingdom a role of the Audit Office is to vet the finances of the strategic partners to ensure that the profit margins are within the agreed parameters. Transparency of costs therefore becomes important and therefore is an aspect that the NZDIA supports. The issues in dealing with the complexities of larger companies and commercial in confidence matters are able to be addressed and are manageable.

### Summary

To summarise, Industry is not seeking to re-litigate the current commercial regulatory environment and go back to protectionism by giving a financial advantage to New Zealand companies. What is sought are ways to better integrate government planning and industry support through improved transparency and joint planning with the objective of providing better support to both the NZDF and MoD and better value to New Zealand.

Good progress has been made over the last seven years, but the NZDIA encourages further moves to allow true strategic relationships to happen through better and earlier integration of industry into Defence capability decisions and operational planning. Industry concedes that this frequently will need to occur without expectation of commercial advantage. This can only occur through improved trust and bold organisational decisions by Defence to be more open to industry.

A big problem still remains the frequent turn-over of military project staff. DIA continues to encourage the NZDF to address this issue and keep project staff stable for the duration of those projects.

The DIA desires to see the formal development of a Defence Industry Strategy to support the wider Defence Strategy. This needs the participation of the MoD, NZDF, MBIE, as well as industry representation. Within this strategy development process there should be discussion on, amongst other things:

- Greater integration in procurement and operational planning
- The capability for New Zealand companies to be Prime bidders
- Strategic assets within New Zealand
- Fair profit mechanisms and monitoring

The DIA would like to see some guidance on these issues from the 2015 White Paper.

**References:**

- MoD Evaluation Division Report, Optimising New Zealand Industry Involvement in the New Zealand Defence Sector, August 2014
- New Zealand Defence Industry Association, NZDIA Strategic Plan 2020 and Beyond,
- New Zealand Government, Defence White Paper, 2010, Ministry of Defence
- New Zealand Government, Defence Capability Plan, Ministry of Defence, June 2014

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## Submissions for Defence White Paper 2015

I have taken the time to do some research over the last couple of weeks and here are my conclusions. We can't afford to build a massive Defence force overnight, but we should expect it to develop roughly in proportion to growth of our population and economy. There are many challenges in the regional security environment, block obsolescence in many of our primary defence platforms, and very low funding of defence in the recent past. I hope that whatever the outcome of this 2015 review, the force we can provide is able to be at least a factor in de-escalating tensions that are building among countries that we still count as our friends. If we are forced to choose a side, we would like our contribution to be a survivable and effective one, and I believe the defence personnel that fight on our behalf deserve nothing less.

### Question 1: Security Outlook

*What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?*

Some of the potential aggressors are friends and trading partners of NZ so part of the rationale for maintaining a military force has to be diffusing tensions in the region, as well as contributing to a combined deterrent effect. Whether ISIS infiltrates a poorer South or South-East Asian nation, or China finally tips the global balance of power before being ready to take on such a responsibility, smaller nations like NZ have a part to play ensuring that neither side sees war as a winnable option. This means increased cooperation and joint combined exercises so NZDF can assist an allied operation if needed. It may also involve programmes to interface communications and bridge language barriers.

Evolving security environment requires evolved resources and higher readiness - today's patrol could easily escalate into something else. "For but not with" and "credible minimum" may not be appropriate anymore, but rather a scenario oriented approach might be more useful to assess the most effective contributions NZDF could make to resolving a conflict. We need to keep in mind that an outclassed and outnumbered force is no deterrent, so keeping the peace is going to be working more closely with allies and more expensive than in the past.

*"Do not depend on the enemy not coming, but depend on our readiness against him. Do not depend on the enemy not attacking, but depend on our position that cannot be attacked." (Sun Tzu)*

### Question 2: International Environment & New Zealand's Interests

*What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?*

NZ interests are not only in trade routes, but in a stable and peaceful region and world that contains many friends, investment and trading partners. We also have an interest in doing the right thing in terms of human rights, the environment, and relationships with other countries. In terms of defence, this means maintaining a war-fighting capacity while using it to balance external threats and demonstrate both commitment and restraint in relation to disputes between our mutual friends.

A major challenge to NZ future security is that defence budgets need to be consistent with NZ's economic performance, military risks produced by pressure on the global balance of power, as well as the expectations of potential allies and countries we may wish to influence on regional security.

Australia is moving its defence budget to 2% of GDP, seems like the responsible thing but we are starting from a lower base and have to overcome block obsolescence. What priority are NZ voters willing to give defence, and will it be too late if a conflict erupts? Do we want to be treated as freeloaders by Australia? We probably are but we would still very concerned about supporting slow and inefficient Australian shipbuilding programmes. We also don't want to compromise economic growth, as that would impact our ability to maintain whatever capabilities we were to develop.

The rule of international law and conventions is a part of the global paradigm that contributes to international peace and security, so enforcing them should be a contribution to NZ's security interests. There seems to be a growing trend of irregular forces or illegal activity (eg abuse of fishermen in South China Sea) as a proxy to claim territory that a state is not entitled to claim, so there may need to be a strategy in place for that as well.

*"...to subjugate the enemy's army without doing battle is the highest of excellence. Therefore, the best warfare strategy is to attack the enemy's plans, next is to attack alliances, next is to attack the army, and the worst is to attack a walled city." (Sun Tzu)*

### Question 3: Primary Roles of Defence Force

*What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?*

Primary roles of defence include (but not limited to):

- contributing to military alliances enforcing UN resolutions and/or mitigating shared military threats of friends and allies;
- interdiction of criminal activity in territorial and international waters, including piracy and illegal fishing;
- assisting friendly countries with security threats;
- patrolling and conducting rescues in NZ's EEZ, Pacific Island EEZs, and areas of responsibility.
- patrolling areas of illegal fishing or piracy in international waters;
- maintaining armed force as a deterrent to military conflict;
- maintaining skilled personnel, equipment and resources that can be used to assist Civil Defence and Police if required.

### Question 4: Territorial security

*What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?*

Illegal fishing and smuggling are the main territorial threats, and potentially abuse of the international convention in Antarctica. This may involve a tougher stance on such activities and efforts to secure cooperation from other nations involved. Illegal fishing in particular sounds like needs a concerted effort to eliminate organised crime (apparently based in Spain), and demand action from countries that host the offenders. We also need to enforce minimum conditions for crews on any fishing boats in NZ's EEZ, and possibly require all fishing to use NZ flagged vessels if this remains problematic. We definitely need a capacity to legally board hostile fishing vessels that use common tactics to avoid being boarded, whether or not in territorial waters, so are the OPVs setup for this? Of course, any escalating conflict in Asia Pacific could potentially include

submarine attacks on oil wells and refineries within NZ, so inshore patrol vessels could have a remote chance of needing at least ASW detection capabilities.

## Question 5: New Zealand vs International Security

*How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?*

I cannot see how NZ can be protected without contributing towards security of Australia and stability of Asia Pacific. There are also critical trade items such as oil that we need a secure supply for until renewable energy becomes more efficient, and export markets that need stable and growing economies to sustain demand. Both China and USA are also important investors for NZ so our interests include a peaceful regional environment.

We need to build alliances and interoperability while also building our own capability. Can RNZAF Orions feed useful real-time data to friendly sea and land forces? Can NZ Defence Force interoperate with other countries in the region such as Vietnam and Pakistan? Our future alliances may not be the ones that proved useful during the cold war. Even being able to work with PRC could prove to be something that helps to diffuse tensions among our allies.

*"Two sides remain in standoff for several years in order to do battle for a decisive victory on a single day... What enables the enlightened rulers and good generals to conquer the enemy at every move and achieve extraordinary success is foreknowledge." (Sun Tzu)*

## Question 6: all-of-government effort

*How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?*

MFAT and the intelligence community are the obvious frontline in times of rising tensions and should be relied on and funded to provide the right advice and results.

The system of governance of NZ's defence activities should also be reviewed along with the actual Defence Force. I understand the Defence Minister, Prime Minister, NZDF Chief Of Staff, and Secretary Of Defence are part of the committee that is responsible for this, but I hope there is some MFAT involvement and perhaps some additional representative from the Defence Select Committee?

The official organisational structure for project managing procurement and force development seems to have produced compromised survivability and inadequacy in platforms such as the HMNZS Charles Upham and HMNZS Canterbury or the one-size-fits-all result with the NZLAVs. If this is because of conflicting objectives or insufficient commitment to delivering military platforms that our services can depend on to keep them alive, then perhaps NZDF needs power to veto any dodgy procurement. Of MoD needs some protection against micro-managing of Defence Ministers.

Immigration also has a role in detecting infiltration of hostile actors but also of enforcing immigration rules in a way that smooths the way for legitimate immigrants without encouraging illegal immigration. This may involve setting up official immigration offices in areas that are sources of illegal immigration/asylum seekers, and being able to share information with other destination countries.

One of the key reasons to maintain a credible defence force is being part of our wider efforts to stop our trading partners fighting against each other. NZDF is the sharp end of NZ diplomacy, perhaps offering a less confrontational approach than some of our larger allies but having the means to

engage if needed. Any temptation to cut spending on MFAT should be taken with the understanding that diplomatic missions are the most effective contribution to winning a war, preferably without fighting.

*"Calculate advantages by means of what was heard, then create force in order to assist outside missions. Force is the control of the balance of power; in accordance with advantages." (Sun Tzu)*

## Question 7: Defence Force and Civil Defence

*What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?*

NZDF should assist when requested. Perhaps there is some use in maintaining some small specialist core group with rescue skills, probably sharing the NZDF firefighting role. There may be some utility in maintaining a forest-fire water bombing aircraft, although it would probably spend every summer in Queensland... maybe the most valued part of the ANZAC alliance!

## Question 8: Defence force and Youth Development

*What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?*

To give employment, training, pride and discipline to the youth destined to become New Zealand's future warriors. NZDF trains its people for war, so we don't want criminals to get that sort of training unless they are also subject to the discipline. Any NZDF youth development programmes that take on rebellious youth as part of court sentences should make those youth subject to military discipline, which includes military prison if needed.

## Question 9: Defence Capability

*What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?*

What advantages can NZDF utilise? As a maritime nation I suggest we should put more priority on maritime defence to make the most meaningful contribution, at least in the minds of potential destabilising influences in Asia Pacific. Our maritime combat units should therefore prepare to operate in higher intensity conflicts, not merely as self defence. If we are to have amphibious landing capability, they have to have a survivable capability. Our infantry needs the best mix of protection, armoured support and battlefield technology we can give them. Even if armed hovercraft and Littoral Support Ships were to be used to negate common beach defences, they still need to be armoured against machine gun fire and have their own offensive weapons to protect the troops.

## CAPABILITY PRIORITIES

Priorities for major new capabilities, since my wishlist is nowhere near affordable in the current economic climate...

1. Further upgrade the existing ANZAC frigates for anti-ship missiles (if even possible) and 100km+ range anti-aircraft missiles. This may involve assessing options to relocate the Sea Ceptors.
2. As a maritime nation I think frigates provide our highest value contribution to any potential coalition, both in ASW and AAW configurations. 4 frigates should be the absolute minimum fleet so that 2 can be deployed together for mutual protection.



3. Some of the existing LAVs should be converted for a more balanced range of capabilities, including command, mortar carriers, target acquisition, and recon.
4. Next priority should be extra Littoral Support Ships, numbers depending on usefulness of available mission modules but I would expect 2 as the minimum for both availability and being able to support each other on missions due to the bulk of any fleet being limited to deeper water.
5. Additional frigates. 2 or 3 more would allow for higher availability of the frigate fleet and be able to escort our own logistics and replenishment vessels without compromising our contribution to an allied fleet. Future conflicts could involve enemies using submarines to attack our supply lines, so this would also be a prerequisite to provide escort for any additional ships.
6. Development of armoured and amphibious capabilities for a couple of infantry companies, which includes a LSD (Landing Ship Dock) and helicopters for tactical landing support.

*"Calculate advantages by means of what was heard, then create force in order to assist outside missions. Force is the control of the balance of power, in accordance with advantages." (Sun Tzu)*

## LAND FORCE

Reduction to 90 LAVs? Maybe if they were only needed for protected transport (ie convoy/troop escort), but NZDF now says land forces must be able to sustain up to 2 companies deployed. While LAVs may not be optimal to mechanise an infantry company, the current idea of modifying some should be developed for further variants to enable armoured support units in each battalion, especially heavy mortar carriers. In addition to ambulance and command variants, a mechanised support unit could have: reconnaissance (networked to share battlefield information), target acquisition (typically have extra sensors and a mast), indirect fire (120mm mortar turret, probably auto loading and networked, and/or self-propelled howitzer), and bunker/tank busting gun (probably 105mm low recoil overhead type), and potentially air defence (gun and/or missiles similar to US Marines LAVs). US use all the above functions on their LAVs in some form and they also have personnel carriers since their brigades are fully mechanised.

I suggest that NZLAVs need to be armoured against RPGs as most LAVs in Iraq seem to have been, and we could investigate upgrading cannons to 40mm bushmaster. Perhaps the appropriate setup for NZ Army would be a squadron of recon and mortar LAVs for logistics protection, another LAV squadron attached to each battalion with the full range of support vehicles, a couple of command and recon vehicles permanently attached to each company, and the rest allocated for training/attrition. LAVs should be seen as a force multiplier integrated with the units they support, and while we probably can't afford more of them we can still get the maximum benefit by configuring them to be more networked and integrated with the various combat functions. I can't see how a dedicated command & control vehicle is especially useful unless all combat units are networked with it, meaning they can all see the networked battlefield information.

CAMM Sea Ceptors (Common Anti-Air Modular Missile) are already being purchased for ANZAC frigates, but UK also plan to use modified CAMMs for their army. We should investigate whether we can get the UK's truck launched system when it becomes available.

The medium intensity scenario sounds like it should really involve tracked vehicles in at least one fully mechanised company per battalion, and perhaps include 155mm howitzers capable of "shoot & scoot" tactics along with air support, so perhaps we need to specify that NZ Army is not equipped for that level of engagement. Perhaps we also need to send some properly fitted out LAVs to Iraq! British "lessons learned" from Sarajevo conflict included an observation that on some battlefields an armoured company is as effective as a full light battalion, due to the manoeuvrability and force multiplier effect engendered by the armoured vehicles.

The current training of an infantry company as support for special ops sounds like a compromise that would result in competing force allocations as different companies rotate through an operational commitment. Perhaps more practical (if personnel numbers allow) would be to setup a smaller sized recon/commando/marines unit within each battalion. This would provide a natural recruitment path within the battalion, a source of SAS recruits, as well as giving both battalions the capability to contribute to the "demanding tasks" mentioned in the 2010 WP.

*"What enable an army to withstand the enemy's attack and not be defeated are uncommon and common manoeuvres. The army will be like throwing a stone against an egg; it is a matter of weakness and strength. Generally, in battle, use the common to engage the enemy and the uncommon to gain victory." (Sun Tzu)*

## STRATEGIC LIFT

I think we should assess whether the 8 NH90 helos are sufficient for future scenarios where war is likely to have a higher tempo with more emphasis on Manoeuvre, as future budgets allow.

Once the C130s come to end of life, we should look for replacements that are sufficient for all combat platforms that need to be moved into theatre quickly, especially for the main variants of armoured vehicles we might expect to have in service after that time. US Army had problems making its LAV battalions air deployable and I understand had to switch to non-turreted mortar carriers. For NZ, we can't airlift a whole battalion anyway, so we would identify the platforms that have to move first to support an operation until a sea landing delivers the remaining assets.

Canterbury does have some tactical lift capability, but something of a compromise and not exactly a mil-spec level of survivability. I think it should be seen as "strategic" sealift, mostly delivering assets into theatre. As currently our only ship capable of supporting a landing, Canterbury still needs some air defence.

A tactical "landing ship dock" designed to quickly launch multiple landing craft, and potentially hovercraft, from a well deck etc could be a future capability that would support landings of anything more than small scale peace-keeper missions. This is unrealistic unless we become ready to invest in air combat again, along with armoured infantry and whatever else are the prerequisites for an assault landing capability. Probably not a priority at the moment, as NZ Infantry is generally not equipped to be the first troops across the beach in such an operation. However, thinking of the eventual Canterbury replacement in 20 to 30 years, could be 2 types of ship — a strategic sealift equivalent to the Canterbury and Charles Upham for logistics, plus a tactical landing ship dock (or two) for amphibious roles.

I suggest that Canterbury should be fitted with a hospital sufficient to handle casualties from a combat operation. It should also have more air defence capabilities, so perhaps one option would be to add multipurpose 35mm cannons to all ships in the fleet including Canterbury.

*"In ancient times, those who are skilled in warfare gained victory where victory was easily gained. Therefore, the victories from those skilled in warfare are not considered of great wisdom or courage, because their victories have no miscalculations." (Sun Tzu)*

## MARITIME COMBAT FORCE

I generally support the P-3K Orions having their submarine detection suite upgraded, but we should also assess whether its systems can network with the planned US and Australian MQ-4C Triton forward surveillance UAVs, and the frigates.

The Australian "offshore combatant vessel" programme may be too big for NZ needs, while the British Littoral Combat Ship appears too small for our littoral support ship Manawanui replacement. A 1000 tonne class such as the DCNS Gowind Corvette may be more suitable despite being a bit

slow for littoral combat, but would still put the mine countermeasures and survey roles in containerised mission-modules and fit the 57mm to 76mm guns that seem common in this role. There may be justification for a few extra littoral ships, so modularity allows us to field littoral support/combat ships to cover multiple roles. We could advocate for common fitout for surface and air defence roles in the Australians Offshore Combatant programme. This ship must be able to take some Sea Ceptor launchers and some anti-ship missiles, and the Australians might eventually start to like Sea Ceptors for their own littoral ships too. We should also ensure we have the opportunity to get Hamilton Jets for them.

We should look at whether ASW and/or inserting special forces become an additional littoral capabilities, but definitely some form of UAV system would be required in the near future. This ship will be going in harms way so it needs the right combination of countermeasures, ECM, CIWS, and gun/missiles. The choice of anti-ship missiles depends on whether it needs its own defence against fast missile boats or relies on being accompanied by an attack force, but is a factor for littoral.

Possible littoral mission requirements:

- Carry out covert and armed reconnaissance to facilitate theatre entry for amphibious or special forces operations
- Locate and destroy enemy coastal forces
- Provide force protection for high value assets operating in littoral areas against asymmetric threats such as mini submarines or fast attack boats. Airborne threats are more likely to be shore-based missiles, low flying helicopters and UAV's that can use terrain to mask air defence from larger vessels in the fleet.
- Conduct and provide security for mine clearance or hydrographic survey

Some enhanced patrol type capability could contribute to fisheries protection in Pacific Islands as well as NZ waters, so perhaps this could be achieved by using the Cook Islands as forward bases for some of the littoral combat ships suggested above. This may also contribute to employment in the islands as much as to Navy recruitment, and be a closer base to potential conflict risk areas. The Islands still need their "Pacific Class" patrol boats for training and local police duties, but we should cooperate with the Island governments on that.

Frigate upgrades have been overdue, so its very good to see this happening and especially the decision to go with "active" missile technology. The Sea Ceptor systems appear to be an effective mid-range missile against a saturation attack that could easily be a tactic employed by a large well resourced enemy, a tactic that could overwhelm the US and Australian ESSM technology. We should investigate whether Harpoon equivalents such as RBS-15 or NSM can be launched from an add-on module as with the Australian ANZACS (as far as I know), or if the Mk 41 launchers could be left intact so only Sea Ceptors have to be deployed forward of the bridge. Perhaps also check how our Phalanx CIWS performs in proximity to another ship deploying chaff, due to an incident a few years ago where an American Phalanx apparently targeted the chaff instead of the incoming missile.

If we don't have space or budget for longer range anti-aircraft or surface strike/anti-ship missiles at this time, we should still be enhancing the inner circle of self-defence, keeping in mind that Phalanx is a last-ditch weapon and nothing should get close enough to need it as a last resort (especially while being reloaded!). I suggest some new 35mm point-defence cannons would accomplish this most effectively, especially the dual purpose systems (ie dual feed with different ammo types) with capability against fast surface and air threats as well as anti-missile. Probably 3 or 4 mounted fore and aft with overlapping fields of fire to provide some redundancy, and no deck penetration so could be fitted on OPVs too. The 35mm calibre has 6000m range against surface targets, uses NATO AHEAD (programmable air-burst) ammunition for anti-missile role, and claimed missile kill distances of around 1.5km. Some examples and info:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denel\\_35mm\\_Dual\\_Purpose\\_Gun](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denel_35mm_Dual_Purpose_Gun) (best!)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oerlikon\\_Millennium\\_35\\_mm\\_Naval\\_Revolver\\_Gun\\_System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oerlikon_Millennium_35_mm_Naval_Revolver_Gun_System)

The South China Sea is now at risk of becoming congested with submarines from just about all players in the region. If we have decided that NZ can never afford at least a couple of subs, then we should look at additional ways to mitigate this threat such as how we exchange information on enemy positions in real-time with our allies, including the CEC system planned for the British Type 45 destroyer. In this regard South Korea, Vietnam and Philippines are starting to look some of the allies in the region that we may need to work more closely with to the extent that we can share battlespace data.

Happy to see the submarine detection upgrades on the P3C Orions progressing for the same reason, and maybe it should be tested at every opportunity during exercises in littoral waters. Another possibility could be unmanned underwater vehicles, possibly operated from an extra littoral support ship.

*"One takes on invincibility defending, one takes on vulnerability attacking. One takes on sufficiency defending, one takes on deficiency attacking. Those skilled in defense conceal themselves in the lowest depths of the Earth, Those skilled in attack move in the highest reaches of the Heavens." (Sun Tzu)*

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With the rise of Naval in Force in Asia ,Americas , the spread of Anti Ship missiles , the spread of Nuclear Powered/Armed Submarine with likes China,India,Pakistan,Brazil. Spread of advance API Submarine within Asean with China ,North Korea ,South Korea,Malaysia,India,Japan Pakistan ,Taiwan,Vietnam also The Americas ,Brazil ,Chile. And now with Russia with its massive rearmament with Nuclear and Conventional weapons and provacantly moves in Eastern Europe and Baltics .And with the way thing are going in Asia with North Korea still seeking Nuclear arms fired from Land and Submarines ,and now with China making very bold and provocative moves with reclamation work in Spratly archipelago, where the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have competing territorial claims.which has add to tensions , Senkaku Islands dispute between Japan ,and so set up of East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone , which are all provocative moves within asia, And China seeming not will to sit down with Parties and Finally Settle these Decades long Disputes ,Instead trying to out “Gun” the region with major Naval Build/Air/Army Force buildup to assert their claims , which is now causing other nation to begin major arms build up. And for New Zealand not to have a “Opinion” on China moves in Asia is a bit weak , we need to be try to promote dialog and resolution , not sitting aside watching a arms race.We seem to forget here in NZ how “Nuclear” China is with,Nuclear Submarines,Nuclear Missiles(Ship,Submarine,Ground,Aircraft Launched) and ever growing Nuclear arsenal stockpile.We extend our hand to Invite China Warship,which could be nuclear armed we don't no , yet we will not let NoN Nuclear United States Navy Ship here i think that is two faced.Yes China is One of our biggest trading Partner, but we have many trading partner in Asia., but the way they are going about Asserting himself is not in Asia/Pacific/worlds best interest and not the right way and puts the hole region at risk.We also need to keep a wary eye on events that are happening in Ukraine , Eastern Europe , Baltic states with pretty Bold provocative Moves.

With NZ being an island Nation and Shipping being a huge part of moving our exports in and out , Our Fishery , Our Oil and gas assets ,We need to have a well Equipped Navy/Air Force to Protect our EEZ and Ship Lanes ,Fishery Oil and Gas which are or will be important to our Economy.We need also need to be able support the Pacific Nation whether by EEZ Patrols,Fisheries Protection,Disaster Relief /Support with the effect of climate change Training ,Support.We also need to be able assist our Allies in the Asia with Joint Patrols ,Joint Exercises Training ,Port Visits.

We also need to be able to take part and maintain a presence on world stage in International Exercises and International Operation like we are with pirates patrol,anti-drug trafficking patrols.And Another mission i see more of New Zealand Navy and in Air Force having to take part in is Anti-People Smuggling Missions off the North North West of New zealand with Australia on Border on Lockdown i see New Zealand as there possible next target , with them having to use bigger boats such as large trawler or Cargo vessel to make the longer trip and deliver max amount of people.

New Zealand Defence force needs to seek a even closer relationship with the Australian Military in such things as joint procurements(frigates,Tanker,LAV replacements)and joint operations. And as i suggest below maybe seek a way to have access to Australian C-17 Aircraft with a Joint RNZAF/RAAF crew to operate while in use with RNZAF with us paying a fair amount for use as need.We also need to seek the help from our American Allies in the procurement of some of the American made hardware such as the C130J and P-8s and maybe KC-46 as maybe a thank you for the Help in Afghanistan and Iraq .We also need to seek more joint exercise , training and visits , it is time we welcomed there Army,Airforce,Navy to NZ for visit and exercises in NZ.

Replacement of our ANZAC Frigates ,Endeavour Replacement ,Monwai Replace,Replacement OPV IPV, Replacement of the P-3/C130/B757 are important programs, with a few years grace in regards to the ANZAC and P-3 /C130/. Selecting Replacements , Putting contracts in place,Setting Funding aside,Arranging Possible offset Programs' needs to be starting now, as these programs are Multi Billion dollar procurements.And for a small budget like ours we need

to plan well in advance and set fund aside in the years leading up to procurement.As this will relieve financial pressure on the outward years budgets.I think key to some of these pourcment as some are Multi Billion Dollars projects in regards to public option is , to have good offset projects such as job creation , use of New Zealand suppliers.

Below i have write they best way i think we should go about replacment for equipment for the Airforce and Navy

#### Airforce:

##### # P-3CK Replacement

P3CK is a critical part of NZ Defence Force for protecting and patrolling New Zealand EEZ ,Marine Search and Rescue in NZ and Pacific Nations,and within Asia as we seen with MH370,Protection of fishery and Gas Oil , Freedom of Navigation.And now With the Rise Naval Surface Fleets and especially Submarine forces in Asia With Nuclear Powered and Armed with China,North Korea,India,Pakistan. And API submarines with China,North Korea ,South Korea,Japan,Vietnam,Malaysia,India,Pakistan,Taiwan.And also The Americas with Brazil acquiring Nuclear and API ,Chile,Argentina and other America's Nation Acquiring API.These planes are critical for the Country,and with the way thing are going in Asia with such things China making Island, trying to assert Dominance over the China Sea Lanes and not willing to sit down with Parties to settle things in a "Non Confront Way",P3 is very important . And also with the threat of people smuggling these planes are critical.

The P3 needs to be replace with at least as capable if not more Capable than the P3Ck is now . I see talk of using business jet solution like IAI 3360 Maritime Patrol Aircraft , or Turboprop Solution Airbus/ATR Maritime Patrol Aircraft , i think they are just not suit for Long Ranges RNZAF flies and with very little room for Upgrades and New Capacity later in life.The only real Replacement i see is the Boeing P-8 Poseidon with a 4-5 Aircraft Purchase And a Purchase of 4-5 UAVs/UAS like GA Predator XP/MQ-9s Guardians/ Predator B'(CPB) /Elbit Hermes 900 MR/MP.

With the UAV/UAS to do close Inshore Patrols,Medium/Short Range Marine Search Rescue, to free up the P-8 for the Long Range Anti Sub,Longrange Fishery Patrol,EEZ Patrols,Exercise,Nato/UN missions etc.With a MQ-9s Guardians/Reaper/Mariner 1,852 km Range 14 hours endurance or Hermes900 MR/MP 36hr Endurance fully loaded would be more than enough to cover the country , With a set up on the Predator XP/MQ/Pred B (CPB) suck as MQ-9 United States Customer Board Guard Coast Guard with SeaVue marine search radar;with electro-optical infrared sensor optimized for maritime operations or -ASI's Lynx synthetic aperture radar and Raytheon's MTS-B electro-optical infrared sensors Or with the Elbit Hermes 900 MultiRole/Marine Patrol with Eblit Sensors setup .With the Ground Stationed/Aircraft being easily moved by C130H/J , it could work out of many regional Airports in NZ and WorldWide.Id equip 2 UAV/UAV to be able to carry a Ground Surveillance Payload,which could be used to help Army/Navy/CivilDefence/Police/USAR/LandSAR so can be a very useful multi Agency

assist. And with Australia acquiring MQ-9 aircraft it is another good reason if we can tag on to there MQ-9 Procurements pls using there training, maintenance ,upgrades etc. With XP, Pred B CPB MQ-9 Gardein cost US\$19-\$22 Hermes 900 \$19-20 million each system. A system of 4(CAP) would Cost \$125-\$155 USD with ground station include support .With it being able to be used by multiple agencies see this as fairly reasonable price.

I've heard talk of NZ purchasing RQ-4 to me it is too much capability and way out of our budget, i see money better spent on a P8-MQ-9/Hermes 900 option.

With Australia,USA,Japan, South Korea going to have RQ-4 Global Hawk Once again we maybe able to seek and arrangement to have One available if needed from the RAAF / USAF. Boeing P-8 you get LongRange, Modern ,Fast, Easy Maintablity ,Easy Access to Parts ,In production, Easily Upgradable, Based on Existing Commercial Airframe 737-800, Modern ASW ,Search Rescue , Modern Electronics Most of all USA , Australia are ordering them , along with Britain ,India Which will help with Training/Maintenance/Interpretable. With Australia having order 8 with an option of 4 there is an opportunity to save some money, we maybe able to Joint Purchase P-8 and acquire the 4 Australia has as options ..

They maybe fair bit more in price than Say a Business Jet /Turbo prop , but with the P8 able to Carry more Sensor/weapons/ fast more easier to add new Capability i think it a better fit. Maybe a way to lower Acquisition cost would be to get a P-8 Lite Less some of the Top End Capability , vie lower end software/electronic. Giving us a P-8 with same the Capability as P3CK have now , With P-8 upgraded with block upgrades over time to bring up to full spec. With USA planning multiple block upgrades to there P8 over time , we should be able to upgrade them easily .

With a fully US Navy P-8 Costing \$256.5m USD Indian P-8 Costing \$228USD. A budget of 1.2Bil-1.5Bil USD needs to be set aside to purchase of P-8 with \$120-160USD Set aside for a MQ-9/Hermes 900 (CAP) so a budget of \$1.6-2.1 USD Billion should be set aside to Replace P3CK and Upgrade our Surveillance. We are lucky we have a few years grace due to P3 Upgrades we have already done , and i think we still need to look at upgrading the P3CK till end of service , with the such things as Rolls-Royce Series 3.5 engine upgrade which has shown 12% better fuel burn and can be done during overhauls. The saving in fuel maintenance could set aside for replacements. With a Small Budget like ours the key is to start making Decision now and putting contracts in place ,start putting fund in place spread payment over multiple years, as this is going to make it easier , and with the UAV/UAS able to be used by multiple agencies may be able to fund from other department funds.

#### # C130H

Another important Aircraft for RNZAF , I See talk of buying 2 C-17 think it's overkill price wise and is insane for just two aircraft. And to own just two way too expensive for our small defence budget be better to invest in C130Js. And with one White tail C-17 left after paris air show. We Would be better to seek a way to have Access to the Australian C-17 Fleet maybe have a Joint RNZAF/RAAF crew based in AU to train and Fly with the RAAF and we pay to use it as need for Transport ,Training. That would give us the Long range strategic capability to Airlift our Army LAV/MHOV/LOV, Without major outlay. If we could not find a way to have access to RAAF C17, and we still wished to obtain a Long Range Strategic Transporter ,best option would be A400 yes it is having troubles which i outline below but by the time we would require it would have had been in service for awhile and Issues sorted and would be the only Credible long range strategic transporter in production in the next 10-15years .

We missed a huge opportunity to purchase C130J with Australia 10 years ago which would have saved us money i would hate to see us make another mistake in procuring new Airlifters. We would be better to stick with what we know and that's the C130 Hercules,so Upgrading to the C130-J makes more sense than C-17,A400,KC 390, lets look at the other options

#C-17 Expensive,Stopped Building \$250 Mil a piece.

#A400 Just entering Air Force Last ,Still troubled Development,Crashed Recently,Engine Issues,Delivery Delays ,Release to service delays,Malaysia only Asian Buyer.Assembly Faults ,Software Faults.But has Potential , problems should be sorted by time if we require.

#KC 390 Still in testing ,Embra seeking to slow Design/deliver , because Argentina/Brazil financial issues.Has potential.

With the C130J we sort of no what we are getting, In production with Multi Years Manufacturing contracts with US force,Compared to the C130H it Files farther ,higher cruise speed, ,takes off and lands in a shorter distance , advanced two-pilot flight station with fully integrated digital avionics; color multifunctional liquid crystal displays and head-up displays; state-of-the-art navigation systems with dual inertial navigation system and global positioning system; fully integrated defensive systems; low-power color radar; digital moving map display; new turboprop engines with six-bladed, all-composite propellers; digital autopilot; improved fuel, environmental and ice-protection systems and an enhanced cargo-handling system. Easier To Maintain ,Upgrade ,Cheaper to own and Operate over C130H .Then you have the choice of a range of roll/on/off capability like the MPA/AIR AIR

Refueling,Strike,Air to Air Refueling .

With Many countries having the Js ,USAF,USCG,RAAF,RAF,Italy,Iraq,Norway,South Korea so once again having access to a lot of Training/Parts/Maintenance/Knowledge which has to make it cheaper to own and operate and upgrade.With a US\$100-120 million Average price for a International Sales a fleet of 5-6 C130J for US\$550-650 million , makes way more sense budget wise capability wise compared to,650-750USD for 2-C17,plus a small fleet of say 3-4 C130Js US\$325-425+Support Mill we would be looking on billion dollars.If we couldn't reach an agreement to have access to C-17 and had to buy into Long Range Strategic Airlift, the second Best Option would be a 3-4 A400 purchase , even though A4000 has run into a lot of trouble at the moment by the time we need to purchase these bugs would be sorted and then a fleet of 4-5 C130Js.With a A400 Priced from \$125-150USD million a fleet of 2-3 A400\$325- \$475mil USD at and 3-4 C130Js \$375-500USD at cost of \$750- \$800Mill USD this would give us a very good airlift capability.

#### #757 Replacement

This is a very hard Aircraft to replace , as this planes sit in a Jet sweet spot with range and capacity between the likes of a Small Twin Boeing 737/Airbus A320 and the Bigger Twins of the Boeing 767/A330.I see 4 options here to replace,

#One you look for Two Newer low hours B757-200/300 and send them through the same upgrades at ST Aerospace Services as they did a excellent job on the 757-200 , i would go for a B757-300 which is a newer frame and slightly more capability.

#Second could go smaller like the C-40 Clipper/Combo but you lose Range of 2000+Km,Passenger Load , Pallet loads 3-5 pallets depending on Config , but then you do get the benefit of new technology , easy of parts supplier. training as based one commercial



airframe , and if the P-8 is brought commonality between aircraft. But i feel this C-40/Combo would be a downgrade from the B757 we have now , and with the loss of range , cargo people capacity it the Wrong Choice.

#The Third Option i see is to go bigger into the the B767/A330 Range of Aircraft which are more capable than the 757 in Range/Payload but costs are alot more.

You could buy two new KC-46 in Troops Transport /Cargo Configuration (less Air/Air Refueling Refueling) KC46/767-200c which is just the TroopTransport /Cargo has just been certified.. With the KC-46 going to be brought in the Hundreds by the US Military i think this is a viable options as we only need it in VIP / Troops Transport /Cargo Configuration. It being based on a Commercial Airframe you have easy access to Maintance, Parts, Training. Then you have the A330 MRTT which is slightly bigger than the KC 46 and does have a slight Range /Payload advantage over the KC 46 but cost slightly more , and with many country RAAF, RAF, Saudi Arabia ,France ,India having them or acquiring them it is another option.

#Fourth option is to look for good Used 767/A330 frame and have them converted to a MRT/VIP Config from People such as IAI who are renowned for there 767 Combis or ST Airspace.

With 767/A330 Airframe , you would be able add a Tanker Capability as an upgrade to conversion to MRT, this upgrades could extend the loiter time of say P-8 to 20 hrs , Extend the Range of say our C130J/A400 , and with Air to Air refueling always needed with International Exercises and Missions it would be a very handy asset

I believe there only two real option for the RNZAF , if the budget allows buying good second Hand 767 Airframes and have them converted to VIP/MRT this would give us Extra Capability in such as Range, Cargo/Troop/MedeVac Carrying over 757 and could fill the gap for Ultra Long Range Troop Cargo(Pallet) movements, which would remove some need for C-17/A400 . OR second is to stick to what we have and looking and buy new Bigger 757-300 and having them converted to Combis by ST Aerospace , you would get a modest increase in Range, Payload over our existing 757-200.

#Light Attack/Fighter Aircraft

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When labour Government canceled F-16 purchase and disbanded our Fighter Wing of our Air Force, it was a major disgrace to our country and the Many fighter Pilots from WW1&WW2 turned in there grave. I Think with this review we need to look at reestablishing a Light Fighter/Attack squadron of 10-12 Light Aircraft. I think we should be look into a Jet Powered Trainer /Light Attack Aircraft, such as Cessna Scorpion, Alenia Aermacchi M346, KAI T-50. We need to be able provide some form protection for our airspace, We have no way of escorting an aircraft if needed, or stopping if needed. I believe we would not be able to step straight into fighter jet such as F-16/J-39, F-18 as we would have lost the knowledge to operate these aircraft and i believe the cost the cost of procuring top end fighters from the start maybe a hard sell to the public for a start. We should be look at a Procurement of 10-12 low cost Jet Trainers /Light Attack Aircraft. I believe the procurement of the Cessna Scorpion is a very viable option, cost wise and capability wise, with a cost of 20-25 Million USD, Operating of cost of \$3000 dollars an hour is very well priced for its capabilities With it able to cover mission such as Air Interdiction, **light attack and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance** missions, As well as covering the full Traing Cilibas. It also being able to carry Air to Air Missiles and Guided, Non Guided bombs as well. It is a very vestile aircraft. It would also provided good training opitunities to our Army with Close Air Support, Anti Air Training and Close Air Support Intaligence in a conflict. And Navy Anti Missile/ Aircraft training. For a cost of \$240-400 Mill USD including support to re-establish a Fighter Wing i think this is a very fair.

#### #NH90

I think the NH90 was Excellent Purchase and this purchase gets a hard time, when it shouldn't. Its is least one and bit generation step above the UH-1 in every aspect Airframe, Engine, Avionics, Operating so of course the RNZAF is going to have issues in stepping into the NH90 from UH-1. I Think things went wrong in Execution of program. And with the development issues it has had been having Engine, Corrosion, Ramps, and being Fairly Young Project it is going to run into issues and is, Its not a good look but that surely where the Warranty/Guarantees comes into effect To make them correct issue. Compared even the Sikorsky UH-60L which is next suitable aircraft it is more capable in every way and i think in the long run it will shine

As for not operating in Vanuatu, we brought the TTH version not marinized so i think they are getting are a hard time when the TTH were not designed for that mission to spec, multiplies days at sea operating in sea involvement. If We want to use them on the Canterbury we should look into buying 4 more NH90 as i think 8 is a bit on the lowside special if we want to deploy on ship like we seem to want to should Buying 4 Marinized version maybe a NFH version with no ASW or a Full Marinized TTH, or maybe Upgrade to 4 of Our Existing TTH, but new frames would be better choice to follow, they would be suited to used in a marine environment on the Canterbury and Frigates Offshore Patrol Vessel to Complement the Seasprite add extra capability when need, and could still Do "Overland operation" as cover for non- Marinized NH90 when not needed by navy.

Navy:

### ANZAC Replacement :

NZ must become a 3 Frigate navy , With such as big EZ Zone to protect ,Billion of Dollars in Fishery / Oil that need protecting , International/Pacific Comentiment, Training ,Rising Tension in Asia Baltics Two is not Enough ,Our goal should be 3 Frigates.

With the Increase in Submarine API/Nuclear, Anti Ship Missile in Asia we need to able to protect our Sovereignty , important trade routes and stand by our Allies . I believe the Offshore Inshore Patrol Boat we brought under project Protector are very insufficient for some of the Missions we send them on and future mission that will be needed and i believe a extra frigate will be needed .Three Frigates would allow, #One

Dockside/Maintenance/Upgrades/Rest ,#One on International Deployments eg: Pirate Patrols/International Excises/International Visits. and last in NZ for Training/Long Range ECZ Patrols,Home Defence,Locals Port visits ,Rest.

While,Reducing the OPVs fleet to 1 from 2 and IPV fleet 4 to 3-2 which would free up manpower and allow for the increase in capability with a Frigate near home.With Australian and British in design/planning we should be engaging them and joining on to one of their projects , as i think it's key , if we buy their designs eg same Hulls/Engineering/ Basic Weapon Main Gun , Anti Air , Anti Sub ,Electronic and during production run , it is going to lower the cost for production/maintenance/training for us .

Type26 planning to enter service in 2021 5-8 year before we need first ship in force it will be well tested .With the RN T26 to deployed Sea Cept Air defence,Phalanx CIWS.Mrk 52 MainGun same weaponry that our ANZAC have or are get upgraded to or are upgraded Versions of existing weaponry it makes very good sense .

With Australian (SEA 5000) looking to use the Hull for there Frigate based on the AWD, and with the way the AWD project went cost wise,quality wise i don't think it is a good choice, but is it an an options.

Then of Course there is the FREMM Frigate which in production and is very capable ship but has totally different Weapons Operating Systems etc..

Then of you have the South Korean Option with *Incheon*-class frigates , these ships are well built and with very modern Armaments Electronics and are another viable options also Danish IVER HUITFELDT class frigates, is viable option .

To me the best option is a purchase of a so called Type 26 Lite ship with, eg less( Stingray Torpedoes, Downgraded Electronics, radars,).But purchased to a standard at least as Good Anti Submarine Anti Surface Suit ,Anti Ship Missile/Anti Air, Anti Torpedo Suit as our Current Upgraded ANZACS.If we want to afford 3 of Type26 Frigates with a RN TY26 costing 400-546 Million USD , Maybe 3 of Type26 "Lite" option costing \$444-460 Mil USD each so for 3 could cost \$1.5\$1.75 Billion with support. With Block upgrades of software,radars, weapon upgrades to bring them up to full specs to spread the cost over multi years.We maybe able to take say sea ceptor hardware off ANZAC and fit to Type26 maybe ANZAC mk52 gun and fit to the Type26.If we plan to replace in the 2025 time frame we should be deciding shortly on which directing we are going, start putting things in place in the next 3-4 year which give us multiple year to set aside funding , so we can afford the 3 frigates we need which is very do able if u spread the \$1.5-1.75 Billion cost over multiple years will make the cost manageable and will not raise public eye liked happened with the ANZAC.I think it would be a good thing to seek a Offset Programs, eg using our skilled Maine Industry to produce Parts,Maybe finishes fit outs on last Type 26 Vessels , which will create jobs etc which will help with public option too.

### #Endeavour Replacement

I see two ways to replacing her , We could follow the RAN and Norwegian Navy with the MARS/Tide Class Project based on 'Aegir' design developed hull by UK-based BMT built in south korea,they are in production right now, know what you are sort of getting capability wise and cost wise and would be able to be put in production fast to replace endeavour, , And course with RN NA getting them could help with it could help with Cost , Maintenance , Training , Upgrades, inter capability. We would want to keep the Hull ,Mechanics ,Bridge as close to RN NA spec to keep cost in check. With a British Ship costing around \$195 million each for 4 ,Norway Navy one costing round \$213Mill. We could scale hull to our need size and capability keep mechanic Bridge close to other Nations for \$195-\$213 with these ship we are going to more capability current vessel. Second way is could join force replace Replenishment ship with Australia which is due to begin soon , But once again i see that being dragged out with issues and i believe we wouldn't be able to have replacement ready in time. So to me the best option is the follow the British design Ageir , keeping the same Hull ,Mechanics ,Electrical as the British and just Scaling it to our Requirements for \$195-213 Mill USD.

#### IPV.OPV Replacement

For a Start the Protector OPV and IPV were foiled from the start , overweight ,badly built , insufficient for what we need, seem to have gone for cheapest option , and now we are going to pay by having to purchase new boats earlier than should of . This is what i see as good way to rectify this and add capability.

Replace Existing Protector OSPV and ISPV. Reduce OSPV to One from Two, Replace with new One more slightly Larger/Capable OSPV 90M Range. Replace the Fleet of 4 ISPV with a Fleet of 2-3 vessel Slightly Large than existing at 66M Vessel.

The Best OPV i see to purchase is 1 Damen Design Offshore Patrol Vessel 2400 /260 both more capable , based on commercial technology , better endurance , seakeeping ,safer ,better utility, versatile, Ice Strengthening from the start , Able to hanger NH90 , and with them able to take 2 Mission Modules , Such as - ASW (side scan sonar)- MCM- AUV or SUV- Pollution control Diving Support- Logistic support goods, Energy and water making facilities. Hospital facilities. It would be an all round good ship and would allow be 2 hulls to be replaced with 1 more capable versatile hull. With the spare crew able to be spread between OPV, IPV, T26, DSV. Then using the same hull design Damen Design Offshore Patrol Vessel 2400 /260 with a Crane and Dive Support Model would be used to replace HMNZS MANAWANUI it would be able to add more capability to the Navy Cover the Diving Operation /Counter Mines plus extra's capabilities with OSPV being as the same Hull as the Replacement Dive Support vessel i suggest Below will make Maintenance , Upgrades , Training Crew , Crew Interchangeability easier .And hope more affordable to purchase. And with these ships having more capability and room for growth and upgrades and extra capability though extra modules purchased later are a excellent choice. As for ISPV id reduce from 4 to 2-3 . I would purchase a fleet of 3-2- Damen Offshore Patrol Vessel 950 Sea Axe, to replace the four we have as they larger that existing Vessel and more capable and better suited to NZ needs, these boat have Better sea Keeping due to Axe Bow, Commerical Tech ,Safer, Better Utility and would allow for upgrades and mods latter on which we can not do to the Protector Vessels. The OSPV and at least 1 ISPV must be armed , with a forward firing remote control Gun of say 20MM like of Typhoon G - 20/23 mm gun not big, but enough to make a point when needed , if we had fired a couple of warning shot across the bow of the Poacher Vessel we had in the toothfish ground even just seeing a Gun mounted , i don't like they

would have given us a run around and pretty much made foul of our Navy, with Sea Sheeped doing our work. And with both these hull OSPV and ISPV being Built by the same company use of common parts etc it will help with maintenance and training. I think it would be good to seek an off set for this programs , such as final stage fit out etc parts building as our Marine Industry is one of the best in the world and it would help with public option.

#HMNZS Manawanui Replacement-

I think that the new Dive support Vessel needs to be a multipurpose vessel able the cover Dive Support and Counter Mines , but is able to take on other mission. I Suggest Purchase a Damen Offshore Patrol Vessel 2400 /260 same Hull same as the OSPV i suggest above, its more capable , bigger, faster, safer, better endurance, sea keeping, better utility , versatile over existing design , Able to hanger NH90 , and with 2400/2600 able to take a Dive Support and crane Module. Plus 2 Mission Modules , Such as - ASW (side scan sonar)- MCM- AUV or SUV- Pollution control Diving Support-, Logistic support goods, Energy and water making facilities. Hospital facilities. It would be an all round good ship Able to cover the Prime mission of dive support counter mine, plus with purchase of extra module able to support other missions .And with it being as the same Hull as the OSPV i suggest it will make Maintenance, Upgrades , Training, Crew Interchange easier.

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**DWP-0183**

## Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

*United Nations Consultative status with ECOSOC, UNESCO and UNCTAD  
Special relations with the ILO, FAO, UNICEF, and other organisations and agencies*

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**22 June 2015**

### **To the Ministry of Defence on the Defence White Paper 2015**

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Aotearoa is part of an international women's organisation established in 1915.

WILPF works on issues of peace, human rights and disarmament at the local, national and international levels, participating in ongoing debates on peace and security issues, conflict prevention and resolution, on the elimination of all forms of discrimination, and the promotion and protection of human rights.

We welcome this opportunity to make a submission on the Defence White Paper 2015.

We have not answered all suggested questions.

#### **1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

According to the New Zealand Defence Force's own assessment, 'New Zealand does not presently face a direct threat of physical invasion and occupation of New Zealand territory.' (Defence Assessment 2014, p. 29, 2.1.1, paragraph 66)

In 2009, when the then Chief of Navy, Rear Admiral David Ledson was asked, 'What is the most significant maritime security threat facing your nation?', his reply included: 'In the near waters, the most significant security threat relates to the ocean itself' (presumably a reference to the effects of climate change on the level of the oceans) and, 'Looking further afield, the most significant threat is actually the lack of a tangible - to many of our sailors and the majority of our citizens - significant threat. Without a threat that has definition and "realness", there are significant challenges in developing and maintaining credible - but expensive - military capabilities, equipment, and personnel.' (U.S. Naval Institute media release, 18 March 2009)

The Defence Assessment also notes that there are many factors moderating the possibility of major international conflict, such as, economic interconnectedness, 'there is a strong, documented memory of past conflicts and their catastrophic impacts; public opinion to varying degrees in both democratic and non-democratic states, and their ubiquitous access to immediate information from across the globe, places limits on decision-makers' ability to use force; and global norms and international diplomatic mechanisms encouraging the prevention or de-escalation of conflict have strengthened since the end of the Cold War.' (Defence Assessment 2014, p. 14, 1.3.2, paragraph 16)

The Assessment raises the issue of cyber threats (Defence Assessment 2014, p. 30, 2.1.2, paragraph 67), but New Zealand does not need a military force to counter these. In fact, expertise for this is more likely to be found in the civilian population.

No threats means that there is no reason to have an extremely expensive military force.

WILPF argues that New Zealand does not need a military and it would seem that the NZDF's and Ministry of Defence's own assessment would support that argument – how can a country need a military if there is no threat?

### **3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

WILPF argues that New Zealand does not need a military, and that all the roles currently performed by the NZDF could be performed by civil agencies.

### **6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

The Defence Assessment lists areas in which the NZDF is involved as part of the all-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests. These include:

Fisheries management

Oil pollution

Search and rescue

Domestic disaster response

(Defence Assessment 2014, pp. 31-2, 2.1.4, paragraphs 72-76; 2.1.5, paragraph 79)

In New Zealand we already have a Ministry of Primary Industries which deals with fisheries management, a Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency, the Fire Service, Maritime New Zealand and Antarctic New Zealand.

WILPF argues that all the activities currently undertaken by the NZDF in these areas would be better undertaken by civil agencies, many of which are already in existence, such as those mentioned above, and including the development of a coast guard which could protect New Zealand's economic zone.

### **7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

It need have no role (see Question 6).

### **8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

It should have no role.

The militarisation of children, young persons, and their education is contrary to New Zealand's obligations as a state party to both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.

The increasing involvement of the NZDF in schools, education and youth development programmes raises concerns in relation to New Zealand's compliance with Articles 28 and 29 of the Convention

(especially 29d: 'The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin;') and with the intent of the Optional Protocol.

WILPF supports the inclusion of a comprehensive peace and human rights education programmes in the New Zealand education curriculum.

### **9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

Maintaining militaries continues to maintain existing structures that foster conflict. Instead, states should shift from a national security focus, that is, one dominated by militarism, to focusing on human security, human rights concerns, and the overall goal of peace.

A genuinely independent and positive foreign policy would focus on diplomatic initiatives, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and other areas that are aimed at preventing armed conflict.

Why not take the opportunity to work to strengthen the multilateral system and work for the prevention of violent conflict, rather than attempt to deal with the management of it once it occurs. New Zealand should be working in the international arena to enhance humanitarian assistance and diplomatic support for peace and reconciliation processes during, and after, situations of armed conflict.

WILPF strives to challenge militarism, and encourages states to invest in peace and strengthen multilateralism. Our vision is a world free from violence and armed conflict, in which human rights are protected, and women and men are equally empowered and involved in positions of leadership at the local, national, and international levels.

With their entrenched masculine norms and patriarchal attitudes (Defence White Paper 2015, Public Consultation Document, p. 26: 84% male; 16% female), militaries do not enhance security or gender equality. They promote a culture of violence and maintain existing structures that foster conflict.

We do not need the NZDF.

#### **We would also draw your attention to the effect of military activities on the environment, and quote from a briefing prepared by Peace Movement Aotearoa:**

There seems to be little consideration given to the impact of military activities on the environment, biodiversity and climate change - both here and overseas - as the following examples illustrate.

The main training area for the army is in the Rangipo region of the central North Island, an area that includes the Tongariro National Park and World Heritage Area. While there has been much publicity about the impact of the Kaimanawa wild horses on the fragile environment of the region, there has been little public discussion about the far more destructive impact of military activities such as live firing of a range of weapons and weapons systems (including mortars, missiles and artillery), detonation of explosives, and the operation of heavy and / or tracked vehicles.

The air force bombing range in Kaipara harbour - where the air force drops 500lb Mark 82



high explosive bombs, practices helicopter gunnery, surface-to-air missile firing, and carries out explosive ordnance disposal - borders the Department of Conservation Papakanui Spit Wildlife Refuge, a nesting site for the most critically endangered native bird, the New Zealand fairy tern, and home to the endangered northern New Zealand dotterel population. Both of the live firing ranges around the navy training base on the Whangaparaoa peninsula, adjacent to the Shakespear Regional Park, are in the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park, and one of the ranges faces the Tiritiri Matangi wildlife sanctuary.

The Talisman Sabre military exercise, the largest run by the Australian armed forces, which also involves training for land, air and maritime warfare, including amphibious operations, “with all four services of the United States armed forces”, and which the New Zealand armed forces will be fully involved in next month.

Most of Talisman Sabre takes place in Shoalwater Bay, the biggest and one of the most environmentally significant parts of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, an area that has a high degree of biogeographic significance and is home to a number of significant, endangered and vulnerable flora and fauna species.

Globally, armed forces are a major contributor to climate change: in part because armed forces are a massive consumer of non-renewable resources - including fossil fuels used by military vehicles, vessels and aircraft - and a major source of greenhouse gas emissions; and partly because the excessive amount of global military expenditure - \$1,776 billion (USD) last year - and military research and development, diverts resources away from the development of sustainable energy sources and other initiatives to slow the pace, and reduce the impact, of climate change.

Celine Kearney  
President, WILPF Aotearoa

I would like to provide a personal written response to the call for submissions on New Zealand's proposed Defence White Paper. The response is structured around the key questions provided for in the Defence White Paper Public Consultation document.

**1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

As suggested in previous White Papers I agree that the likelihood of direct attack on New Zealand by state-based forces is highly unlikely. Major threats to security are more likely to take the form of threats to individual NZDF personnel when deployed in situations like that currently underway in Iraq, threats to our EEZ from illegal fishing or other resource extraction, threats to Antarctic interests, and HADR issues. In terms of other issues New Zealand is likely to have to face, I believe these may spring from the need to aid our neighbours and/or the need to respond to possible jousting between great powers – this is more relevant to the below question and will be discussed there.

**2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

The Pacific Island region has been identified as New Zealand's most important geographical area of interest. Illegal fishing, international criminal activity and the fragility of states represent the most likely challenges that New Zealand may have to respond to in this region. The former has been recognised by programmes such as *Te Vaka Moana* and increased naval cooperation (Quads etc). The issue of crime is to be dealt with by customs and police, though NZDF may have a surveillance (Air Force) or interdiction (Navy) role to play.

The final issue of state fragility may see the New Zealand government called upon to help local governments restore law and order. Here one issue that may need to be better understood before any responses are formulated is with respect to the dynamics of the local state-based security sector (for example in Timor Leste where the FEDTL and the PNTL and the border forces play particular and at times conflicting roles) as well as with regards to the growing role of private security companies. A commitment to intelligence and cultural awareness (including language learning) would help offset the risks posed by engagement in such potential scenarios. Timor Leste, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea remain somewhat vulnerable to external shocks or internal rupture. The NZDF would be well advised to ensure a keeping up with Pacific developments, especially as this is identified by numerous defence and foreign policy documents as being our primary area of responsibility.

The backdrop to this sub-regional focus also includes the role of other larger players. Australia, China and the USA are increasing their engagement throughout the broader Asia-Pacific. New Zealand maintains a close working relationship with Australia for good reasons, but part of our comparative advantage in the South Pacific in particular comes from not being completely aligned with Australian interests. There are benefits to be had in some increased areas of cooperation – such as in the cross crewing of naval vessels – but there

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are also some areas where the NZDF would receive a better response working alone or in concert with a PIF response. This also brings in the issue of balancing working relationships with the USA and China. Aligning closely with Australia necessarily brings New Zealand closer to the USA. Informal discussions with serving personnel have suggested to me that many appreciate the chance to 'play with the Americans' – particularly as they have a range of high tech gadgetry that is much admired.

The political fallout from decisions to align more closely with the Americans, both in terms of possible domestic concerns and in terms of our relationship with China, should, however, entail caution. I believe New Zealand public opinion would be mixed in terms of receptivity towards engaging more strongly with the USA. The issue of scale also means that the practical ability to interact is limited (ie the hosting of large scale US military contingents is difficult), and opportunities to interact would be best aimed at HADR or similar exercises – preferably also in a context where the US and China may work together as New Zealand does need to balance its relationship with both parties. Here my view of likely Chinese engagement in the Asia Pacific in the future is predicated on the notion that it cannot be assumed that China will seek to be expansionist, particularly not past any claims in the South China Sea, and that promoting a China threat theory undermines moderates within the CCP and acts to strengthen nascent Chinese nationalism unnecessarily. Whichever political faction gains ascendancy will determine the nature of future foreign policy, although this will arguably also be impacted by rates of economic growth and the social interaction of individual Chinese with the rest of the world. I believe the most likely scenario that might spark a conflict is that of some form of skirmish, hopefully more limited rather than total, over territories claimed in the South China Sea. Given this, New Zealand should strongly advocate for a legal resolution – the Permanent Court of Arbitration may provide a start point but arguably China should be lobbied to have its case heard before the ICJ and cease building installations for the present time. This is more the role for skilful diplomats, but previous defence diplomacy efforts might also be a way to test common feeling within the PLAN and regionally-focused defence diplomacy could be increased to useful effect.

This brings us to international institutions. New Zealand needs to increase its engagement with the UN. There is a significant gap emerging between developed Western nations and developing nations in terms of the willingness to contribute troops or police to UN missions. The ideals of the UN remain ones that New Zealand should seek to uphold, and, particularly given our successful bid for a UNSC seat, the NZDF should be a key contributor to UN missions. Thus far we have tended to focus on sending small numbers of specialists, particularly military observers or demining experts, on UN missions. However New Zealand should contribute more to UN operations, and could do so in such a way to further showcase some of our national values – particularly those of tolerance and gender equity. The UN is only ever as good as its constituent parts, and New Zealand would do well to set an example in helping to reverse the trend away from UN missions and towards coalitions of the willing. This is particularly relevant in the sense that two of our major partners, Japan and China, are two of the few countries which have been increasing their commitment to the UN. It is also important to note that other important partners, such as India, have begun to express rancour about the fact that Western countries appear to be shirking their responsibilities. Engagement through the ADMM+ is also vitally important as regional issues

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may demand regional responses and this forum in particular provides relevant and high level interaction.

**3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

UN peacekeeping, surveillance, defence diplomacy, anti-piracy, anti-terrorism, responding to illegal fishing, SAR, HADR, reconstruction roles (PRT), security sector reform roles where appropriate. Military exercises when the political value of engagement has been ascertained. Engagement with regional partners Australia and other PIF countries should be prioritised followed by engagement with important regional actors such as France, China, Indonesia, India and the USA to help maintain interoperability but not without due consideration to the political ramifications of undertaking such exercises or activities. Constabulary type roles might be usefully played by Navy when required to interdict and detain at sea, though additional policing roles should not be undertaken by NZDF personnel and complementary civilian policing roles should be encouraged by the NZDF as part of the NZ Inc response to security issues as will be discussed further below (for research on this see Greener and Fish 2015).

**4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

The main risks are more illegal activity rather than defence-related per se. This could see the Navy in particular take on a more constabulary type role in terms of the interdiction of illegal vessels. However, this could be more complicated in the Ross Dependency should major transnational corporations or other states increase their interest and attempt to undertake unregulated exploration or extraction of resources. This is for the moment unlikely, but it does also impress the need to prioritise attempts to move away from fossil fuel reliance and to potentially seek out alternative possibilities for resolving issues before they begin (ie ensuring awareness of international legal cases etc).

**5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

New Zealand should prioritise securing our EEZ from illegal fishing efforts and thereafter prioritise engagement in the South Pacific, often through engagement with other Pacific Island countries where they have the capabilities or with Australia but also alone where appropriate. This will also require engagement with other actors such as the USA, China and France, but here the effort should be very much politically-aware in terms of conducting defence force activities as a diplomatic exercise too. Internationally, engagement in UN missions must become more of a priority. This is expected of us as a UNSC E10 member, and is also the best way to try to engage with developing countries and with countries with differing agendas. As these differences will not dissolve without concerted effort at finding a common ground, the UN provides a site for discussing and resolving conflicts. This is

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particularly important as the world becomes more multi-polar, as issues regarding disparity of wealth become more pressing and as new non-state actors become more relevant. Inter-state coalitions of the willing do not address the breadth of actors nor possible solutions that a revived UN could. Another avenue for engagement might be through the ASEAN family of regional arrangements, probably most usefully through the ADMM+.

**6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

In consultations with respect to the 2010 DWP process I lamented the fact that this was a Defence review rather than a Security review. Given the mantra of jointness within the NZDF and the claimed significance of whole of government approaches it is frustrating that it seems that there is still no (publically available) **comprehensive** overview of how the various agencies work together to help maximise security interests. The DPMC's National Security System document provides some useful schematics and the lead agency notion is particularly helpful. However, in order to understand Defence's role in this it seems that a stronger in-depth review of all agencies, areas of overlap, areas of sole jurisdiction, grey areas (ie can Naval officers have full police powers?) and an overview of agency capabilities to help outline where gaps or sites of duplication exist. This may be available in classified material and be limited due to concerns about the possibility of such material being utilised by those seeking to challenge this Security System, but despite protestations as to improved CIMIC and other workings I believe anecdotal evidence suggests there is still much to be done to improve the functioning of NZInc.

**7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

Military forces have particular expeditionary capabilities that other agencies do not have. This means that they are often the instrument government reaches for in seeking to respond to a wide variety of events. This begs two questions. One is normative, that is, should the NZDF undertake HADR roles. The other is, if the answer is yes, how should this be carried out? At this point in time the normative question is to some degree moot – the infrastructure and skills needed to utilise helicopters, unimogs and LAVs is to a large degree concentrated in the NZDF. I do think there is a case for shifting some of this capacity to Civil Defence or to concentrate this skill set in the Reserve Forces, however, at this point this may be difficult in terms of limited resources and therefore at this stage. NZDF does have a significant role to play in responding to natural disasters. This is fairly uncontentious at the moment in that there hasn't been any particular concerns about military aid to the civil power type roles in New Zealand, though improved coordination with civilian agencies would help to improve the national response to such issues. ODESC does play an important role here, and the Security Framework does help align agencies to some degree but a more comprehensive national security strategy (along with desktop exercises and increased engagement of civilian agencies in NZDF exercises where these agencies also had a strong presence at the planning stages) would aid this objective further. The term 'unforeseen events' is rather broad. The NZDF may play a role in other MACP roles, as long as these remain strongly bound by legislation that ensures police primacy in counter-terrorism and so on. One issue here that will require sensitive planning and policy is that of the proposed

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introduction and use of UAVs – a suggestion to which the NZ public displays significant concern. Existing assets and capabilities such as the Army's unimogs, the Navy's IPV s and OPV and the RNZAF helicopters will be particularly important in responding to crises but this also highlights the need to carefully consider the issue of replacement for the Hercules fleet. The suggestion of the C-17 does not, to my mind, allow for a flexible enough option for responding to natural disasters in terms of its landing requirements, and although it may potentially be part of the suite of things brought in for replacement purposes, there is particular need for an aircraft that can carry out the types of duties that the C-130s currently do. The problem appears to be sourcing an appropriate replacement in terms of limited purchasing options, but the ability to get into the Pacific, to land on a variety of airstrips, and to carry significant enough cargo is central to the issue of what New Zealand should do both nationally and regionally.

**8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

Cadets play a useful role in bringing skills and leadership qualities to bear for young people. These could be advertised more widely and/or connections with schools made to help transition those that would benefit from the experience of being in the cadets with greater ease. However, engagement should be voluntary. That is, the return of compulsory military service would not be compatible with shifting values unless the NZDF itself became quite a different institution. Offering courses for troubled teens may be a way to help bring structure and order to some people, but this should certainly not be a broad brush approach.

**9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

Replacement of the C-130s, as noted, is crucial. The JTF needs to be able to be properly operational, with amphibious landing also being a central emphasis. However, most important is a focus on personnel. Retention issues appear to have improved, as has morale. Yet more needs to be done to achieve the ideals of the Total Defence Workforce – it is still fairly difficult to segue in and out of the NZDF, for example. Moreover, gender ratios appear to be reversing rather than improving and this needs to be a priority for New Zealand. New Zealand needs to respond to the Women, Peace and Security agenda at the UN, for example, and the NZDF could provide a stellar example of gender equal practices. Finally, education – not just training – should be a central value of the NZDF. The complexity of environments that NZDF personnel operate in requires a flexibility of response, an ability to think critically about the situation and an ability to respond appropriately. Language training, CIMIC and a greater institutionalisation of the value of ongoing education would significantly benefit the individual on deployment as well as the institution as a whole.

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**1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

The overriding threat to New Zealand is our inability to understand and engage with our international neighbours. On this lies our ability to address all other external threats to our nation. This is an "all of nation" challenge with many components including:

- a. Political relations, especially head of state.
- b. Diplomatic Relations
- c. Engagement with global institutions and ensuring their effectiveness.
- d. Military Relations
- e. Other government ministries
- f. Academic – research, sharing (e.g. track 2 diplomacy.)
- g. Trade Relations
- h. Local Government
- i. NGO and community organisations
- j. Schools – e.g. language, culture and visits.
- k. Tourism
- l. Diaspora – New Zealanders around the world and migrants into NZ.

The pre-eminence of this issue is demonstrated by the history of the last century. WWI arose from the belief that security lay in military strength, and enormous resources were focussed on ensuring that capability. The result was great instability and the incredible tragedy of that war. While the faith in military-based security was not abandoned, attempts were made to provide a basis for understanding and engagement through the League of Nations. While the League had significant successes, it had major flaws. The failure of the US to support it combined with the German withdrawal meant that it failed to prevent the Second World War.

This second tragedy motivated an intense search for a better solution by the world's nations, led by the great powers and culminating in the creation of the United Nations before the war ended. This incredible effort during the conflict has been captured in Slazenger's book "The Act of Creation". The results of the UN and many other institutions have been dramatic, with no more world wars, very few international wars, and a host of international laws and agreements which set the basis of the current world order and prosperity.

Nevertheless, belief in the military basis of security persists at all levels, diverting enormous resources from resolving critical global and social causes of conflict, exacerbating sensitivities between nations (e.g. East Asia) and stimulating destructive response to sub-national disputes (e.g. Middle East). At the same time, non-violent approaches to resolving conflict are largely ignored (Chenoweth ("Why Civil Resistance Works") and Gene Sharp ("From Dictatorship to Democracy")).

Thus the strength of our ability to engage with our neighbours, both bilaterally and multilaterally, including through international institutions, is the core of our security. Ensuring the strength and effectiveness of such institutions is a critical component of this. Therefore the primary call on our security budget is to ensure that the infrastructure for international engagement is effectively functioning.

The second most critical threat is seeing security primarily in military terms. If, when problems arise we tend to reach first for military solutions, we are likely to get conflict.



It is important that everyone involved is well informed about non-military approaches to addressing problems and that there are the capacities to use these effectively.

Other threats include Nuclear Weapons, increasing militarism, terrorism, cyber crime, environmental disasters, failure of the economic system, illicit drugs, organised crime and misuse of intelligence.

Development of remotely controlled and automated warfare. The rapid development of these technologies and their increasing availability has raised enormous potential of destructive action with low risk to the offensive party, and thus few constraints on their use. This requires a substantial initiative to develop an international framework to ensure that such technology is only used for constructive purposes.

**2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

- a. The global power structures will change radically, with declining power and legitimacy of the US, and to a lesser extent Europe, and the increasing economic power of China and the other BRICS countries, as well as many others.
- b. The nature of threats will change radically, with environmental, resource and organisational issues becoming increasingly dominant, with expectations that the international system will become more active in addressing issues. These threats demand that non-military solutions dominate.
- c. Relationships in the Islands will vary considerably with many different nations increasing their influence there. NZ will be only one of many players, and needs to be able to cooperate with all other parties.
- d. Foreign agreements need approval by parliament, and in all significant cases, scrutiny by select committee.

**3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

- a. Monitor and the seas in its region and address illegal resource exploitation
- b. Respond to major emergencies on land and sea, including in the Pacific Islands.
- c. Support island nations in managing their security threats in conjunction with other nations.
- d. Keep close relations with armed forces in the Asia-Pacific to promote mutual understanding and peaceful military relations and doctrines.
- e. Promote understanding of peaceful responses to security threats, including respect for the rules based international order.
- f. Support UN initiatives around the world.

**4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

- a. Illegal resource access – e.g. fishing
- b. Unsustainable tourism activity.
- c. Increase in extreme weather events.
- d. Illegal migrants
- e. Biohazards being imported

- f. Environmental disasters associated with resource extraction.

**5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

- a. There needs to be a broad-based analysis of NZ's security risks and the methods of addressing them, and the appropriate resource allocation made on that basis. Such an analysis would also provide a basis for prioritising the Defence Force's efforts.
- b. Part of this analysis would be developing constructive strategies to relate diplomatic, political and military perspectives to defuse conflicts well before they become dangerous.
- c. Associated with this there needs to be effective parliamentary and public oversight of defence and intelligence operations in a form similar to the "Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control" in previous governments.
- d. An important element of this analysis would be ensuring that intelligence was used in the interests of NZ, ensuring our independence and effective relations with all other countries. Any intelligence alliance must be managed to ensure that our operations remain under our control.

**6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

- a. Keeping close contact with other government departments, and relevant community groups such as university strategic and peace departments, to assess the overall strategic environment and ensure that Defence has the appropriate capabilities.
- b. Be prepared to respond promptly to emerging issues, cooperating with other departments.
- c. Educate other departments and the public as to Defence's proper role.
- d. Maintaining effective intelligence services to provide information for other departments.

**7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

This should be one of its major operational features of the defence forces. This would involve

- a. well trained staff and effective equipment ready for rapid deployment, with
- b. capable air, sea and land transport systems.
- c. Training for local emergency services.
- d. Intelligence services need to have the competence and capabilities to ensure that our intelligence operations serve NZ interests.

**8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

- a. Promoting respect for self, others, and their role in the broader community.
- b. Understanding the broader perspectives of security, and way of promoting peace.

- c. Promoting respect for the rules based international system and the institutions that support it.
- d. Use of Model UN programs to enhance understanding of international relations.

**9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

- a. Equipment to carry out its agreed roles, and the ability to operate them.
- b. Understanding of our political and social environment and the factors that maintain stability.
- c. Abilities to engage constructively with defence forces in our region and to minimise threats and conflicts.
- d. Ability to project NZ's role as a peace-base nation.
- e. Ability to understand and constructively use emerging technologies.

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**New Zealand Defence Force White Paper Submission 2015****Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

Thank you for inviting public submissions. This submission concerns Defence Force workplace safety. New legislation soon brings NZ in line with Australia, and charges the PCBU with keeping persons within its influence reasonably safe at work. It sounds like an oxymoron to be safe around firearms. That will never be the case. But we can reduce the risk of staff being shot by friendly fire and help people feel safer, maybe even improve staff morale by psychological benefits from a greater sense of personal safety experienced in certain otherwise risky, or volatile circumstances.

IRIS is a recent award-winning NZ technological invention by Hunter Safety Lab. The IRIS system identifies targets excluded from a shot up to 100 metres away (150 metres in open terrain). Developed by Michael Scott and David Grove, IRIS was created for hunter safety. Most hunting accidents and deaths occur inside just 40 metres. IRIS can also be useful in certain other particular safety situations. We think it may also be useful in certain international defence/peacekeeping missions including civilian staff, to easily distinguish protected persons or objects from foe.

IRIS is an extra layer of protection by a light weatherproof vest made with an IRIS material and a lightweight scope to detect this IRIS material. IRIS reads anyone or anything with IRIS material within its scope range. In forest hunting, IRIS stops you from accidentally shooting your mate, child, or dog by alerting you they are within range. IRIS does not replace training, or common sense. IRIS technology combined with a trained eye mitigates accident risk and may have the effect of increasing the sense of safety by civilian staff around armed military staff and foe.

In defence/peacekeeping, IRIS alerts the shooter to IRIS protected persons, animals or objects, excluding them from the target range. IRIS is a neutral piece of technology that enhances target identification accuracy beyond what the naked eye can see and the mind can process, the effect of which is improved perception of safety in volatile or high stress situations where it is desirable to protect certain subjects to reduce the risk of accidental death or damage by friendly fire. IRIS means an event becomes more about the shooter's intent, perhaps easier in an investigation.

ACC paid \$15 million for shooting related accidents and deaths in the last five years, some related to the Defence Force with its own particular safety considerations. IRIS is a cost effective new technology, combining a scope laser system with a unique reflective material that is light and easily incorporated. It is flexible in application and design, quick and easy to deploy as is, and easy to use. IRIS's objective is to save lives.

We suggest the Defence Force considers IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) solutions for use in peacekeeping operations as workplace safety best practice for defence and civilian peacekeepers, and considers IRIS. Existing IFF solutions are expensive and thus uptake has been slow. IRIS consists of a gun mounted infrared sensor and reflective patches on a hunter's vest that warns the hunter if they aim/point their rifle at another hunter. Hunter Safety Lab is now applying its patented technology to industrial safety applications, and interested in developing a customised IFF and firearm safety solution for peacekeeping operations.

IRIS is a cost effective extra layer of protection for integrated peacekeeping missions, or valuable cultural subjects, improving workplace safety by mitigating risk of shooting accidents (death, injury, damage). To our knowledge, there is nothing like IRIS; first of its kind. The US is showing interest.

Thank you for considering IRIS for your workplace safety strategy for future peacekeeping missions.

We remain at your disposal.

 Hunter Safety Lab

We welcome the opportunity to make a short submission.

**Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

Peace and security essentially depends on the effectiveness of the United Nations (UN) system, and our interaction with many other multilateral institutions. Our future security fundamentally relies on a rules based international order that respects national sovereignty. The overarching threats therefore are UN's deficiencies, or breakdown. Our challenge is to ensure that its institutions are effective and are used to address our needs.

The Institute for Economics & Peace (2015 Global Peace Index) reports that deaths caused by terrorism doubled in the last 8 years (20,000 dead in 2014). The global economic impact of violence hit US\$13.4 trillion, with global losses from armed conflict at US\$817 billion. Global military spend was US\$3 trillion, while crime and violence cost US\$2 trillion.

Until the last quarter of the Twentieth Century, threats to security were mostly associated with prospects of aggression by foreign military forces. More recently, however, sources of threat have expanded well beyond such boundaries. Whereas some continue to be associated with traditional military power, numerous others are associated with non-state actors and increasingly target civilian populations, as much as military personnel.

Other major threats and challenges best addressed through agreements continue to be nuclear weapons, conventional terrorism, cyber crime and cyber terrorism, environmental disasters, weapons and people smuggling, illicit drugs and crime. Challenges include how to constructively engage with nations in armed conflict, how to facilitate diplomacy and trade with nations while they are in an insecure state, and how to ensure the protection of those who have a right to be protected, in NZ and abroad.

With continued Internet and mobile phone user expansion globally, peace and security today is both a physical and virtual affair. Being online or offline is everything when it comes to information management. Data control and its integrity remain important, as is tracking means and access to optimum transfer speed and encryption, while effectively sharing information for decision making, and bearing in mind the sharing nature of hackers, Bitcoin, Facebook and Instagram generations, and the freedom of speech. Digital strategy remains important.

New Zealand's remote geographic position will not save it from exposure to intended or unintended threats to its economic activities, or to its political, cultural and social institutions, which are just as likely to originate with individuals or non-state actors as with

foreign militaries. There is an unfortunate risk of conflict between China and the USA, and the Defence Force needs to develop its policy options, giving high priority its ability to work with partners to discourage drift toward such an outcome.

**Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

The future composition and effectiveness of the UN Security Council (UNSC) will have significant bearing on conflict and its resolution internationally. The shadow of the Veto power looms tragically over some of the most intractable conflicts of the late Twentieth Century, for example Palestine and Israel, Russia and the Ukraine, and Syria. Non-state actors, some tied to the name of religion, now play a significant role in organised aggression. Regardless of whether the UNSC makes progress on proper and improper use of the Veto power, other UN agencies such as the Peacebuilding Commission will expand their operations and provide venues for New Zealand to contribute positively to peace building.

New Zealand is the fourth most peaceful country in the world today (2015 Global Peace Index). We mainly need our Defence Force in the aftermath of natural disasters (climate change), making us well placed to help other countries, too. In terms of international relations, New Zealand is a signatory to UN treaties, works closely with the UN network on all global matters and is known as a peacemaking diplomat. Strong relationships with individual countries remain important for trade, without compromising commitments to human rights, or the environment. The world is either online or offline today (the Internet, mobile phones), making information management and technology savvy critical. Ethical use of drones (recording or armed) and nuclear disarmament are other important legal issues.

**Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

New Zealand is committed to UN treaties about advancing peace, humanitarian law, human rights, international criminal law and meeting its obligations to protect. The Defence Force supplies peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations (POs), offers protection, disaster response, and assistance with recovery and reconstruction. This is an important continued role for the Defence Force with its long history of POs, shows our commitment to peace, as well as our close cooperation with fellow nations to advance global peace.

In terms of military spend, New Zealand needs to balance its domestic needs with what it needs to effectively support close neighbours and contribute to international peacekeeping. The Defence Force can deepen its links with the UN's Peacebuilding Commission, with ASEAN, and with the small military forces in the Pacific Islands, for example PNG, Tonga, and Vanuatu (equipment needs are addressed below). Technological advances internationally

mean New Zealand needs to ensure it has highly skilled Information Management staff to address online and offline threats, and ensure the free and secure flow of information for peace and security decision-making.

New Zealand may also wish to consider changing its name (brand) from the Defence Force (DF) to the Peace and Security Forces (PSF), to more accurately reflect its true purposes today (emergency response and peacekeeping), which also clearly accords with the central theme of the UN Charter (Article 1, Purpose 1), which for its signatories means:

“[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace[.]”

**Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

One is States taking an interest in certain territories with a view to exploit natural resources, in particular private oil drilling interests, the security risks being the consequences of territorial disputes, or an environmental disaster caused by drilling, causing public unrest.

**Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

New Zealand is a peacekeeper and peacemaker. It is a country exposed to nature with volcanoes and earthquakes, and its fair share of bad weather. We need a strong home team to help the country in disasters and emergency situations. New Zealand comes first and is a good neighbour who helps her neighbour countries, and has a long history as a diplomat for peace in international relations and nuclear disarmament.

As a peacemaker, New Zealand contributes positively to the UN on many levels, including the UNSC and with drafting treaties. New Zealand subscribes to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which needs more field support to be effective (Joseph Kony).

Ironically, there are also workplace safety considerations with incoming legislation making New Zealand more consistent with Australia and the EU. The Defence Force needs to look at new technology, including IFF (identify friend or foe), weapons tracking and emergency response equipment. The Defence Force needs a strong physical infrastructure capable of rapid deployment, in NZ and abroad, by improved emergency response equipment and transport (helicopters, recording drones, IFF).

**Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

As directed by its Minister, or the Queen's Representative the Governor General.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Attorney-General ought to jointly submit a written legal opinion to Parliament every time before Defence Force troops are dispatched overseas, testifying to the legality of the move and its compatibility with the UN Charter (citing the article under which the mission will operate).

**Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

As the fourth most peaceful country in the world, New Zealand needs a Defence Force focused on peace and security, equipped to restore peace and security for the benefit of its people firstly, then in other nations as it is able and welcome there. With our greatest domestic threat in terms of casualties and property damage being natural disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, flooding, storms), the Defence Force's links and work with regional emergency management units are important, as is ensuring response equipment is of a high standard capable of rapid deployment within New Zealand, and overseas by POs.

**Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

New Zealand has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world. New Zealand has problems with gangs, domestic abuse, and drug and alcohol related violence and damage. Instead of young men and women languishing in privately run prisons, watching TV or plotting in the yard how to perfect their next crime, would they benefit from working for the country and learning how to manage their lives? The Defence Force is better placed than most to instil discipline. The Cadets program is not enough. The primary risk group comprises teenagers into their mid-20s. We suggest the Defence Force works with Corrections on a military alternative to prison for low risk offenders, by inmate's own choice, or mandated by Corrections.

**Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

New Zealand peacekeeping today is not outright military, often POs are mixed teams with an increasing civilian component, focused on relief, recovery and reconstruction. Peacekeeping teams are a mix of people who need to positively engage with the community they are there to protect and help, ie diplomacy in conflict areas, and be sensitive to local faiths and culture.



We note Colonel Martin Dransfield's paper '*Perspective on the Challenges, Opportunities and Imperatives for Mission Success in Afghanistan and Timor Leste*' that

"[i]f the effects that peacekeeping missions want to deliver are robust and accountable [...] then it follows that national contributions need to include civilian, military and police experts capable of delivering guidance and results across all sectors. This approach was demonstrated by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that were provided by countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Korea, Sweden, Turkey and the US in Afghanistan and need to be analysed, evaluated and considered for future peacekeeping operations."

An agile Defence Force needs skilled personnel beyond military; field specialists from the civil sector, and a robust technologically advanced emergency response infrastructure with for example, helicopters, LAVs, recording drones and IFF. The Defence Force needs to constantly look at new technology to drive new, better means of rapid deployment and useful equipment for POs to keep safe the people under their protection. There is also potential for New Zealand to contribute more to UNSAS and promote regional Pacific peacekeeping, sharing skills

UNANZ is a registered charity proud to promote our UN obligations of peace and protection of human rights by way of education about the same. We are honoured to work with many New Zealand organisations, government officials, academics and the embassy community on peace education for New Zealanders, sharing ideas about how to advance global peace and celebrating important UN days.

Sincerely,

**Special Officer Peace & Security, UN Association of New Zealand (UNANZ)**  
Helena McMullin (LLM)

**1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?**

- Instability in the Pacific / Asia
- Influx of illegal immigrants
- The raiding of New Zealand's maritime resources
- Spread of terrorism – both physical and cyber
- New Zealand being isolated from either direct or indirect action on New Zealand preventing support from NZ's defence partners or providing economic isolation and the inability for New Zealand to trade

**2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

- Increasing widespread terrorism
- Increasing competition for limited natural resources (Maritime, arable land, fresh water, space, life style)
- Increased hostile cyber activity
- The growing influence and consumption requirements within the greater Asian region

**3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

- All of our current defence activities with an increased focus on Maritime resources, Antarctic resources and Cyber activities.

**4. What are the emerging challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

- an increased focus on the protection of our Maritime resources, Antarctic resources and Cyber activities

**5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Forces efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and global security?**

- New Zealand's economy will never be large enough to support the defence capabilities that it would require to stand alone. There will always be a reliance upon New Zealand's partners and ally.

In this knowledge ;

- 40% of NZ's Defence efforts should be focused on protecting NZ's assets and interests, including Antarctica
- 40% of NZ's Defences efforts on supporting our partners , ally and our joint interests
- 20% of NZ's Defence efforts should be focused on the UN and global security.

There will be many situations where our efforts on supporting our partners, ally, our joint interests and supporting the UN/global security issues will combine and collectively be 60% of our efforts.

Due to the increased costs as we deploy Defence force assets further away from New Zealand, 20% in effort does not necessary relate to 20% of fiscal spend.

#### **6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

- There is a natural overlapping/ interweaving of some of the services provided by various Government departments including the Defence. This should be further encouraged to maximise the synergies that exist and to reduce duplication.

I'm not sure of all the activities/ scope of the various Govt departments, or the level of cooperation and information sharing between them.

Some of the all-of-government areas that should be investigated are.

- NZ Police
- Department of Corrections
- Antarctic NZ
- Civil Aviation
- Conservation Department ( use of remote islands)
- NZ Customs
- Immigration NZ
- Maritime NZ
- MBIE
- Foreign Affairs
- GSB
- Aviation Security Service
- Environment Ministry
- Primary Industries
- Ministry of Pacific Island affairs
- National Cyber Security

**7. What is the Defence Forces role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

- NZDF should continue to provide to provide its existing role in this area utilising both its physical resources and its skilled personal.
- The NZDF maybe the best place to house the resources and assets required to protect our maritime resources and foreshore from environmental disasters.

**8. What should be the Defence Forces role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

- The Defence Force should be part of the Nations "Tool Box " for developing NZ youth. Compulsive military or basic training is not a magic cure all for our youth issues but is an important factor for some of our youth.

**9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectivity, now and in the future?**

- I have tried to answer the various questions with a more outcome based approach rather than what particular capabilities are needed. I suggest that's more of a NZDF function once the outcomes are clearly defined, capabilities need to be sought and suppliers selected.
- NZDF needs to have an effective investment strategy that looks at both the delivery and at cost effective support (thru-life) costs of that capability over the expected lifetime of the capability.

As NZDF will always be a small buyer with a relatively small budget on the global market. There is little commercial imperative for a supplier to provide timely and responsive thru-life support for a small occasional buyer located near the bottom of the South Pacific. Our best time for any influence is at the negotiation time before the purchase decision is confirmed. It's at this stage that the long term thru-life supports options need to be negotiated.

Some points that the NZDF could consider in obtaining cost effective thru-life support costs are:

- ~ The ability to engage local industry in order to minimise costs, inventory holdings etc.
- ~ At the time of purchasing new capability gaining agreement so that the NZDF has agreed

access to IP when the supplier chooses not to support the capability for the agreed 'x' years. It may not be cost effective for the supplier to continue to support certain capability if their other customers have moved on. This would give the NZDF "options", they may choose to engage a NZ company to support the capability for a further "y" years while a suitable alternative is sourced or funding becomes available.

~ The ability to strongly encourage the overseas supplier to engage with an established local industry partner in order to keep in country support costs low. This would provide a local point of contact for the support of that capability and should be cheaper than establishing a 'local' NZ support office. The incremental costs for a local company to provide support, should be more favourable than those associated with establishing a 'green field's' support facility in NZ.

I trust that these bulleted comments are of some value to your process, as you evaluate how to best spend 'every day New Zealanders' money on the effective Defence of New Zealand.

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**SUBMISSION TO**  
**Defence White Paper 2015**  
**PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT**

**20 June 2015**

**Proposal Prepared By:**



## Submission on Defence White Paper 2015

### Customers Requirements:

This public consultation process provides New Zealanders with the opportunity to give their views on the future security challenges facing the nation; the appropriate roles for our armed forces in responding to these challenges; and the capabilities that are most likely to be required to fulfil these.

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity.

It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views.

We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

### InTELCOM Services Ltd.

InTELCOM Services has been a reliable supplier and a manufacturer of high quality products used by Government, Defence, Broadcasting, and Telecommunications for more than 25 years.

InTELCOM has been supplying equipment and services to NZ Defence Force departments for 25 years.

### Conclusion

InTELCOM and our manufacturers deliver and support advanced equipment to meet client needs.

## Key Questions

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

InTELCOM Services Limited believes that the major threats to security are from:

- Increasing global terrorism
- Threats from radical groups
- Cyber terrorism
- Global displacement of citizens due to war, famine and natural disasters
- Food and water shortages causing pressure on NZ's areas of interest, especially fisheries
- Pressure to open up areas such as Antarctica for mining and other exploitation

2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

Defence will be asked to work alongside our allies and regional partners to protect nations from attack by terror groups in whatever form that may take. To do this defence must be equipped with modern surveillance and detection equipment that will assist our allies to prepare for an attack. Communications must be lean and effective, and communications equipment must not only operate between the divisions of our armed forces, but also interoperate with our allies. Government directives need to clarify the response of our armed forces to threats that are detected and defence must have the structure and equipment required to make that response.

3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

- Threat Detection
- Threat Interception
- Support for allies
- Air + Naval support for natural disasters
- Army deployment for civil unrest / disaster logistics
- Work with NZ industry to develop innovative solutions

4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

- Support for natural disasters
- Pressure on NZ's areas of interest, especially fisheries.
- Terror cells / public attacks
- Civil unrest
- Pressure to open up areas such as Antarctica for mining and other exploitation creating conflict.



5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

Number 1 priority is the security of New Zealand's territory and economic zone

Number 2 priority is the support of our neighbours and allies

Number 3 priority is the participation in peacekeeping and security

To achieve the first priority the Defence Force requires a mobile 'ever-ready' force equipped to handle delivery of assistance via air and sea for disaster relief, for patrolling our economic zone and land forces for peacekeeping in the event of civil unrest. If the Defence Force is equipped to provide these needs, then they are also ready to deploy outside our territory in support of the third priority.

The second priority is more demanding in terms of equipment and training. To make a meaningful contribution to our allies, we cannot rely on them to supply our forces with equipment to enable us to participate. We need to be self-contained, but ensure that our forces are operating with internationally compatible equipment and trained to operate in a larger theatre embedded with forces from another country. This will require significant capital investment.

6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

This is a question that requires a multi-agency approach – there is no "correct" answer. The aim needs to be a clearer picture of roles and of responsibilities. Also a reduction in the silo effect of having Air Force, Army and Navy plus HQ, on one hand, and civilian government organisations such as Police, Civil Defence and Security agencies with similar roles. Each of these organisations has to some degree a duplication in support infrastructure which could be merged or sourced in a different way, all are funded out of the same public purse.

We acknowledge that this is a major challenge and that even a common communications network for Police / Fire Services (such as the P.25) has significant hurdles.

There are options:

1. Maintain the status quo
2. Re-model the Defence Force as a 'fighting force' splitting off non-military roles to civilian departments and NGOs.
3. Create a knowledge base for infrastructure such as IT, Communications (technical and PR), and HR, providing international best practice and up to date with evolving technology. They would provide services across the defence sector, police and security agencies.

Options 1 and 2 encompass the current adhoc situation.

Option 3 provides an opportunity to create an integrated security service across defence and the government departments involved in keeping New Zealand secure.

To achieve the best outcomes this agency would require access to Defence HQ, Police and Security to ensure that they could keep their support current with the issues faced by these organisations. Multi-disciplinary access provides for a top-down approach keeping all organisations aligned to the bigger picture. Currently purchases are made that could be used across organisations, but lack of communication between defence and non-defence means that sectors that could benefit from purchases but they are not made aware.

It also allows purchases to be pooled between services to leverage large market pricing and ensure interoperability where required.

7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

The Defence Force continues to be a large, well-organised group, capable of mobilisation at short notice, which is able to act autonomously and independently, within a mandate.

Its role in natural disasters and unexpected events cannot be under-estimated as they can bring a significant, disciplined response to a difficult situation. This must remain one of its major functions at home.

8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

Defence has always carried out a training role in New Zealand and should continue to actively support the source of its young recruits. If The Defence Force understands where its recruits come from (e.g. NZ Cadet Forces, or other community profiles or groups), then it has a responsibility to support those groups with training material, possibly equipment, and certainly life experience. This could be in form of hosting groups of potential youth groups in training exercises, live-in experiences, flying camps, or equivalent Army and Navy experience.

9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

- Being an isolated island nation, NZ needs to be able to reach and operate effectively in theatres across the world by ocean and air to meet our priorities.
- Have sufficient on-the-ground capability when they arrive
- Protection while they are there
- Communication and intelligence during the whole deployment process

I have several concerns re the Defence white paper.


1. The billions spent on military "defence" should be used for humanitarian relief in NZ and overseas.
2. I question the need as above to have a defence force.
3. I don't see NZ in any danger re invasion etc 4. I think that some young people need a group situation and focus/routine to aid their development/socialisation but do not consider this appropriate in a military environment e.g Academies etc Better to focus on Community work, VSA, Environment Accademies, Relief for natural disasters.
5. NZ forces are already well deployed in overseas and local relief and humanitarian aid so I think the money best spent on a specialised : "force" but not with the military associations e.g the learning how to kill.

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## St Andrew's on The Terrace

Hato Anaru o Te Parehua  
Founded 1840

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Charities Commission: CC33597



Defence White Paper 2015  
Ministry of Defence  
PO Box 12703  
WELLINGTON 6144  
[DWP15@defence.govt.nz](mailto:DWP15@defence.govt.nz)

### **Submission on the Defence White Paper 2015**

Prepared by Rev Dr Susan Jones, Sandra Kirby, and Paul Barber  
On behalf of the Parish Council of St Andrew's on The Terrace

The following submission is made by the Parish Council of St Andrew's on The Terrace, Wellington. St Andrew's on The Terrace is a Presbyterian congregation, first established in 1840, with a long and distinguished record of working for social justice and caring for people within and beyond our community.

### **The Ungirding Principles to our Submission**

As all its member congregations have, St Andrew's on The Terrace has been urged by the Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa New Zealand from its General Assembly in 2014 to develop programmes that promote just peace. Part of our response to this call is this submission on the Defence White Paper 2015. Our concern is that the people of New Zealand live peaceably with the nations of the world and that this peace is based on just and fair treatment of all people.

Jesus himself was a person who lives peaceably with others, though he still confronted wrong acts and oppression of others. He is widely known and revered as someone who resisted the temptation to fight back evil for evil. Through his non-violent response when he was offered violence, far from being victimised and silenced, he has become a centuries-long and worldwide example of what real humanity looks like. His example has inspired other non-violent actions and stances even in people of other faiths such as Mahatma Ghandi as well as in Christian such as the Rev Martin Luther King.



Outside the United Nations in New York, USA, stands a statue showing a sword being turned into a plough. This echoes the Jewish prophet Isaiah's accounting of the vision of God that instead of fighting, people should be able to enjoy a peaceful enough existence where they can get on with their ordinary lives, for example, peaceful enough for them to participate in agriculture and farming in peace and security. When swords are no longer needed in such a peaceful society they can be adapted into agricultural implements. New Zealand's own agriculture and general economy benefits from us being at peace.

Significantly the "Let us beat swords into ploughshares" statue was gifted to the UN by the USSR showing that this Judeo-Christian symbol of the movement towards peaceful coexistence was prized even by a communist regime. The full text reads: *They will beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war anymore.* Isaiah 2: 4.

The comments below are in response to some of the questions contained in the Defence White Paper consultation document.

***What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?***

The first question that must be addressed in this White Paper is, why New Zealand maintains expensive military capabilities in the absence of any military threat? Senior leadership of the defence force itself has stated that there are no immediate military threats to this country:

*New Zealand does not presently face a direct threat of physical invasion and occupation of New Zealand territory. The likelihood of such a threat to the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and territory over which we have a sovereign claim, emerging before 2040 is judged to be very low, and would be preceded by significant change to the international security environment.*

*New Zealand could therefore expect to have a reasonable amount of time to re-orientate its defence priorities should this be necessary. (Defence Assessment 2014, p.25)*

This shows that there is little justification for further investment in military combat and attack forces. New Zealand faces a significant number of much more immediate social and economic challenges. The \$3.5 billion defence budget would be far better employed “combating” those “threats” rather than preparing for much less likely or direct scenarios of military threat or indeed participation in armed aggression towards other states.

The Defence Assessment rightly identifies climate change, socio-economic inequality among the leading risks. These risks would be mitigated by a far different investment of defence resources, for example, into climate change mitigation and response activities, or supporting greater socio-economic equality in New Zealand (e.g. building social housing) and internationally through higher levels of overseas aid.

**•What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand’s interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

New Zealand must seek to maintain an independent foreign policy focused on peaceful conflict resolution and maintenance of good relations between states. As a small, peace and prosperous democracy, our interests are not served by seeking military alliances and endless preparation for war as part of a global cycle of violence.

We are deeply concerned about information linking New Zealand military personnel to instances of potential human rights abuses. The security of our country is greatly undermined when our armed forces are linked to torture or inhumane treatment of prisoners for example. New Zealand’s position on the United Nations Security Council is based on our portrayal of our country as a principled defender of human rights. This is put in question when we choose military engagements and alliances that are associated with abuse of human rights.

New Zealand must focus its resources on supporting foreign policy built around diplomatic initiatives, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief aimed at preventing armed conflict, as well as supporting peace and reconciliation processes during and after armed conflict.

**•What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests broad?**

Coast guard and civilian emergency and disaster response capabilities are far more urgent and meaningful roles for keeping the people of New Zealand and our associated countries safe and protected.

Re-focusing New Zealand's armed forces towards a highly skilled, well-equipped and professional coast guard and disaster relief role would be far more useful and cost-efficient response to the most pressing security interests of our country.

**•How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

The enormous social, economic and environmental costs of maintaining combat-ready armed forces are not justifiable in the current "fiscally constrained" Government budget cycle. It is therefore appropriate that military spending be given a lower priority behind higher and more urgent government objectives to lift vulnerable children out of poverty, improve the supply and quality of social housing, to double overseas development aid and doubling our refugee quota to name but a few examples.

We recommend that the government plan for a reduction of military spending over the next 10 years with the aim of re-allocation of the entire budget towards civilian-based, peace-promoting activity.

We recommend cancelling the upgrade of frigates (\$446 million) and the replacement of Hercules C-130s (\$600 million) and investing those capital funds into building \$1 billion worth of social housing (around 4,000 units) that is affordable for low income families.

**•What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

A Defence Force equipped and trained to attack other countries is particularly poorly configured to do the most common activity it is called on to do – provide assistance in disasters and emergencies. The recent inability to deploy newly purchased helicopters to assist disaster relief in Vanuatu is a perfect example of this mismatch between capability and responses needed.

**•What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

We are deeply concerned about the growing involvement of the defence force in increased levels of militarisation of children. We believe it is not appropriate for the military to be involved in working with children and youth development work. The role of the military must be focused on adults and children should be protected from activities that amount to de-facto "child soldier" activities – we have seen photos of children dressed in military attire and carrying weapons acting out control checks on "refugees" as part of such programmes.

The evidence shows that military style training camps do not work for young people (e.g. *Positive Outcomes and positive futures for young people in the Bays Trust Area*, Centre for Social Impact, February 2015, p.8). There are many civilian social service organizations that specialize in youth development work and can do this far better and more effectively and at a lower cost.

**About St Andrew's on The Terrace**

St Andrews on The Terrace is a progressive Presbyterian church established in 1840 as the first Presbyterian church in Wellington. Our mission is to create a lively, open Christian faith community, to act for a just and peaceful world, and to be catalysts for discovery, compassion and celebration in the capital. Our membership is drawn from throughout the wider Wellington region. St Andrew's on The Terrace has long been associated with strong social justice positions. Successive ministers and members of the congregation are actively involved in working for peace, justice and social equity. On the 8<sup>th</sup> August 1983 St Andrews on The Terrace was declared a Peace Church and declared its buildings a nuclear weapons-free zone in March 1984. As a community we are currently active in supporting the Aotearoa Living Wage movement; interfaith activities that promote peace and justice and supporting refugee resettlement.

Further information on this submission is available from:

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St Andrew's on The Terrace  
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Website: [www.standrews.org.nz](http://www.standrews.org.nz)



## DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

### RESERVISTS

The only submission I wish to make is in relation to reservists.

I understand that there is a worldwide trend towards increasing the role of reservists as back-up for regular armed forces and I believe that New Zealand will be part of this trend.

The importance of reservists should therefore be recognised in government policy on defence.

Some proposals for consideration arriving at this policy could include the following:

1. Assess the likely reservist requirements in terms of:
  - (a) skill set – what skills are required and may best be provided by reservists? e.g. medical, logistic, engineering, trades, etc;
  - (b) number required for each skill set;
  - (c) preferred geographical source – should we, for example, be focusing our recruitment for any specific skill set? e.g. is it better for all/most of the medics to come from a particular city/area so that they can do local training together?
2. Reservist recruitment and liaison:
  - (a) provide for proper recruitment and marketing programme for reservists;
  - (b) find out what benefits attract reservists and what aspects discourage them so that all these factors can be taken into account in the recruitment and marketing programme;

- (c) make reservist activity meaningful and effective with minimal time wasting: today's people (especially those with special skills) are busy people and will not tolerate or endure time wasting.

3. Employer Liaison:

- (a) make better use of the extensive business networks of the Defence Employer Support Council as a link to business and employers (and potential employers) of reservists;
- (b) establish and maintain links with reservists' employers to ensure that they are receiving the benefits (from the reservist themselves) that should come with employing reservist;
- (c) consider compensation payments to employers of reservists (as happens in Australia).

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DWP-0194

## New Zealand Society of Anaesthetists (Incorporated)

22 June 2015

Defence White Paper 2015  
Ministry for Defence  
PO Box 12703  
Wellington 6144

DWP15@defence.govt.nz

### Discussion document: Defence White Paper 2015

Thank you for the invitation to provide feedback on the above discussion document regarding the role of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and the provision of its services. The New Zealand Society of Anaesthetists (NZSA) welcomes this opportunity to provide our views and considerations on this paper.

### About NZSA

The New Zealand Society of Anaesthetists Inc., (NZSA) is a professional medical education society established in 1948. It represents almost 500 medical anaesthetists in New Zealand and works to foster education and research into anaesthesia, and support the professional interests of its members. Members include specialist anaesthetists in public and private practice, and trainee anaesthetists. NZSA is a member society of the World Federation of Societies of Anaesthesiologists<sup>1</sup> (WFSA) and is represented at Executive level of the WFSA.

To further the education of our members we organize conferences involving other anaesthesia societies from around the world including the Pacific Society of Anaesthetists. We recently hosted the 2014 Combined AACA ASURA conference and inaugural Pacific Super Meeting in Auckland.

### Introduction

Our interests with regard to the Defence White Paper lie in the areas of disaster relief both in New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, and emergency management within New Zealand alongside government departments.

The NZSA shares interests and staffing with NZMAT and the Pacific Medical Association, giving us a unique insight into the medical and civilian aid requirements in the Pacific, and sharing that expertise with NZDF would potentially improve the aid response by the NZDF.

Through our Overseas Aid Committee (OAS)<sup>2</sup> we organise emergency and relief cover for the Pacific Islands and work with government agencies and other organisations to ensure support is available when disasters occur in the Pacific region. Organisations we work with include the Ministry of Health New Zealand Medical Assistance Teams (NZMAT), the Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AUSMAT), the New Zealand Fire Service Urban Search Rescue team (NZFS USAR) and the Pacific Medical Association (PMA).

As a member of the WFSA we are committed to improving and supporting anaesthetic services in the region of Asia Australasia, specifically with our Pacific neighbours. This work is also carried out through our OAS, which has spent some years fostering improved anaesthetic services and providing training for

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See references on page 4



# New Zealand Society of Anaesthetists (Incorporated)

Pacific Island anaesthetists. Through this work and these connections our anaesthetists are also most effective in disaster response situations.

## Effects of climate change

It is well documented that over time climate change will affect public health and have an impact on what health services are required. I draw your attention to *A Human Health Perspective on Climate Change*<sup>3</sup>, *New Zealand Medical Journal*, November 2014, Volume 127<sup>4</sup>, *Climate Change: Potential effects on Human Health in New Zealand, 2001*<sup>5</sup>.

The Australian Defence Force has also assessed that climate change will be a contributing driver to its defence activities in the Pacific in the next 20 years in its *Defence White Paper 2013*<sup>6</sup>, detailed in related articles *Sydney Morning Herald*<sup>7</sup>, and the report *The Securitisation of Climate Change: a military perspective*<sup>8</sup>.

These reports detail that climate change will cause increased weather disturbances affecting public health and the health services required, including an increased frequency of floods, droughts, earthquakes, tsunamis and hurricanes. In the next 25 years we can expect an increase in disasters in the South Pacific region, affecting the populations of Pacific Island countries and New Zealanders holidaying in the region.

## Emergency Management – Pacific Islands

Anaesthetists occupy a central role in disaster medical emergency work. We run the operating theatres, help organize pre-op resuscitation and are involved in post-op ICU and pain management. New Zealand anaesthetists have got involved in helping out in the Pacific for many years and there is a core group who frequently go to the Pacific to work in some cases for years at remote locations and have extensive experience of local people being frequently able to speak the local languages and are good friends with the staff in the major hospitals in the Pacific Islands. This knowledge and experience has been called upon by NZMAT and the Pasifika Medical Association for disaster relief work.

## Recent disasters

New Zealand anaesthetists have been involved in disaster response in the following recent events:

- **Tropical Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu, 2015** – Dr Tony Diprose, of NZSA OAS and NZMAT, worked in Port Vila Hospital for 2 years and assessed needs at short notice for NZMAT. Dr Diprose continues a training programme for Pacific Island anaesthetists at Hawkes Bay Hospital with a 12-month training attachment.
- **Cyclone Ita, Solomon Islands, 2014** - Dr Alan Goodey, of NZSA OAS and NZMAT, went to Samoa as part of the New Zealand government response for needs assessment. Dr Goodey has worked regularly doing plastic surgery procedures in Samoa at Apia hospital.
- **Tsunami, Western Samoa, 2009** - Dr Goodey and Dr Ted Hughes (NZSA OAS committee) were both "chef-de-mission", coordinated medical and surgical work, and worked in the operating theatres. Dr Hughes is a part-Cook Islander and has extensive experience in Rarotonga Hospital in anaesthetics, including theatre and ICU work, and the retrieval of critically-ill patients.

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See references page 4



## New Zealand Society of Anaesthetists (Incorporated)

New Zealand anaesthetist Dr Maurice Lee (NZSA OAS) also recently went to Nepal following the May 2015 earthquake, setting up a remote hospital with aid agency Samaritans Purse and surgeons.

Our anaesthetists who respond in these emergencies are most valuable because they usually have significant experience in the locations, have key contacts, and often know the native language. This allows them to provide effective and timely assistance in emergency response situations.

The anaesthetists from these recent deployments have all reported to us that utilizing their contacts with other medical professionals they knew at the location, enabled their work to be most effective.

### Current status

Currently New Zealand anaesthetists are called to respond to disasters such as those listed above by various methods – through the Pasifika Medical Association as part of the NZMAT response, by aid agencies, or occasionally independently through their own contacts.

This system has worked for the above disasters, but going forward, with more disaster events likely, we believe the responding agencies would benefit from working closer with the NZDF to strengthen our communications around these deployments.

Currently a meeting occurs between the NZSA President, the Pasifika Medical Association, and Army representatives approximately every three months in Auckland. This is a useful meeting and we would like to see continued support of the NZDF for this and also that it be extended to include more groups.

### Recommendations

We submit that the New Zealand government Defence White Paper 2015 needs to plan for the likelihood that the NZDF will be required to respond to more disasters in future. We believe the following recommendations would be useful to build links and plan disaster response both in the Pacific Islands and domestically in New Zealand.

We suggest:

- a closer liaison be developed between NZDF staff and disaster relief staff in New Zealand with particular expertise in Pacific deployments and aid efforts, in order to increase the efficiency and timeliness of NZDF assistance with Pacific aid work
- regular meetings throughout the year especially before the Pacific Cyclone season (between November and April) between the following agencies: NZDF, NZMAT, NZFS USAR, Pasifika Medical Association, NZSA OAS

### Conclusion

New Zealand has a responsibility to provide medical aid to Pacific Island countries. It is acknowledged that we can expect more extreme weather events, requiring emergency response, in the Pacific Rim area in the next 25 years and beyond.

It is important that government agencies and medical organisations plan together so that New Zealand can respond most effectively. Anaesthetists have specialist services, expertise and knowledge that are needed in disaster events. These services are available to support the NZDF medical teams in disaster and emergency response situations in both the New Zealand and the Pacific Islands.



## New Zealand Society of Anaesthetists (Incorporated)

We recommend closer liaisons between the agencies involved, as outline above, and we look forward to continuing to work with the NZDF and other government agencies on planning and response for emergency events both in New Zealand and in the Pacific.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit on this important topic. I am happy to discuss this submission further. Please feel free to contact me at [president@anaesthesia.org.nz](mailto:president@anaesthesia.org.nz).

Yours faithfully,

*EW (Ted) Hughes*

Dr Ted Hughes  
President

### References:

- <sup>1</sup> World Federation of Anaesthesiologists, <http://www.wfsahq.org/>
- <sup>2</sup> NZSA Overseas Aid Sub-Committee, <http://anaesthetist.digiwebhosting.com/about/nzsa-overseas-aid-sub-committee/>
- <sup>3</sup> *A Human Health Perspective on Climate Change*, National Institute of Environmental and Health Sciences, 2010, [http://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/programs/geh/climatechange/health\\_impacts/](http://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/programs/geh/climatechange/health_impacts/)
- <sup>4</sup> *New Zealand Medical Journal*, Volume 127, November 2014, <http://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/read-the-journal/all-issues/2010-2019/2014/vol-127-no-1406/6366>
- <sup>5</sup> *Climate Change: Potential effects on Human Health in New Zealand*, for MFE by NZ Climate Change Programme, 2001, <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate-change/climate-change-potential-effects-human-health-new-zealand>
- <sup>6</sup> *Defence White Paper 2013*, Australian Government, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/>
- <sup>7</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 & 25 March 2013, <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/be-prepared-to-fight-heat-and-wild-weather-20130324-2god8.html>, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/climate-to-put-defence-operations-to-the-test-20130324-2goch.html>
- <sup>8</sup> *The Securitisation of Climate Change: a military perspective*, Major Michael Thomas, Australian Army, [http://www.academia.edu/9850971/Climate\\_Securitisation](http://www.academia.edu/9850971/Climate_Securitisation)

# Submission Form

Please send your submission to: **Defence White Paper 2015, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 12703, WELLINGTON, 6144**

You can also make your views known by submitting written comments either using the online submission form on the Ministry of Defence website at <http://www.defence.govt.nz>, or by uploading or emailing completed submission forms to [DWP15@defence.govt.nz](mailto:DWP15@defence.govt.nz)

**Deadline for submissions:** To ensure views expressed through the consultation process can be considered in the Review, a deadline of 22 June 2015 has been established for receipt of formal submissions.

## Contact details

*Name:
Group (if applicable): Mailing address:
Contact telephone number:
Email address:

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## Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

*1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?*

Growing assertiveness and dominance of PRC may have a large scale affect on the southern hemispheric region causing diffused sporadic and chaotic splintered offensive activities against our allies, key partners and economic trading routes.

Cyber crime, intellectual property theft, industrial espionage and intently destructive and disruptive means used against our economy is a growing area of concern.

Continued efforts at splitting the 5 nations alliance put's New Zealand at risk of isolation.

*2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?*

Russia, China, Africa and some Middle Eastern countries appear to be forming mutually beneficial arrangements for economic, energy, weapons and technology transfer. There may be further pressure and demands to provide support to our allies in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and offensive support operations.

*3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?*

New Zealand needs to be able to supply rapid response, agile forces with skilled abilities that can provide unique and highly useful capabilities to it's allies. As we see war shifting into the cyber domain I believe New Zealand can serve its allies and own interests in up skilling its forces in the area of cyber skills. Recon, forward ops, HUMINT, OSINT, CYBINT, MEDINT and TECHINT.

I believe our nation and joint forces strategy aligns nicely in being able to take advantage of being rapid, unified, network enabled force that is technologically and intellectually the most capable of providing this unique ability. With emphasis on the need of agility and high tempo. Stand up a national Secure Operations Centre that conjoins to all national agencies in providing a more secure infrastructure that can gather and provide alert and intelligence capabilities out to our allies



4. *What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?*

The threat of terrorism remains a real and dangerous risk for all societies. New Zealand's remote location is not a guarantee of safety. Terrorist acts could take the form of overt violence to citizens, or other activities intended to create panic and loss of confidence in national authorities. National critical infrastructure is a key risk and requires rigorous safeguards across the various levels of security. The increasing risks and low cost of cyber attacks means that this form of security must be robustly enabled and supported. Cyber security, particularly in regards to critical infrastructure, requires a Whole of Government approach, within which the NZDF has a part to play.

Cyber crime in its own right is an increasing threat. From criminal use of the internet for money making ventures, to the stealing of secrets for commercial or other gain, New Zealand must take the threats seriously and establish appropriate frameworks and capabilities to protect the Nation. As a 5-Eyes partner it should actively seek to leverage the opportunities available

5. *How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?*

Defending New Zealand sovereignty is always first and foremost. To ensure our protection and not risk isolation from the 5 nations it is of equally high priority to support our allies in all operations that includes the other 4 nations take part. I believe we should always move as one (the 5 nations) and show continued support to each other as a strong alliance.

Continued efforts to reinforce and prioritize its support to the 5 nations and remain a vigilantly active member in contributing in operations.

6. *How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?*

Form a secure Multi Agency Network for sharing and exchanging classified and unclassified information to aid in conducting local and maritime operations with greater effect and rapid response (if necessary).

This network should be protected by a national SOC within which the NZDF will be a key agency of.

NZDF should have a specialist trained cyber workforce that are capable of providing assistance and necessary responses to all of a government.

Cyber training and awareness program should be funneled to all-of government agencies in an effort to raise our cyber protection across the nation.

Please refer to the Official Information Act 1982

7. *What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?*

Logistics and support. In the event of a disaster, so long as there is a multiagency network that is capable of in the field mobile situational awareness. The defence force can coordinate a rapid response in providing all necessary support of unutilized and close proximity equipment, services and personnel from its own resources, agencies and 3<sup>rd</sup> parties in the commercial sector.

Ensure the multiagency network continues sustained operation during a crisis situation.

8. *What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?*

The Defence Force is one of the nation's iconic institutions, which inherently captures the public attention. As such it is the explicit responsibility of the Defence Force senior leadership to lead by example and encourage Defence Force personnel to provide a positive public image at all times. In turn this can play a part in the positive development of New Zealand youth.

Military skills and their training represent positive activities for developing responsibility and acceptance of personal challenge for young men and women. Programmes to allow selected youth to experience some of these activities should be encouraged.

The military can take a lead in stimulating interest by New Zealand youth in issues of national importance, by careful introduction and management of appropriate programmes. The shortage of graduates with cybersecurity skills from western universities is a relevant point. Within the guise of military cadet programmes, youth would benefit from some low level education in cyber risks, threats, and techniques to overcome them, with a view to stimulating an interest in related academic training and career fields. Partnership with academia and business could establish a highly valuable national programme to encourage youth towards this field, which would have both national and NZDF benefits for the future.

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) Gap Year programme has been a success story for many years. Although its principal aim is to encourage youth to consider a career in the military, it inherently has a positive influence by virtue of the exposure to the excitement, challenges, and personal responsibility which military life entails. The NZDF might benefit from reviewing the ADF programme.

9. *What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?*

Network Centric operations are an essential element of a contemporary military force. The necessary systems and processes to ensure the right information is available to the right people in the right format at the right time, must be implemented to enable the future NZDF. Equally essential is ensuring that the information that decision makers will rely upon within this network centricity, is suitably protected through suitable cybersecurity measures to ensure its availability and integrity.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

Please be aware that all submissions are subject to the Official Information Act 1982. Please set out clearly in your submission if you have any objection to the release of any information in the submission. In particular, please indicate which part, or parts, you consider should be withheld, together with your reasons for withholding the information.

Submission to 2015 Defence White Paper Consultation from

Our meeting welcomes the opportunity to contribute ideas for the 2015 Defence White Paper. Simplicity. Peace. Integrity. Community. Equality and Sustainability are important values to us. In response to these values we reaffirm our testimony of the past and offer it as a way forward for New Zealand in developing a Defence White Paper.

*We totally oppose all wars, all preparation for war, all use of weapons and coercion by force, and all military alliances: no end could ever justify such means.*

*We equally and actively oppose all that leads to violence among people and nations, and violence to other species and to our planet.*

*Refusal to fight with weapons is not surrender. We are not passive when threatened by the greedy, the cruel, the tyrant, the unjust.*

*We will struggle to remove the causes of impasse and confrontation by every means of nonviolent resistance available.*

*We urge all New Zealanders to have the courage to face up to the mess humans are making of our world and to have the faith and diligence to cleanse it and restore the order intended by God.*

*We must start with our own hearts and minds. Wars will stop only when each of us is convinced that war is never the way.*

*The places to begin acquiring the skills and maturity and generosity to avoid or to resolve conflicts are in our own homes, our personal relationships, our schools, our workplaces, and wherever decisions are made.*

*We must relinquish the desire to own other people, to have power over them, and to force our views on to them. We must own up to our own negative side and not look for scapegoats to blame, punish, or exclude. We must resist the urge towards waste and the accumulation of possessions.*

*Conflicts are inevitable and must not be repressed or ignored but worked through painfully and carefully. We must develop the skills of being sensitive to oppression and grievances, sharing power in decision-making, creating consensus, and making reparation.*

*In speaking out, we acknowledge that we ourselves are as limited and as erring as anyone else. When put to the test, we each may fall short.*

*We do not have a blueprint for peace that spells out every stepping stone towards the goal that we share. In any particular situation, a variety of personal decisions could be made with integrity.*

*We may disagree with the views and actions of the politician or the soldier who opts for a military solution, but we still respect and cherish the person.*

*What we call for in this statement is a commitment to make the building of peace a priority and to make opposition to war absolute.*

*What we advocate is not uniquely Quaker but human and, we believe, the will of God. Our stand does not belong to Friends alone - it is yours by birthright.*

*We challenge all New Zealanders to stand up and be counted on what is no less than the affirmation of life and the destiny of humankind.*

*Together, let us reject the clamour of fear and listen to the whisperings of hope.*

In response to the questions asked in the consultation documents we offer our collective input that is drawn from the testimony written above.

*Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?*

We believe that significant security challenges come from: climate change, natural disasters, inequality, challenges to democracy, and political interference in the South Pacific by international power giants both national and corporate.

*Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?*

Climate change, economic deprivation, and political marginalisation are threats not well described in the support documents for the consultation. We see a risk that our ally Australia is closely aligned to USA in defence policy.

We prefer a ready reaction capability and not a Defence Force. Focusing on peacemaking, cooperation, and sharing resources as we walk lightly in the world is more constructive than an armed approach. We see strength in being a nation that is a good global citizen and strong member of United Nations.

Minister Murray McCully in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 29 September 2014 said, *"The UN must fundamentally improve its performance in preventing conflict. Once fighting is in full spate, the options for peace disappear. Prevention is critical not just in new conflicts but also in the cases on the agenda where conflict is frozen or where peacebuilding has not really taken hold."* We agree and hope New Zealand will as a member of the Security Council will be active in this preventive thinking.

*Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?*

We believe it is unhelpful to maintain an armed, offensive force. It brings dangers of its own. A nimble, fast acting response team that offers neighbourliness, leadership, support and enhancement of resilience within our region can emerge from our existing defence force. To build peace, stability and security we favour dialogue, openness, and community building. New Zealand has resources and knowledge to share with other nations and groups. In sharing we also gain. By dispensing with weapons and offensive combat capability, we free people to train in conflict resolution, to work as peacemakers, to nurture our planet and affirm life.

*Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?*  
We do not see new external threats at this time. However, challenges exist when freedom of information and ownership of information are in conflict. Challenges occur also with increasing disparity between rich and poor and when the place of tangata whenua is displaced by closed minds and prejudiced thinking. We need to be open to find mutually beneficial relationships both within New Zealand and internationally. Openness and global citizenship are themselves protective actions for security challenges.

*Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?*

The priority should be on peace and fostering mutually beneficial relationships, dispensing with arms and weapons technologies. We support a fast deployment, support team rather than a defence force. Such a team can take action in a wide variety of emergency, conflict, protection and enforcement situations as and when they arise. We see the skills, leadership and resources of such teams as of immense value for everyone.

*Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?*

We advocate for openness to being a neighbour in the South Pacific and world and not just isolationist to New Zealand. Looking at advancing the interests of our planet and all peoples in the area, not merely New Zealand, is a primary protective strategy.

*Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?*

A nimble, fast acting response force that offers neighbourliness, leadership, support and enhancement of resilience within our region is a tremendous national asset. Disarming and becoming a focus for collaboration and a resource for environmental and development assistance has benefits for everyone.

*Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?*

We see wonderful value in search and rescue, environmental protection, and leadership skills for young people. Helping them resolve conflict, build peace and work co-operatively are great aims.

*Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?*

A ready reaction team would need to develop new knowledge and capabilities in peace studies, reconciliation, mediation, communications and environmental management.

# Submission Form

Please send your submission to: **Defence White Paper 2015, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 12703, WELLINGTON, 6144**

You can also make your views known by submitting written comments either using the online submission form on the Ministry of Defence website at <http://www.defence.govt.nz>, or by uploading or emailing completed submission forms to [DWP15@defence.govt.nz](mailto:DWP15@defence.govt.nz)

**Deadline for submissions:** To ensure views expressed through the consultation process can be considered in the Review, a deadline of 22 June 2015 has been established for receipt of formal submissions.

## Contact details \* = Mandatory

*Name:
Group (if applicable):
Mailing address:
Contact telephone number:
Email address:

## Key Questions

In setting out New Zealand's defence policy and priorities for the coming years, the Defence White Paper 2015 will be the primary guide to how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity. It is important that all New Zealanders have an opportunity to voice their views. We invite you to use the questions below as a guide to your input into the consultation process.

1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

See attached pages

2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

See attached pages

3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

See attached pages

<p>4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?</p> <p>See attached pages</p>
<p>5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?</p> <p>See attached pages</p>
<p>6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?</p> <p>See attached pages</p>
<p>7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?</p> <p>See attached pages</p>
<p>8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?</p> <p>See attached pages</p>
<p>9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?</p> <p>See attached pages</p>

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant. Please feel free to attach additional pages as required.

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## SUBMISSION ON 2015 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER.

This submission speaks to the nine key questions that have been asked by the Ministry of Defence on how the Defence Force will contribute to the nation's future security and prosperity and then speaks to other important issues that in the authors' opinion need to be addressed.

A background in geography, 12 years service in the New Zealand Armed Forces (eight in Royal New Zealand Air Force; four in Royal New Zealand Navy Volunteer Reserve) and recently researching and comment on defence and security issues, especially New Zealand, are the lens through which the author has composed this submission.

### 1. What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

"Because there are many other things governments and populations need to spend their money on, they need to be persuaded of the prospective role of their navy and of its value in assuring their prosperity and security. .... This will be more difficult for a country that has lost, or perhaps never had, much awareness of the importance of the sea. Surprisingly, given its geographic setting, this is often said to apply to New Zealand. In responding to such challenges, it is particularly important that the navy at least knows what it is for."<sup>1</sup>

#### THREATS AND CHALLENGES FROM WITHIN

There are significant challenges to New Zealand's security from within and without and both, if not addressed, will have detrimental impacts upon the wellbeing of the nation. There appears to be the perception that New Zealand's geographic isolation protects us from foreign enemies. Whilst this may have done in the 19th Century modern technology certainly negates any defence that geography may give us. We are the most isolated country in the world, geographically, with our closest neighbour being Australia<sup>2</sup> that hasn't prevented foreign enemies from operating in our waters during World War One<sup>3</sup> and our waters and airspace during World War Two.<sup>4 5</sup> Later there have been reports of Soviet and other unidentified submarines operating in or close to New Zealand waters, plus now the Russians are reportedly operating their Borei class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) in the Antarctic waters. Since these submarines are based with their Pacific fleet at Vladivostok, it may be assumed that the Ross Sea would be one likely patrol area for them.<sup>6</sup>

#### Sea Blindness

Within New Zealand there is the apparent apathy towards defence by the political elite, the establishment within the public service and the public. The quote of Tillman's is an accurate description of both the New Zealand political elites and the general public's attitude towards the need

<sup>1</sup> ("Disputed Regions," 2015; Till, 2004, pp. 93 - 94)

<sup>2</sup> (Mapp, 2014)

<sup>3</sup> (Hutching, 2012)

<sup>4</sup> ("German Raiders in the Pacific," 2015)

<sup>5</sup> At 0300 hours local on 8th March 1942, Japanese submarine I-25 launched a reconnaissance aircraft, 5 miles off the Wellington Lighthouse to observe Wellington Harbour. The mission was successful with the aircraft successfully recovered. Then at 0230 hours NZST on 13th March 1942 the aircraft was launched to observe and record shipping in Auckland Harbour (Waitemata). Meanwhile the submarine had spotted 20,000 ton merchant ship which was hunted and attacked after successful recovery of the aircraft. The ship was claimed as sunk. The previous day the submarine underwent a depth charge attack in the Hauraki Gulf. (Hackett & Kingsepp, 2002 - 2013)

<sup>6</sup> (Field, 2015; Weekes, 2014)



for a navy, especially a blue water navy. This concept is sea blindness and can be defined as the lack of recognition that our national economical lifelines are inextricably linked to and totally dependent upon our Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC).<sup>7</sup>




Figure 1 New Zealand Trade Routes.

Being an island nation New Zealand is a maritime nation and as such our SLOC are our lifelines through which 99.5% of our trade, by volume, is transported by sea.<sup>9</sup> Figure 1, illustrates New Zealand's trade routes with the line thickness denoting the volume of trade to each destination. An example of our SLOC dependence is our reliance upon energy in the form of oil. During 2014 indigenous production of oil products was 1,890,260 tonnes; we imported 7,262,200 tonnes and exported 1,833,980 leaving a deficit of 5,371,940 of tonnes required to be imported to meet consumption demands.<sup>10</sup> If for any reason that supply of foreign oil is interrupted or halted, our economy as such will eventually grind to a halt, until we are able to either reinstate the flow of foreign oil or find a substitute energy source. In New Zealand's case, we do not necessarily need to be physically invaded to ensure our submission by a foreign enemy, when a cessation of shipping to us will ensure our unwilling compliance with any demands.<sup>11</sup>

Hence in New Zealand's case this is the crux of sea blindness, in that political elite and the population either are unwittingly ignorant of the country's dependence upon the sea or choose to ignore it, which in our case does seem, as Till states, surprising especially considering our geography and the fact that we are known for our sailing ability such as Round the World Ocean races and Americas Cup racing. I would go further and extend this to defence overall because of the perceived "protection" that the surrounding ocean gives us. However in today's world that distance is actually our Achilles heel; a substantial weakness in our defences.

#### Lack of Long Term Political Foresight and Cohesion in Defence Planning and Acquisition

Since approximately the mid 1980s there has been a noticeable lack of long term political foresight and cohesion in defence planning and platform acquisitions which has resulted in a somewhat fragmented defence force structure, which may be good for certain activities in isolation but, detrimental to others

<sup>7</sup> (Haydon, 2010)

<sup>8</sup> (Oughton, 2011)

<sup>9</sup> ("Overseas cargo Statistics: Year Ended June 2007," 2007)

<sup>10</sup> ("Oil supply, transformation and consumption," 2014)

<sup>11</sup> (Till, 2004)

as a complete Defence Force. A Defence Force is system of systems and each system can and will have an impact upon super and sub systems. Therefore if one system is not fully compatible or compliant then it has the potential to create expensive problems. In a defence force this is the same and New Zealand has had expensive examples of this, such as the Multi Role Vessel HMNZS Canterbury where a Roll On Roll Off Ferry design was adapted to create an amphibious force ship. Whilst this vessel is now performing for New Zealand after expensive and time consuming remediation work, it is not a fully fit for purpose ship. It cannot fully fill it's required capability of disembarking vehicles and heavy or awkward offshore in seas states greater than Sea State Two because it utilises a stern ramp methodology rather than a well dock which can be utilised up to Sea States Five or Six. The same can be said for the NHI NH90 helicopters which are to be utilised on the Canterbury when needed. They were not marinised because of cost, hence can only be operated at sea on seas no greater than Sea State Two. These restrictions defeat the purpose of the acquisitions and restrict the capabilities of NZDF. A third example was the HMNZS Charles Upham which was an acquisition disaster and cost the country financially. Finally, the tanker HMNZS Endeavour acquisition where the flight deck was a very good idea but was only built for the Westland Wasp helicopter weight and not for a heavier helicopter which meant that after the Wasp was retired its' replacement could not use the flight deck unless the flight deck was strengthened at significant cost. Hence I would argue that over the last 30 years, probably hundreds of millions dollars have been wastefully expended in defence acquisitions, due to poor and ill-informed decision making by the political elite, because of political philosophies and placing too much reliance upon advice from experts, in departments who have no experience of defence or defence related procurement.

New Zealand politicians tend to think in a three year electoral cycle which may inhibit their long term foresight especially with regard to defence policy, structure, strategy and procurement. Secondly within New Zealand defence has become politicised and there is no longer an agreement between the main political parties regarding long term defence policy. This was evident during the 1990s and 2000s and to a slightly least extent currently. The collary to this is that in the long term there is no stable long term defence policy and NZDF has difficulty planning long term acquisitions because the rules and policies may substantially change when there is a change of government. Capability requirements may change which will involve expenditure. Therefore I argue that there needs to be a long term defence policy agreement negotiated between the main political parties which is ring fenced. This agreement should be periodically renegotiated, for example very five years.

Dupont (2015) has recently published an analysis piece regarding Australian defence strategy and it he has identified six weaknesses of Australian defence strategy. It is worthwhile noting them here with some adjustments for the New Zealand defence environment:

- Declaratory Confusion and Poor Messaging where after a number of published defence white papers there is no clear statement of defence strategy.
- Geography as Dogma where Australias' (like New Zealands') distance and location were a protection from most conflicts and challenges. However with the advent of modern technologies this spatial locality is no longer the barrier it once was.
- The Limitations of a Maritime Strategy which in Australias' case may be correct but in New Zealands' case there is no obvious maritime strategy. In fact it appears that New Zealand has an Army based strategy and little else which in itself is a limitation.
- Contestable Force Structure Assumptions where strategies are based around planning principles to help determine force sizes, capabilities etc., when in fact no defence force gets to choose where and when it will fight and that the type of fighting can change quite quickly. The point is we cannot choose the fights we become involved in and we have to be prepared for most if not all contingencies. The old adage about taking a knife to a gun fight comes to mind.
- The False Promise of Strategic Warning where it is thought that sufficient warning will be given of any major threat in order for the expansion of the defence forces and that white papers

have the foresight to sufficiently forecast events 20 to 30 years into the future hence allowing for informed decisions upon strategy and future force structures which require procurement to start now.

- Knowing Our Friends Too meaning we should know our friends as well if not better than any adversaries. With Australia being our closest defence partner and ally, it is essential that we understand how it sees and understands the ANZAC defence relationship and not just view that relationship through a New Zealand lens which I suspect happens especially at the political level. It is also essential that we what impacts any changes in Australian strategy will have upon New Zealand and the ANZAC relationship. The second friend whom it is essential that we have to understand is the United States. Again it is any changes in their strategy and dispositions that will or may impact upon New Zealand and Australia because of the ANZAC relationship.<sup>12</sup>

Dupont suggests the following to improve defence strategy, which I have adjusted to the New Zealand defence environment.

- Clarify Defence Strategy in which a clear unambiguous statement is made which clearly states New Zealand's defence and military strategies and their main objectives.
- Evolve the ANZAC Relationship, the US Relationship and Diversify Regional Defence Relationships meaning we need to work on those relationships and at the same time become more involved with regional states that broadly share our strategic values such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines and India by having closer more encompassing defence relationships.
- Make the NZDF more Versatile meaning "an interest based strategy is the key to a more versatile, capable and useable"<sup>13</sup> NZDF. He goes on to say: " Since threats can arise with little warning and from almost anywhere, it makes no sense to design our defence force to combat a particular kind of threat coming from a specific point on the compass, or to privilege the near over the far. The future ADF [NZDF] must be able to defend against an array of often interlocked security threats, both near and far, which means dispensing with the erroneous notion that a force designed for one contingency can provide optimal outcomes for all contingencies. A far better approach is to identify our core defence interests and the generic military capabilities needed to protect them, for it is folly to predict where, and against whom, the future ADF [NZDF] will operate."<sup>14</sup>
- Develop a "Full Spectrum" Military Strategy and Matching Capabilities where full spectrum strategy recognises the need for provision of protection from military threats emanating from sea, land, air cyber space and outer space. This type of defence is an integrated five domain military strategy that has connectivity and investment across the five domains, something which New Zealand would have to look at doing in conjunction with Australia in areas where it is impractical for New Zealand to field such capability, such as in Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft. This type of strategy will enable NZDF to operate with far greater flexibility and fight against enemies more powerful and against non state actors. It requires advanced C<sup>4</sup>ISR<sup>15</sup> systems which are vital on the modern day and future battlefield, plus have the advantage of being very good enablers for other takings such as Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR). The most important point is that this cannot be done piecemeal because NZDF must be a balanced force requiring modern strike aircraft, frigates and armoured vehicles and that the NZDF must be able to fight in all domains including the air, urban areas, open ground, mountainous areas and maritime areas because adversaries are illiberals who will choose to fight on grounds of their choosing, not ours negating any strengths that NZDF have here possible.

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<sup>12</sup> (Dupont, 2015, pp. 2 - 9)

<sup>13</sup> (Ibid, p. 11)

<sup>14</sup> (Ibid, p. 12)

<sup>15</sup> Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

- Implement a Comprehensive Strategic Risk management Process which requires a rigorous approach to defence planning replacing force structure determinants with more flexible planning considerations and principles that guide planners towards thinking about the optimum size, balance and capabilities of the future force. A comprehensive risk assessment process that would assess threats against defence vulnerabilities would have to be quickly implemented and " all significant force structure, acquisition and resource decisions must be subject to a full strategic risk assessment"<sup>16</sup>
- Shorten Acquisition Response Times And Rethink Mobilisation where it is need to reduce the excessively long time frames in deploying new defence capabilities from the time of studying the requirement to the actual deployment. Rapid mobilisation and enlargement today is far more difficult than it was in the 20th Century due to modern warfare complexity and the speed with which new or hybrid threats can occur such as the Russian intervention in the Ukraine or the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have shown.<sup>17</sup>

### Communication with the Public

There needs to more and better communication with the media and public by defence as an organisation and especially by the Minister. Not everything is a State Secret nor is Operational Security involved in everything. Defence is like Justice - it needs to be seen to be done. Whilst the Ministry of Defence, NZDF and the three services have web pages, plus the three services and service chiefs operate on social media, there is also a lack of detail of news or information compared to the Australian Defence Forces or United States Armed Forces. For example the Australian government publicise electronically their long term acquisition plans as the Collins Submarine replacement program.<sup>18</sup> The Minister needs to be more forthcoming with media statements on various trips, for example, in order to help raise the visibility of defence. Again in Australian where their defence ministers issue a short statement after each trip or important meeting.<sup>19</sup> Many times more is stated in foreign sources about New Zealand defence events or happenings than is provided or published within New Zealand by official sources. It would be helpful for example to have a New Zealand Defence Ministers input on a AU-NZMIN meeting rather than just having the Australian version. This includes the media briefings afterwards.

### Apathy about Defence

This apathy is symptomatic of the previous three discussions and the lack of an ongoing discussion in the public arena about defence, unlike those in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. The only time there appears to be any real discussion amongst the general public about defence is when particular acquisition issue is seized upon by a politically motivated group, such as happened with the ANZAC Frigate acquisition and the F16 acquisition or when a world event resonates amongst a particular group such as the Vietnam War did during the 1960s and 1970s. When these happen defence discussions become emotive and at times any worthwhile discourses can be lost in the noise of the emotion. The other problem is that these discussions only occur at irregular intervals rather than continually.

Whilst the idea of a continual discussion on defence may not appeal to some in the political elite and the media because they exceed the two minute news bite, they do however fill a very vital need in a democratic society. Defence and security are very important in any society, but more so in a democratic society because they can imply a possible restriction of some rights in situations of extremis. It also means that society as a whole can discuss how large amounts of the national treasure

<sup>16</sup> (Ibid, p. 13)

<sup>17</sup> (Ibid, pp. 9 - 14)

<sup>18</sup> ("SEA 1000 Australias Future Submarines," 2015) Whilst there is politically and media contrived controversy in Australia about the Collins submarine over recent years, this example is just for illustrative purposes only.

<sup>19</sup> (Andrews, 2015)

are being or need to be spent and when or if blood should be spilled. However in New Zealand's case, as mentioned above, this rarely happens now since the end of World War Two. Many of those who served then and the population who lived through it, have passed on and the national collective memory of that event is exponentially receding. My generation - the baby boomers - and the generations that follow don't know that and that is what I think is one of the reasons why there is this apathy. The other reason is that we were never directly attacked unlike Australia and that probably accounts for the large difference in attitudes between New Zealanders and Australians regarding defence.<sup>20</sup>

## EXTERNAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES

There are various military and security external threats to New Zealand with the two significant ones emanating from the Peoples Republic of China and the non state religious based extremism that is prevalent in the Middle east at the moment. A third threat that whilst not local to New Zealand is the current Russian aggression against the Ukraine that has the potential to escalate rapidly. Lesser threats would be destabilisation of states within South East Asia by extremists and / or failed states with the region especially around the main trade routes and maritime choke points. Destabilisation of Melanesian and Pacific island states are also possible. Fiji has recently held an election but the possibility of another coup exists given previous history.

### Peoples Republic of China

China is pursuing its right to be a Great Power. It once was and will be again and nobody has a real problem with that. What is causing the tensions is China's methodology in asserting its place in the world and right to be a Great Power. For example, the recent Air Defence Identification Zone would not have raised hackles if it had followed international norms.<sup>21</sup> However, it did not because China is trying to assert Chinese domestic law on international airspace. Another form of attempted Chinese dominance is when the Provincial Government of Hainan enacted a law that came into effect (1 January 2014) that prevents all foreign fishing vessels from fishing in the South China Sea including the Spratley Islands. This area extends into the Philippines EEZ and the closest point to the Chinese coast is 600 nautical miles.<sup>22</sup> China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS). Hence, this begs the question of what are China's real intentions? Actions speak louder than words and on July 8, 2013, the Hong Kong pro-PRC Chinese-language newspaper, Wenweipo published a story entitled "Six Wars China Is Sure to Fight In the Next 50 Years"

The 1st War: Unification of Taiwan (Year 2020 to 2025)

The 2nd War: "Reconquest" of Spratly Islands (Year 2025 to 2030)

The 3rd War: "Reconquest" of Southern Tibet (Year 2035 to 2040) - part of India

The 4th War: "Reconquest" of Diaoyu Island [Senkaku] and Ryukyu [Okinawa] Islands (Year 2040 to 2045)

The 5th War: Unification of Outer Mongolia (Year 2045 to 2050)

The 6th War: Taking back of lands lost to Russia (Year 2055 to 2060)<sup>23</sup>

Whilst this cannot be taken as "gospel", such an article wouldn't be published without sanction from within the higher echelons of the Chinese government. Many articles have appeared in the mainland Chinese media written by Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers, mostly Colonels that have called for the use of force to regain "lost territories". They play on the 100 years of shame that is embedded in current Chinese society.

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<sup>20</sup> (Dickens, 1999)

<sup>21</sup> (Hsu, 2014; Panda, 2014)

<sup>22</sup> (Thayer, 2014; Tiezzi, 2014b)

<sup>23</sup> ("Six Wars China Is Sure to Fight In the Next 50 Years," 2013)

It is the 100 years from the 1840s to 1949 when China was plagued with foreign invasions and having to kow tow and pay tribute to foreigners, especially the west and Japan.<sup>24</sup>





Figure 2 China's String of Pearls (Philip, 2010)



Sources: Xinhua, UNESCO

Figure 3 Xi Jinpings Silk Road (Zuo, 2014)




Figure 4 China's Two Island Chain Defence Lines (Cole, 2011)

they cross other nations territory from the Kuril Islands to the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean including United States islands and military bases in the Pacific. It is important to note that the island chains encompass the main shipping routes between the Indian Ocean into the Pacific Ocean via the Straits of Malacca, Sunda Straits and the Lombok Straits as shown in Figure 5 with the vast majority going through the South China Sea to nations such as Singapore, China, Thailand, Taiwan, Brunei, South Korea and Japan. Furthermore there is shipping lanes to nations such as Australian and

These Colonels and other officers of the PLA making these statements in public and in the media would not be doing so, without the sanction of higher authority and that would in this case be the Politburo and Xi Jinping in particular.<sup>25</sup> Xi has taken steps ensuring that the PLA answers to him and he has it fully under his control.

China is developing a "String of Pearls" (Figure 2) across the Asian seascape from China to Pakistan with nexus (pearl) at strategic ports along the string. This is a geopolitical strategy with the Chinese government and Chinese companies funding and building port and infrastructure upgrades. This strategy runs in conjunction with the Silk Road strategy which is eventual the overload route from China through to Europe (Figure 3) with the Chinese government and companies again funding and building infrastructure projects.<sup>26</sup> The string of pearls not only is an economic phenomena but also a military and security one with China believed to be also negotiating berthing and logistical support agreements for surface and subsurface vessels of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in some countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar, plus surveillance facilities at some locations in the Indian Ocean.<sup>27</sup> China has developed a sea control strategy based upon fixed lines drawn through two island chains shown in Figure 4. As can be seen

<sup>24</sup> (Kaufman, 2013)

<sup>25</sup> (Laque, 2013)

<sup>26</sup> (Tiezzi, 2014a)

<sup>27</sup> (Marantidou, 2014; Pehrson, 2006)

Major crude oil trade flows in the South China Sea (2011)  
million barrels per day



Figure 3 ("Oil Trade Flows in the South China Sea," 2013)




Figure 4 Chinese "Nine Dotted" Line ("Disputed Regions," 2015)

New Zealand. This would be an issue to these nations if China was to develop a security hegemony over the area.<sup>28</sup>

The current South China Seas disputes with Chinese assertiveness and "island" construction there is increasing tensions within the region. Since Xi has been appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China has been more aggressive in asserting its perceived claims to territories, within the Chinese nine dashed line map shown in Figure Six, that China legally has no claim to undercurrent international law.<sup>29</sup>

The CCP in 2012 determined that the South China Sea was a core national asset.<sup>30</sup> The 2015 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, cited by Gady, states that is increasing tensions in Asia by its efforts in reshaping the "regional military - security dynamic"<sup>31</sup> China has been coercive in its approach to its claims in the South China Sea. Whilst it hasn't overtly used open military force this time it is using the paramilitary Chinese Coastguard to enforce its claims whether or not they have any legal status under the UNCLOS. This is a direct challenge to the rules based world order that has existed since the end of the Second World War.<sup>32</sup>

China is using this dispute in the South China Sea to obtain as much maritime territory as it can in order to enforce a new *status quo* arrangement that will see it remain in control of the territory that it has coerced from neighbouring states without a return to the *status quo ante*. This redefinition of the status quo is not going to cease until China either achieves hegemony or is shown that it cannot continue down this path without some form of consequences. China is reclaiming land and building artificial islands in order to bolster its claims and artificial islands are excluded from territorial claims in UNCLOS. Furthermore it has not honoured the agreement it signed with the Association of South East Asian Nations in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, regarding conduct about disputes in the South China Sea.<sup>33</sup>

On a wider scale there is the relationship between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands and other areas that China lays claim to. There is a historical enmity between China and Japan, that has been

<sup>28</sup> (Noer, 1996; Yoshihara, 2012)

<sup>29</sup> (Capaccio, 2014; Malik, 2013)

<sup>30</sup> (Ghosh, 2014)

<sup>31</sup> (Gady, 2015)

<sup>32</sup> (Glaser & Billingsley, 2013; Lowther, 2015)

<sup>33</sup> (Chubb, 2015; Ghosh, 2014; The Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China, 2002)

fuelled by the extremely harsh Japanese occupation of China during the early 20th Century. The CCP and the Chinese government have not been adverse in using this in fuelling nationalistic sentiments within China against Japan. Again this follows the pattern that has been established in the South China Sea in that China is aggressively pursuing its claims of territory. However the Japanese are not easily intimidated and unlike the South East Asian nations they do have a defence and security treaty with the United States.<sup>34</sup>

## **2. What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?**

The Peoples Republic of China has been discussed in Question One.

### **Russia**

The Russian Federation is the next nation of concern with its ongoing aggression against Ukraine the annexation of Crimea from the Ukraine,<sup>35</sup> the five day war against Georgia in 2008,<sup>36</sup> and its increased military activity in the Baltic, North Sea and beyond.<sup>37</sup> The west has responded with targeted economic sanctions that are driving Russia into a closer relationship with China. It is thought by some that this relationship may one day turn into an alliance that, if crystallized, would create significant difficulties for the United States with its NATO treaty obligations and its treaty obligations to Japan, because it would be forced into a war on two fronts, something the United States will have great difficulty fighting using convention weapons. Russia is also pivoting towards Asia because it can see the opportunities in such a pivot.<sup>38</sup> Both Russia and China are founding members and the largest members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which is a security centred organisation at the moment, focussed more towards their definition of terrorism.<sup>39</sup> Such an organisation could be expanded to cover military threats as well, creating a military alliance with a similar structure and treaty obligations to NATO.

### **Terrorism**

Islamic extremist terrorism has been prevalent in the Middle East and the western regions of Asia since the formation of Al Qaeda. This extreme form of religious terrorism whilst present in western society in the form of sectarian violence in Ireland was taken to another level with the Al Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States where close to 3000 people were killed. These attacks resulted in US and western coalition invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan further fuelling jihadist recruitment amongst radical and extremist Islamic groups.

The most effective and brutal of these groups now is ISIL (Islamic State in the Levant) which was originally formed in west Afghanistan as *Jund al Sham* (the Army of the Levant), during the 1990s by Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Ahmad Fadeel al Nazal al Khalayleh) a Jordanian criminal. It follows the anti state, anti Shia teachings of famous salafist / takfiri preacher Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi (Isam Mohammad Tahir al Barqawi) whom he met in Afghanistan. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi moved the group to Iraq, renamed it and in 2004 after extended negotiations joined Al Qaeda forming Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi saw this move as a way to guarantee funds and increase fighters and bin Laden thought that he could keep a modicum of control over Zarqawis worse excesses. In 2006 Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike and then after an interim leader the group formed with others to become the Islamic State in Iraq under Abu Omar al Baghdadi, who was killed in 2010 and the group

<sup>34</sup> (Brinkley, 2014; Chang, 2012; Yoshihara, 2014)

<sup>35</sup> (Granholt, Malminen, & Persson, 2014)

<sup>36</sup> (King, 2008)

<sup>37</sup> ("NATO Tracks Large-Scale Russian Air Activity in Europe," 2014; O'Dwyer, 2015)

<sup>38</sup> (Brown, 2015; Feng, 2015; Schiavenza, 2015; Sussex, 2015)

<sup>39</sup> (Tiezzi, 2014c)



was taken over by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al Badri al Samarrai) its current leader.

ISI was still the local Al Qaeda affiliate and the Syrian uprising had occurred which Baghdadi and most of the leadership had seen as a diversion, preferring to concentrate upon Iraq forbidding their fighters to participate even if they were Syrian. However as the Syrian civil war significantly intensified they relend sending a small group under Abu Mohammed al Golani into northern Syria to fight. Golani had the support of Aiman al Zawahiri the then second in command of Al Qaeda and when Baghdadi stated that Golanis group Jabhat al Nusra li Ahl al Sham (the Support Front for the People of the Levant) was subordinate to him and ISI, Golan refused to acknowledge that situation, appealed to Zawahiri and publicly claimed allegiance to Al Qaeda. Zawahiri was unable to reconcile the two, Baghdadi refused to accept orders remain only in Iraq, hence Zawahiri publicly disowned ISI which then became ISIS / ISIL.<sup>40</sup>

ISIL is very well funded, plus it's battlefield conquests have given it a goodly supply of weapons. It acquires income mostly through oil revenue from the black market, donations and ransoms.<sup>41</sup> It is different from most other Islamic terror groups in that it has established a caliphate and under Sunni law apparently Baghdadi meets the requirements to be caliph in that he is:

- a Muslim adult man of Quraysh descent
- exhibiting moral probity and physical and mental integrity
- having *'amr*, or authority meaning that he must have territory to enforce Islamic law

Having established their territory and funding the group have been successful in attracting jihadists and others from many different countries by using very well produced video material that is published on the internet using social media and websites. They are also encouraging others who cannot travel to Iraq and Syria to fight to commit acts of violence and terror in their homelands against the enemies of Islam as defined by ISIL's very conservative medieval version of it. They are also calling for individuals and groups to swear allegiance and form sub caliphs in areas outside of the Middle East.<sup>42</sup>

If ISIL becomes established in Pakistan and infiltrates the military then serious problems could occur because of Pakistans nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has militant problems especially in the tribal areas in the north west of the country. Further east there are significant Muslim populations in Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia and if ISIL establishes a foothold creating an insurgency in any or all of those countries then further destabilisation will occur within Asia. It may not be a matter of not if, but when.<sup>43</sup>

### **3. What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?**

The NZDF first and foremost is a fighting force that prepares for the worse (war) and hopes for the best (peace). Its primary role is warfighting and all that entails. Any other roles such as peace keeping, HADR, wider government departmental support are secondary to that role. Whilst they are important they should not detract from the primary role otherwise the force loses its reason for existence and when it is thrown into a warfighting situation, that could be quite harmful. Having said that, NZDF has many skills that it has acquired and needs for its warfighting mission that can and do transfer across to other government requires and these should be utilised. Defence diplomacy is one area that NZDF is good at and this should be expanded.

<sup>40</sup> (Barrett, Skinner, McFadden, & Ghosh, 2014)

<sup>41</sup> (Lister, 2014)

<sup>42</sup> (Wood, 2015)

<sup>43</sup> (Chatterji, 2014)

**4. What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?**

China is providing funding and aid to the Pacific Islands with its presence in the region increasing. This is a soft power approach rather than the hard power one seen in the South China Sea and East China Sea.<sup>44</sup> It is also provided support to the Fijian Army. The Fijian Prime minister has also called for Australia or New Zealand or both to be ousted from the Pacific Forum and China to be included.<sup>45</sup> Whilst this is just appears to be politics at the moment and Bainimarama holding a grudge, it should not be discounted that over time the pressure from Fiji may grow for this to eventually occur.

As the worlds access to resources diminish pressure will be placed on Antarctic Treaty nations to enable the prospecting and mining of resources on the continent and surrounding oceanic areas. New Zealand has the claim on the Ross Dependency and at some stage we may be placed in the position of having to either enforce the treaty provisions or and / or New Zealands interests in and around the Dependency. That cannot be done if the NZDF does not have adequate and sufficient resources to do so. For example, it is estimated that there are 50 billion barrels of oil in the Ross and Weddell Seas, second only in size to the Saudi oil fields and something of that value, being worth trillions of dollars, will attract considerable, if not intense, competition and rivalry from other nations and non state actors such as corporations.<sup>46</sup> There is also the probability of fresh water extraction and shipping from Antarctica as supplies of fresh water diminish in the rest of the world due to global warming and climate change. This will create a situation where New Zealand will have to stand its ground, politically, morally and more than likely militarily. It cannot do that if NZDF does not have the equipment and people to defend sovereign New Zealand.

**5. How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?**

New Zealand has lost mana in the eyes of Australia and the wider region because of its lack of commitment to defence. The ANZAC defence relationship with Australia is our most important defence relationship and this has been jeopardised in recent time due to New Zealand defence capability decisions which have resulted in New Zealand not pulling its weight in regional defence like it used to.<sup>47</sup> It has been suggested that some elements in Australia see New Zealand as free riding off Australia defence wise and given some decisions that have been made this may be hard to dispute. Statements by Helen Clark denying that New Zealand and Australia were a 'single strategic entity' and that we existed in a 'incredibly benign strategic environment', her decision to disband the air combat force, not to purchase a third frigate and only partially upgrade the P3K Orions, significantly reduced NZDF capabilities for contributing to the defence of Australia. This lead to one Australian defence analyst to state that New Zealand is now a strategic liability,<sup>48</sup> which is a fair description because the present force structure and levels, prevents complete participation in exercises, such as Pitch Black in the Northern Territory, or with the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) that is both air and sea intensive.<sup>49</sup>

The 2010 Defence White Paper states that: *"Australia is our principal defence and security partner. We have no better friend and no closer ally. A wide range of political, economic, social, and security*

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<sup>44</sup> (Hayward-Jones, 2013)

<sup>45</sup> (Davison, 2015; Seru, 2013)

<sup>46</sup> (Field, 2011)

<sup>47</sup> (Baker, 2010)

<sup>48</sup> (Keating, 2004, p. 1)

<sup>49</sup> (Keating, 2004)

connections underpin what has become a common trans-Tasman space. We would therefore immediately respond to any direct attack on Australia. New Zealand's own security is enhanced by the investment which Australia has made in its national defence. Australia has military capabilities that we do not have, but which are essential for higher-end contingencies. The ANZAC relationship enhances the overall depth and reach of the NZDF. It is therefore in our interest to add to Australia's strategic weight."<sup>50</sup> This is a clear and unequivocal statement, yet in practice actions speak louder than words and this statement has not been followed up during the intervening five years with concise actions. There has been very minimal increases in defence expenditure with defence expenditure remaining at around 1.2 - 1.4 % of GDP and there have been cuts in personnel and services since 2009 which have reduced the overall effectiveness of the NZDF. For example in the 2015 budget a total of \$3.3 billion<sup>51</sup> has been appropriated for defence that when calculated as a percentage of GDP on the 2014 GDP figure of \$229.7 billion<sup>52</sup> is 1.4 % of GDP with no real increase in capability whilst Australia's defence budget is at 1.8% of GDP and heading to 2% GDP. Basically the New Zealand defence budget is standing still in dollar terms and what is important is that it's buying power is potentially decreasing. That buying power is the more important factor at the moment when new equipment is required.<sup>53</sup> Relative to Australia, New Zealand's defence capabilities have been depleted since 1999 and are no longer have the ability of supporting the Australian Defence Force as we once did. Hence the reason why Australia no longer sees New Zealand as an essential partner in its defence triad being replaced by Japan.<sup>54</sup>

New Zealand can no longer afford to have the attitude and belief that others will step up and carry New Zealand's slack in defence, especially when they have issues of their own. We have to take capabilities to the table to be part of any alliance or coalition and most importantly we have to be self sufficient not being a liability, which is how we are being perceived by our closest defence partner. Sending some cooks and vehicle refuellers as the NZDF component of an international exercise, because that is all that we could send is pathetic (Pitch Black 2014). New Zealand has to dramatically increase its commitment to its defence in substantive ways so that we can regain the trust and respect of Australia.

#### **6. How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?**

The NZDF has always been an integral part of protecting the nation's interests and it has also been an participated in defence diplomacy offshore. That is a vital role and it should continue to do so because, especially with RNZN vessels, it can be highly visible.

#### **7. What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?**

The Defence Forces role was well evidenced during the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes. Undoubtedly lessons will have been learned and procedures adapted and adopted but the fact that the services were here for three years helping in many ways was and is really appreciated by those of us who lived through and were affected by these events. The fact that the services can swing in action quickly and have the ability to be able to help in Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) situations within New Zealand is absolutely vital to the nation.

<sup>50</sup> ("Defence White Paper 2010," 2010, p. 18)

<sup>51</sup> ("Vote Defence - The Estimates Of Appropriations 2015/16," 2015; Vote Defence Force - The Estimates Of Appropriations 2015/16," 2015)

<sup>52</sup> ("National Accounts (Income and Expenditure): Year ended March 2014 – corrected," 2015)

<sup>53</sup> (Davies, 2014)

<sup>54</sup> (Dobell, 2014)

**8. What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?**

The role of the NZDF in the development of New Zealand's youth is important. It can serve as a role and hence it should continue to support the New Zealand Cadet Forces (NZCF) and actively have the NZCF recruit more members for the NZCF. The NZCF is a good source for potential recruits to the NZDF.

**9. What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

Historically, successive governments have run down NZDF capabilities since the Lange Labour government of 1984. The Bolger National government of 1990 created the greatest cuts to NZDF resources and capabilities with an 18% cut to the defence budget between 1991 and 1998.<sup>55</sup>

**ROYAL NEW ZEALAND NAVY.**

New Zealand being a maritime nation should have the ability to project its power both in a hard power and soft power sense using naval forces, plus it should have sufficient naval forces to protect its SLOC. We have an extremely large area of interest that covers a significant portion of the planetary surface and in order to ensure that New Zealand can monitor, if necessary conduct enforcement action and protect its interests within this area it must have the tools and facilities to do this. Such tools and facilities involve naval, air and space forces with the space force being satellite based surveillance and communications systems. The air forces are dealt with in the RNZAF section.

The Naval Surface Force is at present under whelming, so to speak, and with only two under armed frigates, in time of emergency New Zealand could be placed in a position with no naval combat forces to deter or prevent intrusion into its waters by unwanted or hostile state or non-state actors. With only two frigates, one could be undergoing maintenance and / or refit unable to be sailed at short notice and the other could be tasked overseas and unable to return in a timely manner. Whilst it is accepted and understood that warships are expensive, the cost of not having them and the economy being disrupted by foreign naval forces would be considerably more costly. It is a risk that really is unacceptable and it is one that is not if but when. History tells us that and history tends to repeat expensive lessons for those who ignore it.

**Frigates.**

New Zealand is a small nation however it is an island nation and the NZDF is an expeditionary force with a significant amount of money, resources and people invested in the Joint Amphibious Force based on HMNZS Canterbury. Whilst it is expected that if NZDF is involved in an amphibious operation in hostile waters that this would be as part of a coalition or allied force, New Zealand would be expected to provide some of the covering force and this can only be done with combat capable frigates that are capable of operating with coalition and allied forces. This means that they must have sensors, weapons, and C5ISR<sup>56</sup> capabilities that are compatible with our allies, such as Australia and such that our frigates are not a liability and a hindrance to our allies and friends. The two current ANZAC Class FFH<sup>57</sup> frigates will be due for replacement by the mid to late 2020s that will be an expensive exercise. In addition, two frigates in itself is not a completely viable option because in cases where one is undergoing maintenance and the other is offshore, New Zealand is left without frigate cover if it is needed quickly. Hence it is suggested that a third modern frigate be acquired which will also enable New Zealand to have two frigates when the ANZAC frigates are being replaced next decade. Because of

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<sup>55</sup> (Quigley, 2006)

<sup>56</sup> Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Combat, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

<sup>57</sup> Frigate, Helicopter.

the importance of Antarctica to New Zealand it is also suggested that these frigates be ice strengthened to Ice Class 1A.<sup>58</sup>

#### Offshore Patrol Vessels.

The current Protector Class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) have shown the RNZN and the government that they are an effective class of ship in New Zealand service. However they are somewhat limited in what they can do. An OPV that was better armed and utilised a modular mission system such as the Danish Stan Flex system which allows for the re-rolling of a vessel such as an OPV in 24 hours. Modules can include:

- Gun = 1 x Oto Melara/ Oto Breda 76mm/62 calibre Super Rapid gun
- SSM<sup>59</sup> = 2 x Mk141 quad launchers for RGM84 Harpoon missiles
- SAM<sup>60</sup> = 1 x 6 cell Mk48 (Mod.3) / Mk56 Vertical Launching System (VLS) for RIM7 Sea Sparrow missiles or RIM162 Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles (ESSM)
- ASW<sup>61</sup> = launcher for MU90 Impact torpedoes
- VDS<sup>62</sup> = TSMV 2640 Salmon variable depth active/passive sonar
- MCM<sup>63</sup> = Command & Control equipment to operate mine warfare drones
- Crane = hydraulic crane to operate a Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boat (RHIB)
- Oceanography
- Antipollution
- Survey
- Storage
- SIGINT/ELINT<sup>64 65</sup>

It can be seen from the above that the system is quite wide ranging and means that in the case of, for example, six OPVs not everything has to be acquired thereby reducing acquisition costs. Hence such outfitted vessels can operate in low intensity areas where a frigate is possibly to much capability, or required elsewhere and yet some of its capabilities but not all maybe required. The OPVs operate for less costs and like the frigates should be built to Ice Class 1A standards in order for them to operate safely in Antarctic waters. Like the current Protector OPVs they should also be able to carry 30 extra personnel.

Generally a rule of threes applies with military assets be it ships, aircraft, tanks guns or soldiers, sailors and airmen and air women. This enables a military always to have an operational force, fleet units, aircraft available at all times. Hence one unit is fully operational able to be deployed immediately, one is in training undergoing minor maintenance etc., and the third is undergoing deep maintenance, refit, leave recuperation etc. Nowadays with the advance of modern technology, it is though that with regard to ships this ratio can be reduced from a 1:3 to a 1:2.5 ratio. In light of this then the following is suggested for the Royal New Zealand Navy.

- 3 x ~6000 tonne General Purpose frigates fitted with shipboard anti ship missiles, good quality sensors, and weapons systems for Anti Submarine, Anti Air and Anti Surface Warfare (ASW, AAW, ASuW)
- 6 x Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) - armed ~ 2,500 - 3000 tonnes
- 1 x Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ~ 13 - 15,000 tonnes

<sup>58</sup> ("The Structural Design And Engine Output Required Of Ships For Navigation In Ice Finnish-Swedish Ice Class Rules,")

<sup>59</sup> Surface to Surface Missile

<sup>60</sup> Surface to Air Missile

<sup>61</sup> Anti Submarine Warfare

<sup>62</sup> Variable Depth Sonar

<sup>63</sup> Mine Counter Measures

<sup>64</sup> Signal Intelligence / Electronic Intelligence

<sup>65</sup> ("STANFLEX modules (Standard/Flexible mission modules Royal Danish Navy / Kongelige Danske Marine),")

- Multi Role vessel HMNZS Canterbury to be replaced by a second LHD at the end of Canterbury's service life
- 1 x Maritime Sustainment Capability Vessel (MSC - HMNZS Endeavour Replacement - already approved by Cabinet)
- 1 x Littoral Warfare Support Capability Vessel (acquisition process under way
- 8 x naval combat helicopter for ASW and ASuW
- 6 x AW109 Helicopters fully marinised, armoured fitted with maritime radar, Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR), Electro Optical Targeting System, add-on 25 gun pod, 70mm Hydra rocket pods compatible with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)

The above suggested force structure would give a balanced and capable navy that would serve New Zealand's interests well. It would provide fit for purpose and flexible vessels for the Joint Amphibious Task Force plus the ancillary services required especially on the logistics side. Whilst only one MSC is accounted for here it would be prudent to have another built so as always to have one on hand. The second vessel will also be seen as a significant asset by the Australians and the US for joint operations with them. The same would be said for the second LHD. The AW109 helicopters have been suggested because they can operate off the OPVs and the LHDs. For use with the Army AW109s they can provide basic ship based air support for the JATF. Secondly in other roles that can provide fire power if required for an OPV. Not mentioned here, but they are included with the RNZAF are two marinised NH90s that can be used with the MSC(s) when required. They could be either attached to, or held permanently on the strength of No 6 Squadron. Whilst three frigates have been suggested that would have to be seen as the bare minimum and four or five would be preferable in order to allow for attrition either through combat or accident. Here the Danish Iver Huitfeldt class is recommended because of its cost and the design methodology used which future proofed the design allowing for ease of upgrades.

#### NEW ZEALAND ARMY.

The Army went in Bosnia using very worn out M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers with armour borrowed from the Australian Army because NZDF didn't have any. The Provincial Reconstruction Team went into Bamiyan Province, Afghanistan in 2002 / 03 with leased civilian Toyota 4WD Four Runner trucks because NZDF didn't have vehicles in fit and proper condition for operations. This put NZDF personnel in harm's way when that did not need to happen because of pure budget constraints. The government and the country ask these people to literally put their lives on the line which they do willingly, yet the government send them into harm's way ill equipped, which makes NZDF and New Zealand look bad in the eyes of foreign militaries and the populations of those countries in which they operate. It also says to the enemy - easy targets.

The following force structure is suggested for the New Zealand Army:

- 3 x Regular Force Light Infantry Battalions
- 2 – 3 x Reserve Force Light Infantry Battalions
- 1 x Regiment Special Forces
- 1 x Regiment Field Artillery
- 1 x Regiment Field Engineers
- 20 x 105mm Self Propelled Guns (SPG) – 8x8 Wheeled
- 20 x Self Propelled (8x8 wheeled) Anti Aircraft Artillery (SPAAGSAM) 30mm or 35mm twin guns, radar controlled with Mistral or Stinger Surface to Air Missiles co-mounted on vehicle turret sides
- 12 x AW109 Helicopters fully marinised, armoured, fitted with FLIR, Electro Optical Targeting System, add-on 25 gun pod, 70mm Hydra rocket pods compatible with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) as Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters
- 1 x Regiment Logistics

The SPG have been suggested because it gives the army mobile supporting artillery fire where and when needed which is quick to set up and fire. This does not replace the towed artillery that the army has now, but adds a capability to it because each type offers complimentary capabilities. The reason that 105mm has been chosen is that the towed guns are easily transportable by helicopter using the NH90 without having to strip the gun down which means that the gun can be put into action quickly. If 155mm was chosen then the gun would have to be stripped down for NH90 transport or something such as the Boeing CH47F Chinook acquired to airlift it and its ammunition.

At present the army's anti air cover is light and heavy machine guns and Mistral MANPADs (Man Portable Air Defence System), if they still have the MANPADs. This leaves the soldiers wide open to air threats from Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV), helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Whilst an Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) is quite expensive mobile air defences against low flying aircraft, helicopters and UAVs is required and less expensive. A system such as a SPAAGSAM which is a self propelled gun and Mistral or Stinger missile combination is affordable and needed. A crew of two or three is required to operate the vehicle and optical and radar sensors are used. As with the SPG a wheeled vehicle is utilised because they offer higher speeds and less maintenance than tracked vehicles.

The Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) are suggested because they give the army a capability that they have needed for many years. Whilst fast jets can provide Close Air Support (CAS) the ARH provides more than just guns and rockets. It also is the eyes of the ground commander and can provide air support very quickly if needed. The AW109 suggested is not an anti tank helicopter designed to combat heavy tanks. It is armed so that it combat on light forces, vehicles and light armoured vehicles. Augusta Westland advertise the aircraft with 2 x 12.7mm (.50 cal) gun pods however whilst they are good a single 25mm auto cannon would be of similar weight, provide greater fire power and range, and keep the aircraft out of heavy machine gun range.

## ROYAL NEW ZEALAND AIRFORCE

### Airpower

Airpower is a tool that can be used by a nation to project soft or hard power, depending upon the circumstances and the political will, over long distances in a short amount of time – it is a quick spatial and temporal tool. Airpower enables a nation to expand its geostrategic depth by allowing it to construct a network of alliances and relationships regionally and globally. New Zealand like Australia and the United States is fortunate in that it is currently spatially located in a non military threatened area. There are four very fundamental airpower roles:

1. **Control of the Air** provides commanders with the ability to delaminate, deceive, disrupt, deter and destroy the enemy, and although military operations may be attempted without it, success may be fatally compromised beneath contested airspace. For the Royal Air Force (RAF), control of the air can be defined as: "The freedom, bound by time, to use a volume of airspace for one's own purposes while, if necessary, denying its use to an opponent."<sup>66</sup>
2. **Attack** from the air may be broken down into: deep attack; counter-land operations; counter-sea operations; and information operations. The inherent characteristics of air power, particularly speed, reach, and agility, mean that it is primarily an offensive weapon that can be used to deliver a wide range of effects, both kinetic and non-kinetic, across all levels of warfare. In conventional military operations, all-weather, precision air attack can now decisively shape the operational battle space; the differences in speed of manoeuvre between land and air forces continue to remain orders of magnitude apart.
3. **Air mobility** enables forces to be moved and sustained worldwide, across the entire spectrum of operations. It provides rapid and flexible options to military planners and national and international government agencies, allowing rapid responses to crisis situations globally.

<sup>66</sup> (AP3000 *British Air And Space Power Doctrine*, p. 37)

4. **ISTAR** is the process of integrating the intelligence process with surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance tasks in order to improve a commander's situational awareness and consequently their decision making.<sup>67</sup>

It is noted that New Zealand currently is not in the position of being able to facilitate the first role and it has very limited ability to facilitate the second. Since New Zealand's defence is built around three foundation stones – air forces, naval forces and land forces, this is very disturbing because one stone has been severely weakened thereby severely compromising the structure and capability to defend New Zealand.

#### Air Combat Force

Since 2001 New Zealand has lacked an air combat capability. The reasons for this are well known and don't need to be discussed here. However in one aspect it may have proved to be a blessing in disguise. If the F16 aircraft had been bought they would have needed replacing in the next 20 – 25 years and they were old technology, because having to stand up an ACF now one can start with a clean slate. In New Zealand's case gaining the maximum number of roles out of a platform, longevity, upgradability, affordability and value for money are the key ingredients. There are not many aircraft that would meet these requirements. The Lockheed Martin F35, once it has gone into mass production, should drop significantly in purchase price but its projected operating and sustainment costs are unaffordable for New Zealand and it may not necessarily be the correct platform for New Zealand's needs. The Eurofighter Typhoon along with the Dassault Rafale is also very expensive both to acquire and operate. The Lockheed Martin F16 E/F and the F18E/F Super Hornet have similar cost acquisition costs and the operational and sustainment costs possibly may be too expensive for NZDF to sustain. The only remaining western combat aircraft that would meet New Zealand's capability needs is the SAAB JAS39 Gripen C / D. Table One shows the flyaway costs and the Costs Per flight Hour (CPFH). As can be seen from the table the F35 is the most expensive to acquire and sustain whilst the Gripen C/D is the cheapest. The Gripen C / D also has another advantage over the other aircraft in that SAAB have designed it so that it can be relatively easily upgraded to a new model. They are developing the E model of the aircraft at the moment with production already under way and the first deliveries due in 2018.<sup>68</sup>

Table 1 F/A Aircraft Costings

Aircraft	Fly away Cost US\$ 000,000	Cost Per Flight Hour US\$ 000	Source
Boeing F15E	105	17.0	<sup>69</sup> <sup>70</sup>
Lockheed Martin F16E/F	65	7.0	<sup>71</sup> b <sup>72</sup>
Boeing F18E/F	67	11.0	a <sup>73</sup> b
Dassault Rafale	108	16.5	<sup>74</sup> b
Eurofighter Typhoon	110	18.0	<sup>75</sup> b
SAAB JAS39 Gripen C/D	44	4.7	c <sup>76</sup> b
Lockheed Martin F35	118	21.0	c b

<sup>67</sup> (AP3000 British Air And Space Power Doctrine)

<sup>68</sup> ("Gripen E Production Is Fully Under Way," 2014)

<sup>69</sup> ("Aircraft Price Comparisons," 2009)

<sup>70</sup> (Hatch, 2009)

<sup>71</sup> (Thompson, 2013)

<sup>72</sup> (Joshi, 2012)

<sup>73</sup> ("Aircraft Price Comparisons," 2009)

<sup>74</sup> ("Projet de loi de finances pour 2014 : Défense : équipement des forces et excellence technologique des industries de défense," 2015)

<sup>75</sup> ("F-35 vs. Typhoon: Which Costs More?," 2013)

<sup>76</sup> (Dunnigan, 2013)



The following force structure is suggested for the Royal New Zealand Air Force:

- 18 x Fighter / Attack aircraft
- 12 x Lead In Fighter Trainers
- 6 x First Tier Multi Mission Aircraft for ASW, ASuW and ISR (P3K2 Orion Replacement)
- 6 x Second Tier Maritime Patrol / Surveillance Aircraft
- 6 x Strategic Transport Aircraft
- 8 x Tactical Transport Aircraft
- 18 x Beechcraft T6C Texan II Trainers (adds 7 to current fleet of aircraft already operated by RNZAF)
- 14 x NHI NH90 Helicopters – fully marinised (adds 6 to current fleet of aircraft already operated by RNZAF)
- 10 x Augusta Westland AW109 Helicopters armoured and fully marinised (adds 5 to current fleet of aircraft already operated by RNZAF)

Whilst the above list is wide ranging and expensive, the aircraft suggested do future proof the NZDF for the next 20 to 30 years. It also reintroduces lost capabilities and adds new capability in order to ensure that the NZDF has an airborne force structure that can deploy and be self sufficient. As mentioned previously New Zealand needs to re-establish the Air Combat Force and the aircraft suggested for this is the SAAB Gripen C/D because of its acquisition and operating costs, that it is designed to operate for 40 years (a New Zealand habit) and that it is upgradeable to the newer variant capability. SAAB have started building and producing the latest Gripen, the E/F variant, however they are still manufacturing the C/D variants.<sup>77</sup>

Surveillance is the next largest issue and currently that is conducted by six Lockheed P3K2 Orion aircraft that conduct ASW and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. With the large area that we have to monitor clearly six aircraft are not enough and even with satellite surveillance, operational requirements and tempos can change quite quickly. There is also the maritime fixed wing airborne ASW and ASuW requirements that need to be accounted for as well. Whilst the Orion replacement hasn't yet been decided, the only current aircraft on the market that matches the current operational capabilities of the P3K2 Orion, is the Boeing P8 Multi Mission Aircraft. Obviously such an expensive aircraft cannot be utilised for EEZ monitoring when something less capable will suit. Hence it is suggested that a second tier capability be acquired for that mission, but something that can be utilised for ASW and ASuW operations in New Zealand waters if needed. This would take the strain off the first tier aircraft keeping enabling them to be utilised better and kept in service longer and with less costs.

Overall the above suggested list gives a well structured set of capabilities and platforms which will perform the taskings required of the RNZAF by the government and NZDF. It allows for maintenance programs and doesn't place undue stress on aircraft because of too few platforms acquired for the capability which was symptomatic of the Kaman SH2G(NZ) Seasprite acquisition. In the long term acquiring the requisite number of platforms for a capability is more economical than only acquiring a minimal amount and then not being able to maintain those platforms properly due to constant tasking requirements.

## DISCUSSION

There are many challenges that face NZDF and some of these result from inadequate resourcing and funding over the previous four decades. Part of the problem centres around that fact that many New Zealanders, the general public and politicians alike, are afflicted by sea blindness and this has been detrimental to NZDF costing the loss of capabilities that the country needs now and in the future. Defence plans for the worst (war) and hopes for the best (peace) but it can only do so properly if it is given the proper resources by nations government. There is also the issue of procurements where

<sup>77</sup> (J. Dunnigan, 2013; Gripen C/D; Gripen E Production Is Fully Under Way," 2014)

very little thought has been given to the long term impacts upon the overall balance of forces by the political elite who tend to view the defence world through the lens of costs and electoral cycles. Part of the problem appears to be that defence acquisitions, use of equipment etc., is different to that normally encountered by politicians and non defence government personnel. For example one of the common criticisms against the A4K Skyhawk replacement was that they were never used in anger, but that must be a good thing not a bad thing. One has an insurance policy for fire in their home that they hope never to use, but one day that may happen and they will be thankful that they had fire insurance, or in Christchurch's case earthquake insurance. It was paid for hoping we never had to use it, but one day many of us had to. It is the same with defence capabilities - they are like insurance policies.

There needs to be a long term strategy determined and well defined by the government which clearly states the nations intentions. Then a plan needs to be formulated by defence planners which meets the aims of the strategy. Central to this is a clearly defined set of capabilities which provide for a well balanced NZDF and the individual services within it. Thus, any acquisitions must fit within that capability plan and any acquisitions should be such that they can be updated in the future easily. This is future proofing the NZDF in a way that any upgrades are not going to be expensive in their installation because of structural issues of the platform. As an example, if a ship with flight deck and hangar is being acquired, then ensure that it will be able to operate a helicopter that may be acquired in the future, something that could be somewhat larger and heavier. Also ensure that any platform acquired is not going to be an orphan platform and be costly in maintenance and operation because spare parts are rare or unavailable. Those who give final approval for acquisitions should be aware that cheap is not economic in the long run and if something looks too good to be true then it probably is. Also acquiring the minimal numbers of a platform usually proves to be quite costly in the long term and it restricts NZDF operationally which in turn restricts the governments options.

China is rising as a great nation which is to be expected given its population, economic and military strength. This author does not have an issue with that, however it is the manner in which it is now asserting itself that is creating significant amount of tension in the South China Sea and East China Sea, to wit its methods of assertion and enforcement of sovereignty to territory to which it has marginal claims at best. The major problem with this is that it is not honouring agreements that it has signed, such as UNCLOS or with ASEAN, and it is directly challenging the internationally accepted rules based system which has evolved since the Second World War. It is through these waters that a significant amount of world trade, including New Zealand's, passes and any significant disruption to those trade routes would prove quite harmful to New Zealand economic life, possibly even deleterious. Those trade routes are a part of our SLOC and whilst we can and do use diplomacy to encourage and protect our trade, unfortunately diplomacy also has been known to fail. That is when military force becomes involved and the tension in East and South East Asian may lead to confrontation. This is where New Zealand has to be prepared, however unfortunately we are ill prepared and equipped if diplomacy fails.

Further afield Russia has encroached upon Georgian and Ukrainian territory annexing territory using military force or dubious plebiscites to achieve their aims. They have also increased their military operations in the Baltic and North Seas. Both the Chinese and Russian actions have a 20th Century historical precedent in the Nazi German orchestrated Sudetenland and Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938 along with the Austrian Anschluss of the same year. Hitler's policy was lebensraum and the unification of the Germanic peoples.<sup>78</sup> These moves by China and Russia appear to have similar motives; acquisition of territory and resources by the use of force - implied, threatened or actual.

The spectre of Islamic terrorism is real and expanding especially through ISIL. At present ISIL have replaced Al Qaeda as the most successful Islamic terrorist group and even Al Qaeda is perturbed by

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<sup>78</sup> (Shirer, 1990)

ISILs brutality. ISIL through forming a caliphate are attempting to give themselves legitimacy amongst the world's Muslim population forcing them to pledge allegiance as required under Sunni law. They are also highly skilled in utilising the internet and social media to publicise their message, garner recruits and fighters and encourage terrorist strikes abroad in non Muslim homelands. If they manage to gain a foothold in Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia they will become a major problem in the region. In New Zealand's case they will be sitting astride our SLOC and they have shown their ability to conquer and adapt. Hence it is best if this group is defeated at source rather than left to expand.

New Zealand needs to repair its defence relationship with Australia and start pulling its weight in that relationship. Whilst this has already been discussed in depth in Question Five the point is reiterated here for reinforcement. Failure to do so will see New Zealand cast aside at some stage in the future regardless of historical ties. What also must be remembered is that Australia is New Zealand's last line of defence before the New Zealand coast and it is in New Zealand's best interest to ensure that the defence of Australia is sound and strong. That means New Zealand spending money on proper capabilities for a defence force, not cutting back defence capabilities as has happened since 1991. To be counted at the table one must take something worthwhile to that table.

Capabilities for the three services have been presented and discussed. The costings for these are presented in Table 2. It should be noted that the figures obtained for these costings have been obtained from a variety of open sources and as such do may not reflect the actual costs because not all of the costing details were provided. Military costs are notoriously difficult to quantify through open sources, because each contract is different and every government uses different accounting methods for calculating life cycle costs. Secondly, such contracts are always commercially sensitive. In some cases the figures have been estimated, because costs were not found for that particular item so something of a similar capability was used as the base cost. For example with the SPAAGSAM a tracked cost was found and so an estimate was done from that. Where possible platforms cited are one that will be in service for the medium future and will future proof the NZDF. That is why aircraft such as the F16 or F18 were not chosen because their production runs are due to end before 2020.

It will be noted from Table Two that the ships and aircraft are the most expensive items. Unfortunately this is a situation that cannot be avoided and because of previous government decisions, New Zealand is now in a block obsolescence and the rebuilding of disbanded capabilities position. Currently defence spending is 1.4 % of GDP (\$229.7 billion)<sup>79</sup> which clearly in dollar terms is insufficient. Therefore it is suggested that defence spending be raised to 2% GDP which in 2015 terms would be \$4.6 billion plus inflation and exempt of the capital cost. Furthermore because of the capability shortage capital funding injections would have to be made over and above the suggested defence spending. Such injections using the calculations presented in Table Two would be \$1.2 billion per annum if calculated over a 20 year period or \$782 million if calculated over a 30 year period. This is using a 3% per annum capital cost. All these values are 2015 dollars. For example in year x between the Ministry of Defence and NZDF they would be voted \$4.6 billion plus capital expenditure of 782 billion using the 30 year costing. However it should be noted because of New Zealand's size, basing defence expenditure on GDP may not be practical because it does not take into account the buying power of the defence budget.

What hasn't been included in the table is full ownership costs as the Life Cycle Costs including personnel costings. The 100% costs, as stated, is just for spares, maintenance contracts, manuals, simulators, weapons etc. It does not include any consumables such as fuel, lubricants and ammunition.

One very important point to note is that the acquisition of second hand ships, vehicles or aircraft etc., becomes a false economy because of the high amounts and costs of maintenance required, plus the

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<sup>79</sup> ("National Accounts (Income and Expenditure): Year ended March 2014 – corrected," 2015)

fact that to be effective in a modern environment costly upgrades will be required, they will have to be replaced in a 10 or 15 year period and finally they may not meet all of New Zealand's requirements.

Table 2 Suggested NZDF Equipment Costings

Platform	Qty	Unit Cost 000,000	Currency	Exchange Rate <sup>80</sup>	Total Cost NZ\$	Ref
SAAB JAS Gripen C / D	18	44.00	US\$	0.6934	1,142,197,866	
KAI T/A 50 Lead In Fighter Trainer	12	25.00	US\$	0.6934	432,650,707	d
NHI NH90 Helicopter NATO Frigate Helicopter - Combat Variant	12	43.30	€	0.6151	844,740,693	d
NHI NH90 Helicopter (NFH -Support)	4	36.40	€	0.6151	236,709,478	d
Airbus A400M Grizzly	6	152.40	€	0.6151	1,486,587,547	
Airbus C295 Tactical Transport Aircraft	8	28.00	€	0.6151	323,045,861	
Airbus C295 Maritime Patrol Aircraft	6	50.00	GB£	0.4409	680,426,401	
Boeing P8 Poseidon MMA	6	179.81	US\$	0.6934	1,555,898,471	
Beech T6 Texan II	5	4.50	US\$	0.6934	324,488,030	
Augusta Westland AW109 marinised etc.	23	9.00	US\$	0.6934	298,528,988	
Iver Huitfeldt class frigate	3	1,500.00	DKK	4.5880	980,819,529	
OPV armed ice capable ~ 2,500 - 3,000 tonnes	6	150.00	US\$	0.6934	1,297,952,120	
LHD ~ 15,000 tonnes	2	500.00	US\$	0.6934	1,442,169,022	
MSC Ship	1	250.00	NZ\$	1.0000	250,000	
IPV armed with 25mm Mk 38 Mod 2 gun	4	50.00	AU\$	0.9025	221,606,648	
LAV III / T7 Self Propelled Howitzer	20	8.00	US\$	0.6934	230,747,044	
8x8 or 6x6 Self Propelled Anti Aircraft Artillery Twin 30mm plus Stinger or Mistral SAM	20	7.50	NZ\$	1.0000	150,000,000	
Subtotal \$					11,724,080,373	
Estimated spares, maintenance, manuals, simulators etc @ 100% unit cost \$					11,724,080,373	
Total Estimated Present Value Acquisition Cost \$					23,448,160,747	
Annual Cost increase					3%	
Annual Present Value CAPEX Funding Requirements over 20 year period \$					1,172,408,937	
Annual Present Value CAPEX Funding Requirements over 30 year period \$					781,605,358	

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

The following recommendations are made:

- 1) When formulating defence and security strategy plus capabilities:
  - a) Clarify Defence Strategy.
  - b) Evolve the ANZAC Relationship, the US Relationship and Diversify Regional Defence Relationships.

<sup>80</sup> Exchange rates as of 17 June 2015 from <http://www.xe.com/>

- c) Make the NZDF more Versatile.
  - d) Develop a "Full Spectrum" Military Strategy and Matching Capabilities.
  - e) Implement a Comprehensive Strategic Risk management Process.
  - f) Shorten Acquisition Response Times And Rethink Mobilisation.
- 2) Political elite and planners must understand the reality that New Zealand is a maritime nation and our SLOC are the life blood of the nation and the national economy.
  - 3) There needs to be long term political foresight and cohesion in defence planning and acquisition; that is much longer than the current electoral cycle with less politicalisation of defence strategy, capability and acquisitions by political parties.
  - 4) That New Zealand needs to repair its defence relationship with Australia by being serious about its defence obligations both to itself and to Australia instead of taking the cheap option.
  - 5) New Zealand needs to start building Antarctic capable naval vessels in order to fully monitor and enforce the regulations that apply in Antarctic waters. It also needs to acquire and build capabilities to ensure that it can enforce its sovereignty of its Antarctic claim if need be, especially when there are considerable mineral resources within its Dependency.
  - 6) New Zealand needs to acquire a third frigate in the near term in order to bolster the frigate force. An Iver Huitfeldt class frigate of the Danish Navy would be suitable and less expensive than current British, Spanish, French, German, Dutch or American vessels on offer.
  - 7) New Zealand needs to expand its OPV force by four vessels that are armed and fitted with a system such as the Stan flex modular system.
  - 8) Six AW109 Helicopters fully marinised, armoured fitted with maritime radar, Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR), Electro Optical Targeting System, add-on 25 gun pod, 70mm Hydra rocket pods compatible with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) be acquired to operate from the OPVs
  - 9) A Landing Helicopter Dock needs to be acquired in order that the JATF has a fit for purpose ship that will expand the JATF capability set and at the same time enhance HADR capability.
  - 10) Wheeled Self Propelled Guns be acquired for the NZ Army in order to provide mobile artillery fire support.
  - 11) Wheeled Self Propelled Anti Aircraft Guns and Missiles be acquired to provide anti aircraft protection for the NZ Army against low flying fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aircraft.
  - 12) 12 AW109 Helicopters fully marinised, armoured, fitted with FLIR, Electro Optical Targeting System, add-on 25 gun pod, 70mm Hydra rocket pods compatible with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) be acquired to be operated as Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters.
  - 13) That the NZ Army Air Corp be reactivated in order to operate the helicopters above.
  - 14) That the Air Combat Force be re-established comprising of 18 Fighter attack aircraft and 12 Lead In Fighter Trainers.

- 15) That six Tier One Multi Mission Aircraft be acquired for ISR, ASW, ASuW and other taskings as required; that six Tier Two Maritime Patrol aircraft be acquired for EEZ patrol and as back up to the tier one aircraft.
- 16) That six Strategic Airlifters such as the Airbus A400M be acquired and eight tactical airlifters be acquired for air mobility and Multi Engine Pilot Training.
- 17) That six fully marinised NHI NH90 Helicopters be acquired to boost the current numbers and allow for one or two helicopters to be aboard the MSC when required.
- 18) Another five AW 109 training helicopters be acquired.
- 19) That the combined Vote: Defence and Vote: NZDF be a minimum of 2% of GDP plus inflation and that this sum excludes the capital charge.
- 20) That a Capital Expenditure injection be made to Defence in order to cover the platforms required for the capabilities outlined above. This injection is over and above the 2% GDP because of the funding shortfalls since 1991.

#### CONCLUSION.

If these recommendations are accepted then in the future New Zealand will have a highly credible defence force that the country can be very proud of and that will have the capability to operate within coalitions or alliances, whilst being self reliant and not being a liability to our alliance or coalition partners.

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


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PYLAT COUNCIL CHARITABLE TRUST

New Zealand's Involvement with ISIL

PACIFIC YOUTH VIEW

May 2015

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## THE PYLAT COUNCIL

### Purpose

- To encourage and assist Pacific Youth to participate in the democratic process.
- To advocate for the mental, physical, educational and spiritual wellbeing of Pacific Youth; specifically to increase awareness about factors that contribute to social equity and inclusiveness.

### Vision

A world well informed and influenced by Pacific Youth.

### PREAMBLE

Being a citizen in New Zealand's democracy means that all people in society should be actively engaged and able to contribute toward decision; in order to support Pacific Youth in Christchurch to be able to do this, the PYLAT council have created iSPEAK. iSPEAK is an engagement method to inform Pacific youth about current New Zealand wide issues and get them to share their views and opinions; after which the PYLAT Council collate and send this information to the government and decision makers on their behalf.

On Wednesday 8 April 2015 the PYLAT Council held iSPEAK 9 on *New Zealand's Involvement with Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL – formerly ISIS)*. This event was attended by members of the Canterbury University Samoan Students Association (CUSSA), Pacific students in secondary and tertiary study, those in the workforce and community.

Background information was provided by the PYLAT Council. Then five contested aspects of New Zealand's involvement with ISIL were debated by Jan Logie from the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand and Jo Hayes from the National Party. Hon. Nicky Wagner, Minister of Customs (only one of her Ministerial portfolios) also attended, and answered questions posed by the youth in attendance. This statement is a result of that seminar and reflects the majority views of the Pacific youth in attendance.

This statement does not reflect the opinions of each and every individual. For a breakdown of individual comments and raw survey results used to draw the conclusions here, please see the appendices.

## IS ISIL A SERIOUS THREAT TO NEW ZEALAND?

The general feeling from participants was not clearly weighted one way or another and came across about 50/50. Those who felt that ISIL was a threat to New Zealand stated that it would be easy for New Zealanders who travelled overseas to be caught up in the conflict, particularly if travelling to Iraq or Syria. An alternative theme was that “we [New Zealand] put ourselves on the [risk] list,” as we have taken a stand against ISIL. Those who did not believe New Zealand was at risk stated “ISIL has no interest in New Zealand...we are too small and isolated...” and that the possibility of a threat had been hyped up international media to get New Zealand to commit to being and staying involved.

Participants were not able to determine conclusively whether ISIL was a threat or not, but they would like to see information around this more publically available for this discussion to continue.

## NEW ZEALAND'S RESPONSE

### Participation of non-combat NZ personnel in Iraq

Participants felt New Zealand had not done the right thing by committing non-combat personnel to train Iraqi forces. The primary concern was that by supporting military training we were inciting more violence, rather than looking for a long term solution. There was also some concern that protections such as working in fortified military bases could not guarantee that there would not be any injured or killed New Zealanders when training the Iraqi forces. Some attendees questioned whether New Zealand was honoring its commitment to represent small states its successful bid for one of the non-permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Others felt that despite this being the wrong course of action, they did not feel that their feedback or that of others could change the minds of decision makers.

Participants recommend that New Zealand withdraws its non-combat personnel in Iraq and instead provides a humanitarian role.

### The Anti-ISIL Coalition

The participant's general mood was again split 50/50 over whether New Zealand should even be involved in the Anti-ISIL coalition. Those who agreed with our participation stated that we have to offer something, but both monetary and refugee aid would be more preferable to military training. Those opposed said that “the excuse that 60 other countries jumped on board is not really good enough” rather we must have our own reasons to support international conflict in whatever capacity and not be perceived to be “a pawn for another country.” Others were not satisfied that there were international political and security benefits to New Zealand being involved, and we should instead we should be focused on regional issues.

Participants were unable to determine what role, if any, New Zealand should have in the Anti-ISIL coalition so more information should be released and discussion should continue around this.

## Supporting the New Zealand Muslim Community

Participants did not feel enough was being done to discourage anti-Muslim resentment in New Zealand in light of ISIL's activities, growth and international reach. The mood was split into two groups: firstly those who were not aware this was a problem; secondly, those who thought little had been done to raise awareness of this growing resentment and to ensure New Zealand's Muslim community was not being prejudiced or ill-treated. A concern raised was that New Zealand does not do enough for minority groups and so in the face of the Anti-ISIL Coalition, and the media response, it would be easy to blame or unjustifiably group all Muslims together as radicals or dangerous. Some participants thought it would be good for New Zealanders who were worried about this to get to know Muslim people as this would highlight the problem with this perspective.

Participants recommend that the government seeks to better support the Muslim community during this time; more widely that they make every effort to ensure all minority groups in New Zealand feel valued and that New Zealand is a place where they belong.

## DECISION MAKING

### Parliament's involvement

Pacific youth feel Parliament should have the final say on whether New Zealand will go to war and do not believe the current practice of the Cabinet deciding is good enough, however there were a number of other perspectives. Participants felt that it was inappropriate that the Ministers alone decide due to as the lack of voices represented in the Cabinet and that this was not representative of New Zealanders as a whole, who had elected their representatives, "undermin[ing] democratic values." Others believed that going to war should not be decided by the parliament nor Executive Council or Cabinet, rather put to a referendum. If this is "*the most invasive issue NZ has faced...*" (Quoting one of the speakers) then this ought to get as many voices included as possible. Other perspectives expressed were that there are times our Ministers should make decisions, but that neither option will end the violence which needs to be the real objective. Some participants felt there needed to be more information to given to the public on our participation as there were issues getting access to completely factual and non-political information.

Participant's recommend that in the future, The House of Representatives have the final vote on New Zealand participating in any war, in any capacity.



## Security priorities

Pacific youth felt that that New Zealand should prioritise issues in the Pacific over issues from around the rest of the world. Those in favor thought that New Zealand had a clear leadership role in the Pacific and that West Papua is one regional situation that should be focused on, over one in a place so far away and already with significant international support. Other views included; that participation would be alright so long as enough was being done for the Pacific region, that we should work with smaller states to problem solve and that our priorities should depend on the facts of every case.

Participants would like regional security issues in the Pacific to be prioritised by the New Zealand Government over those from around the rest of the world.

## FINAL COMMENTS

The PYLAT Council Charitable Trust would like to thank Jan Logie and Jo Hayes for sharing the views of their political parties, and the Hon. Nicky Wagner for attending to support the discussion of this issue of such significance to New Zealand.

It is a concern to the PYLAT Council that even with the work of iSPEAK there is still a reoccurring theme where attendees said they do not feel like decision makers care about what they have to say, nor can their voice can make a difference in decision making in New Zealand. The PYLAT Council would like to see the Minister of Youth challenge this during Youth Week 2015 and tell New Zealand's youth that their input is valuable, desired and does have an impact on decision making.

Additionally the PYLAT Council ask that all decision makers, organisations and individuals involved in the decision and implementation of New Zealand's commitment to the ISIL situation consider and act on the thoughts and opinions of Pacific youth represented in this submission.

If you have any questions or queries please feel free to contact the PYLAT Council.

Kindest regards,



*On behalf of the PYLAT Council*  
Josiah Tualamali'i  
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## APPENDICES

### Survey Results

Youth were asked how they felt about each of the following statements. The results were as below. Not all participants who attended filled in the survey.

#### iSPEAK 9 - Survey and Evaluation Results

	Strongly Disagree 0	Disagree 1	Sort of Disagree 2	Sort of agree 3	Agree 4	Strongly Agree 5	Approval Percentage
1. ISIL is a serious threat to New Zealand.	1	4	2	10	0	1	48%
2. New Zealand has done the right thing by committing non-combatant troops to travel to Iraq.	3	7	1	5	1	1	37%
3. New Zealand should not be involved with the Anti-ISIL coalition at all.	5	0	3	4	2	3	48%
4. Parliament should decide on whether we go to war, not just the Ministers.	1	0	2	2	6	5	74%
5. New Zealand should prioritise issues in the Pacific over issues around the rest of the world.	0	0	3	7	3	3	68%
6. There is enough being done to discourage anti-Muslim resentment in New Zealand.	2	2	5	3	2	0	41%

	Terrible 0	Poor 1	Sort of Poor 2	Sort of Good 3	Good 4	Excellent 5	Approval Percentage
How was the organisation of the event?	0	0	0	2	5	11	90%
How was the length of the programme?	0	0	0	0	6	12	93%
How was the venue?	0	0	1	3	4	10	86%
How was the food?	0	0	0	1	4	13	93%
How was the facilitator	0	0	0	0	4	15	96%
How do you feel about the purpose of the programme	0	0	0	1	2	15	96%

(to ensure the Pacific Youth opinion is heard)							
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	Yes	No	Approval Percentage
Should we continue organising these discussion events for Pacific Youth?	19		100%
Did you learn anything new today?	19		100%
Would you have contributed to the discussion if you had not attended this event?	2	17	12%

## Comments from Discussion Groups and Survey Forms

The following comments are notes taken from both the group discussions and also the comments made on the individual survey. Please note that the comments are in raw form and no attempt has been made to correct any grammatical errors.

### Discussion Evaluation Comments

#### 1. ISIL is a serious threat to New Zealand.

- 50/50. In reality it is not going to be a serious threat with the terror watch list and passport removal options for authorities. NZ really isn't involved enough for it to be a serious threat. It is important to remember our views are being shaped by the media from the US and there is lots of propaganda.
- There is definitely a threat but it isn't very serious as we are small.
- Yes it is because of experiences in Sydney and the similarities between our police and laws. It is also a problem because of how small we are, we are able to be dominated. Even if you force people to make a decision to depend on whether we join or not, we'll still be a part of it
- It may be to individual New Zealanders but not the country. There may be a threat to people who travel to Syria and Iraq as they do threaten people who go into their area. As seen in the Christchurch Earthquake there is always a threat to minority groups in areas. We can't go into all the places. But by putting ourselves in Iraq we put ourselves on the list.
- Not serious because of our location but because of our opposing beliefs will always be potential.
- ISIL has no interest in NZ.
- We are too small and isolated that any real threat would be hard to believe.
- Definitely if NZ takes action early.
- How much do we, (the NZ public) actually know? US media coverage and bias?
- Well it wouldn't be but NZ is on a list now.
- I believe that as we are so far away from everyone our perception of danger is lowered but the more active our role is the higher the danger.

#### 2. New Zealand should not be involved with the Anti-ISIL coalition at all.

- 50/50. It is great for NZ to be involved. We gotta have guts or another offer if not going to provide the support we agreed to. NZers should have voted on whether we went or not. We must maintain an independent foreign policy not be a pawn for another country (US).
- ISIL blur boundaries so it is difficult, the fact that New Zealand soldiers will be "inside the barrier" is irrelevant and won't necessarily protect them. We are putting ourselves on their hit list, so getting involved does increase our chance of being attacked, so military intervention (in any form) is not going to help. How will we benefit from this?
- No clean your own backyard before looking over the fence. Humanitarian Aid is okay, sending troops to train fighters is not okay. NZ training soldiers looks bad, it adds us to the hit list.
- We should be involved, but not sure what capacity. We can help from the outside, aid etc.
- The excuse that 60 other countries jumped on board is not really good enough.
- NZ nationally has no power.
- Humanitarian refugee aid could be offered.
- Peer pressure or bullying from the US much?

### 3. Parliament should decide on whether we go to war, not just the Ministers.

- How much do the public know of the actual situation, not just media fed info? It is important that we consider each war distinctly, each situation requires a different response. But this does undermine democratic values also there is a times when the executive should make decisions and take the lead.
- Yes! This is 20 people who are making for 4 million. We don't think a group of 20 people should make a decision for all of us. These 20 people could hold different views to parliament. Parliament is the body that represents the whole country (voters), Ministers just represent the National voters and/or their party.
- That's what happens when you vote National. If it's "the most invasive issue NZ has face" then we should vote it on it! We are a democracy and so no we should not leave it to the Ministers.
- As a democratic society it makes sense that that those who represent us should get a vote.
- Neither, either was they cannot stop the origin of violence.
- Don't feel comfortable with 20 odd people deciding the fate of 100 odd soldiers when there was another option.
- I believe people should have a say as well. I don't think individuals should be forced to vote one way or another.
- Too serious an issue for less than a vote.
- The more representative in deciding council is the better reflection given.

### 4. New Zealand has done the right thing by committing non-combatant troops to travel to Iraq.

- Violence cannot be solved by more violence.
- "Non-combat troops" is that a cover?
- It's done now.
- Probably can't change it because it's happened.
- Non-combat troops seems like the right thing to do right now.
- So long as this isn't the long term solution as I believe we should go to the root cause and go from there. US intervention again is a worry though.
- We should make a stand not to just blindly follow and 1. Do what our whole parliament vote for 2. Represent small states as we promised to in our bid for the UNSC if this fits this then we can do it.

### 5. New Zealand should prioritise issues in the Pacific over issues around the rest of the world.

- This It makes sense to keep our own backyard tidy, at the same time we need awareness of the global scale.
- Help smaller countries and develop some more intelligent people who can solve the problems
- Depends on the situation.
- As long as we are making sure our brothers in the Pacific are being taken care of we should help around the world too where we can.
- NZ must ensure regional stability in the Pacific, ISIL is not good at all but should we really put that first when West Papua is in such need.

### 6. There is enough being done to discourage anti-Muslim resentment in New Zealand.

- The race relations commission said there isn't enough and I believe her. Unless we disassociating NZ Muslim communities from being considered a threat by mere religious association we are going to have problems. Come on if this was happening to Christian communities there would be much more kick up, its only because they are a minority group here and NZ is quite racist generally.
- Personally haven't seen any.
- Not sure.
- Wasn't even aware there was anti-Muslim resentment till tonight.
- More could be done to put it at the forefront of our minds.
- People are worried because they haven't tried to get to know Muslim people and just look at them as to different and thinking that they are different is easier than getting to know them.

## Event Evaluation Comments

### 1. How was the organisation of the event?

- More publicity around this could have attained greater feedback.
- Email and Facebook was good to get awareness.
- I really enjoyed how well set up and how to time everything was. Kapai team.
- Thank you for laying out the evening at the start and explaining everything so clearly.

### 2. How was the length of the programme?

- Need more time for questions and discussion groups.
- Very good.
- Good length for meaningful learning.
- Well considered, kept to the promised finish time.

**3. How was the venue?**

- Cold.
- Close to Uni where I was today, so great.
- Easily accessible and central.
- It is good they all move around means more accessible for our fellow Pacific youth.

**4. How was the food?**

- Can't complain about the KFC!
- Nice mash.
- Any food is appreciated.
- It was ok.
- KFC is always good.
- Those salads were delish so good you guys made your own mash, slaw and gravy to go with the KFC

**5. How was the facilitator?**

- Shot Gideon!
- Awesome as per usual.
- Knowledgeable/professional.
- Kapai Gideon/Josiah.
- They both did really well.

**6. How do you feel about the purpose of the programme (to ensure the Pacific Youth opinion is heard)?**

- Great opportunity for Pacific Youth – even if only a few at a time that all it take. Good job!
- I believe it's a topic to discuss as it is becoming a concern.
- Yes, it works because I am amongst friends and colleagues.
- This is very important, I am glad it is happening.
- We need even more people to attend these, let's get more people to the meetings.

**7. Should we continue organising these discussion events for Pacific Youth?**

- Yes.
- Please don't cut these, I like coming.
- Absolutely, I really enjoy these and they are so helpful for getting my views across to MP's and others.

**8. Did you learn anything new today?**

- That MP's do not have all the answers.
- Yeah loads, I wasn't very knowledgeable about ISIL before this.
- Yes I learnt about the Sunni and Shia Muslims and their issues overtime

**9. Would you have contributed to discussion on NZ's involvement with ISIL if you had not attended this event?**

- Wish I could say yes, guess you guys saved me.
- No, this is why this is good. Eye opening stuff.

**10. Do you have any other comments?**

- Gideon did a great job, just need to slow his pace of speaking down. Maybe turn the lights off if tryna watch the video – explained with the Levant was.
- Shot guys.
- Very good initiative. Learnt a lot, opens your eyes to issues that you would not have otherwise known/cared about.
- National people mad some slightly racist comments and both Greens and National referred to the UN when as a government the NZ government doesn't even pay attention to all UN declarations and international law.
- One thing it would have been good for the Minister to talk about was who is placed on the terror watch list – what reasons? What are their activities and relations? What is the demographic?

### Submission for the NZ Defence White Paper 2015

I was pleased to have the opportunity to attend the public consultation on the 2015 Defence Review held at Mt Maunganui RSA on 8 June led by Tony Lynch, the Deputy Secretary of Defence and his briefing team.

The briefing and the accompanying booklet was heavy on plans for the hardware acquisition which was informative but short on detail. Sadly, though, the document was completely deficient of the topic of any strategies to deal with current and future plans for the people of the New Zealand Defence Force – its people!

One option which I discussed briefly with former Minister of Defence Dr Wayne Mapp after the public consultation meeting might be to introduce an enhanced superannuation scheme to recognise the special service our servicemen and women. Having myself served both the RNZAF and the NZDF for four decades, in my view, our servicemen and women uniquely serve the nation by putting their lives on the line, when called upon to do so, on active service and other high risks situations which invariably involve separation from their families when they are deployed.

It is proposed an enhanced super scheme be established to emulate those provided by previous Parliaments for NZDF service personal where special superannuation provisions provided where cash payments as end of service grant. Such a scheme could be funded by service personnel was equally matched by the NZDF, based on years served, starting after three years of service.

Like other New Zealanders, new enlistees in the NZDF logically are required to join *KiwiSaver* to provide for their retirement payment currently at aged 65. Apart from hardship grants and home ownership deposit provisions in *KiwiSaver*, there is currently no provision for NZDF service men and women to be provided with cash payments to relocate and train for vocations in other fields should they choose to leave the NZDF service before retirement age.

Such a scheme might provide a progressive series of cash payments thresholds, where a portion of the input (over and above the existing *KiwiSaver* contribution) be provided in the form of cash payment. This might require service personnel to contribute, say, a further 2-3% of their salary to the scheme to be matched by the NZDF. Thus, it would be subsidised scheme to provide additional benefits to servicemen and women as and when they might wish to take it.

It is envisaged that eligibility for cash payments would start after three-years' service and based on a set percentage of salary, starting at 3% and then increment by 1% for each year served up to a maximum of 25% after 25 years' service.

This could be leveraged from the existing *KiwiSaver* superannuation scheme. This proposal is aimed to address the special needs of NZDF personnel who may wish to retire from the NZDF before becoming eligible for existing provisions of *KiwiSaver* at aged 65. A cash payment, as outlined, would provide them with a cash pay-out with which to re-establish them in another calling.

While limited to outline form, this proposal is submitted for consideration as a special superannuation scheme for the servicemen and women of the New Zealand Defence Force.



# Peace Movement Aotearoa

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Defence White Paper 2015,  
 Ministry of Defence,  
 Wellington 6144  
 Email: [DWP15@defence.govt.nz](mailto:DWP15@defence.govt.nz)

22 June 2015

## Submission: Defence White Paper 2015

### Introduction

Peace Movement Aotearoa is the national networking peace organisation, established in 1982 as an incorporated society. Our purpose is networking, information sharing and providing educational resources on peace, disarmament, social justice and human rights issues. We have a commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict at all levels from the personal through to international relations.

An outline of our views on the consultation around the Defence White Paper 2015 is provided below, including a specific comment on Question 8 on page 2.

### Submission

Given our commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict, we do not support the basic premise of the public consultation - to “focus primarily on the contribution of the Defence Force and Ministry of Defence towards New Zealand’s security, resilience and prosperity”<sup>1</sup> - which implies that the armed forces have a contribution to make, yet does not assess what it is. This gives the appearance of a rubber-stamping exercise of the government’s existing policy, rather than a genuine attempt to examine the issues around the Defence White Paper.

It is our view that this public consultation should have started by asking whether, in the context of the often-stated lack of any military threat to this country, New Zealand needs armed forces; with a fully informed public discussion on the extent to which military activities and costs may be detrimental to security in its widest sense, resilience and prosperity.

Such a discussion would examine six key issues:

- **the economic and social costs of maintaining combat ready armed forces** - including whether annual expenditure of \$3+ billion for the foreseeable future, and a forecast \$16 billion over the next 15 years on capital expenditure, is the most productive use of public money that could otherwise be used to enhance human security, resilience, and prosperity for all New Zealanders;
- **the environmental and biodiversity costs of military operations here and overseas** - including the impact of military training, exercises and combat operations on the natural

environment and biodiversity, military consumption of non-renewable resources, and the contribution of military activities to climate change;

- **the human rights implications of overseas deployments and military training** - including the impact on New Zealand's reputation when military training and exercises (here and overseas) or combat operations are conducted with the armed forces or security forces of states that are engaged in human rights violations, and when New Zealand armed forces deployed overseas may be involved or implicated in such violations;
- **issues around the disarmament legislation** - including whether military activities and cooperation with the armed forces of nuclear weapons states are a breach of the aiding and abetting provisions of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987, Section 5;
- **foreign policy implications** - including whether we could be making a more peaceful and positive contribution to global peace and security. We note in this regard that successive governments have placed much emphasis on their "independent" stance and making "a positive impact on international peace and security"<sup>2</sup>, but can a foreign policy based on military alliances and allegiances, and apparently endless preparation for war as part of the global cycle of violence, really be considered to be either independent or positive? Surely a genuinely independent and positive foreign policy would focus on diplomatic initiatives, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and so on that are aimed at preventing armed conflict, rather than militarised responses; as well as humanitarian assistance and diplomatic support for peace and reconciliation processes during, and after, situations of armed conflict; and
- **alternatives to armed forces** - with the exception of combat, all of the current activities of the armed forces can be done by civilian agencies, and at a far lower cost because civilian agencies do not require expensive military equipment - for example, fisheries and resource protection, as well as maritime search and rescue, could be undertaken by a lightly armed coastguard with coastal and offshore capability, with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief carried out by unarmed civilian agencies.

Our final comments relate to Question 8 in the consultation document: "What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?".

It is neither appropriate nor desirable for the armed forces - an institution with military operations and the use of armed force as its primary role - to be involved in youth development work; youth development work should only be undertaken by civilian agencies. The militarisation of children, young persons, and their education is contrary to New Zealand's obligations as a state party to both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.

Thank you for your consideration of our submission.

Edwina Hughes,  
Coordinator, Peace Movement Aotearoa.

<sup>1</sup> Defence White Paper 2015: Public Consultation Document, New Zealand Government, 2015, p 11

<sup>2</sup> Most recently, for example, during the campaign for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, and currently on the NZ UN Security Council site, <http://www.nzunsc.govt.nz>



## **PAX CHRISTI AOTEAROA-NEW ZEALAND**

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### **Submission to the Public Consultation: Defence White Paper 2015**

#### **Introduction:**

Pax Christi Aotearoa-New Zealand is an independent section of Pax Christi International, the Catholic peace movement set up 70 years ago in France. Since then, Pax Christi has spread to more than 50 countries and now has members and associates across all faiths, including a Kenyan Muslim member on the current international Executive Board. Since its inception, Pax Christi has been opposed to the violent resolution of conflict which is the basis of our concern regarding several matters in Defence White Paper 2015. It is our belief that the policy set out in the White Paper is against the best interests of our country and directs funding desperately needed to achieve the common good of all our people into unnecessary military adventures which are based on the interests of other nations than our own.

#### **Specific Concerns:**

1. The military history of New Zealand shows that our forces have in general been directed to serve the interests of other than our own people. This began when our dubiously constitutional government invited overseas troops, from Britain and Australia, to quell the legitimate aims of Maori to defend their country and the Treaty which they had made with the British Crown in 1840. From then on, there has been a constant stream of interventions in other people's wars: the Boer War, WW1 and II, Malaya, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and so on and so on. The only one of those which threatened our safety was WWII and the threat of Japanese invasion.  
Today, we are increasingly drawn again into other people's conflicts, largely because of our involvement with what our Prime Minister calls "the club", frequently without proper levels of consultation with Parliament, let alone our people. As the Defence White Paper phrases it: "[our armed forces] ...must be able to project and sustain forces for considerable periods over vast distances, a force that is in all respects expeditionary". This seem to be in contradiction to the stated purpose of our forces to: defend our country against attack.
2. A further related concern is that our involvement in other people's wars exposes us to the increasing antipathy developed towards our "allies" militaristic policies with potentially serious consequences for our long-term best interests. There must be real threats to New Zealand's trade interests in the Middle East and Asia arising from our slavish support for US military adventures in North Africa the Middle East and its sabre-rattling approach towards China and its allies. We developed during the 1980s and 90s, a reputation for independent thinking and policy, particularly in relation to the possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons, which resulted in our being boycotted by those nations which possessed such

weapons. A slackening of this policy has led us to increasing association in training and regional exercises with nations which refuse to be part of moves to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons, against our own commitments in those directions.

3. Our recent gaining of a position on the UN Security Council could give us an opportunity to take forward measures to find solutions to long-lasting international and regional conflicts, such as that in Palestine /Israel or others in our own region, such as the Sprattley Islands, but this must be jeopardised the more we are seen to be a client of "the club", the Five-Eyes group. This latter, a system of military alliances and allegiances focussed on endless preparation for war as the price of peace, links us into an Us/Them view of foreign affairs.. Pax Christi was formed by people who sought ways through negotiation and peaceful dialogue to rid Europe and the world of such attitudes and we remain implacably opposed to them today.
4. Finally, New Zealand cannot afford to be both a member of "the club", with all its expensive purchase and maintenance of irrelevant military gear and surveillance equipment, and to look after the real needs of its people and our immediate neighbours. Why should we spend an average of \$66,436,653 every week on military spending (including nearly \$1,000,000 on military-linked programmes in secondary schools) when we cannot afford more than the cost of upgrading two navy frigates ((\$446 million)on lifting disadvantaged families out of unsafe and unhealthy poverty. Much of our state-owned housing is in a shameful and unhealthy state which could be ameliorated at half the \$600million cost of two replacements for our aging Hercules aircraft. The battle against poverty and inequality, to say nothing about the need to address the effects of climate change, is far more important to this country and our immediate island neighbours than our engaging in geopolitical issues not of our making and beyond our control, except through our ability to disengage from them.
5. There is an important role for militarily-trained personnel in our country. Pax Christi partners and associates speak highly of the work of our peacekeeping forces in Timor Leste, the Solomons and Bougainville, the latter being an unarmed policing exercise which won world-wide admiration. Then there is the need for a disciplined and effective policing of our coasts and regional waters against the depredations of corporate raiders intent on clearing out the last saleable fish for their own profit. Finally, our air force has a fine reputation in bringing aid to the victims of natural disasters which are predicted to become more frequent with increasing global warming. There is much for us to do without wasting money and human resources on other nations' agendas.

## Conclusion

Pax Christi Aotearoa-New Zealand seeks a review of the Defence White Paper 2015 which will change its present focus from supporting dependency on a clutch of unreliable allies seeking to impose hegemonic aims on the rest of the world to fulfilling the real defence needs of our people and our neighbours: to protect us against multi-national exploitation, defend our real trade and economic interests and give speedy and reliable aid to those who have been the victims of natural disaster.

National Co-ordinator

Pax Christi Aotearoa-New Zealand

Released under the Official Information Act 1982



# AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL SUBMISSION

DWP-0202

22 June 2015

## SUBMISSION ON NEW ZEALAND'S DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2015

Amnesty International welcomes the opportunity to make a submission on the Defence White Paper 2015 and enter into a constructive dialogue with the New Zealand Defence Force and Ministry of Defence (NZ Defence). As an organisation with substantial experience in protecting and promoting human rights in conflict-affected countries, Amnesty International believes that NZ Defence can play a key role in creating environments that are conducive to the enjoyment of human rights. As such, our submission focuses on two key areas we believe should be prioritised within the White Paper 2015, and consequently in New Zealand's future contributions to international peace and security efforts.

### **1) New Zealand should make a clear and unambiguous commitment to the protection of civilians in conflict**

Today's international landscape is characterised by a large number of intra-state conflicts where the majority of victims are civilians. 2014 was a particularly devastating year for ordinary people caught up in war zones, with a dramatic intensification of violence, disregard for the rules of war, atrocities and shocking scales of destruction in such places as Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Gaza and Syria.

New Zealand has substantial experience in contributing to international peace and security missions in complex environments such as Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Iraq. In the near future, New Zealand may again be required to contribute forces to the United Nations or other organisations or states for military operations. As such, Amnesty International recommends that NZ Defence places a greater focus on the protection of civilians in conflict, both from direct and indirect harm. This includes efforts to:

- Ensure that substantial training on the protection of civilians, human rights and the law of armed conflict is an integral and prioritised aspect of all training programmes, both within NZ Defence and where foreign security forces are prepared for combat operations. Specific guidance on key relevant resolutions by the UN Security Council (such as resolutions 1265, 1296, 1674, 1894 and 2175) must become a top priority in New Zealand's provision of military assistance and capacity-building.
- Ensure that mandates in which NZ Defence is involved include specific provisions for the protection of civilians. This also includes ensuring that mandated missions are adequately resourced and supported to provide effective protection on the ground, and they systematically monitor and report on abuses of international humanitarian and human rights law.

### **2) New Zealand should commit to the full implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security**

Despite being disproportionately affected by armed conflict, women are still overwhelmingly underrepresented in conflict prevention and peace processes around the world. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 affirms the importance of women's equal participation and their full involvement in all areas of work to promote international peace and security. Amnesty International welcomes that the New



Zealand government has recently committed itself to the full implementation of resolution 1325 by developing a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

As a consequence, Amnesty International recommends NZ Defence to:

- Include explicit commitments to the National Action Plan and the broader Women, Peace and Security Agenda throughout the White Paper 2015. The National Action Plan should be used as a strategic foundation and central planning and implementation document across NZ Defence.
- Ensure that all training programmes, as outlined above, also include training on all pillars of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

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This general submission does not pretend to address all the key questions posed in the Defence White paper.

There is a certain irony about a review which coincides with the ongoing commemoration of the First World War, a war marked by heroism and tragic loss of life (often because of inept leadership). A war which was supposed to end all wars in fact created the conditions for a further world war; the resultant re-drawing of geo-political boundaries has directly or indirectly contributed to the current instability in the Middle East, in particular, with ongoing fighting despite or because of Western intervention, significant environmental degradation and huge loss of life, both military and civilian.

Fourteen years of the so-called "War on terror" has created a much more volatile world rather like a forest fire out of control which military engagement is likely to prolong indefinitely rather than resolve. It seems that we are destined to keep on repeating the mistakes of earlier generations if we resort to force of arms rather than seek political or diplomatic solutions. New Zealand through its membership of the UN Security Council should be challenging the conventional wisdom and pushing for a world whose resources are more fairly distributed, where human rights abuses are eliminated and where refugees are treated humanely (cf Australia). We should certainly not be engaged in Iraq in any capacity. It is not our place to sort out the mess created by the USA, Britain and their partners whose failed policies of dubious legality have generated a sense of injustice and powerlessness which underlies much of the terrorist activity so prevalent today.

New Zealand is uniquely placed, so far from the world's trouble spots, to build on its nuclear-free status (which has earned us great respect) and peace-building record to set an example to other nations. In an ideal world this country could follow the example of Costa Rica and become fully demilitarised and, like that country, use the resources thus released to achieve carbon neutrality. Realistically, without the political or popular will, that is unlikely to happen but New Zealand could strive to move progressively towards that ideal and confine our military activities to our sphere of influence in the Pacific building on our reputation in Bougainville and making a greater commitment to disaster relief as rising sea levels and adverse weather conditions, whether or not attributable to climate change, make increasing calls on our resources.



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23 Jun 15

## **TERRITORIAL FORCES EMPLOYERS SUPPORT COUNCIL SUBMISSION TO DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2015**

### **Background**

1. The Territorial Forces Employer Support Council (TFESC) is a mandated statutory board under the Defence Act 1990. Its role is to champion Reserve Forces and Youth Development initiatives on behalf of the Minister of Defence in order to increase the effectiveness of the New Zealand Defence Force military and youth development output delivery.
2. The TFESC has three key objectives:
  - a. Provide high quality and representative advice on policies, programmes and issues relevant to the availability and services of reservists, on matters referred to it by the Minister, NZDF or of its own motion.
  - b. Promote the adoption by industry, employers, educational institutions and the community, of policies and practices supportive of reservists, and their availability for service, and youth development initiatives involving the NZDF.
  - c. Foster and promote the availability of reservists for service by acting as an interface in promoting the benefits of service between industry, employers, the community, and the Services.
3. The TFESC meets twice yearly and comprises the following Councillors, who are appointed by the Cabinet Appointments and Honours Committees for a term of two years:
  - a. Peter Townsend, CNZM: CEO Canterbury Chamber of Commerce (Chair);
  - b. John Allen: CEO NZ Racing Board (ex-officio);
  - c. Martin Brennan: Director National Private Capital Ltd (Canterbury and Upper South Island Representative);
  - d. Linda Cooper: Auckland Councillor (Youth Mentoring Representative);
  - e. Grant Crowley, MStJ: Immediate past CEO Baldwins Barristers and Solicitors (Wellington and Hawkes Bay Representative);

- f. Stephen Cunningham: Director Offender Employment and Reintegration, Department of Corrections (Youth Development);
- g. Neville Donaldson: Assistant National Secretary, Services and Food Workers Association (Trade Union Representative);
- h. Christine Fernyhough, CNZM: Philanthropist (Primary Sector Representative);
- i. Bill Holland, MNZM: Partner Holland & Beckett Barristers and Solicitors (Bay of Plenty Representative);
- j. Dr Virginia Hope, MNZM: Chair Hutt Valley and Capital and Coast District Health Boards (Health Representative);
- k. Dr Pauline Kingi, CNZM (Diversity and Ethnic Affairs Representative);
- l. Dr James Lockhart: Senior Lecturer Massey University (Manawatu and Kapiti Coast Representative);
- m. Hon. Steve Maharey, CNZM: Vice-Chancellor Massey University (Education Representative);
- n. Allen Mazengarb: Partner Auld Brewer Mazengarb and McEwen (Taranaki Representative);
- o. David McGregor. OBE ED: General Council Envirocounsel (Auckland and Northland Representative);
- p. Jerry Rickman: Independent Director (Waikato Representative);
- q. Hon. Heather Roy: Chief Engagement Officer Torquepoint (Local and Central Government Representative);
- r. Sir Julian Smith, KNZM, OBE: Chair and Managing Director Allied Press (Otago and Southland Representative);
- s. John Spencer, CNZM: Chairman KiwiRail (Strategic Relationships);
- t. Vanessa Stoddart: Independent Director (Business New Zealand Representative);
- u. Tui Te Hau: General Manager \*experience (Women's Representative);  
and
- v. Brigadier Jon Broadley, MBE, ADC: Director General Reserves Forces and Youth Development and business advisor, accounted4 Ltd (New Zealand Defence Force Representative)



## Executive Summary

4. The TFESC believes that Reservists play an integral role in the supplementation and sustainment of the NZDF to secure our nation's territory and resources and protect our citizens from external military threats by:

- a. defending NZ and our interests,
- b. contributing forces under collective arrangements to the United Nations, or other organisations or states,
- c. performing public services or assist the civil power in a time of emergency, and
- d. assisting with initiatives that better develop the youth of NZ.

5. In the past 15 years over 2000 Reservists have deployed on operations to or in support of Timor Leste (450 deployed 150 backfilled Regular Force (RF) appointments here in NZ to enable the RF staff to deploy), Solomon Islands (approximately 300 or so), Canterbury Earthquake (1100 or so) and a number of other reservists have deployed as individuals to Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, South Korea, Israel and Egypt. Given their civilian skillsets coupled with some military knowledge reservists are ideally suited to Operations Other Than War (OOTW) including low level peacekeeping and nation building. A number of reservists have also been brought in on fulltime engagements to help run youth development training within the NZ Cadet Forces and the NZDF Youth Development Unit – a role they are inherently suited to given their experience with dealing with youth in their own communities.

6. Reservists also provide a link from the NZDF into the wider NZ community that they draw their moral support and their recruits from. This engagement with the NZ public remains a key role for Reservists noting that their primary role will always be to supplement and sustain NZDF military operations in support of NZ's national interests.

**Questions 1 and 2: What are the major threats or challenges to NZ's security now and in the future? What changes in the international environment, including relations between states, non-state actors and international institutions, will affect NZ's interests?**

7. The key global challenges that will threaten NZ's security now and into the future are population changes, depletion of essential resources and climate change. These are likely to result in:

- a. an increased risk of terrorism, fuelled by poverty, religious extremism, unemployment and/or disaffection with societal norms;
- b. displaced people including urban migration, and conflict and environmental refugees;
- c. poaching of key resources,

- d. less respect for sovereign boundaries; and/or
- e. more natural disasters.

**Questions 3 and 4: Given the future outlook, what are the roles the NZDF should perform to keep NZ secure and advance our interests abroad? What are the emerging security challenges that NZ is likely to face in its immediate territory including the EEZ, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency**

8. The NZDF needs to retain the ability to defend NZ albeit this is less likely to be a direct overt threat by a major force and more likely to be a covert/targeted threat to NZ's security and prosperity by cyber, biological, resource poaching etc.

9. The NZDF's warfighting capability will more likely be employed offshore against an enemy difficult to identify operating in an urban asymmetric environment. It is likely that NZ will contribute to a coalition effort for a major contingency but it is also important that the NZDF retain the ability to lead and support a multinational force in the South West Pacific area of interest.

10. In short the NZDF must maintain a flexible range of forces to operate across the spectrum of conflict from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance through countering resource poaching in the Southern Ocean to joint combat operations in the maritime land and air environments (small contingency NZ led to large contingency NZ contributing).

**Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the NZDF's efforts between ensuring NZ is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and allies, and contributing to international peace and security?**

11. The TFESC believes that while all of these tasks are important their priorities are in the order they are listed in the question i.e. NZ's security is Priority 1 through to international peace and security at Priority 3.

12. In stating this priority listing it should be noted that the Council believes that the scope of NZ's security incorporates support to both youth development and the wider NZ community in such activities as:

- a. disaster relief and other civil defence support;
- b. youth development schemes such as the NZ Cadet Forces, the Ministry of Education's Service Academy Scheme, the Ministry of Social Development's Limited Service Volunteer and Military Activity Camps schemes, and other associated youth development support; and
- c. leadership development activities that help NZ become stronger, independent and more confident on the world stage not only in the defence arena but in business, local community and humanitarian support areas.

13. NZDF, NZ Police and other Government agencies, and Non-Government Organisations such as Red Cross, should be engaged in a more joined up approach

to countering international peace and security challenges. This will ensure a more comprehensive response which incorporates stabilising a conflict situation, providing a safe environment for humanitarian support to be delivered through to helping re-build a nation. The work that NZ has done in Timor Leste is a great example of what NZ Inc. can achieve when a comprehensive approach is taken.

**Question 6, 7 and 8: How should the NZDF operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests? What is the NZDF role in contributing to NZ's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters? What should be the Defence Force's role in contributing in the development of NZ's youth?**

14. To counter the possible threats outlined earlier and to contribute to an all-of-government response the NZDF needs to comprise a flexible range of:

- a. Fulltime forces, supplemented by specialist part-time forces (intelligence, medical, linguists, cyber specialists, psychologists, etc.) at high readiness and well trained to counter an asymmetric terrorist threat in the maritime, land and/or air environments (counter-terrorism and cordon forces supported by command and control, intelligence, communications, logistics, protected land mobility/air transport (fixed and rotary winged)/military maritime assets, improvised explosive device disposal and specialist search capabilities).
- b. Fulltime forces supplemented and sustained by military and/or specialist part-time forces and civilians to counter all the other threats, contribute to civil defence emergencies and assist with nation building, leadership and youth development programmes that help contribute to a better NZ. Part-time reserve forces are ideally suited to lower spectrum Operations Other Than War given their civilian skillsets and understanding of governance, business and community. Their use on these types of operations can prove more effective and efficient given that the fulltime forces can be retained at a higher trained state and higher states of readiness for higher-risk contingencies.

15. To help achieve this, the NZDF has the ability to positively influence New Zealanders from the ages of 13 to 70 years of age as follows:

- a. 13-17 year old through the NZ Cadet Forces with the aim to develop confident, responsible young citizens who are valued within their community;
- b. 15-18 year old students in the Ministry of Education's Service Academy Scheme to help them re-engage with their education needs to succeed in whichever profession they pursue;
- c. 15-18 year old serious offenders at the Child Youth and Family's secure facilities at Te Punawai Youth Facility to help them reduce the likelihood of serious or other re-offending;

- d. 18-24 year old long-term unemployed youth and young adults in the Ministry of Social Development's Limited Services Volunteer Scheme; and
- e. 17-70 year old fulltime Regular, part-time Reserve and fulltime/part-time civilian forces moving seamlessly between all three career streams. This would include attachments to other central and local government agencies and major businesses to expand the knowledge base and network of NZDF personnel to make them more effective in a wider of all-of-government response to support NZ national interests.

16. This continuum of influence can be enabled with the support of the TFESC and other key influencers across NZ (National and Local Politicians, LSV Patrons, Ex/Current NZDF members in key business, academic and community roles etc. ) in an active engagement programme with the NZ people so they better understand the value proposition the NZDF has to offer. It is the belief of the Council that this is not well articulated at present. The NZDF's Engagement Strategy supported by the Engagement Hub tool will help facilitate this.

**Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?**

17. In addition to those roles outlined above, the key capabilities that the TFESC believe need to be improved to keep the NZDF relevant and inter-operable into the future are:

- a. Forces that are able to respond to the rapid evolution and spread of cyber threats;
- b. Military shipping that has an icebreaking capability to enable better protection of NZ's Area of Interest particularly in the Antarctic Region;
- c. Remotely Piloted Aircraft to provide closer surveillance and air to ground and air to sea lethal force if necessary;
- d. Air transport that can transport the new fleet of medium helicopter as well as a larger land force; and
- e. Better command and control capability and systems for deployable C2 of a multinational inter-agency joint task force to enable NZ to lead a medium-sized contingency in the South West Pacific if required.


**Peter Townsend CNZM**

Chairman

Territorial Forces Support Council

Defence White Paper 2015  
 Ministry of Defence  
 PO Box 12703  
 WELLINGTON 6144

To whom it may concern



The photo attached is the former NZED workshop and grounds that should be the starting point for Central Otago combined training centre. Ward support teams was an old submission sent to our local government to integrate all services, for training purposes. i.e. Civil Defence, rural fire, police, army, air force, Navy, red cross, others. coast guard... Health services...

All services train as normal BUT also train as one under the command of a field commander, who cor-ord all services .

The Intergraded Expansion Group for all ages should be based on the end of the school term, with joint funding, industry, ect.

Thanks for your support and company since local government reform 1989.

A pilot group should be started in Central Otago as we all learn to accept change as we build stronger communities that serve New Zealand, as duplication disappears for the Southern Region.

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?

With this restructure of the defence force as mentioned in the white paper all threat and challenges will be meet. Border entry, changes in community demographic, population changes.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?

The Defence force will need to be integrated, "The Integration Expansion Group" all ages based on the end of the school term.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?

Be a world leader, Preparation, Planning, Time and Space.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?

Events that require resources and manpower to support, security, earthquakes, fire storms, floods, ect. Reactions at a local level.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?

Review its structure, goals, objectives yearly, But What if?

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?

Have across party policy, agreed at all levels, a plan, the white paper.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?

The Integrated Expansion Group, all ages, based on the end of the school term. Be welcomed to be part of the long term community plans.

The Clyde Community plan welcomes all combined service group, as a means to support the centralisation of government services.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?

To serve the Country, The Integrated Expansion Group, all ages, based on the end of the school term. Industry, Councils, all service groups, corrections departments, police, Rural fire services, health board, doctors, nurses, others.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

Role: To seek out, kill and capture, repel attack both by night or day, regardless of weather, season or terrain. Base training on this with gallery shoots, for weapons training, once trained. To be integrated. In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.

The Defence white paper has outlined the pathway the combined services should take as it become a world leader, towards its policy, plans and outcomes. It should include all ages, as it takes ten years to train a defence person? I.e What do you want to do at the end of the school term, (To become a better person)

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Social Media, Terrorism and personnel shortages for the NZDF

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Terrorism moving closer to NZ and maintaining the current requirement will effect the NZDF as currently there is man power and skill shortages that can make the NZ Governments requests extremely difficult to complete.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

- SAR, Surveillance (Global), Humanitarian Assistance especially to the pacific islands.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Health risk from Ebola etc. is NZDF ready if they needed to assist in NZ.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

1. NZ Secure
2. Support Security for Pacific Partners
3. Global Security
4. International Peace

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

NZDF should Leading in an mutli-agency effort.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

If there was more staff the NZDF would be able to assist further in national disasters and unforeseen events but NZDF doesn't contribute extremely well for what transportation and personnel are available.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

There should be more recruitment in low decil schools and more requests for schools to visit there local camp and base to really show the youth what is available .

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

More Staff, better pay for civilians for consistency and opportunities for civilian staff to progress further in the NZDF

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

ISIS retaliation for the NZDF sending troops to the middle east to assist with training the Iraqi Defence Force. The threat of ISIS sympathisers and extremists within this country and the nations under our protection, that are radical enough to attempt terrorist action with our borders to prove a point and in their eyes, make a stand.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The international environment is constantly changing. Not to many years ago the Muslim extremist threat was not some thing considered so close to home, When you look at the Bali bombings and more recently the Sydney bombings and foiled attempts at terrorism. this must indicate the need to focus more on civil and local counter terrorism defence and having a ready reaction force capable of deploying to local areas rapidly. Assisting our partners interests to achieve the same level of counter terrorism.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Having a credible air combat wing that can deploy to assist and reinforce already established Air Combat forces. This asset would need to be compatible with our defensive partners and to have a Maritime combat role to add CAP cover for a blue water forces and Amphib operations.

A compatible Naval units that have more than a self protection weapon fit that would be able to counter an over the horizon threat.

An up to date and robust Amphibious landing capability throughout the Pacific and around our own shores. able to operate in up to force 6 conditions and land well armed counter terrorism vehicles to combat a low level incident.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Southern ocean Tooth fish exploitation.

Muslim extremists and supporters, acts of terrorism.

Natural disasters

Human trafficking

BIO security risks as we become more mult cultural.

Exploitation of our natural environment.

Internal disruption due to cultural disharmony.

Civil conflict.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Internal threats of extremists committing an act of terrorism.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Our allied nations taking a stand against religious extremist groups committing great acts of mass murder and terrorism will affect the people in our country that have the same values and beliefs as these religious extremist groups. These people may start to feel as if they need to assist their fellow people against NZ and it's allies. This will also affect the general public and defence personnel as they will not be safe in NZ or abroad. Take the UK for example defence personnel there can't even wear their uniform in public as they are under threat of being murdered a prime example of this is Lee Rigby.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Combat and Non-Combat rolls assisting our five eyes partners. As well as quick response to natural disasters.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Illegal fishing, tampering, terrorism and espionage.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The threat in NZ seems to be low, so having a large security force here is not necessary. We would be better equipped if we had strike aircraft if there were threats in or around NZ, with a reasonable force supporting our international commitments.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

The defence force should take into account the governments suggestions and ideas, however currently the defence force is crippled when having to deploy or react quickly due to the current channels it has to take through politics.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

The defence force needs to play a larger part in the training of personnel and procedures especially when it comes to a base level of disaster relief at the lower ranks. I also needs to do more work to ensure that I can work in harmony with civilian disaster relief efforts.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The defence should play a part in that, however it should not be up to the defence force's budgets. Youth Development Unit is a capability that is provided by the defence force's facilities, personnel and budget. I believe the funding for this should come from an alternative government faction. As for the role the NZDF plays in Cadet forces, we commit staff and funding to those roles again they can benefit from funding coming from another area of the government.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

The NZDF NEEDS an Air Force with a strike capability and a larger naval fleet. Having an aircraft with

strike capability will assist our Navy in protecting our EEZ. Because of the large EEZ I also believe that the Navy needs a larger fleet and more personnel, with potentially having more than one base in NZ.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

I believe the NZDF lacks funds to achieve it's roles effectively and will continue to do so unless it receives more money.

The attrition rate also needs to be addressed.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Terrorism within and without NZ, the rise of PLAN and China's growing influence in South Pacific.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

China's developing platform in the South China seas: see dominance of entire region and could see China eyeing NZ territorial waters and South Pole.

Peace keeping missions to South China sea; as Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines: all face off with China over disputed island chain.

Could lead to escalation of violence in the disputed sea.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Showing the international community the strengths and character of the RNZN. Peace keeping missions, trade envoys for the NZ brand and goods.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Increase in Illegal fishing activities, the first refugee boats sighted off NZ, growing influence and power of China in the area: increasing China's growing military and expansion plans for Pacific region.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Purchasing one or two more Frigate/Destroyer ships: for more operational exercises and presence in the NZ area, Pacific and world theatre.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Threats: Religious and political extremists. Illegal immigrants/asylum seekers.

Challenges: Keeping up an effective, efficient and professional defence force with a shrinking budget and mayor expenses/upgrade programmes in the next 20 years.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

N/A

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Maintaining its current role of patrolling our EEZ.

A more solid presence in the South Pacific, taking part in more international military exercises and actual humanitarian/peacekeeping missions outside our usual sphere of influence. Show the New Zealand public that we have a military that is not constrained by budget, lack of manpower or low morale.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Foreign intelligence services are getting more advanced and more interested in New Zealand's military and government.

China and Japan's increasing influence and clout over the other pacific nations. More illegal fishing within our EEZ as oceanic resources diminish.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Domestic security and EEZ has highest priority, joint exercises/projects/resources with Australia is next followed by continued partnerships with the surrounding pacific islands, i.e. humanitarian missions and/or disaster relief.

Putting boots on the ground when there is an international conflict or provide effective support/transport to foreign militaries and governments.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Provide resources/manpower/equipment that can be shared between government agencies. Clear simple goals and expectations, flexibility throughout the command structure to account for changing environments.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Provide transportation and disaster relief quickly and effectively. Having NZDF men and machines always in a state of readiness.

Provide military personnel that have that kiwi 'can-do' attitude toward any situation/environment.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Provide an attractive alternative to civilian life and/or qualifications. Keep the YDU operational, its doing good work.

Military personnel doing 'hearts and minds' interactions with schools, polytechnics, universities etc.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

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Modern equipment! The older the equipment/tool/vehicle gets, the more money is spent keeping it operational to the point that it exceeds its own value/productivity and becomes financially inefficient. Bringing back some sort of aerial offensive weapon platforms (fixed-wing strike aircraft or attack helicopters) to increase the NZDF's military might, i.e. Air Force protecting its own transport aircraft or providing close support fire for deployed ground personnel. Having offensive weapons also shows the international military community that we are self-sufficient.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

The government needs to understand that the more money you put in the military, the more they will do. This has the same reverse effect, the more constraint the budget is, the less the NZ military will be in the public eye as well as the international community. If the NZ government wants to be taken seriously by its allies and the Pacific rim then showing military muscle is the most clear and direct way of doing it.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

- Fisheries and seabed resource theft.
- Biosecurity threats through unwanted species of flora and fauna coming into New Zealand.
- Influx of asylum seekers
- Terrorism from disaffected individuals or groups
- Narcotics importation, creation and dissemination
- Protection of NZ's Sea Lines of Communication

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

An increase of foreign influence to developing countries that will adversely affect the views of those states towards New Zealand. This may provide opportunities for the foreign influence to create infrastructure and forward staging posts within potential striking range of New Zealand.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

- Long Range Maritime search and rescue
- HADR in the pacific islands
- Increased support and military presence in the pacific islands
- Contribute to maritime security tasks in New Zealand, the pacific and South East Asia

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

- Increased threats from IUU fishing.
- Drug importation

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

- Participate in international maritime security patrols throughout the pacific and in SE Asia.
- Provide support to nations defending against extremists and groups promoting global terrorism.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

- P-3's, helos's and Navy to protect maritime security and MPI interests.
- Army, police and Helo's for land and inshore security.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

- Providing a pool of people at short notice while still conducting most of their regular roles.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

- Long range maritime search and rescue
- Land search and rescue
- Defence of sea lines of communication
- The ability to install equipment at short notice for operational requirements.
- Utilise ships and aircraft to monitor and locate emitters in the entire EW spectrum.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other

defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

We need to continually review and upgrade our equipment to remain relevant in our areas of operation. A defence force who fails to continually revise update their operational capabilities, fails to remain relevant.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

the attrition rate is terrible and needs immediate work towards a solution especially as a tradesman we are loosing huge numbers. they are looking at recruiting qualified pers and paying them larger amounts eg. sgt pay as a private yet I have seen no work done on keeping the tradesmen the army has and has trained into good leaders not just qualified tradesmen. base salary should reflect civilian pay levels then have mil factor added to that. I do not want my name used on publications however I will discuss with people further if needed.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

- Terrorists and Activists motivated by religion and beliefs.
- Internet Security and Cyber Crime.
- Maintaining our National Parks and Environment, protecting from pollution.
- Over population.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

- War against terror. It's everyone's problem and the Defence Force will be required to fight it. Some people will oppose this.
- Trade agreements, Mining NZ resources and immigration always cause controversy. If this affects NZ's economy it will affect Defence's budget.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

- Secure N.Z., it's EEZ and our Pacific partners.
- Provide disaster relief.
- Maintain operations within foreign defence partners to further enhance capability and interoperability.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

- Terrorism, Cyber Crime, Piracy, Illegal Fishing, Drug Trafficking.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

50/50

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Unsure.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

- The NZDF should contribute as much as possible. This is what makes NZ believe in our service men and woman.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

- Planes, Mechanised Infantry, Military Working Dogs, Modern weapon platforms.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Please return to the top of the page and click 'Save and Close' to make your submission.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Now

1. NZ does not have a single national strategy or goals. This means formulating effective defence and security strategy (or policy) is problematic as there is no overarching policy aim to achieve only loosely defined concepts such as "security".

Future

2. Maintaining social cohesion within NZ: there is no clear and synchronised effort to ensure that NZ domestic social cohesion is maintained. An increasingly pluralistic society with high levels of immigration and an aging population could result in ethnic, cultural and socio-economic disparity which has the potential to turn in to sectarian violence. The state of Israel uses compulsory military service as a pragmatic policy mechanism to overcome such factors.

3. Economic resource protection: sustainability of fisheries and mineral wealth in the face of unregulated or unethical competition is likely to grow as living standards increase globally, and demand for consumer goods grows apace.

4. Cyber-security: as the social and economic fabric of NZ and the international community become increasingly reliant on real and virtual cyber infrastructure, so the whole system becomes more vulnerable to cyber attack.

5. The increasing costs of military capability and operations at a time of super-profitable global corporate enterprises is likely to lead to private military contracting being increasingly attractive to Treasury. The international legal and ethical frameworks for using private military contractors needs to be clarified to protect contractors and populations.

6. Similarly, using NZDF military personnel to supplement NZ Police, Customs, Fisheries, NZ Aid, etc may enhance the economic utility of vote Defence as state sector resourcing continues to be constrained and competitive. The challenges would be to facilitate this in ethical, moral and legal ways.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

1. International agreements such as the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement introduce legal mechanisms which challenge hitherto accepted notions of sovereignty (such as domestic governments' rights to legislate domestically for internationally uncompetitive policies). Defence and Security policy and procedure needs to keep abreast of such changes.

2. The Russia-Ukraine conflict at present demonstrates the limits of protection afforded to small and medium states from pacts and alliances such as NATO. That particular conflict is demonstrating to all observers that limited conventional warfare can still be utilised to achieve national policy without the threat of military escalation. Other nations within NZ spheres of concern and influence may be encouraged to do likewise.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

1. Demonstrate in all areas of security and defence activities including capability acquisition choices, force preparedness, interoperability and cooperation with our only ally, Australia. Notwithstanding the two countries' sovereign status, as NZ's only ally, it behoves NZ to make this a cornerstone of all defence and security policy and strategy.

2. Economic zone and territorial security assistance to the civil power and military enforcement and actions for NZ, protectorates and dependencies including counter-terrorism.

3. Participation in FPDA, ABCA and bi-lateral activities to promote international security and defence particularly in relation to NZ trade relations and foreign affairs priorities.
4. Maintain defence capability and preparedness sufficient to credibly assert national sovereignty (ie minimum combat capability, maximum flexibility in support of whole of govt policies).

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

1. Peace-making and peace-keeping contributions in fractured, failing or failed states.
2. International activities resulting from failed or failing states, such as sea piracy, cross-boarder incursions, and para-military criminal activities.
3. Aging population as a challenge for Armed Forces recruiting.
4. Militant religious secularism.
5. Identity and data security including passports and banking.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

1. NZ conventional military security is assured by our proximity to Australia. The alliance with Australia should be the cornerstone of all Defence policy in order to ensure that our obligations and benefits as an ally with Australia are realistic.
2. More coherent policy formulation in relation to tethering Defence policy to wider security and foreign policy objectives would yield greater return on investment. Similarly, in relation to domestic policy such as law enforcement, EEZ patrolling, youth development etc.
3. The keystone criteria for prioritising Defence investment should be in meeting 1 and 2 above and should be agnostic as to how NZDF is then structured and organised in order to ensure that Defence activity is focussed on achieving the desired ends most economically.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

In order to ensure that Defence policy and investment is coherent with a whole of govt approach NZDF should participate/instigate:

- Defence and Security Policy and Strategy Group
- Defence and Security Operations Group
- Foreign Affairs and Trade Group
- Internal Affairs, MBIE, Education Group
- State Services Commission programmes
- Tertiary Education and Research sector group
- MOD and Officials Group

Through participation in normal state services governance and working mechanisms and committees. Using an investment logic approach to Defence could see better returns through more cohesion with MFAT policy, MBIE etc.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Current approach is adequate (ie supplement to civil authorities).

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

In acknowledgement of the unique and profound personal impact that military service has on people in terms of enhancing their ability to participate positively in NZ society, particularly the young, policy mechanisms and programmes for achieving social outcomes such as work readiness and trade training should be further developed.

Consideration should be given to creating a military service immigration class for foreign nationals with priority skills for NZ. This could extend to targeted languages other than English and linked to MFAT/NZAid funding. For example, conducting a military trade school in Fiji under a joint agreement between the NZ Defence College and Fiji military (open to other Pacific peoples too) could increase Fiji and island capacity, identify and up-skill potential NZ immigrants, and promote security and good governance within EC2.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

1. Interoperable with ADF:
  - a. Minimum credible maritime surface combat, protection and support vessel/s (mix of manned and unmanned)
  - b. Amphibious projection and support vessels for a Marine battle group as part of allied/coalition combat operations (less artillery and armour)
  - c. Marine expeditionary light battle group-minus for independent ops other than war
  - d. Marine ResF combat brigade for extended JIIM combat operations in allied/coalition operations
  - e. Spec Forces for b-d above and spt to civil authority.
  - f. Air mobility, recon and projection for a-e above.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

There is always the threat of war and despite the current anniversaries and reflection it appears that these are not factors in the Defence White Paper. The threat of international instability through a number of factors (terrorism, extremism, environmental degradation, mass population movement due instability, economic drivers and persecution) all remain evident and concerning today - the need to be able to provide trained forces to protect our interests remains and should be made clear.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

It could mean any level of intervention including war.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The operations listed in the white paper show a stronger commitment in numbers and variety of deployments in the 90's and early 2000's than in more recent years. Few UN peacekeeping efforts are supported. These have been key to NZ's international commitments and orientation and a more purposeful focus on these is both relevant to the Defence Force and important as to how NZ positions itself internationally.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

More environmental appreciation of our territory is required including the considerable area added as part of the Continental Shelf yet coincident with this was the decommissioning of HMNZS RESOLUTION and the downgrading of the active role the NZDF had in collecting hydrographic and oceanographic data to improve the knowledge of our maritime environment and use this for environmental protection and maritime resource exploitation.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The reality is that most of what the NZDF does is internal within NZ territory and then the next area of focus and presence is, by a significant margin, Australia - thus it is and always will be a challenge to both focus on and commit to security and stability work in other areas - thus guidelines should be used for numbers or % of personnel involved in peacekeeping operations etc and the Government should prioritise operational work globally.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

The lack of use of the NZDF to gather environmental data as at Q.4 above is an example of the lack of an all-of-government approach.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Response is clear and generally appreciated but there is a lack of national level plans for realistic regional events of national significance and a significant lack of coordinated national training for responding effectively to such scenarios.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The YDU programme is successful and appropriate; expanding it in a measured way would be reasonable.



Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

It needs less assets and it needs to train with those that it needs more regularly and operate them frequently. measures of asset utilisation should drive

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

the white paper is incorrect in stating NZDF involvement in Antarctica from 1965 (appears to be based on use of Hercules). Navy ships were supporting the NZ effort from 1956 and the Navy provided advance party personnel in 1955.

The H&S at Work Act will exempt the NZDF from the application of this Act when undertaking operations. The white Paper does not define operations and activities such as Navy deployments are not even considered 'non operational'. Terminology will be required to be more carefully considered, at least in reference to the above Act (potentially in force from 1 Oct 15); standardisation therefore could be useful.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

"Lone wolf" attacks from extremists within NZ.  
Refugees in the form of "boat people".  
Illegal fishing in our EEZ.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

With the increasing unrest in the Middle East, there will be greater scrutiny on how to protect NZ from unknown internal threats.

Our good relations with USA/AUS will mean more operations in a coalition environment.

NZ's seat in the UNSC gives it some weight. Due to prior good track record, NZ needs to bring challenges faced by smaller states to the spotlight.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

HADR  
Military Observers under UN Mandate  
Chapter 6 and 7 UN Missions  
Security Force assistance  
Security Force Mentoring and Training.  
Direct Action against known threats.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

New Zealand should look to work more closely with Australia to assist in international peace and security globally.

This will in turn assist Australia in their own security, and NZ by extension.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

foreign and domestic terrorism via international trade and exports of new Zealand assets and goods,  
gang related crimes against the government, large terror groups internationally expanding over countries  
borders and eventually to new Zealand, difficulty in surveillance following natural disasters

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

International terrorism.

Domestic terrorism.

Overt ethics fundamentalist group that express disdain for Government/Defence Force.

Poorly controlled immigration and related financial laws.

Rapidly increasing over population of developing nations in South East Asia.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

My number one concern for the future is the uncontrolled population growth of nearby developing nations. Most Asian nations do not share New Zealand's respect or concern for the environment and rarely enforce any laws regarding this.

Over fishing and other uncontrolled exploitation of people and their environment is already causing problems in their local regions. Once their populations reach a critical mass they will start to expand out to assert dominance over areas belonging to other nations. New Zealand must prepare for any probable future conflicts of interests before it turns to a conflict of arms. We must be seen as a brick wall to foreign advances not a garden fence. Though we have our natural allies, it is unwise to rely on them completely. New Zealand as a nation must realise that the world is not peaceful or as big as it used to be.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Provide an openly forceful of helpful presence when required.

The defence force must not be seen as weak in the face of conflict and must be deployable and take command of natural or man made disaster situations.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

We must be able to project our authority effectively throughout our EEZ. Due to the rising populations of developing nations and their need for food resources, New Zealand's EEZ might be seen as an easy target with the knowledge of our lack of fire power and the will to use it.

For the subject of the Ross sea, International law must be adjusted to suit the severity of the situation before it can be enforced by New Zealand.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The New Zealand public must come first. Home land protection must be the number one priority.

We must support our traditional allies in every way we can without bringing into concern the first priority.

New Zealand should not volunteer to take on global responsibilities too large for its man power and funding that bring into concern the first two priorities.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Defence must be responsible for informing the government on all defence related matters and advise them on what the defence force needs to address these matters.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

To provide security and protection for New Zealanders.

The defence force must be prepared well in advance for all possible events with provisions for near and distant future predictions of the state of humanity.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The youth of today need a defence force that they can look up to and see as an exciting and worth while career option.

The defence force needs to be seen as an important part of society that is present and respected ion the community.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

An effective and well supported supply chain.

Reliable low maintenance technology.

Effective training for all personal to prepare them for all types of conflict ie. regular and effective small arms training to ensure all Military personnel are proficient marksmen.

Command an effective aerial and maritime defence capability.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Defence personnel fitness levels.

Lack of fire power, especially aerial and maritime, and their associated stocks of munitions.

Personnel retention and moral.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

- Domestic and International Terrorism threats (ISIS and associated groups)
- Possible expansion by foreign powers into our sphere of influence (China, Indonesia, India, Russia) - SW Pacific, Southern Ocean etc.
- Natural Resource Protection (Fisheries, Oil & Gas, People Trafficking).

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Global Financial Crisis

- National Immigration Issues (Build-up of foreigners in NZ)
- Increase in Muslim Terrorist activities (ISIS)

NZDF may have to deploy internally to combat Domestic Terrorism. If the World suffers another Global Financial Crisis some states close to NZ may become desperate and resort to military means to achieve success (Indonesia)

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Navy

- Naval Combat Force - Continue supporting multinational operations in support of anti piracy. Continue to strengthen FPDA defence agreement and participate in exercises. Continue to work with regional alliances ( RAN, RSN, RMN, USN, RN).
- Naval Patrol Force - Continue to patrol NZ EEZ ( Fisheries, Customs, DOC Support)
- Naval Support Force - HMNZS Canterbury to continue to develop Amphibious Doctrine for NZDF. Continue to develop MST and MCM Capability in RNZN.

Army

- Develop a Amphibious Operations Capability within NZ Army
- Continue to deploy troops on Peacekeeping Operations and in support of our traditional Allies.
- Continue to develop interoperability with our regional allies (Australia, Pacific Islands, USA, UK, Singapore, Malaysia)

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Expansion from regional players - as resources diminish there is going to be a increase in resource exploitation eg: Illegal Fishing in Southern Ocean, Domestic Illegal fishing.

Possible expansion into Pacific Nations by China will lead to pressure been put onto NZ by having a Chinese presence in our "neighbourhood".

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Priority One - Supporting Security and Stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia.

- Priority Two - Ensuring NZ is secure.
- Priority Three - Contributing to international peace and security globally.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

As directed by the NZ Government

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

NZDF should be available at all times to provide support to any unforeseen event or natural disaster. Contingency plans for all events should be in place and practiced regularly.

NZDF provides a pool of manpower and equipment at ready notice to assist other civilian agencies in times of need as demonstrated by Christchurch Earthquake, Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu.

NZDF should look to developing a specialised skill set in disaster relief operations and developing specialised skills within its personnel.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

NZDF should continue to work with NZ's Youth via Cadet Forces, Youth Development Unit's and Limited Service Volunteers.

NZDF provides a vital service in this area and it should be considered by Government as a viable option for some at risk youths.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

#### Navy

- A third frigate (or equivalent platform) to continue Naval Combat Force outputs.
- Replacement for replenishment tanker HMNZS Endeavour.
- Replacement for HMNZS Resolution and HMNZS Manawanui.
- Scrap the IPV fleet or give them to Customs/MPI and purchase a third OPV.

#### Army

- Continue to develop Army capabilities across all corps.
  - Reduce size of LAV fleet to a realistic number - outfit some LAV's for specific roles (armoured ambulance, command vehicles, Engineering and Recovery, Mobile Mortar platform, Anti Tank capability etc.)
  - Redevelop a ground based Anti-Air capability within NZ Army - MANPADS, vehicle based SAM)
- Continue to enhance Special Forces (SAS, Commando)

#### Airforce

Purchase a suitable multi-purpose aircraft to perform the following roles ( CAS, Air to Air Defence, Air to Surface, Anti Shipping) RNZAF would only require no more than 12 air frames to provide capability. Suitable aircraft would be F-18 Hornet as used by RAAF and USAF. Upgrade our logistics fleet of aircraft to provide tactical logistics, and strategic logistics capability's.

Look to replace ageing P3K Orion fleet with modern MPA aircraft in the future.

#### NZDF

Investigate and acquire a UAV/ RPAS capability for whole of NZDF. Roles to be conducted include: Maritime Patrol of EEZ, battlefield reconnaissance. Nil combat capability required.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

What is the NZDF going to do concerning the lack of Service Accommodation and Service Housing, particularly in Auckland when the local iwi, who own the land that Navy's Service Housing is situated on, claims the land and houses back. Forecasted to be around 2015 and 2018.

This loss of service housing will affect a considerable amount of service personnel and with Auckland's current housing market been as it is, many people will have no option but to leave the NZDF as owning a house will not be a viable option for them.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

New Zealand is in a unique position in which we are regarded with trust or indifference by most of the world. This works well for our self defence however we can be exploited by parties that may infiltrate our civil systems and use New Zealand as a gateway into their enemy's interests. For example, New Zealand travellers (on New Zealand passports) can travel to many nations without a visa due to our trusted status. In order to maintain our trusted status and integrity we must guard against those that would act through our good nature to harm others.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

I anticipate corporate exploitation of resources to exasperate relations between states and their people resulting in increasing civil tension and potential for internal strife across the globe as international institutions threaten local economies. This will likely result in more political manoeuvring at the United Nations level. However, New Zealand must be ready to act as our national morals dictate. Our population should have confidence that we as a nation through our Defence Force can act to uphold the morals and ethics that we as a nation believe in.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The Defence Force should be postured to protect New Zealand territories from military violation and where other Government organisations cannot reach should protect against external political and economic violations of our territories.

The Defence Force must be operational as a partner in foreign diplomatic missions in the manner that the NZDF has always excelled: hearts and minds. Through winning friends in our neighbouring states and those states that are in our interests to maintain close relations with, our Defence Force can offer other Government organisations a kinetic instrument to further relationship building efforts.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Continuing violations of the NZ EEZ, the Ross Dependency etc highlight that the financial gain to violators exceeds the risk of NZDF interception. This should be assessed as only getting worse as fishing stocks across the globe are over-fished. The lines between policing and military action must be better defined so as to either better empower NZDF to act against the threat or delineate between NZDF activities and those of less resourced other government agencies.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The Defence Force should be regarded as the nation's physical embodiment in the international stage, acting internationally as the nation's values and morals dictate. Our friends, partners and allies must be able to trust us but with trust they must know how far we are willing to support them and we must be very transparent about this.

The NZDF is ideally equipped for protecting our nation's waters and maritime resources, however if this is to be used to maximum potential to achieve real results and set a precedence internationally that we are a nation that does not tolerate violations of our economic sovereignty then the Government in consultation with the NZDF and other applicable government agencies must re-evaluate the Defence Force's security parameters with regard to the protection of our maritime

resources.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

The Defence Force is the subject matter expert at acting in a kinetic manner in any environment and with this the organisation brings organic sensory capability with which to evaluate it's operating environment, not only geophysical and threat but also political and social.

Other Government agencies and Defence must be prepared to function together to protect and further the nation's interests however they must first understand each others' abilities and limitations so as not to clash at critical moments.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

The Defence Force should remain ever ready to assist the civil power in the event of unforeseen events and natural disasters. The organisation is inherently reactive and is designed to operate remotely and under organic support so it is ideally suited to support initial response efforts. The organisation also has a highly competent management function that is designed to use all resources efficiently and effectively even when sustaining loss and damage to function. The Defence Force offers the civil power a pool of capability that can support other government agencies in the immediate aftermath of unforeseen events and natural disasters.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Having seen the results of the Youth Development programs I am confident that the organisation offers values and ethics to New Zealand's youth that socially may not be passed on. I believe that the Defence Force is a competent source of basic development however I do support civilian specialists taking on a case management role post the Youth Development program to follow up on the gains achieved by the youth involved.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

The organisation has a thoroughly competent kinetic force, if the kinetic force is to be used effectively in future it must have a broad spectrum of different information gathering and processing elements to feed the critical information to these forces. With the advent of remote drones I believe that there is a new opening that NZ can exploit better than other nations. Remote drones prevent our personnel from being exposed to risk of death, therefore I believe that drones should be used increasingly in our kinetic forces but in a non-lethal role as I believe that killing opponents in modern conflict is counter-productive and capturing enemy combatants is more valuable to our image than creating further animosity. In this respect I believe that more resourcing be provided to the Service Policing elements for the conduct of processing of detainees and prisoners.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Our forces need operational experience in all facets of their trade and I believe that to maintain competent and experienced forces they should be employed as often as possible in as many different environments as possible. The organisation's strength is in it's accumulated knowledge.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Global spread of hostilities perpetrated by individuals and small groups allied to extremist organisations  
Natural disasters  
Espionage, corporate and government  
Illegal immigration/arrivals by sea  
Illegal fishing in our waters and in the Southern Ocean

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The global spread of individual and small group attacks against states aligned against organisations such as ISIS, Al Qaeda etc. Underpinned by the spread of extremist propaganda via communication and IT systems.  
Global population growth with food shortages  
Need for biosecurity and food product security - risk of corporate sabotage, theft of technology  
Increasing population density in our Pacific Island neighbours as well as in NZ, resulting in larger numbers of casualties from natural disasters. Possibly an increase in severity of weather related extreme events/disasters

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Electronic security and monitoring of individuals/groups deemed to be a risk to our security  
Maintain a capability to rapidly respond to major threats within our country  
Monitor and where needed, control arrivals and shipping in our waters.  
Maintain/develop a more comprehensive HADR capability both for national and international response  
Maintain close military and diplomatic ties with our major allies to ensure adequate support in the face of possible threats

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Illegal arrivals/immigration or importation of weapons for the purpose of terrorist attacks  
Illegal fishing  
NZ is currently too far away and too small to be of interest to large consumers of food/agriculture products, but if global food production becomes insufficient for the needs of large population groups, there may be a risk to our national security.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

The NZDF should be the primary agency with the capability to deliver and provide HADR missions within our shores and to our Pacific neighbours. Whilst this capability exists, it does not appear to be as well developed as that in Australia, nor as rapidly deployable.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Continue to support the cadets to instil a sense of national pride, respect and discipline.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Up to date and inter-operable weapon and vehicle systems. From my limited view in RNZAF related to aeromedical evacuation: Aircraft platforms which are reliable, interoperable with Australia at least, and capable of performing our required mission within a greater range in support of our forces. I'm not convinced that the limited range of the 757 makes it a suitable AME platform for the long distances which may be required in support of our forces operating in the Middle East.

Whatever systems the NZDF purchases in the future should be identical to that operated by the ADF.

We are too small to re-invent the wheel, and should learn from other's experience and mistakes.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Terrorism is an ever present threat, while no direct attacks have yet taken place in NZ, it is only a matter of time. Terrorism also creates instability in parts of the world that have indirect impacts in NZ.

Resource security, NZ is a country rich in living resource, as these become more scarce in the rest of the world NZ will become more of a target for illegal activities/ resource security threats

Climate change will impact the South Pacific causing instability that could easily affect NZ if it is a soft target.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Sino-US tensions have the potential to escalate, as NZ builds healthy relationships with both countries there is potential for this to negatively impact NZ security interests.

It is important for NZ to maintain its image as an independent and valuable global citizen. This means contributing to the maintenance of stability throughout the world, not just sitting in our corner of the world and pretending that it has nothing to do with us. That means maintaining a credible armed force.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Domestic resource security ( EEZ patrol, homeland security)

HADR support to the Southwest Pacific and further abroad

International peace keeping, not just in the popular areas, but in harms way as well

Credible Naval, Land and, to an extent, Air combat capability

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Increasing pressure on living resources, by countries with poor fishing practices and little respect for NZ's marine environment.

oil and gas prospecting as world supplies dwindle and the hard to reach places like NZ become viable.

Illegal fishing in NZ EEZ and Ross dependency

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

NZ should take a defence in depth approach to this by applying equal effort to all areas. Contributing to International Peace and Security through peace keeping missions and if need by combat missions is just as effective in the protection of NZ interests as EEZ patrols and working with our allies.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

The NZDF provides assets, logistics, security and hard line options while other gov't agencies provide specialist skills in areas such as fisheries, customs, policing and health care. It is important that the

NZDF utilise the key skills and abilities of OGA's to contribute to NZ security.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

the NZDF has a pool of well trained, resourced and dedicated people who are ready to deploy at short notice to support HADR operations both domestically and abroad. No other organisation or group of people can provide this level of readiness and support at such short notice. It is therefore vital to maintain a well manned and resourced military. While this level of personnel and resource redundancy is not cheap, it pays dividends when the need arises.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The NZDF should continue to set a strong and proud example to NZ's youth so that they can lay the foundation for NZ's future.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

- Enhanced strategic and tactical airlift capability (C-17 + Hercules or equivalent)
- Maritime patrol and surveillance capability, both air and sea
- Naval Combat vessels able to integrate into a Task Force and act autonomously
- Development of a legitimate Amphibious capability which will become increasingly important in the South Pacific as climate change starts to take effect (CANTERBURY doesn't cut it)

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Nil

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

1. Protection of the resources around NZ, such as fishing, water, hydrocarbons and minerals.
2. Protection of trade links as NZ is a maritime trading nation and to ensure our prosperity we need open sea lanes of trade.
3. Instability in the world through terrorism or other actions such as what is occurring in the Ukraine, ie keeping "good world order". While a small player, NZ needs to be able to contribute in small but meaningful ways, be it via Land, Sea or Air capabilities.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Instability in the world through terrorism or other actions, such as what is occurring in the Ukraine, could impact on NZ's economic prosperity and therefore the ability for NZ to remain a stable and safe place to live. The difference between stability and anarchy in society is only three dependable meals. Cut food supplies, fuel etc to NZ and it is conceivable that internal violence could occur here. To counter that, NZ will have to remain willing to help overseas actors with their problems, as we have done in Timor, Afghanistan and now Iraq.

The alternative is that NZ becomes self sufficient in everything we need and I don't believe we could do that without even more investment than what is placed into the Defence Force now.

In a 25 year time frame, anything could happen in world politics and technology. But as a Force for NZ and NZ's insurance policy against troubles ahead, the Defence Force needs to have the personnel, flexibility and tools to do our job properly. This will require investment from Government but is essential for NZ's safety and economic prosperity.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

1. Surveillance and protection of NZ's maritime arena. NZ has a huge area of maritime interest, ranging from Antarctica up to the Equator. In order to use our small resources in an effective way we need better surveillance of this area and that means Satellites, aircraft/UAVs and patrol ships and closer relationships with our partners in the area.
2. It is not enough to just understand the space we live in, but if there are threats to that space we need to have the teeth to deter or to defeat an adversary. The Defence force needs capabilities that are known and respected by our adversaries. Anti ship missile delivering and anti submarine capable aircraft/UAVs, sufficient Patrol Vessels to cover all parts of our EEZ and combat vessels. As an aside, the last 10 years has shown the Navy that to generate one operational frigate we need three, as shown by the struggle the Navy is having to generate one frigate while they are undergoing much needed upgrades. The Air Force have 5 Hercules for a reason, ie this generates at least 2 operational aircraft.
3. Expeditionary effects. Cyclone Pam showed how NZ must have the tools required to support our neighbours. The Solomon Islands also show how we must have the means to undertake policing actions, while Afghanistan has demonstrated that to operate in peace we must train for higher end military actions. In other words, NZ will most likely be safe and secure for the future, but the world is going to require help and as a good citizen of the world, we should be able to help. This means a highly equipped, small but deployable army, ships and aircraft to get them to the places required and more ships and aircraft to keep them supported while there. But to be effective and credible will take investment on the part of Government.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its



immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

1. Protection of fishery, gas and oil resources and the unknown minerals that are within our EEZ.
2. Protection for, and support to, our interests in Antarctica as there is too much unknown wealth in the continent to not look to protect our interests there.
3. Illegal immigration. While not yet able to make it to NZ, it's probable that global warming will force the displacement of people, especially in the Pacific (low lying islands) and NZ could be a very attractive place to live. While the current Mediterranean Sea illegal immigration problem (6,000 illegal immigrants in the last 7 days alone) may not be of a similar scale here, it is something that NZ needs to be ready for.
4. Stabilisation of the Pacific Islands. It is in NZ's interests to ensure that we can help local islands remain stable, otherwise NZ may need to help them on NZ soil.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

1. In the next 25 years I think the threat to NZ's EEZ and immediate territory is going to be our biggest concern. As described above, this is a Maritime Environment, requiring the right balance of ships and surveillance aircraft to protect this life giving resource.
2. We must also be a player in the world. The Defence Force is an extension of political will and is a diplomatic and economic assistance tool when required. So we must continue to contribute to operations overseas. I think most of NZ accepts that we will never have a "powerful" military and nor should we as it's too expensive. However, how about being very, very effective with what we have and adjust it's personnel and equipment make up to match the modern threats of today. We must be able to be effective in helping our Pacific neighbours if they are threatened by an adversary or a natural disaster and we must add some value to an Australian operation if required. Ships and aircraft can provide an effect greater than their cost and footprint. Furthermore ships, especially frigates, provide the only independent NZ Government effect that does not require a supporting country or base.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

The Defence Force is an extension of political will. We already work with other government agencies ranging from Civil Defence, to Police, to MFAT through to GCSB. This must continue and we need to be able to provide these agencies the tools they need to be successful as well as using these tools in the world. A frigate in a Middle Eastern port, providing an opportunity to show-case NZ's food and beverages is a powerful selling tool. The ability to recover bodies from a sunken ship or aircraft at home is a powerful message to the NZ public on the value of their Defence Force. The ability to operate with and for the GCSB when required, is a powerful message to our partners about our value. This encompasses cyber defence which is an increasing area of direct attack on this country that will grow in size and capability.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

This has been discussed in places above. The Defence Force is NZ's insurance policy for disaster relief and we need to be able to provide the capabilities that the NZ public expects of us. We should

be ready to help the NZ public in many scenarios, outside of the traditional roles of Fire/Ambulance/Rescue helicopters etc. These include, submerged ships/aircraft recovery, environmental disaster protection and recovery (especially if more offshore oil/gas platforms arrive in NZ waters). This is going to require a specialised vessel (the Littoral Operations Support Capability) in order to do this well. Furthermore we need to do those traditional tasks like rescuing people through to dropping relief supplies to communities isolated by floods. The Defence Force will continue to be expected to undertake operations and activities that are beyond the capability of other rescue services.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The Youth Development Units seem to be doing a good job in turning troubled youth around. This needs to be supported.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

The balance of the Defence Force isn't right I think. A maritime nation like ours needs to have a maritime focus and be prepared to understand and defend the "moat" that surrounds us, be it above or below water and in the air. This requires effective surveillance tools like satellites, aircraft/UAVs and Patrol Vessels and then equipment with teeth (aircraft and UAVs (maybe), and frigates for the ability to loiter and defend to stop an adversary.

The SAS remains the premier warfighting Army tool. I suggest it is expanded in numbers if possible. The regular Army continues to be the feeder unit for the SAS but is reduced in size. The remaining army is focused on becoming a more flexible, highly trained unit. This is in all areas such as LAV use through to dismounted operations that is focused on a company strength that is able to seamlessly operate with and from ships (ie with CANTERBURY on Pacific island tasks) and be supportable through a number of rotations, in terms of people and ships and aircraft to support them. Dare I say a Marine Corps style arrangement based on a company size? Expansion, if required, comes from an increased and supported Territorial Force.

The Air Force needs to continue to provide lift for the small army contingent above and for operations within NZ as well as the maritime surveillance and prosecution missions discussed above.

I think the Navy is too small in personnel numbers to undertake this increasingly maritime focused role and will need to increase in size. Furthermore, as for Army and for Air Force, in order to have one operational unit, you need two supporting it, we also need three Patrol Vessels and three frigates. Canterbury and an Endeavour type vessel provides support to the rest of the Defence Force.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

The current Defence Force is appropriate in size but I don't think it's balanced in the personnel structure or in the equipment based capabilities that we have. I believe a Maritime Focus is essential for the next 25 years as resources become more scarce and adversaries look to our space, water and resources with envy.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

social media being used to

- 1) attack people, via bullying, stalking, being found guilty before being proven innocent
- 2) to recruit people for causes in other parts of the world that are not part of the NZ morals/values.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

ensure our good relations with allies. and continue to educate NZ (the service personnel) about the other services. exchange programmes are an excellent way for this to be achieved and should continue. ie Longlook. also for our people to continue studying under the tuition of other forces.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Do not underestimate the work that YDU is doing. Ensure this programme stays for a very long time. Make it a permanent feature of the NZDF and remove threat of the unit being disbanded. The work that is done with NZs troubled youth today will have a direct impact on the current issues of domestic violence/ aggravated robbery/ unemployment etc. by giving our youth a chance to learn more pro-social behaviours we are creating a better chance for our future generations.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

We are there to maintain law and order. to bring calm. to set the minds of all civilians at ease. to show that if/when a disaster hits, there is no chaos and a plan is in place to make everything ok again. for those who are severely affected to share their burden and take away some of the pain.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

see answer to Q6

also, back in the day many youth were given the option to either serve a sentence or join the defence. Many chose defence and as a result have had highly successful lives and I am sure there are some WOs out there today who were given that very option.

There is so much red tape out there now that even defence will not accept applicants that have a mark or two against their records. We have trainees who would thrive in a military context but can't due to a few poor life choices. when you meet them and understand that they weren't choices, but were forced to do the things they did because of circumstance, the heart bleeds. We are trying to defend a nation, lets give our young people hope and an opportunity to better themselves by reopening the channel of military service.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

A major threat that has increased since the last Defence White Paper is the threat of terrorist acts carried out by extremist groups. This threat will no doubt continue to grow in the future.

In addition to this, the on going threat posed by illegal fisheries to our national interests is still present.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The uprising of extremist groups mentioned above have developed and continue to develop. They appear to be gaining momentum and have established a strong foothold in the Middle East especially (however they are spreading and making their way into other parts of the world). The inability of the Nations in that immediate area to deter such groups is of concern and as a result, it has necessitated the input and assistance of Nations from further afield. As a result, the NZDF have made a decision to provide assistance and thus have unfortunately increased the likelihood of creating a vicious cycle whereby our involvement may also make us more of a target here at home.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Counter terrorist roles.

On going maritime patrols of our EEZ

Increase interoperability with our ally Nations - in particular US, Australia, Canada and UK.

Maintain and increase our intelligence gathering in an attempt to intercept and cut off extremist groups mentioned in previous answers.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Once again; one of the largest security challenges we are likely to face in this region is from extremist groups. The challenges associated with identifying, monitoring and intercepting such groups will be difficult but is paramount.

In addition to this, our EEZ must be monitored and patrolled, and not only patrolled, but if/when breaches are discovered in this area, we must be firm and carry out actions to ensure the offending party is punished/reprimanded and future offenders are deterred.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Forces efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and

and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Ensuring NZ is secure must be our main priority and this is where the majority of our efforts must be concentrated. This is also achieved not only on our shores, but off shore in areas such as the Middle East. Although it is far away and seems distant, this will have a huge bearing on our security at home as this is where the bulk the threats originate.

Secondly, the security and stability of Australia and our ally Nations must be ensured. This is achieved by joining these Nations in their efforts at home and abroad.

Thirdly, contributing to other pursuits such as humanitarian aid missions is still important, however

should not be carried out at the detriment of our ability to commit funding and resources to looking after our own security interests first and foremost.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

By committing resources where needed. For example maritime patrols of our EEZ in support of fisheries, customs, immigration etc.

Also, our participation in the Antarctic mission - whilst non military in nature in terms of its overall intent - assists other departments and areas such as research and scientific pursuits. A by product of this involvement is that it is a mechanism to increase our relationship and interoperability with the US.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

We provide a rapid response ability with a relatively large pool of people and resources. Not only do we simply provide a pool of people, it is the type of people that is key. These people are generally fit, well equipped, well disciplined, and skilled in a wide range of areas that are of great use in such times. For example; Medics, field engineers, fire fighters, plant operators, drivers, logistics specialists etc. And these people often possess superior leadership qualities which is critical in times of unforeseen events and natural disasters. The types of resources are also of great benefit in such times; aircraft, vehicles, ships, and other equipment. The NZDF is a large group of very well trained and adaptable people that are at the NZ government's disposal for these type of situations should they need them.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

It is not really up to the Defence Force to develop New Zealand's youth. They will be too busy undertaking the roles described in previous answers above to also be charged with this additional responsibility. If they happen to have some positive influence on NZ's youth by virtue of the fact that they set a good example and are seen to be something to strive to achieve then this is simply a beneficial side effect. There are numerous other government departments that should bear the responsibility of youth development, and in fact this is their core purpose, so it is unreasonable and unrealistic to expect the NZDF to also take on this responsibility. After all, the NZDF does not expect other government departments to undertake any of its core roles and responsibilities.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Modernised, versatile, and more capable airlift capability is essential. Currently we are reliant on other nations for assistance with airlift when it comes to deploying. We need to be more self sufficient in this regard. This is likely to be achieved by more than one type of aircraft. A larger, long range capability for transporting such items as the NH90 helicopter, LAV's etc. and a smaller capability for domestic/short - medium range.

At a minimum, an air combat role must be re established. Initially, this would consist of ground attack/close air support aircraft. Once again we are reliant on other Nations for this capability and we need to be able to carry out this role ourselves. This does not have to be 'jet' aircraft. Now that the T-6C Texan is in service in the RNZAF, this is an ideal opportunity to reinstate an air combat capability into the NZDF. There is a variant of the Texan which is designed specifically for the ground

attack/close air support role and would be logistically sensible and affordable to acquire.

An increase in UAV capability makes sense in the modern military environment. UAV's can be employed in any of the core areas of responsibility that the NZDF operates; Counter terrorism roles for reconnaissance and surveillance and potentially to carry munitions, maritime patrol, as well as assistance to the NZ Army as is currently used. They can also be used for some of our other roles such as disaster relief and humanitarian aid missions in a reconnaissance and survey capacity.

Obviously the increases in capability mentioned here are 'air power' related, due to my background this is the only area of NZDF I feel confident/qualified to comment.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other

defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

1: Weak nation states in the Pacific. Corrupting influences, some tainted by extreme terrorism groups ideologies, are influencing politics in the Pacific region. As a result, NZ can expect to see an increase in the following...

- a )The emergence of struggles between key players of the nexus between terrorism and transnational crime.
- b) The continuation of foreign nationals attempts to arrive at NZ's borders with nefarious intentions.
- c) The growth in corrupting influences in NZ's economy.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

NZDF should continue with its stated aims of protecting NZ's strategic interests and the interests of its allies, particularly its closest ally, Australia.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

- 1. People smuggling.
- 2. Human trafficking.
- 3. Radical Islam.
- 4. Commercial transnational crimes.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

- 1. Beef up its external security layers by building its air strike force capacity to enable early threat engagement at its 200 mile territorial zone. Loan 4 x F18 Hornet jet fighter planes from the Australians. even have our allies based here. 2 x planes at Auckland, 1 x at Ohakea, and 1 x at Woodbourne. This strike force capacity would rebuild that which was decimated previously plus give the Australians something to do with their old F18s as they are going to replace them anyway.
- 2. Abandon large, cumbersome frigates and develop capacity for an array of faster, smaller interception-type vessels very much akin to the torpedo boats of WW2; such vessels enabled rapid response and engagement with enemy. Forget using frigates to slowly intercept foreign illegal fishing vessels, only to run out of fuel whilst the offender slips in and out of territorial waters. Instead, deploy special forces to parachute to the vessels and detain them, then have the fast interception boats mop up.
- 3. Bring back better fitness and recruitment procedures that will get the best people into the job. be more involved in the community by being more visible.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Ensure we are mission ready by continuing to train for all unforeseen scenarios imaginable. Use our



quality friendships with the allies to best utilise our resources and grow our combined body of knowledge in modern warfare by continuing to train with them. Tomorrow's wars are asymmetrical; they will if ever again be against massed concentrations of troops or armaments, unless the new era of superpowers such as China or Russia try it.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Be ready...use the unforeseen as lessons in readiness. Volunteer to help here and overseas, as we already do.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Raise your profile, many of our youth are loaded with talent and would welcome the challenges that the NZDF could put to them. Russian president Putin has just decided to raise the standards and expectations of physical fitness in Russian schools, as his govt fears an inactive, indolent, and unfit future for many Russian young people. Good idea. Lift the bar of expectation from the present participation to that of competitive...That is why the Soviet Union was so successful in its professional approach to physical education.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Unless we are going to use Air New Zealand or an ally's air force to carry our combat troops, we need to beef up our air force so that we are more able to meet threats earlier. Having a ground force is ok but we don't have any threats here. We need to continue to be able to take our people to the threat...which means we need a bigger air force and a strike capacity to ensure that is possible.

NZDF should also recognise that NZ has punched above its weight in most wars on record. In many respects, our sporting and business prowess is a consequence of our superior commitment to win despite the odds. Our special forces are an obvious example of this, as US president Obama wanted to use them repeatedly. We should, as do a number of smaller nation states, develop our capacities in spheres relevant to their operations: size, ability; strengths, and threats.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Our air force strike force capability was decimated and whilst it would be cost prohibitive to replace ourselves, why don't we ask our allies the Australians if we could loan 4 of their F18 Hornets and base them at the 3 air bases in NZ. Bring their crews and tutors over and teach our pilots how to fly them. Have the rapid response vessels constantly mobile protecting our 200 mile zone, and get more kids into the army. Compulsory service of some type has worked for Sweden, Japan, Israel and anyone else...bring it back....

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Protection and enforcement for the natural resources of NZ, it's protectorates and South Pacific neighbours (particularly their fisheries).

Territorial disputes on the Antarctic shelf.

Instability of governments and public institutions within the South Pacific region.

Civil order and the maintenance of core public services and infrastructure under the increasingly severe effects of climate change.

Widening inequality of wealth, privilege and opportunity under entrenched free-market policies will create opportunities for disaffected parties to act against governments and the general public.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The regional influence of China and India will continue to rise and increase tensions with USA.

The exploitation of natural resources will increase with accelerating degradation of the environment and associated collapse of food systems.

Global population increases and widening prosperity gaps will worsen the impacts from natural disasters and severe climate events.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Regional peace keeping and stability operations.

Search and rescue.

Civil assistance and disaster response.

Regional pre-conflict and post-conflict peace-building.

Natural resource protection and monitoring.

Cyber warfare.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

As above

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

An increased focus on support to democratic government in the South Pacific.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Continue to play a key supporting role.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Maintain a critical mass of standing military forces at key locations around the country to provide a contingency force for a range of scenarios.

Continue to train and upskill young New Zealanders for roles beyond the NZDF due to the skills, experience and attitudes engendered by military service.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

No change

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in

the future?:

Most of the current capabilities. There is no apparent contemporary role for indirect fires.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

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Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

I would like to comment on the down sizing of Waiouru as a Military Camp. Waiouru is an important part of the Army Training. There are several units that require the use of the Training Area that Waiouru offers. These include Combat School, Artillery School and the LAV's. With Combat School, they are here in Waiouru doing training for long periods for most of the year. This is a wasted cost to the Defence in the travelling, accommodation and meals. This also applies to all the schools mentioned. With the Artillery School, moving to Linton has meant that they not only do not have the space to fire their weaponry but also the fact that they are not able to move their guns in and around the Palmerston North district. The LAV Wing, this is a cost to transport the LAV's up to Waiouru every time they wish to use them. There is no room in Linton to do the kind of driving required to keep our guys up with their driving skills. Where else in the country do you have the space to do the kind of training that our recruits, cadets and quite a few of the units need to protect our country effectively and it will also at the same time save the Defence money with all the costs of them being away from their home location. It will also be better on the families in the long run, if they chose to come to Waiouru as when the soldiers are not in the field, then they can be home with the wife and kids outside of work hrs. A lot of people grow to love Waiouru and wish they would never leave. These people with the posting cycle only stay for a short time (usually 2 yrs) and those that have never been here before usually do not want to come as they think of it as isolated. I understand this, but would it not be better to be with family as much as possible and I am sure that there are families in these units mentioned that wish they were here rather than in Linton by themselves while their partners are here for training for long periods.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

cyber threat and those political and religious groups opposed to NZDF policy.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

NZ Defence has to be aware of the potential threats to bio security and New Zealand's ability to supply good quality agricultural and horticultural products. NZ Defence can play a greater role in border security both at airports and coastline.

NZ Defence can in association with Internal affairs establish a coastal surveillance monitoring that can support our border controls against possible threats by foreign invaders electronically through an enhanced use of the present light house facilities and actively monitor coastal activities.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Better awareness of our local environment and the enhanced ability to react in a timely manner as and when this is needed.

The use of satellite technologies will provide us with an ability to monitor our overseas interests and provide an eye in the sky approach to our assets abroad.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm of Cook Islands and the Ross Dependency?:

Primarily this will be the protection of our fishing from overseas interests and can include the Cook Islands and allied places who wish to see New Zealand and in their economic development.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

NZ should look at how effective it can be in establishing a monitoring capability for its own sovereign territories and then in association with other countries in the region develop a protective framework that benefits the economic wellbeing of our friends and partners and of our ally Australia and in so doing promote the spirit of international peace and cooperation for the benefit of the New Zealand region.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

By providing the expertise and knowledge necessary for the development of the protection of the nation's interests.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

NZDF provides a national ability to help out directly with any natural disaster that may occur in a positive and practical way that goes well beyond the capability that the police or civil defence organisations can offer.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

NZDF can offer a guiding set of values that could help NZ youth become far more positive in their outlook by providing a positive role model that the youth of NZ could aspire to achieve, making NZ better and safer as a whole.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

To be the best at what it does and to be able to develop in this capability for the future.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Screening of immigrants could see a significant involvement by NZDF in weeding out undesirable people at the border in a collaborative approach with existing border control agencies as NZDF will be seen as having a weapons capability that other border control agencies do not have.

This could be for all manner of border control issues at airports and coastal surveillance.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Lone Wolf attacks by people influenced by Isis or other extremist groups.

Environmental Extremists, (baby powder attack)

Media influence on public opinion can be detrimental to defence and security.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Be more active in conflicts overseas, eg, Boko Haram in Africa, Isis in Iraq. Step up our involvement in combat missions.

Also other conflicts closer to home such as West Papua.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

New Zealand's security should be the priority, but just because we are isolated from the rest of the world shouldn't mean we sit back and not contribute to international peace. Just as we shouldn't just wait for an incident that affects us to happen, I believe we should be more proactive in our role as a responsible and contributing global citizen.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

More funding, more opportunities to work with coalition countries to advance knowledge, share ideas etc.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

1. Chinas Military expansion (both in hardware and South China Sea/Spratley islands)
2. Indonesia as a potential failed state.
3. Economic downturn if NZ adopts a militarily isolationist stance that has an adverse economic impact with our trading partners.
4. Challenge of adopting expeditionary war fighting in the amphibious environment.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

1. Chinas changing demographics will result in China being at the peak of it's maximum potential military and economic power in around 10 years. from then on, an aging population and declining birth rate may push China into a "use it or lose it" military act. Discussions in the Peoples Army(PLA) Publications on anti-corruption policies as a means of improving the PLA's warfighting ability is indicative that within the PLA that military confrontation is not "if" but "When".

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

- Promote inter-operability in expeditionary warfare in an Amphibious environment. This includes inter-operability in both the tri-service and coalition environment.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm, Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

1. Internal - Civil Disturbance in the Urewaras.
2. External - Increased Antarctica land claims (eg China)
3. Influx of refugees (of note - refugees, while "challenging" can also be an economic advantage for NZ by providing diversity).

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

- Equal priority. They are all interlinked. Supporting the security and stability of our friends and allies ensures our own long term stability and security.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

- No Change, with the exception that HQ DJIATF (HQ Deployable Inter-Agency task Force) is permanently established with permanent roles and not the current double or triple hatting that is occurring with "shadow" post parolines.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

1. In the short term, it is essential as "first responders" (eg the Christchurch Quake).
2. In the long term, it is essential as the NZDF is a de-facto tertiary education provider. As such, it is a means of changing the long term culture, ethos and behaviour of the NZ population. promoting resilience and hardiness into the NZDF will flow into the general population.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

1. Promotion and support to the LSV and Cadet programs should be increased.
2. Of note, an enhanced LSV (short of full conscription) may fill the void created in the late 70's and



80's by the disbandment/downsizing of the territorial battalions. The youth of yesterday, today and the future want mana, respect, a sense of belonging and to be part of a team or whanau. The gang problems now prevalent in rural NZ, were exasperated/enhanced by the territorial force cutbacks. The gangs filled the void.

3. Full conscription is not recommended. The potential adverse effect is that minority groups attain military training which can be used in subversive acts of violence.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

1. Increased tactical and strategic airlift and strategic sealift capability.
2. An significant improvement in current tri-service inter-operability.
3. A significant reduction in current tri-service rivalry.
4. Increased co-location (in peace time) of tri-service personnel who are required to work together operationally. Specifically the co-location of a Joint Movements/Terminal Unit in Auckland where 100% of the NZDF airlift and Sealift capacity is based.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

1. The NZDF is the only ABCA nation that does not co-locate it's Terminal and Movements units alongside the respective mode of Transport. NZDF has 100% of it's strategic Air and Sea lift assets located in Auckland, but has it's Terminal and Movements units remotely located in the Manawatu region. This is not the best practice of our Coalition partners (eg 176 Port and Maritime Regiment is co-located in Portsmouth alongside the Royal Navy. This slows down the mobilisation and deployment process.
2. The greater Auckland region is the single biggest regional recruiting pool for NZDF. By not having a significant Army/land Force element in the Auckland region (not everyone is good enough to be in 1 NZSAS Regiment), we are depriving the NZ Army of a large pool of potential recruits who wish to be subsequently posted to the Auckland region.
3. Recommendation, establish an Army Terminal Unit in the Auckland region. It only needs to be a Platoon (minus) in size, and has the advantage of providing redundancy/back to 1 NZSAS, JMCO Auckland, HMNZS CANTERBURY and the new Logistics supply ship.
4. The new Zealand tax base is too small to sustain three independent services. We are adopting amphibious expeditionary forces along the lines of the USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). This may result in the NZDF amalgamating the NZ Army and RNZAF into a single service such as a Royal New Zealand Marine Corp, complete with it's own Rotary and Fixed Air Wings. This will go a long way towards mitigating and removing inter-service rivalry.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Public Apathy -

\* What are they here for?

\* What are they there for

Lack of funding for capability.

Lack of public understanding of role and need for combatant Navy.

A higher need for community engagement.

A lack of understanding regarding our global contribution.

Geographical naivety.

A cap threshold (personnel).

Finance.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Are we actually a fighting force and do we need to be?

Should we be contributing to world base order or looking after our own EEZ.

A lack of understanding regarding the need for a war fighting capability.

Don't sell our capability well to support new capability.

No reserve capability - platforms and personnel.

Over commitment of a capability. Platforms get morphed into multi role functions.

Lack of a personnel capability brick. Without enough or the right people, assets and capability are a waste of time.

Increase simulation.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

1. Challenges to our EEZ
2. Competition for resources in our EEZ and the EEZ of our protectorates
3. Radicalisation of religious minorities within NZ

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The end of the Antarctic Treaty system and the Madrid Protocols (banning resource extraction in Antarctica) around 2048 will lead to a massive increase in resource competition and extraction in Antarctica. In the lead up to this, research activities will also increase. While NZ remains committed to a demilitarised Antarctica, the Ice area to the pole is included in our SAR region of responsibility. The increased activity will see a need for NZ to increase its SAR capability on Antarctica - across sea, air and ground. At present, NZ has no airborne ISR capability that can conduct search over the ice that can be based from NZ without having to land on the ice to refuel. Also, NZ Army has not Antarctic SAR capability.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

1. Protecting the natural resources in our EEZ and the EEZ of those small Pacific Island states that lack the defence capabilities to do this for themselves.
2. Acting in humanitarian interest to prevent, reduce, or end conflicts.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

The end of the Antarctic Treaty system and the Madrid Protocols (banning resource extraction in Antarctica) around 2048 will lead to a massive increase in resource competition and extraction in Antarctica. In the lead up to this, research activities will also increase. While NZ remains committed to a demilitarised Antarctica, the Ice area to the pole is included in our SAR region of responsibility. The increased activity will see a need for NZ to increase its SAR capability on Antarctica - across sea, air and ground. At present, NZ has no airborne ISR capability that can conduct search over the ice that can be based from NZ without having to land on the ice to refuel. Also, NZ Army has not Antarctic SAR capability.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

There are no physical military threats to NZ's territorial integrity - NZDF efforts at home should be prioritised on disaster relief and protecting our resources in our EEZ.

NZ should not be afraid to commit forces to contribute to international peace and security - either under a UN mandate, or a coalition of willing nations.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

NZDF should be more closely integrated with national security agencies (e.g. SIS and GCSB). There is little point in establishing duplicate capabilities in a force / agencies as small as ours.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Realistically, the NZDF is a small pool of available manpower - it lacks the mass to make a huge difference. It's real contribution is in leading the initial reaction and planning the response - these take advantage of the key NZDF strengths.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

It is a defence force not a social agency. Too many politicians / older voters think of the NZDF in terms of the Compulsory military Training of the 1950s/1960s, when violence was an accepted method of discipline.

instead of focussing on the scraps / dregs of society, the NZDF should be used to advance the case of high-performing youth and helping them to excel.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

1. The ability to conduct ISR across our EEZ / protectorates 24/7, and to analyse the data collected.
2. The ability to deploy our land forces by sea/air in time to make a difference without having to rely on Australia
3. The ability to commit meaningful land forces to combat operations

The ability to operate anywhere across the globe - not just the southwest pacific - from Antarctica to the Arctic

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

There is a lot of talk about procuring C17s. I believe these are important as they allow us to project to Antarctica without risking a landing in dangerous conditions if conditions change in flight.

Acquisition of C17 should not be viewed as a complete alternative to a C130 liker capability - we still need something that can carry a LAV to a small strip, as the C17 would struggle to land on many strips in the South Pacific. We need both capabilities together.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

The protection of our maritime environment, its enclosed resources and the trade that flows over, through and to/from our EEZ.

NZ is critically reliant upon the sea for our trade, our well being and our economic development. The vast majority of our trading partners lie beyond what many call the arc of instability we need to ensure that the sea lines of communications and the air lanes remain open for free trade.

We are surrounded by ocean and seas which many see as our natural defence. It is also our natural Achilles heel because of its size and our reliance upon it. Ensuring we have the ability to project the necessary force and effort to maintain sovereignty over our domain as well as protect the resources should be of critical interest and importance.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The influence of Non state actors on the global economy will continue to increase as will the negative consequences of their influence on global confidence.

The shortage of fresh water and protein (and in some cases actual physical land) within the Pacific region will begin to excerpt pressure on common sense and reasoning and we may start seeing some unexpected actions and aggression from some nations. Fresh water and protein (ie Fish) are more important than oil in many small nations. The aggression and turbulence that we witness in the middle east due to our dependence on oil, could easily be replicated in our region when the shortages of fresh water and protein begin to eventuate.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The current roles listed in the SOI and other Strategic documents remain as valid today as at any stage. It can appear though that we sometime do not focus on them in any priority order. When you consider that the primary mission of the Defence Force is to secure New Zealand against external threat, to protect our sovereign interests, including in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and to be able to take action to meet likely contingencies in our strategic area of interest....it did seem unusual that the last strategic review dropped Inshore Patrol out of the equation (IPV did not feature in either the Initial Deployed Force nor the Rotation Force for 'option 20'). The focus was clearly on meeting contingencies in our strategic area of interest. Consequently a suitable Force Structure to sustain safe operations for the IPV was not included in subsequent Force Generation equations.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Very similar to my answer to Question 2 - The shortage of fresh water and protein (and in some cases actual physical land) within the Pacific region will begin to excerpt pressure on common sense and reasoning and we may start seeing some unexpected actions and aggression from some nations.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

By introducing and maintaining capabilities with the agility and capability to operate on and in 'the NZ station' as well as further afield with limited requirement for regeneration. There should also be sufficient capability (from a quantity) perspective to ensure NZ remains secure whilst also contribution else where. This should be an 'and' equation not an 'or' - therefore the requirement should be to have enough agile and flexible capability rather than single one-off niche capability than can only operate in NZ OR elsewhere (not both).

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

as required to support our National Security Policy.....

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Provision of people and infrastructure to ensure the nation (or region) can resume or continue to function as soon as possible. Support as required to the nations emergency services in a subordinate role.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

To provide high quality, safe training to convert our youth into effective sailors, soldiers, air men and women and civilians (such as interns) to ensure the NZDF has the workforce required to excel.

I personally do not believe (for a range of constitutional issues and protection of the vulnerable) that we should work within other circles such as YDU. Service in the military needs to be a personal choice, a choice to uphold our values and ethos and deliver our purpose. I am not saying that the current 'YDU' model shouldn't continue but I do not believe it is up to the military to conduct it.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Capabilities with the agility and capability to operate on and in 'the NZ station' as well as further afield with limited requirement for regeneration.....and sufficient personnel to sustain the safe operation of those capabilities.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

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Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

- The NZDF should focus its acquisition of new capabilities to proven off-the-shelf military hardware, rather than wasting hundreds of millions of dollars on attempting bespoke upgrade projects.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

In the short to medium term there are unlikely to be any direct physical threats to New Zealand. Our isolation makes us a 'difficult' proposition for a country to physically attack New Zealand. In the long term, particularly as resources are expended, there the risk begins to grow as large countries need to find new places to source food, water and other resources to continue developing.

The immediate threat to New Zealand is the taking of resources that are difficult to police, essentially those at sea such as fisheries.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The Pacific and South East Asia are both very dynamic and challenging areas, both of significant importance to New Zealand. Although international conflict is not certain, small scale international hostilities are increasingly likely in some areas, particularly places like the Spratley Islands where resources are claimed by many nations. Should the localised problems escalate, there is potential for larger scale conflict.

The impact on New Zealand would be significant. Not only do we have large trading relationships with countries in this area, a significant portion of our trade to other parts of the world travels through the region also.

Many South East Asian countries see Defence Forces as more than just a military tool, they see it as essentially to foreign affairs and diplomacy. Without a credible military capability, the ability of the NZ government to have any ability to influence affairs in the region will diminish. The ability to contribute military and intelligence capability to an enforcement operation in the South Pacific and SEA regions is also important to provide us credibility with traditional allies.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The NZDF should be the primary physical 'projection' organisation available to the Government. The NZDF should be able to conduct all activities required by the government outside NZ Territorial Waters (the police should be the primary power inside TTW). It should be the primary overseas intelligence, military force and foreign affairs organisation the government uses to achieve its aims. Within New Zealand, it should have the ability to support other government agencies in areas where the military capability provides the ability to cost effectively aid them. Examples of this are the Navy and Airborne Surveillance and Response Force supporting MPI, Customs and Foreign Affairs. The air transport force supporting other government agencies and all the services providing manpower in natural disasters, both within New Zealand and overseas.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Worldwide shortages of natural resources is likely to be the biggest challenge facing New Zealand in the long term. Our small population means New Zealand's resources are likely to last considerably longer than many other nations. This includes fisheries and offshore mining as well as onshore resources such as drinkable water.

The spread of terrorist organisations and the problem of disaffected individuals is also an issue for New Zealand. No matter what involvement New Zealand has in overseas deployments, we are seen as a western country. This makes us a target for disaffected people no matter what our foreign policy

is.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The primary purpose of the NZDF should be to provide military capability within New Zealand, in our immediate areas of interest (Australia, South Pacific and South East Asia) and if available the wider global community. Outside of some very basic core military capability that has been used in peace keeping and enforcement, it should focus on niche areas where a small force can have a large impact and will be valued more by allies. Areas such as Special Forces and ISR fit this capability. As a maritime nation, maritime forces (both naval and airborne) should also be a priority. To achieve this, lower level military capability will be required to grow people into the specialist areas, however the focus should be on the niche capability.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

The use of the Defence Force can be a cost effective means of supporting other government agencies. The size of New Zealand prevents government agencies having high tech and expensive assets for their own use in a way that the US do with the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol have. Where military capability can transfer to support other government agencies, it should be used as much as possible. This includes personnel to support civil defence, MPI and customs support from naval vessels and air force surveillance aircraft and support for long range search and rescue to the RCC.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

The NZDF should be able to provide a large volume of personnel who are trained and able to operate in varied environments to assist agencies such as civil defence. This can also occur in the Pacific where those countries do not have the ability themselves. The NZDF should not be the lead in these areas, rather work to support other government agencies.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The development of NZ youth should only be a secondary role. Other agencies such as Social Development should take the lead. Although the NZDF may have people able to assist in some of these activities, it should not be to the detriment of being able to provide military capability. The NZDF should also not be treated as a 'training ground' for industries. It should focus on getting the most out of its investment in people and training. It is a huge waste of resources to see someone trained, provide outputs for 20 years, and then not have their engagement extended because their 'time is up', only to see someone new needing to be trained to do the exact same role.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In general the capabilities the NZDF procures should be 'off the shelf' and not unique to New Zealand to reduce risk of project failure.

Capabilities that are essential to have include:

Special Forces.

Long range multi-mission maritime aircraft capability. Manned for combat roles and search and rescue and either manned or unmanned for ISR.

Naval Combat Force. We are an isolated nation and the only real way here is via sea. Protection of Sea Lines of Communication is also vital to NZ.

Air and maritime transport capability. Sufficient to move current and future sized deployable platforms.

Land Combat Capability. To provide an independant small force to Pacific Nations for peace keeping/enforcement ot to contribute to a larger force in higher level combat operations.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Increased infringement of the NZ EEZ by other nations due to shortages of global resources and a potential perception that we are unable to police our own territory.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

An extension of funding to the YDU programme to provide increased intake capability into the programme as well as increased staffing for the programme to reduce instructor fatigue/burnout.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Proven, off-the-shelf capabilities. The recent upgrade to the P-3K2 has highlighted the escalated costs, drawn-out deadlines and under-performing equipment. NZ's defence technology industry and the NZDF's hardware requirements are too small to support in-house development/upgrade projects.

Air-to-ground strike and sufficient airborne self-protection equipment. With the progress of overland ISR on the P-3K2 the shortening of the intel and targeting loop is likely to be vital to effectively supporting our own and allied ground forces.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Protecting the EEZ and other natural resources of NZ.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

With the depletion of fishing grounds in other regions NZ's EEZ and the Antarctic are becoming very tempting areas for foreign fishing. The knowledge that NZ has limited Naval and Air resources to monitor and protect these areas further tempts foreign nations to exploit these resources. This will require the NZDF to improve capability in the areas of ISR of these areas especially increasing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Monitoring and managing the protection of NZ's natural resources. providing Humanitarian Relief especially within the South Pacific region. Aligning with our coalition partners and sharing responsibilities to maximise effectiveness without incurring excessive costs associated with trying to do everything ourselves (we must work as a coalition partner and trust our partners!).

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Illegal foreign exploitation of our natural resources.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Protect our natural resources first and foremost, align closely with our coalition partners, especially Australia, provide regional support to the south pacific region, and then support our partners in areas further afield.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Share resources and capability to the greatest extent possible: This includes creation of an All of Government Corporate ITC system managed under one roof that supplies corporate business solutions based on individual user sign-on and credentials (PKI and single sign-on). The reduction in licenses across the government agencies combined with the buying power for hardware and other ITC devices will result in significant savings that can be used to improve the quality of service delivery and ensure well managed and scheduled rolling refreshes of hardware and software required to perform daily corporate functions.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Be ready to respond to provide humanitarian assistance and national security to the people of New Zealand. Ability to mobilise personnel and equipment in support of police, fire, and other first responders as needed and provide a common Command and Control infrastructure that not only supports military functionality but also general internal government and NGO C2 capability as well.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

As Prince Harry recently said, the Defence Force provides a structure that aids youth in developing a quality set of values and work ethic that significantly contributes to the current and future stability of

the country. Outreach to the youth of NZ by the NZDF is critical and should be encouraged as a means of providing the youth with a common understanding of individual responsibility and their importance to being a part of New Zealand today and into their future!

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Significantly more surveillance and monitoring of the EEZ as well as the ability to respond to threats to our natural resources from illegal foreign exploitation. Larger Navy and more UAVs in the Air Force. It should also be noted that having only ONE naval base places NZ at SERIOUS risk of not being able to support the Navy should anything happen in or around that single point of failure. With such a significant reliance upon the navy, as NZ is an island nation, that single point of failure can and WILL be exploited by those desiring to do harm to NZ. One terrorist attack upon the navy's single base of operations could knock out the navy's ability to support operations in and around NZ for a significant period of time resulting in the ability of foreign agents to freely exploit our natural resources in and around NZ until the base is made operational again. Similarly, one natural disaster in the area of the base could result in the same outcome. This is totally unacceptable for a island nation!

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

In the Defence White Paper 2015 Public Consultation Document Defence Command & Control System (DC2S) is shown as completing in 2015/16 timeframe. The IIS plan signed by capability steering group (VCDF) the Initial Operational Capability of DC2S is scheduled for 2016 with Full Operational Capability to be declared after SK17 (i.e. later 2017 to early 2018). This will only happen IF Sr. Leadership continues to support and resource the many functions of DC2S and the changes required to fully implement and exploit the capability of DC2S. Network Enabled C2 is a paradigm shift and will take time to absorb and learn how to properly exploit this capability to the full benefit of NZDF and the greater NZ community.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

The people of New Zealand must be protected from terrorist attack. However, this threat is not existential. The greatest direct threat to our prosperity and thus our security is disruption to the sea based trading network on which we are dependent for 90% of our trade by value and 99% by volume. A serious threat to the free movement of goods at sea would destroy our economic life. Such threats are certainly foreseeable.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The situation in the South China Sea has the potential to disturb the balance of peace in our region, particularly if nationalist forces gain traction in Asian countries. Our economic well being and security would be directly impacted by such conflicts. We must be seen to contribute to honest brokerage in such a scenario - while being demonstrably aligned with the rule of international law. This will require maritime presence. An inability to project such presence will diminish our standing with key Asian partners and our right to be heard in world affairs.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The NZDF must be able to guarantee territorial sovereignty and sovereign control of resources under UNCLOS, for both NZ itself and our Pacific friends. Maritime patrol and response must be given the right priority. MPR resources must be configured for multi-purpose deployment, which can be achieved relatively easily with both afloat and aviation assets. Government must also have the option to deploy force in ambiguous contingencies where basing and over flight rights are problematic. Again, maritime forces are essential to this. These forces must be credible in combat.

Please note that I say "right" priority, not "absolute" priority. The relative importance of missions aside, there is an absolute moral obligation on the NZDF to ensure that those force elements most likely to be placed in immediate danger are properly equipped and protected. The needs of the special forces trooper and the infantry rifleman must therefore be at or near the top of the order of priority.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Illegal exploitation of fish stocks is the dominant threat and will be for the foreseeable future. Weather and sea conditions protect against illegal immigration to a very large extent, although this may emerge as a threat downstream.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

It is a fallacy to assume that meeting these commitments requires disparate forces and thus prioritisation, particularly in the maritime sphere. Capable maritime forces can be employed in all four contexts without waste given intelligent force design including use of systems modularity (systems compromising both people and equipment).

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

There is too much fractured effort at present despite the example set by NZDF and customs. Bodies like ODESC are not sufficient to ensure operational and tactical alignment. There should be a single operational tasking structure for all agencies that contribute to defence and security, and fully aligned procurement and interoperability policy.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Plainly the NZDF has a role, albeit as a by product of primary capabilities. Any insistence that we assume a more prominent role should not be funded from Vote Defence - without a concomitant reduction in defence commitments, which is not in any sense sustainable.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

the current YDU serves a very useful purpose and should be continued. It could be expanded subject to MSD resourcing,

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

We should stop conflating platform size with role. There is no longer any logic to the argument that links proximity to or distance from the high water mark with vessel dimensions. As opposed to two FFH, two OPV, and four IPV, we would be better off with five flexible multi purpose platforms that can be role configured as required, using UAV and the very capable RHIB now available for true inshore work and with modular systems held ashore and installed with the people to operate them for higher end operations.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

People issues are the main impediment to the effectiveness of the NZDF. This is caused in part by the talent shedding necessitated by our "up or out" pyramidal career structure, which sees us haemorrhage effective people for not other reason than to maintain promotion opportunities. The DWP must address this a means of retaining and promoting talent.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Domestic Terrorism-the rise of ISIL as an internet entity has provided more opportunity for a domestic terror attack.

HADR-The NZDF runs the risk of being caught short in the event of a large scale domestic or overseas HADR operation, due to constant underfunding of HADR capability in the 2ER and 2HSB, and over reliance on the Canterbury and ageing C-130s. This problem will be exacerbated if the NZDF purchases a smaller fleet of transport planes than we currently have, or if said planes require longer/better airstrips to land on than the C-130s.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The growing influence of China in New Zealand's area of influence in the Pacific could lead to low level confrontations, between the NZDF and Chinese forces, similar to those currently seen in the South China Sea. In addition, the growing problem of overfishing in the Southern Ocean will lead to more conflict between our Navy and illegal fishermen. If the NZDF does not seriously invest in an assault boarding capability for our Navy, we risk being embarrassed again and again by both parties.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The NZDF should be continuing its operational focus, by deploying more soldiers abroad to support UN missions throughout the world. In addition, we should look into placing soldiers into Pacific nation militaries, as part of expert knowledge exchanges.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

As I have mentioned in question 2, Chinese influence in the South Pacific and illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean will be two of the NZDF's major problems we will face. In addition, domestic terrorism

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The NZDF needs to focus more on its Joint Task Force, based on a USMC style force, allowing us to be more flexible and deployable. This will allow us to not only support our own domestic needs, but also react quickly to support our Pacific neighbours and Australia. The NZDF should support international peace and security as our last priority, through UN backed deployments.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Unsure.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

The response to the Canterbury earthquake, while being a fluke due to the fact Southern Reaper was operating in the immediate area and 2ER was deployed to Woodbourne already, is exactly how the NZDF should act. However, too often the soldiers on the ground are unable to deliver the full effect due to poor decision making in HADR Task Group HQs, and by poor deployability of needed assets

and troops due to lack of air or sea lift. As such, major changes need to be made in these areas if the NZDF is to be able to react effectively in HADR operations.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Compulsory Service for two years from the 18th birthday, then five years in the Reserves. This not only enables us to fill our recruiting problems throughout the services, but also instils a military discipline and drive in New Zealand youth. We can then also pick the best from that group to further serve the NZDF as Officers and NCOs.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Greater sea lift capability, as the Canterbury is always suffering breakdowns and going through refits. Another vessel, of same size, would help relieve this problem as at least then we would have one vessel operating at all times.

Updated medium air lift capability. The C-130s should be replaced by the same number of planes preferably updated Hercules planes or an extremely similarly capable airframe. While Globemaster's and Galaxy's may make us look cutting edge, they are far from what we need and from a price comparison alone they are a terrible option, as a new Hercules can land on shorter, rougher airstrips (such as those we use in the Pacific), are much cheaper to purchase and maintain, plus we already have all the infrastructure in place.

If we look towards re-instating our Combat Air Wing, we should look towards purchasing a wing of A 10 Thunderbolts, as they provide us with a true and proven Close Air Support capability, given that while we will not face a foreseeable air to air threat in the future, allied A 10s were used by the NZDF in Afghanistan to great effect. The purchase of these would also bring a lot of pride and prestige to our Air Force.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

The fact that the RNZE is not included in the plans for the Cav Task group strikes me as strange, given we are always needed and used, and this could be why no one outside the RNZE seems to know our capabilities or how to deploy us.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

**The following are the main potential threats and challenges to New Zealand's security;**

Religious extremism on a global scale,

**"Home-grown" extremists' attacks,**

Countering foreign intelligence agencies conducting operations against New Zealand personnel, interests and assets both domestically and overseas,

Protection of natural resources against aggressive state sponsored exploitation and violations of sovereign territories,

Supporting traditional allies in conventional warfare against advanced adversarial forces on multiple fronts.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Three major themes dominate the international environment.

The Russian problem. Over the last year, Russia has begun to show the international community that it is still a major military super power that should not be underestimated. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsular from the Ukraine, supporting of Pro-Russian militia in the east of Ukraine, bolstering of all branches of the armed forces with new equipment and technology, and incursions over NATO member state borders are all provocative actions testing the resolve of the international community to intervene.

A traditional likening of Russia to a bear could be used to describe what is happening throughout Europe - The beast is awakening from hibernation and is now looking for food. The Cold War is over and is now warming up, with the potential of engulfing the West in an inferno.

If Russia continues down this path of provocation, a singular diplomatic or military event has the **potential to spark of a new European war, which in turn will affect New Zealand's economic and security partners.** This tipping point will not only throw Europe out of balance and into war, but could also send a broader message to other state actors to engage in their own national expansion agendas throughout the world and usher in a new era of global conflict.

Chinese economic expansion. The Chinese, like the Russians, are flexing the strength through economic power backed by the military, rather just by force. The sheer rate of modernisation and need for all things western by an ever expanding and enriched population, is overtaking the **country's ability to supply the resources domestically.**

In response to this, the Chinese have expanded. They have become a global heavy weight many diverse fields of production of various consumer goods, the banking sector holds the majority of western debt, the country has physically expanded its territorial claims in the South China Sea, and is **providing "free" aid and construction projects to smaller nations throughout the south pacific with the caveat of their future support to any future endeavours.**

Although these are not necessarily provocative economic tactics, the potential for stand over posturing, economical isolation or seizing of resources by force to secure the interests of the Chinese people is always a threat.

Non-State Actors. The potential for an unforeseen attack on civilians, military personnel, interests or

infrastructure by Non-state actors provides the biggest direct threat to New Zealand's and her allies' security in modern times.

The rise of Islamic State (IS) is only one of many threats by non-state actors that could major implications to New Zealand's security. This is largely an unseen enemy which hides in the shadows and can strike with little to no warning.

The nature of the tactics employed by non-state actors, by default, puts Defence on the back foot. Without full spectrum information gathering and intelligence analysis of probable threats, "out-of-the-box" thinking and the ability to rapidly act on real-time intelligence, Defence will not be able to effectively combat and neutralise any threats.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The roles should be:

Defensive and Offensive joint information and intelligence activities.

Persistent overhead surveillance over areas of interest.

Defensive and Offensive counter-intelligence activities.

Counter terrorism and insurgency operations

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

**"Home-grown" extremists' attacks.**

Hostile foreign intelligence services operating within New Zealand and the countries of the south pacific.

**Aggressive state actors bolstering military activity within New Zealand's' AOI, AOR and EEZ.**

Over exploitation of natural resources within our EEZ and areas of responsibility by corporations and aggressive state actors.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

New Zealand – No attacks on the homeland.

Allies (FVEY/FPDA) .

Partners and Friends.

Global Security.

Peace keeping.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Defence should have a collaborative partner with civilian security services and police. Considering the size of the NZDF, a plug-and-play approach to any operation, choosing those based on expertise and experience, rather than on rank or service, is a smarter and more effective way of approaching complex situations or operations.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

To provide the next level of expertise, professionalism and equipment above and beyond those available to civilian first responders at short notice in order to preserve life.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Part-time National service for high school students from the age of 16. This would instil a greater sense of patriotic duty and social responsibility. It could also provide those who would normally left school early, an opportunity to gain a trade or move on to a military career after high school.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Tactical and Operational level unmanned aerial vehicles, including live full motion video downlink for all stakeholders (operational units, headquarters, government agencies, etc.). These aerial systems should be armed variants in order to project force in support of expeditionary forces if needed.

Future proofed intelligence facilities for all stakeholders. Physical infrastructure, C2 systems and IT.

Tri-service approach to equipment procurement and training.

Tri-service training of all trades to maximise interoperability.

International training/exercises/deployments/postings across ranks and service branches.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Move sourcing and supply of key items (ie: clothing or IT) away from potential adversaries and back to a domestic supplier and/or historically friendly/allied country.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

The threat of an attack inside NZ from a homegrown terrorist, or from someone who has returned from fighting in foreign conflict zones (e.g the middle east).

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Peacekeeping in the Pacific will always have a place, but experience fighting in an asymmetric conflict (e.g Iraq) will allow that knowledge to be brought back to NZ for WHEN there is an attack in NZ.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Being able to monitor homegrown terrorists will soon become an issue, as NZ's public opinion is strongly against this, so is essentially tying the hands of the very people who are trying to protect them.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

This is not a blanket answer for all situations, but typically where Australia (and 5-eyes) go, we should follow. We essentially use Australia as a barrier between us and the rest of the world but do little to pull our weight. Having worked with several 5-eyes nations in my job, their opinion of us is dwindling due to the fact that we are quite often "the last to show up, and the first to leave".

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

There should still be control of the defence force by the government/people as that is who we serve. But our activities on operations are released to the public far too often/too soon which sacrifices our OPSEC as well as the OPSEC of 5-eyes partners.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

NZDF does well in times of civil emergency, and their current role/actions with respect to that should not change.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

I believe in re-instating CMT, or putting more effort into cadet forces. I came from cadets, and it taught me discipline and mental fortitude and gave me a career path in the army.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

An airforce strike wing. As this is how majority of the future wars will be fought. With majority of our 5-eyes going to the F35, we will be able to purchase F18's from them.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Operations are important. For experience of the soldiers, as well as building ties with our 5-eyes partners. And for retention. There's no point training people, who then leave because all they do is train, those days are gone. Operations is training as well.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

1. The rise of fundamentalist groups such as ISIS, Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
2. Invasion of our EEC Zone by foreign flagged fishing vessels.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

See Q1 but as some of these factions seek to impose their views on society they will definitely affect our security. This could be actual violence or cyber activities. The use of social media to influence young people has already caused an impact.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

1. We should continue to support our allies in ventures that seek to counter the radical threats we face.
2. We should continue to provide humanitarian aid to our neighbours and friends.
3. We need to actively discourage poaching from our EEC

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territories of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

We need to maintain the status quo in Antarctica and to provide full surveillance of the EEC by both Naval and Air Force units.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

First priority is to work with our allies - Australia and the United States.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

We should try to work as a combined force but recognise the individual traits of each service.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

The main response to any disaster be it in NZ or overseas is to provide shelter, food and water to the people. Then to support rebuilding or rehousing efforts

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

I think the Defence Force should not take a major role. I think supporting the Cadet Forces provides an opportunity to younger people to experience the military lifestyle if that is what they choose to do. I would not support a return to compulsory military training.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

The Defence Force needs to ensure it is well manned with capable people who are trained to operate the best that modern technology can provide. We should not shy away from major capital expenditure if that is what we need to do to buy the most suitable equipment. Keeping 50 yr old aircraft going is not the best way to spend the Defence dollar for example.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

I think we need to look after our people better. My 20 years in the RNZAF set me up financially thanks to the generous superannuation options that were available to me. I feel sorry for those serving now in that respect. However I would still encourage the Defence Force as a good career.



Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

My thoughts regarding major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security include but are not limited to:

1. Piracy on shipping lanes through South East Asia disrupting trade to/from NZ.
2. Illegal harvesting within NZ EEZ, specifically NZ fisheries and mineral resources.
3. Instability of various South Pacific nations.
4. Insurgence of religious extremists.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The major shift of power/influence occurring in world politics i.e. the once sole superpower - America and the rapidly developing China, will have an enormous impact on NZ. I see this affecting the NZDF in that America will endeavour to retain its post WWII ally while China will try to gain the trust of a new (strategically placed) partner. This situation has the potential to provide the NZDF with the ability to once again establish itself as a strong (pre-nuclear free policy) ally of the US Defense and also increase its dealings with China.

The recent movements in extreme religious activities, especially wrt Islam should be of concern to NZ and the NZDF with South East Asia both a neighbour and a critical trade route.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

1. Secure NZ trade routes, specifically the South East Asia shipping lanes.
2. Intelligence gathering/surveillance regarding NZ resources.
3. Be both a role model and provide support for our South Pacific neighbours.
4. Prepare and mitigate for the worst case scenario regarding home-grown terror attacks.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Piracy, illegal fisheries, illegal mineral extraction, illegal immigrants and vigilante activities (i.e. Sea Shepard). Major challenges wrt all of these are distance, area and media.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

NZ, South Pacific, Australasia, South East Asia and the rest of the world.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

NZ Govt. agencies need to be more integrated and intelligent. Although over the last decade this has been mentioned, from my perspective this has mostly occurred at the upper management levels. For example there must be extensive cross overs throughout the various Govt. departments regarding training. However, apart from the odd and generally one-off participant this enormous resource each department funds is left under utilised.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

The NZDF is NZ's security policy. We provide what the NZ Govt. demands and requires of us.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

I believe the reduction of trades and personnel within the NZDF has been to the overall dis-service of the nation. The NZDF has the potential to provide the nation with skilled, employable and disciplined citizens. I would strongly recommend the Govt. utilises the NZDF to up-skill the youth, noting that although the NZDF may not get extensive service out of all personnel that the country as a whole is better off.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Combat, intelligence gathering, air and sea lift capability.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

The NZDF is too bureaucratic, this has lead to the non-operational areas being less than optimal in effectiveness and efficiency. The back-end seems to been expanding at the expensive of the front.

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Released Under the Official Information Act 1982

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Radicalized/ home-grown terrorists, Foreign nations encroaching upon NZ's economic zone

World War 3

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Will the Chinese for a new world axis? Which side do we stay on?

Will we be called upon to defend NZ from foreign invasion?

Does the NZDF have the capability to repel invaders? or help allied nations defend their own ground? no

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Have a strike capability, build up our strategic air-transport and tactical air-transport capabilities (and not confuse the two!), invest in a new aircraft to maintain a high level of advanced technology, not 50 year old aircraft, so we have highly trained technicians and crews, and the aircraft have more efficient flight profiles (saving money and not polluting the world)

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm, Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Pirate/ illegal fishing

Inability to control the Ross Dependency should the Antarctic treaty ever fail (the growth of bases by nations who we could one day be aligned against, like China and South Korea within the Ross Dependency)

The Navy is too small to police these areas

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Much higher than they do now. We are scrapping the barrel, and it is the Defence Force personnel who are always getting the pointy end of the stick.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

We should be a vast manpower resource, but there aren't enough of us to do that without negatively affect our primary jobs or putting excessive strain on our families.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Military style academies, much like YDU, but schools.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Decent Air Transport (strategic and Tactical and Helicopters)

Air-defence (strike wing) capabilities

Sea Defence- more ships

UAVs

What is the point of having a big Army when we can't get them in anywhere???

Stop thinking the Army Way is the Right Way. Each Force has it's own strengths and weaknesses, and the continual efforts to be purple (which is really Green) just means the differences that make each service strong are being erased.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Please Stop cutting personnel numbers, we are hurting so badly.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The first priority of the NZDF under the Govt should be its commitment to the defence of New Zealand and the stability and security role it can play in our immediate neighbourhood in the Pacific.

The Govt needs to consider appropriate contributions to international security and peace-keeping operations which are UN mandated or supported.

Decisions about deployments need to be made independently by New Zealand in accordance with international law rather than one where one country(s) impose their will on New Zealand to deploy by virtue of their size and power. Decisions to commit troops into high threat environments for any more than twelve months should require bipartisan support across parliament.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The Defence Force has had a proud history in the development of New Zealand's youth, not only for the young people that enlist but also youth who participate in programmes like 'Youth Life Skills' and 'Limited Service Volunteers'

Empowering young people to take control of their lives and reach their full potential no doubt contributes to New Zealand's security - as a result YLS and LSV programmes should be given the same priority as any other operational roles the NZDF is required to perform.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

The first capability the NZDF needs is people.

Over the last five years, regular force personnel numbers have been slashed by over 1,000. There has also been a reduction in women serving in the Defence Force. Record low morale and high attrition have resulted in major losses of skilled and experienced personnel.

The Defence Force has estimated it will take at least seven years to restore the force to its former strength.

The Defence White Paper needs to outline the Govt commitments to the NZDF through:

-Honouring the social contract between Government and Defence Force personnel who, without union representation or ability to negotiate wages, rely on the Government to treat them fairly.

-Recruit and up skill personnel to the level required for the Defence Force to carry out the roles expected of it and to ensure the ability to deploy, to sustain the appropriate level of readiness and fully utilise assets which can not currently be used because of lack of skilled personnel.

-Work actively to reduce the level of accidents and work injuries in the NZDF by ensuring best practice in workplace safety.

-Ensure that it recruits the best personnel available by ensuring equitable treatment of men and women in the Defence Force, irrespective of gender or orientation.

The Second capability is Equipment:

-Investment in capital equipment needs to be continued to ensure the effectiveness of the Defence Force, to maximise the safety of its deployed personnel and to ensure its interoperability with the Defence Forces of those it trains with and works along side with overseas.

-The Govt needs to ensure the NZDF has the equipment to achieve a robust network enabled command and control system and an effective Joint Force Capability.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Aside from the obvious requirement to protect NZ's sovereignty NZDF should be focussed on achieving the NZ Govt policy goals abroad. Focus should therefore be around our trade partners and those countries with whom we share similar values and morals. We should be looking at where we can make the most impact on these relationships and scale our forces accordingly.

We should acknowledge the limited types of operations and locations where we are likely to take on a lead role and be realistic about what roles would add value to our likely coalition partners and where they would be comfortable using us.

We should be turning our weaknesses into strengths by acknowledging our strategic projection issues and inability to field large forces. Rather than trying to emulate conventional capabilities geared to mid intensity combat we should be focusing on niche capabilities that are highly valued by our allies and easily projected.

Some examples of these could be HUMINT and PSYOPS teams or specialised assessment teams for community engagement during the planning phase of missions or natural disaster relief.

We should minimise our focus on conventional, balanced forces and instead include a heavier weighting of these easily deployable and highly valued niche capabilities which we could readily send wherever there was a desire to have NZ represented. This should also be reflected in the organisation of the Defence Force with these niche capabilities grouped together in units specifically geared towards deployment rather than being cobbled together on an as-needed basis.

We should be focussed on light (non mounted) ground forces as these are much more strategically deployable and able to be maintained at a high level of capability with the resources that NZ has at its disposal. They are also more likely to be useful in our primary areas of concern with regard to protection of NZ's sovereignty.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

NZDF should be more tightly integrated with the other government departments and even within the respective services. There would be great benefits from utilising light infantry as reconnaissance for various departments as but one example.

There are synergies to be gained where the ability for non-kinetic NZDF capabilities being utilised operationally by domestic agencies would also provide a significant training benefit for NZDF. This happens already with the EOD capability and should be extended to other areas where NZDF core capabilities can be utilised for their intended purpose but in a domestic setting.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Defence should not be a stand-in for social welfare. Just because Defence can fill this role if required it does not mean that it should on a permanent basis. Surely it is a waste of resources to use personnel trained to fight overseas in a role of youth development. It has to be more effective to use people that are predominantly trained in youth development to undertake this role.

If what is desired is a specifically military experience then consideration should be given to compulsory military training so that NZDF personnel can add value in their field of expertise and the resilience, understanding and organisation of the nation can be improved as a result.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

One of the biggest issues for Defence capabilities is the capability procurement process itself. It takes an inordinate amount of time and effort to procure simple capabilities or even like-for-like replacements of current capabilities.

NZ should not be looking to be on the cutting edge of defence technology but should adopt a fast-follower approach where we identify a capability gap as is presently the case but then select only from proven products in-service with trusted allies. If we waited until an ABCA nation had a capability in service for two years and discussed it with them prior to purchase there would be very little risk to NZDF with that capability. The real benefit to this approach would be if it resulted in the ability to relax or get an exemption to the MBIE rules of procurement. Rather than spending 5-10 years identifying, justifying then selecting capabilities we could reduce this to less than two years with less risk. This would be a huge saving in man-hours and free up personnel for other areas of Defence and is likely to cost less at every stage of the life of the capability.

NZ does not have a defence industry so we would not be unduly discriminating against local providers. Likewise if we only selected from countries that ran fair and open tender and evaluation processes then we would not be discriminating against any manufacturers.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

The NZDF currently operates under a manning cap which is detrimental to efforts to modernise our workforce planning and administration. We can not be a flexible employer, allowing for example a parent to return to work at 50% full-time capacity, if we then count that 50% as a whole person for manning purposes. We would quickly run out of vacant positions before we fill our required output needs.

We should instead be working to a monetary personnel budget with the salaries of uniformed personnel set centrally as is the case currently but with CDF or component commanders free to manage numbers of personnel as they see fit within their personnel budget to achieve their outputs.



This could include the option of uniformed or non-uniformed personnel filling the various roles and the ability to readily transition between the two.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

From what I have observed in the media, I believe the greatest threats to New Zealand are religious/political extremism and international crime.

As we have seen with the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a greater trend in civilians taking up arms against perceived aggressors. Whilst this is admirable in some cases the fact that they form their own groups rather than join militaries is of great concern. As we have seen with Australia and Europe, these fighters are coming home and trying to enforce the ideals taught to them whilst overseas in their home country, which, particularly in the case of ISIS, conflict with the ideals of New Zealand. These foreign fighters and those who here are compelled to go, but are unable to do so, are a threat in that we may be perceived as a possible target to many of these overseas groups, as seen in Australia with the Sydney siege in 2014.

Probably the greatest threat that has become apparent especially in the case of al-Quaeda, is that no one singular group are often solely responsible for attacks and threats, but many smaller groups that are influenced by a central idea. Ways to combat this I think would be better education and monitoring of at risk groups, (which seems to be adolescent males) so we can show these groups through education that these extreme ideas are contradictory to the country they live in and harmful to themselves and others. With the emergence of the internet as a significant medium for ideas and theories to be shared, particularly social media, the use of these resources should be considered greatly in detecting, resolving and combating any threatening media that is being distributed.

I have also mentioned that international crime is a threat, and by that I mostly refer to illegal immigration and smuggling. As seen in Australia and now Europe, mass refugees are increasingly trying to seek more drastic ways of entering the country, I believe that as Australia's border strengthens our borders may be seen as a better option to possible asylum boats.

It is for this reason I think it is imperative that New Zealand maintains and possibly looks at strengthening its border security, so maintain or upgrade the P-3K2 aircraft capability, and maintain a strong Navy presence in our exclusive economic zone to maintain our border security and help deter potential illegal immigration and smuggling.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The NZDF should continue to assist and lead in humanitarian missions, search and rescue, aerial surveillance and overseas training. I think we should also show a greater interest in wartime capability of our force, the amphibious task group seems to reflect this, but should not be entirely the basis for a quick response battle group.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and

security globally?:

New Zealand at home should be the first priority then other overseas commitments. The government should take great care when deciding upon deployments particularly combat deployments as to whether realistically we have the manpower and capability to actually make a difference.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

In peacetime the defence force should be able to operate easily not only within itself but with other government departments as well.

The military police should work more closely with police perhaps even cross training

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

New Zealand's ability to handle a national and or global pandemic and the associated national and international civil unrest that would cause. The New Zealand government must be able to command and control large amounts of infrastructure with the assistance of the military. Because the military over time is being focussed on a few nesh outputs its ability to respond in a meaningful way for a reason such as this is questionable at best.

Maintaining New Zealand influence in pacific islands. How will the pacific islands look and be governed in another 30 years? Its not hard to make some reasonably obvious predictions that could cause some headaches for our regional security. A increased and continuous presence in and around the pacific islands is achievable and expected of New Zealand.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Chinas influence in the pacific will cause tension between NZ and the US in the future. This will happen because of the trade links between China and NZ and the closer regional relationship NZ and China will have due to their political influence in the pacific.

New Zealand's historical brotherly relationship with Australia will become increasingly strained over coming years. This will happen because of increasingly differing defence and foreign policy, in simple term Australia siding with the USA "more" than NZ and the differences in defence policy that requires.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Maintain an ability to "war fight, or make peace" not just peace keeping

MPA Maritime patrol Air Craft

Strike air craft

Capable Battalions

Sea lift and OFP Off shore Patrol vessels

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Pandemic

Other county's Submarine's using our and the EEZ of our pacific island neighbours unchecked.

Illegal immigrants on boats, possibly during a global pandemic

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

New Zealand defence minister should seriously consider aligning Australian and New Zealand defence policy as much as possible. Separation between NZ and Australia in public opinion or the will of its Politian's is in it self a threat to our life styles as we know them. For any serious threat to NZ in the future will require absolute co-operation and "good will" between the governments, defences forces and peoples of Australia and New Zealand. This requires NZ to make contributions far away such as is happening in Iraq with the ISIL fight and other operations. The NZ public should be told and involved more in what the defence force does.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

As it is I think it is quite integrated into the all of government approach now

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

All NZDF personnel should be trained to understand that despite specialisation they are employed at the will of the NZ government to do any duties required of them. The NZDF is getting very corporate in its attitudes and I believe this is diminishing its ability to respond to unforeseen events in a timely manor. The NZDF should be able to provide 100 people instantly and 1000 people within 24 hours for national resilience reasons.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

NZDF should continue and increase its role in LSV.s limited service volunteers. Their should also be compulsory service or some young offenders.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

MPA Maritime patrol air craft

Air Combat capability

Heavy sea lift

3 combat battalions

OFP off shore patrol vessels

Military emergency services

Simple capabilities like the ability to provide large amount of man power, accommodation, food and tent.

The military should not be reliant on civilian agencies, that is the whole point of a military to be able to operate when everything else stops.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

People who work in the New Zealand defence force should be able to have the same job security as other government departments. For example everyone in the Nez Zealand defence force is on a fixed length of employment contract. Example 3 years 10 years ect. e result being large amounts of our most skilled and valuable defence force personnel leave for the private sector for fear of not gaining "contract extentions". This is a self imposed handicap the NZDF imposes on itself of the ill thought

out reason of keeping NZDF core personnel young in age. The NZDF policy of short fixed contract employment has many unwanted and ill understood outcomes that could easily be remedied if the employer "NZDF" simply used normal performance based open contract used for all other government employees.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

ISIS and Islamic extremism, maritime trade routes disrupted from global unrest or piracy, Cyber Attack and terrorism, espionage or high level information gathering from other nations. Illegal fishing in NZ EEZ

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

major economic collapse of one or more traditional military allies, and the rise of fanatical non state actors. This may mean we can not rely on our traditional military allies as we current do. Due to the size and make up of our defence force, we rely heavily for logistic and combat support when conducting operations overseas. if we don't have this support and can't or wont deploy our troops because of that we could start to lose our standing and influence in the international community.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Maritime security and patrols, increase maritime presence in the South Pacific, including South America. Continue to support our allied partners in peace keeping and combat operations. Support MIO operations off the Horne of Africa and Persian gulf areas. Send Naval Assets to visit our free trade partners to reinforce that partnership

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

illegal fishing in the EEZ, cyber attacks and terrorism, illegal immigrants via boat. Foreign vessels that are unsafe, un seaworthy or using unsafe work practices in NZ waters. Maritime trade routes being disrupted by piracy or global unrest. Though not in our immediate territory, disruption to the maritime trade routes has a direct and immediate impact on NZ economy.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Support Allied partners in Peace Keeping and Combat operations. continue to participate in joint multi nation exercises. Continue to send defence personnel on courses and training opportunities with allied militaries. Invite more foreign militaries to exercise in NZ.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

the NZDF can provide a large amount of man power that is quickly deployable. The NZDF has the ability to move large numbers of displaced people quickly. The NZDF has a large range of technical skill sets to help with HADR tasking. The NZDF has a well defined command and control structure to manage all this.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

YDU and LSV to continue but offer leadership courses to all secondary school students.

Sponsor or be present at more outdoor activities and sports (like the US Navy sponsoring the winter X games).

Completion Shooting is a very fast growing sport in NZ, and though the service rifle champs are held in the Waiouru every year there many more events that happen all over the country.

anything on the water the Navy should have a presence in, surf life saving, thunder cats, yacht racing.

getting young people involved in sports that a link to military skill sets should be looked into.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

NZ Naval combat fleet needs be increase to a 4 frigates.

1st for overseas operations

2nd for South pacific, southern ocean patrols or exercising with Australia.

3rd for training or in a regeneration phase

4th in maintenance.

RNZN boarding capability needs to increased to deal with the modern threat. A stand alone Boarding Team that can be deployed and operate off a foring military vessel, provides a huge benefit to the government. i.e. A deployed boarding team is still gives a valuable contribution but without the commitment of a whole frigate.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Strike aircraft or attack helicopters need to considered as a part of long term strategic plan.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Present threats:

- Jihadist terrorism emanating from Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen
- Growing challenges to liberal international norms of democracy, free markets, respect for sovereignty and self-determination, particularly by Russia and China
- East Asia instability, especially over resources, strategic sea lanes and spheres of influence in the South China Sea

Future threats:

- Proliferation of jihadism, state collapse and sectarianism in the greater Middle East and North Africa
- Relative decline of American global power and rise of revisionist non-democratic powers, especially China and Russia
- Pacific conflict and instability, particularly over resources

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Changes in international environment:

- State collapse, jihadism and sectarianism in Middle East
- Increasing challenges to norms of state sovereignty and post 1945 liberal international order, especially from revisionist states of Russia, China and Iran
- Decline of US superpower status and rise of China; possibility of an eventual transition of **hegemonic power and development of new international norms and institutions that reflect China's interests and values (which are neither liberal or democratic).**

NZ interests and role of NZDF:

- On-going threat of terrorism, instability and violence from Middle East: this affects vital strategic waterways, oil reserves and trade. Potential role for Navy in shoring up open sea lanes and engaging in anti-piracy missions
- **New Zealand's interests maintained and advanced by post-1945 liberal international system:** New Zealand needs to uphold norms of this system and resist changes detrimental to fundamental precepts of sovereignty, human rights and liberal norms regarding inter-state conduct
- New Zealand needs to foster strong relations with both US and China, while recognising that they may soon become peer competitors

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

- Monitoring the EEZ and maintaining territorial inviolability of waters
- Assisting with regional stability and peace-keeping operations
- Counterterrorism and special forces support for international efforts to combat jihadism
- Anti-piracy and collective security actions to maintain freedom of navigation

- Post-conflict reconstruction, particularly where New Zealand has existing experience, such as in the Pacific

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

- Increased attempts at illegal fishing and resource exploitation
- People smuggling and the potential of asylum-seekers entering New Zealand waters
- Over-fishing

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

- Security of New Zealand and immediate region first priority
- Continue partnering with allies in region to advance common goals
- Continue to voice support for liberal international norms of conduct and rule of law
- Special forces role in counter-terrorism

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

- Continuation of current interactions with NZIC, MPI, Customs, Police and other national security agencies to ensure secure borders, timely intelligence products reflecting best assessments of threats and opportunities for New Zealand, and continuation of compliance with New Zealand laws within our territory

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

- Use the lessons learned from successful deployment following Christchurch earthquake to enhance plans for future disaster reaction and relief strategies for New Zealand

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

- Continuation of Cadet Forces and similar initiatives
- Defence Force as an advocate for fitness and a healthy lifestyle; further initiatives such as the ForceFit App.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

- Updated airlift capability; possibility of purchasing two C17s to augment existing airlift and ensure effective transition from C130 and 757 in the 2020s
- Purchase and use of UAVs both for surveillance and armed activities, for EEZ activities primarily

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

N/A

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

- Challenges to international rules-based norms and behaviours.
- Future challenges to established norms with respect to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.
- South Pacific stability.
- Disaster resilience, both in NZ and the South Pacific.
- Cyber security challenges.
- Bio security.
- Resource protection.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

- The increasing trend of large and/or powerful nations (eg Russia, China) to challenge or ignore international rules or established international behaviour norms. These countries, which also hold veto power in the UN Security Council, can also make a UN response impossible. The dilemma for NZ is then in how to respond, and whom to partner with to respond.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

- Regional surveillance.
- Proactive regional engagement, including capacity and resilience building.
- HADR.
- Resource protection.
- Broad international engagement with a range of partners.
- Antarctic support.
- Cooperative peace support and peace enforcement operations globally.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

- Challenges to NZ's ability to enforce its sovereignty and/or control over its resources including in the EEZ and expanded Continental Shelf.
- Challenges to NZ's claim/presence in Antarctica.
- Challenges to NZ's ability to assert itself or enforce control in the Southern Ocean.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

- In priority order, NZ needs to be able to:
  - Enforce its control and sovereignty over its own claims and resources;
  - Work cooperatively with Australia (and other partners) in the region; and
  - Contribute to peace and security globally.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

- As NZ is a small country with limited resources, the NZDF should be a key enabler and resource for other Government agencies. For example, the NZDF should continue to provide the coastguard functions that it does now. However, these support functions need to be explicitly recognised and

funded.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

It makes sense for the NZDF to play a role in domestic HADR and also preparation and resilience. For example, although it may not make economic sense to have more than a couple of bases and camps within NZ, for domestic HADR resilience and response purposes it may make sense to have a spread presence throughout the country.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

This should be proposed from agencies such as MSD for policy consideration rather than from the NZDF.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Wide area regional surveillance of the Pacific and Southern Ocean.

Rapid mobility throughout the broader region.

Enforcement of sovereignty and behaviour in NZ's area of interest (a current capability gap, as demonstrated this season in the Southern Ocean).

Domestic and regional HADR response.

Ability to respond to regional security crises in cooperation with Australia.

Ability to contribute to peace support and enforcement operations globally.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

We need to make sure we have sufficient breadth of capabilities to offer options to Government when contributing to global contingencies. There is already a risk that the only option realistically available to Government is a single, sub-optimal one (eg currently with Iraq) rather than a choice of several viable options to make a meaningful contribution.

During capability acquisition we need to have a process for asking ourselves what solution would be good enough - ie what kind of equipment could we make work for us as an 80/20 or 90/10 solution. Instead, we still seem to have a process that is based around getting the best (and most expensive) equipment that meets all criteria, and therefore diminishes the capital pool available for the broader needs of NZDF. As an analogy, NZ is mainly a country of second-hand Japanese car owners, which gives us acceptable, good quality transportation at an affordable price - in the Defence world we don't seem to be able to consider such an approach.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Internal:

Threats to an unprotected natural resources - water, agriculture, fisheries. The use of a benign NZ environment for nefarious purposes i.e. transiting point for criminal/terrorist activities, passport / identity fraud. Vulnerable to inferred attack, i.e. phone calls re potential contamination of a major product line.

External: Surrounded by a moat and a friendly country the threats are more esoteric but include threat to natural resources in the massive EEZ, threats to shipping lanes and potential illegal immigration (although more of a challenge for them).

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The unsettled Middle East / Levant area while distant can have an impact on a small economy, i.e. oil price shocks. with the NZ now back as part of the 5 eyes relationships, our token, but symbolic support for military activities in distant lands as part of the coalition is important on the international stage. NZ should have small but niche capabilities that can contribute in a wide range of supporting roles in support of bigger partners.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Maritime: Surveillance, airborne and ship based. Access to 5 Eyes satellite capability is essential hence the need to stay in this critical relationship. Attack. If you have the surveillance capability, it is necessary to be able to enforce it by having forward firing weapons on aircraft and appropriate armament on ships that can cover the EEZ.

Land Base: Niche capabilities in highly specialised areas, such as combat medical, intelligence, special forces and a rapid deployment force of a credible size well equipped and trained to work in range of activities from HADR to combat operations in support of bigger partners.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Continued competition for natural resources such as fisheries and mineral exploitation. Instability in the pacific islands if NZ does not take a proactive leadership role, leaving the vacuum for other players i.e. China etc.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

In the extremely high cost world of military capability, NZ must focus on niche and credible capability where it can contribute to bigger partners and the international effort.

It cannot afford to waste the Defence dollars, as in the LAV purchase. All procurement must meet the NZ sovereign requirements first and secondly have the ability to contribute meaningfully to support the partner nations and others where government directs. These two aims can meet i.e. in the purchase of a heavy lift aircraft which would slot into the ADF infrastructure and support network.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

A lot more than perhaps it does now. while it is always available under 'aid to the civil power', and in support of disaster relief, other threats to NZ internally like counter drug operations in support of police and customs need greater capability than what the responsible departments have. Defence has the technologies to provide niche support internally in NZ if the law permitted. The drug threat it is believed is a bigger threat to national security and well being than more distant terrorist threats. Indeed proliferating the NZ market with drugs by state supported terrorists is one avenue used elsewhere in the world

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

As the main source of a disciplined well equipment body of personnel it must always have a ready ability to contribute as per the aid to the civil power act provides. while this should not be the primary focus, it must be a collateral acknowledge role for the NZDF within NZ and local areas of responsibility.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Far greater than what it is. NZ youth are the potential of a nation and it is essential more is provided in shaping this pool of NZ Citizens. Greater support to cadet forces, encouraging schools to have cadet forces again with support. Greater involvement by military units in their local communities in support of schools and activities. Once again, not in place of the NZDF primary role but have the budget, staffing and resources to do more than it is, which at present is based on the desire and interests of individual commanders as to how much they support the cadet corps now.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In the 4th largest EEZ in the world, a credible maritime force is essential and two frigates do not cut it. While the smaller vessels can do the surveillance, the more capable combat platforms are needed to enforce the law, both within NZ and also, as is more the case, in an international coalition force somewhere else in the world.

Likewise a maritime air capability with forward firing weapons is necessary to rapidly provide surveillance and take appropriate action where necessary. while this has only been done once around 40 years ago (a weapon set off against a vessel in our waters), the world has changed significantly since then.

I am not qualified to comment on the ground capabilities but the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance role is critical to the land based force. It is debatable whether the NZDF could contribute significantly in a heavy weapons way (artillery, tanks) to any modern force, probably for the cost and need to train and move them around), some armoured support capability is required. The previous comment on LAV was based on every critical report I have read of that purchase, but what the right capability is, is a matter for serious debate across the board and not just within Army.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

In my 48 years in uniform and now 52 years of service total, I have seen the NZDF for the last 30 years being over committed. Ready to cut back on personnel, budgets and capabilities but never

willing to cut back on commitment for the NZDF for operations and tasks. Governments need to know that if they cut back on capability, there is a resultant cut back on what can be delivered. It is lesson no one seems to learn.

Even today with relatively generous government support the NZDF cannot support even a reasonably large commitment for anything more than one, at best two rotations.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

I believe it would be terrorism.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

I think the relationship we've built with the USA is great as we can learn a lot off them, use there assets when deployed, and foster a relationship that would make them great allies. However, it could be seen as a 'double edged sword'. I only say this because the closer relationship we build with the USA the greater target we become to enemies of the USA.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

SAR (Search and Rescue). With the amount of natural disasters happening around the world, I believe if the NZDF had a true SAR capability we would be seen as great allies with the skills we can bring. Also, it would develop great PR with the national and international countries.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the Territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Whalers in our national waters, illegal fisheries, computer warfare.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

New Zealand security should be of the utmost importance followed closely by allies Australia. Supporting our friends should follow on and eventually we should start thinking of international peace. During this whole time though, global security should be going on concurrently.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

It shouldn't be a government call to protect and advance the nations interests. That should be what the NZDF strive for on a daily basis regardless of what government puts into action.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

It should be larger than what we're currently doing. I believe doing cordon duties, and providing medical assistance isn't enough. We risk more overseas than we do in our own motherland. We should provide a USAR (Urban Search and Rescue) capability that is ready to move at a moments notice. This could start out as a volunteer scheme where the NZDF provide the resources and the training is outsourced until it is self sufficient. The training could be vetted on a annual basis to ensure current practices are being employed and once this asset is completely capable of being employed then looking at making it a full time role, even if it's just a secondary role i.e. Pri/Sec, PI Comd/USAR Comd, PTI/USAR Team Member, Medic/USAR Medic, Rifleman/USAR, PJI/USAR Specialist, Driver/USAR Team Member etc.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

I truly believe that a CMT (Compulsory Military Training) scheme should be utilised between the ages of 18-21. If the individual in that age bracket has a job or is studying then they are void of this scheme. If they're doing nothing then they should be clutched up and utilised on a min scheme of 24-36 months. As with the youth, I believe the schemes such as YDU, LSVs, YLS should be a longer term scheme. It seems to be quite minimalistic. After 3 month they're placed back into the same environment as what they were in prior to attending the scheme/course. This doesn't give these

individuals much of a chance to change their ways. If it were longer term, some things such as immediate recruit training for those individuals capable should be implemented, giving the individuals the skills, knowledge, and mana to move on from where they currently are (assuming they're in a bad place to start).

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Unsure, I think it's our capabilities are currently fine but with the advancements in technology, the capabilities change, and is therefore a forever evolving beast.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

I think the NZ government should allocate more money to the NZDF to implement some, if not all, of the schemes mentioned. If the funding increases, the technology increases, opportunities increase, and wages increase. All of these together make for a greater NZDF as a whole and is more likely to ensure that retention within the NZDF is greater.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

As it currently is:

- develop confident and capable citizens for future service to the NZ Community and NZDF through the New Zealand Cadet Forces;
- use it's particular set of capabilities to grow and assist NZ youth through YDU, LSVs and Academies, in order to prepare youth for the task of citizenship; and
- train young NZDF recruits for a future either within the NZDF or civilian life (recognising that not every recruit that joins will stay in the service their whole working life).

Furthermore to:

Provide a sense of / example of worthwhile patriotism or more specifically citizenship for all young New Zealanders of every religion and race to combat the threat of disillusioned youth looking to religious zealots for guidance.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

No answer.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

No answer.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The on-going ISIS/ Middle East issues will no doubt continue for years to come. I believe the NZDF should play a more active and operational part in these types of issues. We train and train for combat - all three services do - why not put it to use more often? Not one person that serves will request that we take more of a step back. We want to go. Politics plays too bigger part in our Defence Force, and too often we decline to help our greatest allies because of what few, few people think. We're set up to go in to theatre, so lets go and assist in making the world a better place. I think it's great that we get involved in piece-keeping missions every few months, and we should continue to do that, but it seems like that's all we do these days. Let's grow a few of our teeth back that we once had...we're a military, not a piece-keeping force.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

NZDF should assist in making it harder for people smuggling operations - why do they keep coming? Why don't we make an active effort in stopping them??. The same goes for whaling and fishing operations inside our EEZ etc...we sent a Navy ship down to stop one of hundreds of illegal fishing vessles (lets admit it, the Japanese vessles aren't there for "research") but we never even boarded, moved, or stopped the boat. It just kept going!

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

No answer.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

As above.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

No answer.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Bring back compulsory military service. Up our NZDF numbers and keep the troubled youth off the streets. Give them morals their parents never did.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Money NEEDS to be spent (and the budget increased). Bring back a strike force to the Air Force, decent warships for the navy, and throw some money at the army too. I'm sick of being asked "so what do you guys actually do - are you even a military??. From an RNZAF point of view, we have very little in the way of Air-to-air combat weapons. If someone wanted to take over our country they could with ease...lets not give them the opportunity.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other

defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

No answer.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Resources: Fisheries and resources related to Antarctica will be a major threat to NZ economy in the next 25 yrs. The ability to patrol and police our sovereign territories (EEZ and Antarctica) will be required. As the commodities dwindle worldwide and the population grows resources will become more highly valued.

Sea lines of Communication: The reliance on trade for both import and export means we need to be able to patrol and police our maritime area effectively. Petrol and commodities coming inbound and exports (primarily dairy products) are the big basis for NZ's economy.

Cyber protection: The ability to defend our cyber networks and attack/strike back at networks that seek to make ours ineffective will be required. The reliance on network based systems for the control and management of basic utilities and trade will need to be protected as their use is becoming more and more prevalent.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The Defence Force is a major contributor to not just protecting NZ interests but to also advance them. The ability to represent ourselves as a good international partner, be that as a contributor to security and stability or to promoting NZ as a worthy trade partner (through lateral engagements) is important given our geographic position and our economy (trade basis).

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Aerial and Sea surveillance operations: the ability to effectively survey and protect sea lanes and stop illicit/illegal acts is important. This should be able to be conducted anywhere in the world and include the ability to perform as part of a coalition/partnership and also to be able to intervene to stop illicit/illegal activities. This includes up to and including kinetic action (missiles, bombs and bullets).

Land Operations: The same abilities described above should also be able to be performed anywhere in the world on land e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

This relates to question one also in that our EEZ and Antarctic region remains a high source of resources for our economic wellbeing. The ability to protect and conduct offensive action to secure our interest is imperative, creating a deterrent effect and back up by the political will to use the Defence force to defend our sovereign territories, be that from other nations or third party actors. Particular threats will be illegal harvesting of fishing and mineral resources from our EEZ (which may include the continental shelf vice the current 200nm limit). The expiry of the Antarctic treaty could also create a situation where force is required to defend and/or take back territories claimed or occupied by other nations. The Defence Force needs to be equipped and trained correctly to achieve this effectively.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

As an island trading nation we are reliant on stability throughout the world to ensure we can import/export effectively to meet our needs. Our six means we need to foster relationships to ensure we can rely on them to help us and in turn we need to be able to contribute to their stability. With globalisation prioritising based on geography does not fit - the Defence Force needs to be able to support and promote NZ interests anywhere in the world and be flexible enough to achieve (i.e. trained, equipped, competent and have the ability to deploy independently anywhere in the world).

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

The Defence Force needs to be able to integrate all its assets within Government departments. This primarily involves the ability to receive and pass back information to allow decisions making and resource allocation. For example patrolling the NZ EEZ should involve providing information to Fisheries, Customs, Maritime Safety, Foreign Affairs so they can make informed decisions. This includes the supported agencies providing data and information to the Defence Force to enable them to effectively deliver the required results. A common information system (or set of systems), up to and including information at the IS level is required. This system also needs to be able to be accessed from Air, Sea and Land units (i.e. the system must be deployable) so as to enable information to be passed as near to real time as possible.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Within NZ natural disasters and unforeseen events should be the realm of central government agencies. The Defence Force support (resources and equipment) should be a secondary or complimentary role i.e. the Defence Force should not be shaped primarily around disaster/unforeseen events, this should be a spin off of having a Defence Force that can defend, protect and advance NZ interests within military settings.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Nil direct involvement - the use of resources/assets from Defence Force should be used where appropriate but it should not be a core role of the Defence Force unless additional funding and resources (personnel) are catered for. In that case the skills and attitudes the Defence Force instills into its members could well be a good avenue for instilling the same skills and attitudes within NZ's youth (and not just at risk youth but for youth as a whole e.g. conducting leadership training with school prefects or young leaders).

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Aircraft, Ships and Land Forces capable of having the required reach (i.e. Antarctica or anywhere in the world) and conducting offensive operations (both kinetic and non-kinetic) to defend/stop illicit/illegal actions that undermine NZ interests and territories. This Defence Force should also be self sufficient and not reliant on another nation or entity to achieve this.

- Air Forces that can detect, identify and neutralise targets (be it with missiles, bombs, precision strike weapons, bullets or using electronic means). These targets could on sea, on land, in the air or under the water.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other

defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

The current Defence Force personnel numbers are not sufficient to allow them to conduct what the NZ Government requires of them and the ability to better achieve the results the NZ Government wants is being compromised.

I have no objections to the release of the information within my submission.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Biosecurity - The threat of pests and diseases and the effect this could have on NZs economy.

Patrolling and protecting NZs Exclusive Economic Zone against illegal exploitation of marine resources.

Guarding against organised crime such as piracy, people smuggling and drug trafficking.

Detering asylum seekers.

Protecting against terrorist threats.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Greater maritime surveillance and deployability within the South Pacific.

An increased special service capability to enhance NZs contribution to our allies in overseas operations.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

We need less Army and more Navy and Air. NZ have the 4th largest EEZ in the world. Our relative isolation suggests NZ is unlikely to fight a war on its own ground. If we did it would be like closing the gate after the horse has bolted. NZ's best defence is on the sea and from the land.

We need increased maritime surveillance and a greater deployability within the South Pacific. More offshore and inshore patrol vessels and a fleet of transport aircraft (much like the old Andovers) that can be utilised for a multitude of tasks within NZ and overseas e.g. troop movement, disaster relief, humanitarian, joint military exercises with our neighbours etc. In fact, I remember attending an Air Power Development forum at Te Papa a few years ago that I think discussed this very issue.

The NZ Defence Force need to be able to maintain their own capabilities. Defence missed an opportunity in not allowing the Air Force to maintain the new fleet of T-6C Texan aircraft themselves. This could have provided valuable aircraft servicing experience to personnel within a range of technical trades. We've allowed too much civilianisation and out sourcing of roles and functions within

the Defence Force and this, if not already, could become detrimental to our ability to be fully self sufficient in operational situations.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Resources are the biggest challenge to the SW PAC in the next 20-30 years and this is where the most friction will occur. With depleting resources globally and competing interests for it there is an ever increasing risk of a confrontation at sea. Think of an armed escorted fishing fleet in and around the SW PAC and NZ EEZ as countries protect those that collect resources. How well are we placed to handle this, especially if one of the countries is a high profile and one of the top two countries we trade with?

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

We need to make sure that we differentiate between roles and tasks. These are currently wrapped together: the NZDF should only have one or two roles and the rest are tasks that we undertake to meet these roles. Our tasks need to be derived from what our primary AO is.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Resource protection and security

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Decide where our primary interests lie and develop a DF for that. If there is residue capability to use internationally (or domestically depending on the focus) then so be it and use it.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Does the NZDF do this or should it indeed be split into a Coast Guard (RNZAF and RNZN) and a Army to deploy.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

I have read the environmental scan for the DWP. My primary concern is the focus on constabulary roles, especially around the SW PAC region.

I am not convinced that we have a clear plan or idea of what is required of the NZDF. In essence what is our primary area of operations, what is our primary area of responsibility and what is our primary area of influence. If we answer these three questions and weight them according to priority and government policy then we will have a solid foundation for determining what capability we require to meet these outcomes.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

ISIS, NZ's involvement with the US and the unlawful spying on NZ residents. The reason I mention NZ's involvement with the US is because of how the rest of the world views this alliance, it doesn't affect me personally as I am just a sailor in the RNZN but it raises the possibility of terrorist threats and acts against our country. The reason I mention the unlawful spying on NZ residents is because of the possibility of a political revolt/uprising/resistance and the possibility of the NZ Police as well as the Defence Forces involvement in such an event. Lastly, illegal fishing within our EEZ and the illegal intervention of international organisations such as Sea Shepherd, what real powers do we as a defence force have over either?

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

NZ's involvement in the TPPA, I believe that NZ should be cautious in taking part in these negotiations. From what I can gather, the trans pacific partnership agreement takes a lot of our already established sovereignty away and gives countries like the US more governance over our way of life as well as our resources and government agencies. What might this mean for the defence force? It may mean sending our troops to international conflicts that maybe we NZer's shouldn't be involved in. I believe we should still assist the US and our allies in the war against terror, as it is a righteous cause, but we should be wary of the methods that the US tend to use, and be wary of which conflicts are just for political gain rather than for the good of humanity.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

NZ should be taking a more active role in the patrolling of our EEZ as well as being granted proper powers of arrest and detention over international fishing companies illegally fishing within our waters. Attention should also be brought forward to the NZ public about the crisis in Western Papua New Guinea, and troops should be sent there to protect the innocent who are being unlawfully detained and slaughtered every day, or we should at least have a presence there. Lastly, NZ should also be more involved in the Syrian crisis, our soldiers are trained to be among the best in the world, therefore they should be allowed to deploy and do their jobs if that is what they desire. NZ is known worldwide for not following the status quo when it is blatantly wrong to do so, and for not standing by while major countries/organisations commit atrocities ie Mururoa Atoll nuclear testing, disallowing nuclear ships in NZ, RAMSI, Afghanistan conflict etc. NZ as a nation has a positive history of standing up for what is right especially against bullying, whether it is individuals within our country or countries/organisations on the political international stage.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Without trying sound paranoid, I think ISIS is a real threat. I believe that it will be just a matter of time before some kind of attack (online, propaganda driven or physical) will be launched against our nation and within our territory as it has happened in Australia already, even with all their intelligence personnel and resources and preventative measures in place terrorists have still managed to make a significant impact on Australia. The defence force as well as the general public should be educated/made aware and be prepared for such acts for one day this may become a reality for us.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and

security globally?:

NZ's security and protection of our people and land should always be the first priority, then the protection of our resources within our EEZ, then the protection of the less fortunate (ie Western Papuans) or the assistance of disaster stricken countries (which ever comes first) and lastly assisting the allies (With Australia being treated no different than any other ally).

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

I don't know what "all-of-government" is but the government should always put our people and our resources first then assist the less fortunate. NZ should be taking more of a leading role, rather than following the lead of other nations. With regards to advancing our nations interests, those things should be left up to the right politicians. We need to heed what the public and members of the NZDF want, for it is them who are contributing to the NZDF, whether it be by paying taxes or by being a uniformed member, those mentioned should always have a say and have their voice be taken into account.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

I don't know because this information hasn't been communicated to me. But I think that having civil defence contingency plans in place and having those plans broadcasted to the wider NZ public would be a start, rather than just depending on the defence force for these types of matters. As a sailor, we are only trained in all things Navy. RE: the Rena disaster and the Christchurch earthquake, we the NZDF did what we always do, "Assist, adapt and overcome". The general public need to be made aware of how to do the same rather than depending heavily on the defence force for such things. Things like pulling dead bodies out of rubble should be the responsibility of everyone, defence personnel are not superhuman when it comes to this sort of stuff. Resilience training should be made standard and given to all defence personnel if this sort of work is to be part of our everyday roles.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The defence force should be taking just an assisting role in developing our youth and this sort of work should not even be on our priority list. If parents are not taking responsibility for such things, then it should be done by the Ministries of Social Development and Education. We are a defence force, not an organisation for troubled youths. Maybe employing remarkable ex-service personnel under the above mentioned ministries, could be given these roles.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Actual JOB/Specialist training, rather than having personnel double and triple hatting without the adequate training or resilience. Too many sailors, soldiers and airmen/women are being given multiple roles and are expected to achieve aims that are usually expected of a team. Since the imping and cost cutting strategies have been implemented, personnel have suffered due to burn out, being over stressed and over worked, bosses having too high expectations, anxiety and depression etc. All these things mentioned and now considered quite standard in the NZDF. NZer's are known for their resiliency and innovation but at the end of the day, we are only human. Also employing the right people for the job rather than just recruiting anybody for the job would be helpful. It seems we have all the resources needed for our defence force to operate effectively, but the training we receive should be adequate, not rushed and should be relevant. We should also be nurturing our own people

and their skills, rather than burning them out, making them leave the defence force in spite, letting them feel resentment toward the NZDF organisation and then recruiting laterally from the UK, which in my trade, has turned out to be disastrous.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

I have been informed that the people who got impeded in 2011 are not allowed to return to the NZDF fulltime for reasons I know nothing of. I think that this policy should be reviewed as this is unfair if they have up-skilled themselves and also for the fact that we are still actively recruiting people from the UK who simply do not have the skills or motivation to do the job, but are getting paid the same as someone in the same rank and position who does have the skills, this in my opinion is not cost effective. I am commenting only on some UK recruited personnel within the Communications Branch of the RNZN. Lastly, with the defence force moving towards being a purple tri-service defence force, in order to truly be a tri-service organisation and achieve this aim effectively, then tri service training right from the get go (basic common training) may need to be implemented followed by job specific training and not general job training. Everything that I have mentioned in this survey is with the utmost honesty, is intended to be unbiased and in good faith, if what I have said is considered negative towards the NZ Government or towards the NZDF then it is unintentional and I apologise in advance.

Please return to the top of the page and click 'Save and Close' to make your submission.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

NZDF has an important role as a trained body of people, both regular force and reserve. The reserve forces of all services need to be strengthened around the country in order to provide a larger pool of trained people.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

A greater Maritime Reserve force. The RNZNVR needs to be strengthened both in personnel and equipment. Each of the four units should have a vessel similar to the current NZ Police Launches, Deodar and Lady Elizabeth.

These vessels, stationed around the country, will perform the following duties and more.

Increase the public awareness of Navy as a whole.

Provide support to other agencies around the country, such as NZ Police, MPI, Customs and others

Provide support to RNZN activities, and public events where Navy involvement is desired

The use of same / similar vessels to Police provides a cost effective platform that has already been proven in service.

Allow RNZNVR personnel to maintain their sea going skillset in order to serve on regular force vessels.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

- Civil Emergency impacts due to natural disaster or pandemic
- Wider impacts on SE Asia due to climate change and Chinese expansion leading to increased pressure and instability of key trading partners.
- Risk imposed by having only one fibre optic cable supplying NZ in a modern, technological economy.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

- Mainly secondary effects from conflict between other entities having an effect on our own trade (including tourism).
- Trade-off between relationship with China and other, more traditional relationships with other nations affected by Chinese expansion for trade and security.
- Middle East conflict (including returned fighters) is a low risk for NZ physical security but instability in the area, especially with key oil fields, is likely to continue to impact on global economies.
- Continued support to multi-national peacekeeping efforts
- Developing conflict in Arctic and Antarctic as retreating ice provides opportunity to access resources (including fisheries, and cruise ship tourism).
- Increase need to access areas with suitably strengthened vessels. Potential for short notice, large scale rescue operations in icy waters.
- Increasing pressure on fisheries global making NZ waters a target for illegal fishing.
- Increased need for monitoring (Maritime Air and Satellite surveillance) and interception (suitable Naval Patrol Vessels)

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

- Increased support to Civil Authorities for emergencies in NZ and abroad.
- Increased specialist support to other agencies to monitor and protect NZ EEZ and resources (including platforms to deliver their functions).
- War-fighting capabilities in support of multi-national peacekeeping, including role-model levels of interaction with affected peoples. This also preserves a level of competency as a contingency for any emerging physical threats.
- Defence diplomacy and engagement with other nations as a credible and reliable partner to strengthen relations in support of other endeavours (such as trade and human rights)

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

- Illegal fishing, including in the distant and challenging waters of the Ross Dependency.
- Large scale maritime pollution from maritime accident or exploitation mishap.
- Increase cruise ship traffic and risk of large scale maritime emergency.
- Emerging risk from people smugglers seeing NZ as a soft target as they increase their capabilities to the point where they can make the crossing successfully. Also the potential for a people-smuggling caused maritime emergency response under SOLAS.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Due to the nature of NZDF capabilities some assets are better suited for particular levels of tasking.  
 - i.e. IPV for local patrolling and MAO&T enforcement; frigates for defence diplomacy and maintaining war-fighting competencies

This means in many cases the real issue becomes ensuring we have the right people to effectively man the various capabilities.

Recruiting, retention and re-enlistment are the key factors for ensuring we have the people to deliver our capabilities.

NZDF personnel need to feel valued and supported if they are to be retained at the effective levels of competency to deliver outputs. And that they are motivated to be fit for service.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Greater interaction between NZDF and other government agencies, including short-term postings of Officers and Warrant Officers would enhance our ability to operate at an all-of-government level.

There are many opportunities to all parties to better utilise each other's skillsets, equipment and relationships to the betterment of NZ.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

- The NZDF is a key support agency to Civil Authorities.
- An increased focus on ability to inter-operate and support these authorities is required.
- Training and experience at operating within the CIMS framework should become essential for Officers and Warrant Officers to enable them to work effectively in WoG responses to emergencies.
- Regular WoG exercises in CDEM responses should be conducted to raise awareness of capabilities and identify opportunities to effectively support response efforts.
- Reserve Forces, who have the best local knowledge in their areas are ideally placed for liaison, intelligence and navigational roles in an Emergency Response. They should be trained, equipped and exercise regularly with the local CDEM organisations and other support agencies. They could then also be effectively used in small scale emergency responses (i.e. CDEM response to fires in Waimakariri District over summer could be supported by Naval Reserve who are trained as fire fighters by the Navy)
- The ability to deploy meaningful responses in support of the Realm Nations and other nearby nations is significant. Continued development of "amphibious" capabilities is required, including ISR and Advance Force Operations to enable rapid deployment of the response when it arrives on station.
- Regular inter-service interaction of key units outside of major exercises to enable development of key skills (i.e. 2ER and LWSF working together on littoral operations; Reserve Units and local CDEM groups)

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Investment in development of NZ youth, yields many long term benefits to the country.

It reduces societal costs and financial burdens on the Justice system, by instilling values of service and responsibility, and developing personal skills and discipline.

It also provides an opportunity to NZDF personnel to engage in the rewarding experience of youth development.

It is disappointing to see these programmes being scaled back.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Increased focus on ISR (including satellite surveillance) and Advance Forces development to enable effective deployment of forces.

Media coverage to inform NZers on what the NZDF achieves and the value it provides (increased CDEM support would help raise the profile). This has improved in recent years but without support from average NZers, we are unlikely to receive adequate funding support.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Do not include my name in any summary of material.

Please return to the top of the page and click 'Save and Close' to make your submission.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Illegal Fishing

Illegal Immigration

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Relationships between states improving

Non-State actors becoming the priority for defence

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Maritime Security, HADR and State building in the South Pacific

the Asia Pacific region

State building and security in the rest of the world

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Illegal Fishing

Illegal Immigration

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Concentrate on Capabilities for security of NZ Maritime Zone.

HADR and Regional Security

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Advice to Government on what capabilities it can, and should, provide.

Providing these capabilities when asked.

Not developing capabilities that are not required.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

A pool of ready, disciplined, adaptable personnel able to undertake a range of activities.

A set of specialist skills able to be used as required.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Providing specialist training courses utilising our military skills, on programmes recommended by the specialist youth development professionals.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Surface Maritime Patrol, short and long range, airborne and surface platforms.

Tactical and Strategic Transport

Deployable ground security forces.

Deployable ground support services (HADR, Development and training)

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

We need to decide what capabilities are not required, particularly the high end, consider what has not been deployed in its high end role.

Eg, anti submarine, Artillery, high end Navy Combat vessels.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

The growing influence of the Chinese government on financially struggling islands in the Pacific. With foreign investment of this scale certain 'expectations' are made of the recipient. We need to be prepared to mitigate this by reassuring our influence in the region.

As a national that relies heavily on imported crude oil, we are vulnerable to the instability in the Middle East. Contributing to the stability of the region is essential until New Zealand moves to a new source of energy in the future.

There is a major economic threat caused by foreign fishing vessels infringing our territorial area.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Develop an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platform to enhance the detection of offending vessels within our waters. We have such a large area to monitor that we need to grow this as a capability.

The Defence Force should have a light aircraft strike capability because whilst it could be argued that it isn't required now, when decided it is needed it could be too late. An example of why aerial strike is so important is with ISIL. The United States is able to contribute to the campaign with minimal personnel risk thanks to acquiring and maintaining air superiority and from a distance attacking ground targets. The majority of modern warfare is conducted with air strike support.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

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Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Lack of experience in Soldiers and Commanders. Army is getting smaller and we are losing too many people.

Soon the army will be a battalion of 19 year olds with a handful of commanders who know nothing

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

I don't know.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

We should remain active on at least one current operation to maintain our status and presence in the international community.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

I don't know.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Keep one foot on the ground. Have a battalion here and a battalion active overseas.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

I don't know.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Be prepared to act in the event of a civil emergency

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

If youth have no idea of their future when they go to leave school, they should be made aware that the defence force is a viable option. Its not well known enough.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

More money into up to date Urban equipment for combat units.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Have a more forward approach to helping the international community. New Zealand is starting to become a country and defence force comfortable with zero accountability. We are too worried about the chance of losing more lives that we are no longer willing to do anything at all.

There are other situations in the international community that can be addressed.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

NZ's security will be challenged by the demand for easier access to natural resources such as food and energy sources as well as commercially sensitive information. The "kinetic" threat is much lower than that posed half a century or longer ago and we are now under threat from influences such as immigration (legal and illegal), sale of land to foreign interests and the theft of intellectual property. The threat which we are least prepared for is climate change and the numerous consequences that rising sea levels will have on our EEZ and our Areas of Interest and Influence.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

- \* China-India relationship is deteriorating. Both are trading partners and have big Defence forces.
- \* China providing support and aid to Pacific Nations (eg building bridges) and thus increasing their influence in the region.
- \* Putin & Russian - going back to cold war days
- \* Islam, other religious and general terrorism (including local fanatics)
- \* Antarctica Treaty due to expire soon.
- \* More global demand on resources, more overfishing, more population demands (NZ & other)
- \* North Africa and Middle East continue to fracture - instability.
- \* Global economy - instability.
- \* Cyber attacks.
- \* Increased unemployment and restless individuals > civic disruptions.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

- \* Increasing factions, dictatorships and zealots > NZDF fights groups rather than countries.
- \* UN is less effective and less able to respond and enforce international law > no clear mandate to fight/protect in other countries/states
- \* Increasing pressures on Australia (eg boat refugees) and more aggressive policies > we must support our ally. Australia provided a buffer for NZ
- \* Allies and partners may become closer aligned to trading partners
- \* Climate change > more storms in the Pacific, NZ & Australia > more Defence resources tied up providing emergency support (short and long termed)

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

- \* Continue to participate in ally/partner/ trade partner exercises and participate in approved (eg UN) activities. If we do participate then we can not expect their assistance if needed.
- \* Continue to provide support for EEZ/border control (eg illegal fishing) and backup Police for major events (eg Rugby World Cup).
- \* NZ to have a stronger presence in the Pacific.
- \* Have the authorisation to take action (eg board ships) involved in illegal fishing - have teeth not just barking.
- \* NZDF should do more independent surveillance of the Pacific - know what is going on.
- \* NZDF continue to provide emergency support to Pacific Nations (eg Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu)

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

- \* Antarctica - I don't think we can afford more active presence. But we can do more surveillance and record breaches in Treaty and other international laws to bring to UN and World Court.
- \*

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and

security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

SIS's role is to provide security advise and information and GSCB's role is to provide information assurance (eg secure networks)

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

- \* NZDF should sit behind emergency services to be called upon in need. They can also take the lead in command and control if required.
- \* If invest in smaller sized ships, aircraft etc (refer to capability comments) then likely some to be around in NZ rather on deployment.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

This is not NZDF core business and should not be involved beyond cadetships.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

- \* NZDF should have more offshore versatile ships. But smaller than frigates. Can then move around the Pacific, EEZ and Antarctica. You are not tying up everything into just a couple of ships.
- \* Better surveillance of the Pacific.
- \* Counter cyber ability.
- \* Soldiers should have the right gear (armour, guns, vehicles, etc)
- \* Aircraft for surveillance, transport & helicopters.
- \* Have ability to stop ships carrying out illegal fishing

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

- \* China-India relationship is deteriorating. Both are trading partners and have big Defence forces.
- \* China providing support and aid to Pacific Nations (eg building bridges) and thus increasing their influence in the region.
- \* Putin & Russian - going back to cold war days
- \* Islam, other religious and general terrorism (including local fanatics)
- \* Antarctica Treaty due to expire soon.
- \* More global demand on resources, more overfishing, more population demands (NZ & other)
- \* North Africa and Middle East continue to fracture - instability.
- \* Global economy - instability.
- \* Cyber attacks.
- \* Increased unemployment and restless individuals > civic disruptions.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

- \* Increasing factions, dictatorships and zealots > NZDF fights groups rather than countries.
- \* UN is less effective and less able to respond and enforce international law > no clear mandate to fight/protect in other countries/states
- \* Increasing pressures on Australia (eg boat refugees) and more aggressive policies > we must

support our ally. Australia provided a buffer for NZ.

\* Allies and partners may become closer aligned to trading partners

\* Climate change > more storms in the Pacific, NZ & Australia > more Defence resources tied up providing emergency support (short and long termed)

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Complacency.

The perception that as NZ is a passive nation it does not need to recognise threats facing other countries. In effect the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard Approach.)

This results in lack of funding to the defence force, lack of capability, lack of stature with other nations, lack of training/exercise opportunities, inability to protect our assets.

This then has a knock on effect in attracting and retaining the "right" people to the organisation. Which further impacts on capability, stature, training / exercise opportunities etc.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

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Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

international terrorism  
Illegal immigrants  
Illegal and unregulated fishing

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

- relationship between China, and its neighbours (Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam.. ) for the contested islands in the south china sea - possible conflict on our doorstep  
- piracy and illegal fishing in the South Pacific - more fisheries patrols in the regions

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Border protection, Monitoring illegal fishing, UN peace keeping roles

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Illegal fishing

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Ensuring NZ is secure, international peace and security and then stability of our friends

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

keep our borders secure and provide peace keeping world wide.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

good pool of resources and personnel.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

everyone should do one year of conscription.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

global presence, a patrol vessel specifically designed for ice operations and support of other Govt. organisations

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Intrusion into the EEZ affecting the security of our nation (low risk) and fishing taking away part of our people's income and national export market (high risk) this is also directly related to our reputation to protect ourselves.

Bio security hazards affecting the condition of our major export's; Dairy, wool, lamb, beef, forestry, viticulture, bees etc. (High risk).

Safety of our peace keepers overseas, we currently rely on our allies.

Reputation as a first world country able to defend ourselves and our allies, we risk looking like a soft target if tensions increase at which time it is to late to change a reputation.

Reputation as a active member of the international society able to step in and offer support in a variety of roles other than peacekeeping.

Ability to step up and actively fight efficiently alongside our allies in an international conflict at short notice.

Ability to make a sustained contribution to a natural disaster of a reasonable scale in NZ or the pacific.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

NZ is an export nation so good relations with all current and possible trading partners is essential. Our reputation, support and relationship with these countries is also essential.

As an export nation the airways and sea routes need to be kept clear and safe for the transport of goods from NZ.

If an international conflict were to erupt we could be seen as a liability not an asset to our allies. We are not currently in a position to defend or attack along side or allies for a sustained period. A first response would leave limited numbers to relieve the front line or train new recruits.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Effective and efficient surveillance of our EEZ with the ability to enforce our rights to these waters.

Strict boarder patrols to mitigate the risk of contamination to our major exports.

A defence force that is respected on the international stage to keep a good reputation.

A defence force that our public is confident can react to a national disaster or make them proud in an international situation.

The ability to support our allies in keeping our trading sea paths and airways clear with force if required.

The ability to ensure any deployments on foreign soil are done with the minimum risk to our people.

So we need to be able to clear the area and hold air superiority during our visit.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Claims on the Antarctic are imminent so the ability to ensure we hold our own is essential to our reputation.

Spying on our farming methods could affect our ability to be competitive.

Terrorism on shore is likely to increase if we support our allies in the fight against terrorism.

We do not currently have the ability to maintain an effective sustained response to a large natural disaster in NZ. ChCh took us to our limit, some would argue beyond as we limited other outputs in order to respond. It was only a coincidence we had military assets in the region at the time. The public perception of our response could have been very different under different circumstances.

Our limited ability to patrol and enforce our rights to the EEZ is becoming international knowledge.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The defence budget is driven politically as votes are driven by public perception of our nations priorities, in the current environment we will be a lower priority than education and healthcare for the tax dollar. In war time the public perception and tax dollar move towards the military, but that may be to late.

An increased awareness to the general public of the outputs of the NZDF would help.

But in our current economic climate the priority should be protecting our exports which should ensure our financial ability.

Second priority would be to build our reputation as a potent effective defence force by enhancing our ability to attack if required and play war games with trading partners. This would give confidence to our allies so they would be more likely to come to our aid if required.

Third would be to strengthen our connection between ADF and NZDF. This would enhance our capability as a joint force.

Lastly would be to confidently step into international peace keeping and peace making roles with all other first world nations and be able to sustain these operations indefinitely. This will keep the fight

from our boundaries and oblige our allies to support us if required.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

communication - what are all the other government agencies trying to achieve? where are the common goals?

I see the EEZ and our boarder patrols as common so lets combine the NZDF capabilities with them to make them effective and capable. I see UAVs and maritime patrol aircraft and a strike force as our specialties to support other agencies.

Civil defence - this agencies needs a massive surge capacity in times of trouble which the NZDF have the skills and with a lot more posts would have the ability to support most natural disasters in NZ and the pacific.

Police - Helicopter transport to drug jobs, use the maritime surveillance aircraft to spot drug plantations, Army ground troops for armed offenders responses, transport of bomb squad equipment and armed security for foreign visits.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

I see Civil defence and police as the experts coordinating the horsepower of NZDF to provide troops on the ground for immediate response, then security also air and ground transport for people and equipment, hospitals on ship, accommodation (tents, camps, bases) medical assistance, media, specialist and political transport, equipment to clear roads and runways and alternate airstrips.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The government should provide this but not sure if it should stay an NZDF responsibility. unless it is ties into CMT for all.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Satellite time - this may be the most effective surveillance and communication device for our current climate.

Strike force - preferably manned aircraft to boost our image to the public, enhance recruiting, enhance our international reputation, give a surge capacity of personnel for local disasters, enable us to make deployment area's safe for occupation and maintain air superiority, give us an ability to build our relationship with trading partners through war games, enable us to protect our nation, we would be able to step into an international conflict quickly and effectively, it would be a deterrent to anyone disrupting or trade routes and we could enforce our rights to our territories.

A reasonable number of surveillance/transport aircraft for EEZ patrolling, restocking deployed troops, pacific support and national disaster response. a mix of unmanned aircraft might allow EZZ patrols to be more cost effective.

A light armoured truck fleet for land transport of troops, civilians and equipment in country and



aboard. These would need limited driver training to be effective. These would also need to be efficient to operate on standard roads.

Tactical and strategic helicopters, some able to operate from ships.

Long range transport for troops and equipment to support engineers, troops a strike force, helicopters and our allies needs.

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Intrusion into the EEZ affecting the security of our nation (low risk) and fishing taking away part of our people's income and national export market (high risk) this is also directly related to our reputation to protect ourselves.

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Reputation as a first world country able to defend ourselves and our allies, we risk looking like a soft target if tensions increase at which time it is to late to change a reputation.

Reputation as a active member of the international society able to step in and offer support in a variety of roles other than peacekeeping.

Ability to step up and actively fight efficiently alongside our allies in an international conflict at short notice.

Ability to make a sustained contribution to a natural disaster of a reasonable scale in NZ or the pacific.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

NZ is an export nation so good relations with all current and possible trading partners is essential. Our reputation, support and relationship with these countries is also essential.

As an export nation the airways and sea routes need to be kept clear and safe for the transport of goods from NZ.

If an international conflict were to erupt we could be seen as a liability not an asset to our allies. We are not currently in a position to defend or attack along side or allies for a sustained period. A first response would leave limited numbers to relieve the front line or train new recruits.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

1. Theft of our resources - fisheries
2. Local dissatisfaction from immigrants and local ideological factions.
3. Illegal immigrants entering our waters , land space.
4. Expansion of China into the pacific region

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

1. Greater presence of China in the pacific, possibly in a strategic placement so as to harvest resources from this part of the world.
2. Electronic, Cyber type attacks to disrupt , corrupt and steal intellectual property and disrupt the country

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

As and when invited , support fellow Nations in Operations.

Engage with pacific Island countries in training and assisting in their Def development.

Ensure we are keeping up with technology and capability. This can be achieved by placement of pers in larger countries Def Forces ,not always buying the equipment

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

1. As above including yet to be declared interests from other large nations in the search for resources ,(food ,minerals , oil etc)

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The ability to conduct quick and precise internal security measures to counter threats from either politically , or terrorist motivated groups as well as potential disaffected groups of new immigrants

Focus on an ability to protect , observe and dominate our EEZ, the Continental Shelf ,and the Ross Dependency.

Using the above skills and equipment , participate in overseas Operations as required

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Greater NZ Inc co operation in training and use of resources.

A better long term , partnered plan in the purchase of equipment's and use of the NZDF Forces in a partnership with other Govt agencies.

NZDF per are a skilled and reliable group that could be used for tasks like search and rescue , maritime operations and other suitable Govt agency tasks. These tasks provide real time training that would enhance their deployability skills

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Providing a solid ,quick, appropriately trained and well equipped response of man power , Command / Control and equipment.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

A greater investment in the NZ Cadet Forces.

They are the "good to great". The youth have family and community support , train in a disciplined environment using a ' military way ".

They struggle to gain resources but continue to parade on average 4000 willing and loyal youth each week.

NZDF, with a minor increase in funding, could be enhancing a model youth organisation that produces youth for NZ who will go on to be positive contributors to NZ society and the NZDF if they enlist.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Agile and affordable equipment that is suitable for the NZ and Pacific region.

OPV vessels , helicopters , ships that can move stores and pers in the pacific (another HMNZS Canterbury would be great). A vessel that allows projection of helicopters and ships.

Increase in surveillance (both land and sea capability) including use of drones etc

More Sailors , Soldiers , and Air pers. Without an increase in man power there will be no growth or stability in NZDF, it is too fragile even now.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

NZ's inability to effectively protect and patrol its borders including our EEZ is a major problem. We are proud of the work we do given the size of our defence force and the area we have to cover but our people are burning out too soon due to the workload. We rely too heavily on allied partners such as Australia that if there was a threat to NZ they would come to our aid but we need to be able to help ourselves. This is also true when working in theatre, we are deployed with poor equipment and not enough.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

NZ's seat on the UN council has meant that we as a defence force are becoming more involved with operations again. If we are to achieve interoperability with our coalition partners in theatre, our equipment and training needs to be able to achieve this. NZ also has vested interests in the South Pacific and Antarctica region. As there is an increasing interest in both these areas from outside nations, the defence force must have the capability to effectively patrol these areas and if required react. We need a war fighting capability, there is no use being able to highlight a threat with no capacity to eliminate it or protect yourself.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

An ability to deploy an effective number of appropriately manned and equipped troops, aircraft and ships into operations overseas to achieve global security. These assets need to be capable of sustaining themselves for a prolonged period of time with units able to rotate pers through that aren't being burnt out. The defence force needs to maintain a sizeable presence in the South Pacific and Antarctica through patrolling, disaster relief and aid and operations within these areas. We also need to increase our presence through UN postings and liaison postings with other defence forces. Encouraging overseas training courses to increase capability at home.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

The rise in the terrorism threat within NZ and the possibility that more terrorists could enter NZ. The upcoming treaty renewal for Antarctica and the increasing interest from other parties such as China. The reducing presence of America within the South Pacific and the increasing interest from Asia given the resources available such as fishing and land.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The defence force needs more people. As it is, there are many roles that are not filled or are being double hatted and done poorly purely because the workload is too high for one person or a small team to achieve. Ideally, we could maintain a strong presence at home as well as contributing to global peace and security but without the people or equipment to do so.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

The defence force is a means of physically enacting the governments interests. In this way, we need to be able to do so through appropriate training, equipment and personnel. The expectations of the defence force to fulfil roles with less and less of a budget to put towards our people, training and

equipment is a huge strain. This is negatively impacting on those wanting to protect and stand for their country.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Providing a search and rescue capability through helos for within NZ, and P3s for internationally. Pers trained in first aid and the ability to respond quickly although we need the infrastructure and more of everything to be more effective.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

YDU is an awesome initiative. The cycle of recruiting, training, deploying and then giving back to the community and starting the recruiting process again needs to be more of a focus. We need pers stepping rough the door and seeing the defence force as great career choice. The ideas now such as boot camps and YDU are fantastic but as per usual there needs to be more funding, personnel and the infrastructure to support this. NZ has fantastic training areas that need to be utilised. As it stands each base needs expanding and new buildings to support the changing requirements of today.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

An ASW capability given the size of our EEZ and assets More personnel trained with initiatives to keep pers in such as better housing and support for military personnel and their families. An upgraded fleet of aircraft that is compatible with allied partners with the ability to transport troops, equipment and supplies without breaking down. Appropriate training facilities in terms of infrastructure, equipment provided and military personnel to teach not civi - we are a military. UAVs to move forward with the change in war fighting style seen today.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

1. The shifting of geopolitical influence between allies and those that are not allied brings the largest threat to New Zealand's security. It has the potential to drag our Nation into extended overseas military operations at the behest of our allies against nations that have/will have a growing influence in our region.
2. Our biggest challenge is how to protect our small nation (in both military power and population) from internal and external threats with the very limited resources we have available, lack of public support and restricted defence budget in comparison to our allies.
3. A decisive cyber attack could be easily implemented in our country. Physical connectivity to the wider world relies on a single point of entry and the majority of Government runs on legacy equipment and software compared to the majority of the commercial world.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

In the short term; the rise of China's military and commercial influence over the pacific region increases its confrontation with the USA. Blindly following the US to further US geopolitical influence may not always be in the best of NZ. However the US will become more active in this region, thus cross training and leveraging their larger military experience to our advantage would be to great benefit to us.

In the long term; rising population across the globe is leading to a lot of migration. NZ has enough domestic production to support a much larger population however many other countries do not. Water, Food and Employment shortage will increase in the future, especially for Young Adults. This will intern lead to friction in society across many nations and result in a higher possibility of social unrest across the region.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

NZ does not have the resource, equipment or manning it needs to actively secure its own borders. This is primarily referring to the Navy however the AirForce could be included in that statement. The Army would be of little use on the home front against external threats however they are useful for civil emergencies and contributing to our international community.

A much larger Navy is required to secure NZ's interests close to home, with the support of a larger AirForce.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

NZ does not have a Defence Force capable of maintaining its current interests let alone any emerging interests.

Likely threats include the exploitation of our nations resources, breaches of territorial boundaries by larger nations and the inability for NZ to effectively monitor the previous two points.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New

Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The NZDF is not capable of defending NZ against the external threats by larger Nations, thus they must concentrate of fostering and maintaining close ties with their Allies, particularly Australia.

NZDF needs to continue to support internal peace and security missions, more than it is doing now, as that is the major draw card for recruitment and retention of its forces.

Put bluntly, first priority should be the well being of NZ. If there is a civil emergency the NZDF must be able to quickly and effectively respond. However to do this they require a NZDF that has the manning to do so, thus second priority is to support the international community with ongoing overseas operation. Thirdly NZDF can contribute to our allies and then lastly to the security and stability of friendly nations.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

NZDF acts as the snap response to civil emergencies / unforeseen events.

They need the capability to stand up 200+ in 24hrs and 500-1000+ people within 48hrs to provide immediate aid and site control. It would be expected within 7-14 days that the NZDF hands over to the civil authorities.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The development of NZ's youth is critical to this nations survival. The YDU program should be extended greatly.

With the rise of technological automation, the job market will not grow in the future. This will lead to a larger and larger number for youth unemployment.

The NZDF is a useful incubator for youth.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Firstly, a combination of the three services, Airforce, Army and Navy, into a single Marine Force.

A larger Navy. Much larger. 20,000+ with 3-5 military ports capable of maintaining 10-15 missions of fleets of ships (not single ships) concurrently.

A larger AirForce. Much larger. 10-15,000+ with 3-5 military airfields capable of transporting 1-2 Battalions, provide air support and resupply concurrently.

The specialisation of the Army. A Marine landing force specialised in working in the SE pacific. With support from AirForce and Navy, the capability of deploying 1-2 Battalions concurrently via Air or Sea. Preferably one Battalion is mounted.



Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

1. The shifting of geopolitical influence between allies and those that are not allied brings the largest threat to New Zealand's security. It has the potential to drag our Nation into extended overseas military operations at the behest of our allies against nations that have/will have a growing influence in our region.
2. Our biggest challenge is how to protect our small nation (in both military power and population) from internal and external threats with the very limited resources we have available, lack of public support and restricted defence budget in comparison to our allies.
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Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

In the short term; the rise of China's military and commercial influence over the pacific region increases its confrontation with the USA. Blindly following the US to further US geopolitical influence may not always be in the best of NZ. However the US will become more active in this region, thus cross training and leveraging their larger military experience to our advantage would be to great benefit to us.

In the long term; rising population across the globe is leading to a lot of migration. NZ has enough domestic production to support a much larger population however many other countries do not. Water, Food and Employment shortage will increase in the future, especially for Young Adults. This will intern lead to friction in society across many nations and result in a higher possibility of social unrest across the region.

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

- Never ending Defence budget cuts.
- Increasing Chinese influence in the south pacific.
- Increasing threat of radical religious movements locally and abroad.
- Climate change may lead to NZ becoming attractive to foreign countries for its resources in Land and fresh water and it's ability to produce food.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

- Hard to predict. Too often in history tensions between countries have escalated to the point of conflict for no other reason than a change of government (or dictator) in one country or just to bolster national support for a failing leadership (i.e Falklands war, Ukraine).
- The best defence is a good intelligence service with global partnerships, backed up by a credible defence force which we currently lack.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

1. Defence of NZ and its interests.
2. Defence of our allies.
3. Continued support to the UN.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

- Increasing Chinese presence in the Pacific.
- Increasing foreign presence in the Antarctic as the grab for resources inevitably increases.
- Illegal fishing in southern waters as illustrated by the fiasco earlier this year.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

- There is no real difference between the defence of NZ and our allies/partners. We would rely on outside help to provide a credible defence of NZ from and external aggressor and as such we have to be seen to be willing and able to assist them when they require it. NZ is not capable of effectively defending itself with our defence force if attacked. We lack the numbers and have too much territory.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

- By maintaining a well trained and equipped force that is ready and capable of fielding a credible fighting force if the situation occurs where that level of force is necessary. It's the Governments job to decide if and where the defence force is deployed.
- All other deployments (peace keeping, humanitarian etc) can be achieved with few problems if the first capability is maintained.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

- By providing well trained man power, accommodation and resources at short notice for prolonged

periods.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The development of NZ's youth is the responsibility of their parents and the government by not turning parents into criminals by ridiculous laws.

The NZ defence force can be a role model and a career choice for the youth of NZ but it is not there to replace bad parenting.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

We need to stop cutting the establishments (manning) of our defence force to make the manning levels look better for the media. We currently have two Infantry Battalions running well under strength. The establishment was around 800 men per Bn in the 90's, it's now in the 500's and we still cannot maintain them at fully manned.

The Navy cannot crew it's ships unless it's one at a time.

The Air force is not a combat force. You cannot hope to win a fight without combat air support. This has been seen in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq where coalition forces including NZ made extensive use of air strikes to help prevent excessive friendly casualties. Our Infantry don't have the manning to absorb many casualties. Our support troops have even less ability in manpower.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

If there is no intention of ever re-establishing an air combat role with either fixed wing or rotary wing air frames then why do we need an Air force? We currently pay for the entire Air Force hierarchy when all that is actually required are the aircrews and the ground crews required to keep the machines flying. The Air Force could be dissolved and absorbed into Army and Navy. The money saved could then be spent on actual war fighting capabilities.

We have too many senior commanders in the defence force. and not enough soldiers and sailors.

We have to get smarter with our expenditure of the money the government allocates to provide the NZ public with the most effective force we can provide for the money. Having a top heavy organisation does not provide value for money.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

It is apparent that influential countries are taking an active interest in Pacific and Antarctic waters. China and Taiwan are competing for influence in the Pacific, the US are bulking up their military presence and South East Asian countries are investing heavily in military equipment (for coastal protection, replacing obsolete equipment and territorial disputes). As for China in particular its actions appear to be propelled by its need to secure energy, metals, and strategic minerals in order to support the rising living standards of its population without depleting their own reserves. Sir Halford Mackinder's 1904 article, "The Geographical Pivot of History," provides a useful insight to Chinese ambition by noting that Eurasia was the geostrategic fulcrum of world power and they desire to add an oceanic frontage to their land boundary. 110 years on similar conclusions can be drawn. China will pursue regaining its lost territory and push American military interests from the South China Sea. China has stated its intention to push its sea power to Hawaii, largely to emulate perceived meddling of US sea power in the South China Sea. This doesn't directly affect NZ, but we are likely to be caught up in any shipping restrictions and political fall-out from participating in US led exercises. The reorganization of the world political map via: state break-ups, the rise of disenfranchised tribal powers, (partly due to the removal from power of strong dictators by Western countries and arbitrary country boundaries imposed after WWI), the defence (or promotion depending on ones point of view) of strict religious values, increased migration of the poor (and the consequential rise of the super wealthy), oceanic territorial expansion in Asia and many other factors affect New Zealand in different ways. While the vast majority of world events occur a fair distance away their effects do affect our region. While most of our responses are political (and rightly so), there is a military dimension: safety of New Zealanders abroad, security of shipping lanes, monitoring and restricting access to New Zealand waters and our greater oceanic area and assisting allies when appropriate.

Part of New Zealand's problem (and hence a threat) is that we are a relatively new country with a short history of cultural development. In contrast Middle Eastern, Asian, African and European societies are promoting and defending up to 3000 years of cultural history. It can be difficult for New Zealanders to understand the rationale and decisions made by such countries where we can try to interfere or influence militarily without any hope of changing the underlying cultural heritage and motivations of the people. Therefore we are better off keeping out of some conflicts.

The relative size of the NZDF compared with our oceanic footprint (including the air space above it) and the increasing military muscle to our West and North West is certainly a threat factor. Part of our problem is that we have few assets to patrol and project force in our greater oceanic region. Having two frigates for example is an effective force of one frigate as the other requires maintenance and upgrade from time to time. It is the same issue for aircraft. Arguably, a frigate or OPV and a maritime patrol aircraft should accompany and protect all sailings of HMNZS Canterbury. There is little point putting our forces into one logistic ship with no additional protection. If nothing else it helps to develop and cultivate an armed escort mindset that can be deployed as a matter of course. If newspapers are correct, South East Asia is home to 1/3rd of the world submarine fleet and a fair percentage of capable naval vessels. They are on our periphery.

It appears from reading newspapers that a major underlying reason for a country to extend its interests into other regions is to secure energy, minerals and food. Energy (oil) and minerals are becoming more scarce (either by depletion of readily available resources or by politically motivated restrictions; use everybody else's resources so we have some left for ourselves when it runs out).

This is causing significant tension in the Asian region in particular and very soon to the Pacific, Arctic

and Antarctic regions. Illegal fishing in our region is another example. This requires New Zealand to be able to identify resources, monitor encroachments and provide deterrents including the threat of using or the actual use of force.

NZ has the capacity to hold 60 days of its fuel consumption, which is below the International Energy Agency guidelines of holding 90 days. NZ has paid Japan and South Korea to hold the extra 30 days consumption. That implies in times of threat to oil traffic, NZ has to transport oil from Japan and South Korea (or any available resource). In times of conflict or threat it may further imply the NZDF providing an escort function to shipping within the Gulf of Arabia and South China Sea area to ensure NZ has fuel.

The NZ Antarctic dependency is mostly an ice shelf and many countries are taking an increased strategic interest in the area. Minerals, oil, tourism, science and food abound within the Antarctic region. A growing disrespect for the region is growing as Northern Hemisphere countries stake claims within the area. It is probable that within the next 10 years or so countries will stake further claims to **the Antarctic region and won't hesitate to explore** for resources. NZ Navy has no medium or heavy ice-breakers or ice strengthened ships to safely patrol the region and ensure shipping lanes to the Ross Dependency stay open. I understand that most nations with an Antarctic Dependency have an ice-breaker ship.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The dynamics of the world are in falling into disarray due to lack of economic progress, civil uprisings, Western intervention, land-grabs for resources and religious ideological differences. NZ is physically immune from these effects due to our geographical isolation. Arguably, we have pockets of migrants that may interrupt NZ stability in the name of their parent countries issues, but that is not an NZDF issue.

NZ is not immune to the overall effect of destabilised regions. Our markets, trading routes and economy have a heavy dependence on international stability. If our economy is affected and the income of NZ inc. is reduced, then there is less money to apportion to the NZDF to maintain its activities and assets.

The main change occurring in our region is the increase in Asian military forces. As the US backs-off **from the region, US aligned countries are increasing their strength to counter China's expansion** into contested areas (coastal and land borders). As the argy-bargy continues, we will be inevitably drawn into some form of dispute resolution (combat presence or otherwise) or we will lose purchasers of our goods.

The proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran is reaching new heights, which is interesting as they **used to be allies in the 1970's. If Iran returns to a non-cleric based political structure**, then normal relations will ensue as they are ideologically opposed to the concept of a Kingdom ruling an Islamic country (Saudi Arabia being the Kingdom in question).

A bigger issue is the lack of jobs (and safety) in poor countries. A tidal wave of migrants is dispersing from Africa and other poor nations in an effort to make a better life. This is putting massive pressure on receptor countries of those migrants. That begs a question in the future: what defines nationality? Who or what is NZ protecting itself from?

Fundamentally, the NZDF needs to be nimble in adapting to the future. By that I mean having the

ability to rapidly update equipment (fast procurement), fast obsolescence of equipment if it is unsuitable, the ability to rapidly enlarge the NZDF (and I argue that we have insufficient personnel to cope with current demands and surges). We tend to think in terms of having two warships (or whatever) and they will last for 30-50 years. New warships (or whatever) should be rotated in and out of service faster to ensure we are constantly adapting to new threat environments and cater for the even more rapid obsolescence of modern technology.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

In no particular order:

- Maritime patrol including armed response.
- **Logistic support and transport of NZDF assets, NZ Gov't agency as appropriate, allied forces and disaster relief.**
- Armed response to urban, East Asian jungle and other regional geographic areas.
- Armed escort for NZDF logistic assets, troop transport and limited air support to ground forces.
- Intelligence gathering.
- Ice capable maritime patrol.
- Military liaison and support.
- **Maintenance of military capable airfields and ports in Pacific Islands to extend NZ's maritime reach.**
- Disaster response capability, quick reaction logistic transport to remote islands, engineering and medical support.
- Provide scientific services in support of NZDF activities.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Emerging challenges include countries vying for energy and mineral and food resources in our territory including our greater oceanic region. Climate change is another factor in that if the sea rises then our Pacific neighbours may be displaced, possibly to NZ shores.

Economically speaking, a fair chunk of profits earned in New Zealand by international companies goes offshore. **This reduces New Zealand's income and therefore tax and therefore money that the Government can apportion to its departments including the NZDF.** A strong economy allows for a strong Defence force. A flagging NZ economy is a threat to its Defence Force.

New Zealand can gain from investing in more scientific research into alternative energy sources such as Methane Hydrates in the seabed. If found to be commercially viable, then suitable protection of the drilling rigs needs to be considered.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Arguably, an onion ring approach is appropriate where we concentrate our resources to supporting efforts close to NZ with diminishing effort further afield. Politically, that may be untenable as we tend to assist allies when called upon and that tends to stretch our military resources far and wide. The biggest issue with supporting allied responses to instability is that we cannot afford to lose large expensive assets. The social outrage is one thing, but it takes a decade or so to plan, budget, procure, receive and deploy new assets.

The likelihood of civil unrest in the Pacific Islands is relatively high and we need to stand-by to assist local governments should the need arise. Being our back yard, this has to be a high priority.

As noted in the 2014 Defence assessment, Africa appears to be a highly volatile area that requires considerable UN military peace keeping presence. Fortunately, it is African nations that are being called upon to assist in the main at this time. But there may come a time in the near future when NZ returns to Africa. If that is the case then we have to consider long-term remote operations with NH-90 helicopters. If that is the case, then NZ's response to closer issues is severely diminished.

It may not be a case of how to prioritise NZDF efforts but instead be a case of determining how many concurrent activities are achievable and supportable logistically.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Arguably, this question comes down to availability of NZDF spare resources that are compatible with the task at hand. IE, integrating where appropriate maritime patrol assets with customs (or MFAT, Police, DOC, NIWA etc) activities on the same flight or sailing. To avoid duplication of resources within NZ, e.g. customs having their own vessels in competition with NZDF vessels, it makes sense that NZDF assists where it can. Fundamentally, all government agencies are concerned with NZ's security. If assisting other agencies becomes too burdensome such that it impedes NZDF outputs and training, then the NZDF may require more vessels or a certain fleet operated by NZDF in support of non-military roles.

NZ is probably too small to have independent fleets for each government agency. Assisting Government agencies is good training for Defence staff, but the vessels and aircraft may not be ideal or cost effective. It needs to be balanced against the maintenance overhead too.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

NZDF contributes as much spare capacity as is available at the time of an emergency. Our primary role appears to be the provision of initial response; where councils, utility companies and other agencies pick up the pieces to rebuild communities.

Our contribution to national resilience is the speed and effectiveness of our response to a disaster. If the NZDF had no spare capacity or minimal spare capacity to assist a disaster, the national resilience may decline as the injury effects of the disaster may be prolonged. It is also possible that international aid to a large disaster may outpace the NZDF indigenous response. That may cause a negative feeling towards the NZDF.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The NZDF has an active role in developing NZ youth by supporting Cadet Forces. The NZDF, through its advertising, promotion of its activities and breadth of available jobs inspires youth to enlist. In addition, the NZDF are directed to provide youth development programs. Bases, Ships and Camps visit schools, provide open-days, allow school visits and have week-long activities for prospective recruits.

Arguably, the NZDF is doing enough to support NZ youth noting that it is not its primary role. I am not aware of the rates of enlistment for youth that undertake youth training, but perhaps that is not a useful measure of its benefits to the wider community.

Any solution involving training youth is a balance of funding, supervision (taking personnel away from

cores roles) and providing an advantage for youth and the NZDF. One potential pathway that may provide benefits to youth and the NZDF is to establish a youth apprenticeship scheme broadly outlined as follows:

- Enrolled as cadets (say aged between 15 and 18) to provide some legal framework and security screening;
- Hands-on trade training (no weapons training) under supervision to earn NCEA credits;
- **Partnership with polytech, provision of 3 R's and driver training;**
- Domiciled on Defence establishment or at home if live nearby;
- Paid a minimum wage, provided with some form of uniform and safety gear. Provided with fortnightly travel warrant home.
- If they eventually enlist, their apprenticeship training will significantly reduce their in-service trade training reducing the time to become fully qualified soldier, sailor or airman. (a positive side effect could be that units will have supervised junior manpower within their sections when their uniformed personnel deploy);
- Apprenticeship solutions can be tailored. For example, a 15 year old from Taihape could train as a chef at Waiouru under a civilian contracted chef or train to become a welder or store-man at Ohakea in a military unit. Non-lethal soldier skills training could be undertaken as a cadet company within an Army Camp;
- **If they don't enlist, then NZ has a broader competent skill base entering the workforce.**

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

**In terms of capability, it isn't always what equipment you have; but how** many, their utility for other roles and how nimble we are at updating and improving our capability. We tend to have one or two **items of large and expensive equipment such as frigates and OPV's (and C-17's if bought).** Arguably, two is effectively one in terms of deployment readiness over time. Maintenance, upgrade and repair often take assets out of service for long durations. A better minimum is probably three of any large deployable asset, providing two in use and one in maintenance. At minimum, we should be able to deploy a battle-pair of frigates that can assist each other and escort our logistic support ships. The NZ Antarctic dependency is mostly an ice shelf and many countries are taking an increased strategic interest in the area. Minerals, oil, tourism, science and food abound within the Antarctic region. A growing disrespect for the region is growing as Northern Hemisphere countries stake claims within the area. It would be beneficial to have an armed medium to heavy ice-breaker or ice hardened ship capability in support NZ interests within the Antarctic region. A polar patrol vessel to work independently or support Naval vessels patrolling the region, carry out rescue missions, assist navigation in the region, support NIWA and allied supply ships; **and ensure the security of NZ's** primary transport link to Antarctica. Most other nations with an Antarctic region have an ice-breaker ship. Being built for polar sailing, we can train Naval personnel for the particular role, perhaps by basing an ice-breaker in the South Island. However, an ice-breaker be virtue of its hull design is not good for general sailing roles.

**NZ's military reach in the South Pacific can be enhanced with bare-bases** established (or re-established using WWII links) for aircraft and naval vessels. This implies having negotiated access to remote airfields and wharfs suitable for munitions storage and handling. This concept allows deployed armed reconnaissance to stage at pre-set locations within the greater Pacific Ocean. The bare bases



will have legal standing, basic amenities and have local caretakers. By using local caretakers: jobs training and money is provided to local people. Pacific islands are quite small and villages are close to existing infrastructure, which limits (almost to zero) their munitions capacity. Such a scheme will also **enhance NZ's presence in the area that may counter Asian influence and provide staging areas for disaster recovery**, some privacy of activities and allow extended duration reconnaissance missions.

I note that Japan builds and operates flying boats in support of maritime patrol activities, search and rescue and landing close to remote islands. It may make sense to return to flying boats for SAR and visiting small Pacific islands. The P-3 is great at finding people stranded at sea and coordinating their rescue. However, a flying boat could land and pick up survivors. A flying boat could also provide fast assistance to remote islands during disaster relief operations.

With the advent of guided munitions, NZDF ranges are becoming too small to contain the implied danger areas. Broadly speaking, non-guided weapons tend to track directly towards a target and have little variation to the left and right. Guided weapons on the other hand have large danger areas in all directions. Safety template dimensions up to and exceeding 400 square kilometres are reasonable minimums.

There is a broad public perception that the NZDF lacks firepower. The demise of the ACF, the lack of naval guns (or the unwillingness to employ them as a deterrent to illegal fishing). I am aware of the rationale for reducing fire-power within the NZDF (financial, big-moat theory, boots on the ground are better than bombs in the air theory, finding political solutions etc). All arguments are valid. However, as we transition into a small amphibious or littoral force, we need some measure of protecting our fleet (including deployed helicopters) and personnel in remote areas. Simple, smart and cheap solutions are required for air support. It may take the form of armed T-6C's configured for long-range flying, fitting smart weapons to the P-3, armed helicopters or other solution compatible with over-water and over-land operations. We lack an armed escort as a function of air capability.

Re-introducing a littoral missile to the naval helicopter fleet would certainly make sense in the modern context. The Maverick missile was an ideal medium range solution for over water, over land, static and moving target, day and night capable missile. Fitting a ship-killing missile as the sole tactical response makes little sense as it reduces flexibility in the littoral environment.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

The location or co-location of NZDF military camps are based on historical assumptions and rationales. It may be prudent to consider establishing a large Base near a port (for example Napier or New Plymouth) where a combined task force can reside.

Alternatively, Linton and Ohakea are regionally close, where Linton is the primary deploying Army unit. It makes sense to have a permanent Naval port (or dedicated ordnance capable Naval wharf and associated facilities located at a port) within 2 hours drive to support Linton and Ohakea deployments. With the Explosive depot at Waiouru, some form of permanent Naval presence in the lower North Island make enormous sense in the amphibious context.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Terrorists (particularly Islamic Jihadists), countries who do not respect sovereign borders (such as Russia in Ukraine, and various nations in the South China Sea), non-state organisations who wish to spread violence and submission, in particular ISIS, Boko-Haram and Al-Qaeda. There is also a threat from illegal resource gatherers, in particular illegal fishing in the Pacific Ocean (not limited to NZ's EEZ).

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The international rules based system continues to face threats from expansionist countries and mainly Islamic Jihadists. This poses a threat to NZ which relies on agree international rules in our interests of peace and prosperity. The threats have come from an expansionist Russia and an increasingly well armed, motivated and implacable Islamic terrorist movement.

NZ has an interest in trade partners being peaceful; the more peaceful the world is, the greater the demand for goods that NZ produces. Therefore an unstable and impoverished Africa is not in NZ's interests. Non state actors such as Boko Haram destabilise entire regions, as do ISIS and Al-Qaeda in the Middle East. Furthermore, Russia's actions are also running against NZ's interests in plunging eastern Europe into uncertainty resulting in less trade.

Moreover, there is a moral obligation for NZ to maintain peace around the world. If NZ is capable of deploying forces to maintain peace, we are morally obliged through our value of being a good international citizen.

This means that the NZ Defence Force must first and foremost be combat credible. The NZDF must be able to deploy to any spot in the world (not just limited to the South Pacific), and maintain peace, or assist in returning areas / countries to peace. This could be against traditional forces, but is more likely to be against insurgent groups.

NZ has an immediate interest in keeping the South Pacific secure and prosperous. The biggest threat to this is from illegal fishing, therefore a high priority should be placed on the NZDF's ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) activities. This should be airborne and sea borne. Once ISTAR has been conducted, NZDF requires a credible option to provide a kinetic force to deter / arrest illegal fishers. This could be air based or sea based.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

As answered in Question 2 - ISTAR, based on air and sea platforms, able to continuously monitor the South Pacific and beyond for certain periods.

NZDF should also be able to strike illegal fishing vessels with a combat capability.

NZDF should deploy to regions throughout the world, in sufficient strength to conduct combat missions, with sufficient integral logistic and medical support. NZDF should be able to deploy up to a Brigade sized element for 8 months, and a Battlegroup sized element for up to 24 months (three rotations of 8 months).

The RNZN should be strong enough to conduct continuous monitoring of the South Pacific and deploy a combat ship (a frigate) to international waters as required.

The RNZAF should have greater ISTAR capabilities and an ability to conduct combat missions in the South Pacific to deter illegal fishing, and a ground attack role in support of deployed land forces.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

The emerging security challenges are increasing tension in the South China Sea, looming exploitation of Antarctica once international treaties expire and increasing illegal fishing.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

First priority should be to contribute to international peace and security globally. A secure world is under greater threat than a secure nation / secure region, therefore that should be responded to first.

There are few direct threats to NZ's sovereignty, therefore that should be the last priority, with the exception of monitoring and striking within our EEZ and Pacific Countries EEZs.

Australia simply does not need NZ's help in maintaining her security. We would be better served partnering with Australia in international missions to contribute to peace and security.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

NZDF should focus on providing a violence based option to government in order to further NZ's aims.

There needs to be seamless integration with intelligence networks, such as customs, SIS, GSCB etc for monitoring our EEZ.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

What it should not be - picking up oil from the Rena, and manning a security checkpoint in Cathedral Square for 2 years after the quake (why couldn't boy scouts etc pick up oil from the Rena, and why couldn't Chubb or someone do the security checkpoint?)

What it should be - planning (NZ Army officers in particular excel at this), coordinating response, providing security and reinforcement to NZ Police, provide signals and communications, provide transport, food, basic shelter, vehicle recovery, medical assistance, triage and treatment. NZDF should take more of a lead role given the unique breadth of capabilities to this organisation, and highly regarded ability of NZ Army officers (who have completed the Grade II and Grade III Planning courses) to plan and coordinate responses.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

None whatsoever.

Sending qualified soldiers and officers is a waste of valuable talent. There are many, many other organisations who can develop NZ's youth. Once upon a time the NZ Army may have been the only one, but now the private sector has more than caught up, and NZDF should not have a role in developing youth. NZDF should focus on combat.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?

An air strike capability, both in support of the RNZN deterring illegal fishing and in support of deployed ground forces.

A larger navy, capable of patrolling the South West Pacific continuously (supported by RNZAF), deploying combat ships to international theatres and deploying land / air elements in strength to international theatres.

A combat credible army, with integral artillery, engineers, armour, signals, intelligence, logistics, medical support and infantry. The focus should be on combat, at any level up to and including Brigade level.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Our officer training model can be improved. Army Officers are entering OCS at too young an age, and are dropping out.

Air Force officers require more focus on all arms skills, particularly given the increasingly asymmetric threat faced on deployments. An increasing awareness of land tactics will also result in benefits such as more tactically appropriate support.

Army and Air Force officer training should be combined, into a Royal Military College - NZ. This should be a year long course, after which new officers commission into either the RNZAF to conduct air specific training, or into the Army. The course should be aimed at university graduates, not school leavers.

To maintain high levels of recruitment, a university scheme similar to the one which the UK has should be launched, whereby NZDF will pay for university fees, in return for some NZDF training during semester breaks and a return of service (including attendance at RMC). This will result in the recruitment of motivated and smart young New Zealanders, increase the academic ability of the NZDF, result in more combat-credible Air Force Officers and bring these two services together. It will also ensure that officer cadets are physically and mentally more mature to deal with the arduous nature of commissioning courses.

Air Force and Army Officers can then progress through similar coursing models, including the all arms tactics courses such as the Grade II and Grade III which set up NZ Army officers for success.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Illegal fisheries,  
Ecological Disasters (Major Oil Spills),  
ISIL,  
Drug importation,  
Asylum seekers,  
Cyber Security,  
Piracy,  
UAV's,  
Sabotage,  
Lone wolf attacks,  
Subversion

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

We will know doubt receive criticism from the public, including possible backlash from the emphasizees of organisations such as ISIL. However I believe it would not be anything significant

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Combat roles to limit the impact of ISIL,  
Take a harder line in regards to Illegal Fishing especially in the antarctic water's,  
More peace keeping roles with the UN in places like south Sudan etc,  
Mine and UXO clearance in places that still require it such as Cambodia, Soloman Islands, Timor Leste etc,  
Deep Mixed Gas Diving to help with recovery of bodies and investigating maritime disasters beyond our current capability

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Illegal Fishing,  
  
Having a higher profile and taking a harder line on offending,  
Having the capability of conducting boardings of non-compliant vessels in not so idea circumstances and ensuring co-operation with other nations such as Australia to search detain and seize vessels and crew members of such vessels.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

I believe our highest priority should be focusing on International problem's We as a nation will always be fairely secure unless their is another world war which there would be forewarning to withdraw assests required to maintain local security.  
Contributing to International peace especially in the middle east and Africa should be our main concern,  
Anti Piracy is also a main concern as seatriade is a big NZ interest,  
Illegal Fisheries is also a major concern

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

I believe that the NZDF should set the standard in reducing our environmental footprint, We could start using solar and wind generators for our bases and water heating, waste separation schemes to reduce our waste going to landfill, Bio diesel etc?

Have a greater community presence and participate in practices that better our communities and country such as weed and pest eradication, building projects, reforestation projects, rubbish collection etc

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

I believe that we need to work closer with organisations such as LandSAR and USAR, We should all in the NZDF be trained to the basic levels of their organisations so if required anyone can react to disasters and we are not learning on the go, Some units should do their more advanced courses aswell so if a major event happens we can deploy anywhere to help save lives where otherwise we may have to wait for international assistance

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The YDU do a great job but I believe more can be done,

Especially for the "at risk of offending" We have some great mentors in the NZDF with more funding anything could be possible.

NZCF is a great way to help our youth if every cadet unit had a parent unit from within the NZDF to help with funding for equipment and volunteers from the unit to help mentor and instruct then it would go along way to help.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Deep Mixed Gas Diving to a depth of at least 200M to enable us to recover bodies, Recorder's Etc. and conduct more effective investigations of aircraft or shipwrecks, 61% of the NZ TTW is 0-100M with our current capability covering not even half of this.

An updated ROV, at present we are using an inspection class ROV with a very limited movement in our manipulator arm,

With a new ROV with full range of movement manipulator arm that would allow us to do a larger range of jobs using the ROV

More emphasis on Individual Self defence, At present I would be lucky to get on the rifle range once every two years which is probably more than most in the RNZN also HTH combat should be taught to all members of the operational branch as it could be life saving skill during a boarding or in protection of our base or ship. Every individual should also be issued with their own body armour and webbing like the army so we can train in our own time with the gear we would be fighting with to ensure we are familiar and are happy with the kit before being deployed

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

New Zealand is a very trade dependant country. Many of the trade routes that we use are susceptible to piracy. We need to ensure our economic capacity by denying pirates the ability to attack.

China is reaching into the Pacific with greater autonomy. they are investing heavily in the islands. If New Zealand doesn't do something China may supplant us the major influence in the Pacific.

Continued incursions by illegal fisheries in our EEZ.

With an increased profile around the world, NZ could potentially be a target of terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda or ISIL.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The influence of China in the Pacific. they are spending a large amount of money in small pacific islands. These could be of concern to NZ due to there proximity to us and in the future they could form part of China's strategy to control the Pacific and should China become Hostile, form part of a barricade to separate NZ from the rest of the world.

The Reduced superiority of the US military means that NZ should start to consider becoming more self sufficient to protect our own interests.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

We should make our presence known more in the Pacific. Remind our neighbours what we offer and how we support them.

To become more self sufficient, we should investigate developing a combined ISR and strike capability. This is a capability that has grown in use significantly in the last decade. The US are solely conducting airstrikes in support of the Iraqi government against ISIL.

Anti-Submarine Warfare.

UAV patrol and ISR.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Continued attempts by asylum seekers on overcrowded boats trying to enter our country.

Continued fishing in our territorial waters and EEZ. With such a small fleet of aircraft and a large area to patrol. It is difficult to maintain a deterring presence.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

By actively participating in international activities. We are cementing our relationship with other nations. This means that other nations should be willing to offer support when we need it.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and

advance the nation's interests?:

The cooperation of varying government departments is essential for a small government like ours, there is minimal resources and so maximising their utility means we can 'punch above our weight'.

The Government needs to ensure that the military are free to conduct their operations with minimal bureaucracy. Too often the NZDF is hamstrung by silly rules that complicate a simple task or operation.

This can be done through reasonable exemptions from some laws.

Communications need to be 2way and effective between the NZDF and the rest of government.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

We are seen as the most effective option for recovering from such disasters. It is important that we are seen by the public and are seen to be effective and most importantly, seen as productive. They can have faith in us and this makes the NZDF's job much easier. We need to lead by example.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

We should be able to support the development of young people to become upstanding members of society but we should be also encouraging them to join the military. If we just run boot camps for the naughty kids, we end up tarnishing our reputation by being seen as the sumping ground for no-hopers or half wits.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Strike.

ISR

UAV capability

More people in the right jobs,

Newer, more reliable equipment.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

The process for replacing our equipment should be transparent, there should be no manipulation of the specifications to choose one 'favourite' type. For example, when looking at replacements for our Hercules and Orion aircraft, we should be considering ALL options. This includes Japanese, European and even Ukrainian aircraft. Be completely unbiased and let the specs talk for themselves. This means we get the best option not a compromise.

As for developing a light strike capability, the Textron/Airland Scorpion jet is a fantastic option as it is very affordable to procure and to operate.

By developing capabilities like this with a bit of foresight, we can be prepared for the future, not trying when it is too late.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Retention of trained Security/Defence personnel, international investment in key NZ infrastructure, international interest in exploiting Antarctic natural resources, ability to police harvesting of natural resources and enforce law in national bounded territories and; extremist activities.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Stronger relations with strategic partners have resulted in better coalition training. Worried about China, especially with Spratly's forming a precedent.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Keep improving ties with strategic partners, leverage Australia's combat air purchasing and lease aircraft for NZ Airforce pilots use, both fixed wing and rotary combat.

Marine expeditionary force is touted focus, ensure Navy gets appropriate craft in order to conduct landings properly.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

As above, increased economic warfare with infrastructure ownership going off shore. Lack of major infrastructure upgrades; power grid is very dependant on South Island hydro, transit system in our capital is crippled by falling trees and weather, deployment readiness states of all three services are poor (particularly Navy).

An incident (natural disaster, attack) in Wellington could potentially cripple national leadership, both governmental and defence. Collocating the HQ's of government departments in a very small geographic area is asking for trouble.

National and military command communication links overly dependant on civilian infrastructure with concomitant contractor costs for 24/7 support.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Prioritise thus:

New Zealand Security

Australasia Security

South-West Pacific Security

Strategic Partners

Global

Peace (NZ Defence Forces train for war, or used to anyway)

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Continue on; form and maintain links with strategic partners, conduct joint operations and leverage better funded and equipped nations capabilities... with mana.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

We kick butt... We are postured in most urban areas to provide immediate relief and support to local populace although Auckland is woefully undermanned ratio wise to provide support. With the large Logistic depots relocated to central/lower north island, providing logistical aid to the Auckland region is limited. Navy require certain levels of tide to dock landing craft for load/offload and air lift capability is hampered by lack of five star hotels and 4G comms connectivity during natural disasters.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Continue YDU, nothing but positives out that wonderful programme. Consider re-establishing full time cadet program for at risk youth instead of CYF's foster care.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

- Native Combat Air capability; fixed wing and rotary
- Increased Air Transport capability
- Increase / relocation of Naval bases
- Increase of local naval patrols; coastguard, fisheries joint ops
- Mobile Air, Sea and Land Command Capability (at Operational and Strategic level)
- National Public Alert System (text, radio, tv, email); natural disaster, attack
- National Defence Alert System (text, radio, tv, email); natural disaster, attack

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Our leadership training IS world class. Our army officers and NCO's are very well trained compared to American Armed forces and on par with UK, Aus and Canadian Forces.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

NZ faces a major threat from the restructuring of the global order through the rise of nations such as China, Indonesia and India reaching a level of parity with the US, Europe and Russia. In the NZ context this will manifest itself in competition for support from minor less affiliated nations such as those the South Pacific, South Asia, Africa and South America. The start of this is already playing out in the South China Sea as China asserts a greater influence through its dubious territorial claims.

NZ also faces major threats due to general resource scarcity, and whilst we appear invulnerable due to our geography, this also lends itself to vulnerability as it will be a stretch expecting any of our principal partners, or our ally Australia, committing resources in the face of the major global dynamics mentioned above.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The changes to the international environment are likely to necessitate a return to more traditional military relationships between states. Australia is already embarking on this journey, as are many nations in Asia, and being matched by the US' slow pivot back to our region. The affect on NZ's interests and the implications for our Defence Force is that a decision will have to be made as to whether we maintain a credible military contribution, commensurate with our size, or commit our physical security to an ally(s).

In parallel with this is the rise of the militant non-state actor, characterised by ISIS, and the potential for this to influence to the behaviour and allegiance of states. The impacts this will have on NZ interests and the NZDF is less clear, however we need to acknowledge the interrelationships between traditional defence, and the role of unlawful migration.

The UN, as the eminent international institution continues to fail to demonstrate its potential, and this poses a risk should NZ policy rely on this as a foundation form of protection, as opposed to traditional alliances which will become more, not less, significant into the future.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

The primary role that the NZDF can perform abroad is one of providing a credible contribution to allied and coalition operations. Whilst the 'attach a flag' approach to contributing to large coalitions conducting low-end operations has been viable to date, as our allies continue to modernise and scale for traditional state on state conflict, we run the risk of not providing a credible contribution to this level of warfare, and relinquishing sovereignty over our security, by relying on other nations to support out of altruism, or at significant long term cost to NZ, rather than as part of a mutual support arrangement.

Credible combat capabilities have proved highly effective at adapting to low-end military activities such as Maritime Interception Operations, border security, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, MH370 search and so on. The 'low end' capabilities however cannot be considered a credible combat contribution, and are not scalable.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

NZ will face increased pressure on our natural resources, primarily from offshore. Illegal immigration

is a very real medium term threat, and whilst NZ's isolation is currently a benefit, as smugglers become better equipped (inevitable as the need a financial support becomes greater), our isolation will be a hindrance as any vessels that get to within a certain distance of NZ will be very challenging to deal with in any other way than to allow them landfall. NZ should not view people smuggling through the lens of an Australian, but must consider it in the context of 100m merchant ships 200nm off the NZ shoreline, and therefore 900nm from anywhere else.

The future of the continental shelf is less clear due to the complexity of illegal exploitation of the seabed and substrate, in comparison to illegal fishing, however this still belies the importance of having a robust surveillance capability over this area and beyond.

The security challenge to the Realm will be that posed by aid from nations whose broader goals are not aligned with that of NZ.

Whilst we often view the fate of the Ross Dependency through the eyes of resource exploitation, which is currently and remains a threat into the future, there is a risk of militarisation of the Antarctic continent.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The best way for the Government to prioritise is to commit to a credible combat contribution to an allied or coalition operation. This will achieve all of the tasks in Question 5. In order to prioritise the NZ Government needs more open dialogue with our ally and other principal partners over what a credible contribution is, being more realistic about NZ's ability to maintain military capability over breadth, whilst achieving no depth.

NZ should leverage off its geographic position, and posture its defence contribution towards contributing to threats at their source, or at least up threat of NZ. This means that contributing to the security of Australia for example, may be the best long term way of supporting our own security.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

The NZDF should work more closely with MFAT as the nation's diplomatic arm. The NZDF exercise, defence diplomacy and military contribution to operations should be planned and executed as part of the widest long term strategy of NZ.

The NZDF should continue to provide the ready resource for disaster relief, however any specific funding for these capabilities or activities should be in addition to that required to ensure the NZDF can make a credible combat contribution.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

The NZDF has a significant role in ensuring our resilience to events and natural disasters. By virtue of the military's ability to plan and execute complex operations the NZDF can provide a leadership role.

Due to the ability of the NZDF to operate independently for a significant period during combat operations, the NZDF lends itself immediately to being the most prepared and able to self sustain in the event of a significant national disaster.

Additional military capabilities such as communications, ISR and tactical and strategic lift are essential components of a nation's resilience.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

The NZDF has and should continue to play an important role in the development of youth. It should be acknowledged the contribution that is made to NZ's wider resilience when someone who has received only a short period of training leaves the NZDF and goes into the community. This opportunity can be targeted and the ability for the NZDF to make this contribution widened, by making the organisation a more attractive one to join for any NZer, and a more flexible one to join and leave. The relationship between the NZDF and schools and business should be strengthened to raise the profile of the NZDF and discover other ways that the organisations can foster youth development, which would be a win for all sides.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

The NZDF needs the capability to make a credible combat contribution to an allied or coalition operation. We are a maritime nation with a strong history of maritime operations, suggesting that this contribution should be of a maritime nature.

The NZ Government needs to be realistic about the number of different capabilities that NZ can sustain, and rather than attempt to achieve breadth of capability, should be focussing on depth.

C4 and ISR are essential capabilities and NZ needs the NZDF to have the capability, both as a combination of national capability and as part of a coalition, to have a high level of situational awareness from the Ross Sea into the South Pacific. We need to become masters of our domain in an information sense, before we can master it in a technical sense.

As has been demonstrated over recent and longer term history. NZ will be called upon to make a 'boots on the ground' contribution, and therefore having a credible land force that can make a part of a wider force is essential. At this more micro level, depth is more important than breadth, and as for all NZ capabilities, ensuring this is a credible combat contribution, and not targeted at being an independently deployable force with little combat credibility, is important.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

It appears that the NZDF is attempting to become a military capable of Amphibious Operations. This is a highly ambitious target that may prove unaffordable, both financially and due to personnel and technology constraints. This could leave defence in the position of continuing to strive towards an unrealistic goal, at the expense of being able to make a credible combat contribution.

It is more realistic to expect NZ to make a contribution to an amphibious operation, and our

capabilities should be tailored accordingly.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

I believe that the biggest challenge to NZ's security now, and in the future is the movement away from conventional warfare, where two nations face off over an issue, to conflict that is fought on ideals and not over land, which will be fought between nations and groups who have different beliefs to the nations where they reside

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

I believe that the changes in the international environment will bring a massive set of challenges, where the New Zealand Govt. will be needing to provide security to their citizens where ever they may be in the world, and the Defence Force will need to change our way of conducting operations to be able to meet the changing expectations. Defence will need to become more mobile and fluid with adaptations to the changing theatres that they will be expected to operate in

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Defence should conduct more courses like Aumangea, where personal are encouraged to adapt to the situations and over come them

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Poaching and illegal fishing, and also the transport of refugees to New Zealand. I believe that New Zealand should invest in an Ice Breaker, to be able to patrol our territorial waters and enforce our nations laws onto those that are violating the laws in our waters

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

To be able to provide relevant manpower and suitable resources to the citizens of New Zealand at short notice,

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

There should be compulsory service as there is in Germany. It will provide the youth with more grounding, discipline, and an opportunity to pick up trades and life skills, and become part of something bigger than themselves.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Defence needs more platforms like HMNZS Canterbury, but the design of the platforms needs to be thought out, and based off a proven platform. In my opinion it should be based on the Albion Class ships MHS Albion and HMS Bulwark

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Defence should conduct more courses like Aumangea, where personal are encouraged to adapt to the situations and over come them. It creates a culture of winning and of achieving the objectives

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Remove involvement with programmes such as YDU, YLS. These programmes do not offer value for money.

NZ Cadet Forces model is far superior and is available to far more young people than the YDU model. NZDF support (though minimal) is adequate given current NZDF resources (Base, Camp, Establishment availability). MSD funding to NZDF to support and further enhance NZCF capability in delivering their youth programme would provide a far more effective use of public monies. In addition expenditure is managed by NZDF directly in a more open and transparent way. Results of NZCF youth training and development (currently available from NZDF/NZCF sources) support this methodology.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

1. Soft / Economic power from the likes of China in the Pacific as well as NZ. Worst case - this may give case for them to 'protect' their assets with force.
2. Terrorism - Both home made and international.
3. Cyber Terrorism.
4. NZs natural resources (water, minerals etc) becoming very appealing to other countries.
5. Conventional warfare in the wider theatre creating instability to NZs economy and territory.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

1. China V USA is a classic. NZ will have to pick sides and will lose out economically and in a security sense regardless.
2. Russia V NATO (lead on from Ukraine). Also not likely but NZ may get dragged into this should it occur.
3. ISIS / instability in the Middle East and Africa. Should this spread into the likes of SE Asia, NZ will be definitely involved as it will directly affect our economy (shipping lanes, increased security threat)

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Primarily to physically defend NZ and its waters. Secondly to stop the threat of anything getting this far south by actively assisting our allies in operations.

Thirdly civil assist (which really falls under defence of the country - whether the enemies are man or mother nature).

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

If the EEZ increases, trying to successfully patrol the large area. Currently 5 SQN and the RNZN are stretched at the best of times, the RNZN could not even board an illegal fishing vessel in the Southern Ocean for example. Possibly a more passive surveillance system (satellites) followed by a more targeted active system (P3 / Naval vessels).

As above with China.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

No brainer:

1. Security of NZ.
2. Security of Australia.
3. Security of traditional allies.
4. Peace keeping.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Depending on the requirement the defence should not always be the first port of call as it is currently. This is a major drain on NZDF resources (holding SAR, MPI taskings etc)

However, if the NZDF is the most suitable asset available - not the easiest, then other governmental

departments should not hesitate to ask for assistance.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

The primary role as it turns out following the CHCH earthquakes.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Get them enthused about the NZDF and it will encourage them to join up. It might keep a few more off the streets as well.

How to achieve this?

1. Get more exciting equipment.
2. Do more exciting things.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

1. People:

We need more of the right people in the right jobs. For example we need specific people to do all the administration (i.e. an admin clerk) so the operators can get out there and operate and not worry about the paperwork.

We also need to train people more effectively. When it takes 8 years to fully train a captain of an aircraft, there is not much left for him to give back before he will leave the NZDF. This is a waste.

2. Equipment:

Equipment to defend the country needs to be invested in. We cannot hire white fleet rental vehicles to take us to war.

We need offensive as well as defensive equipment - fighter /strike jets and air defence, tanks and ships with decent offensive weapons. Without these things we are barely even a 'coast guard'.

Think of this equipment as 'house insurance' for if that day did occur - you don't get rid of your insurance just because you haven't used it in the past 40 years.

Having this equipment would solve recruitment as well...

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

We need to concentrate on the basic requirements. If we decide to spread ourselves too thin then the expertise in the basics will wane and we will lose combat effectiveness.

For example, now we have brand new helicopters and less crews available to fly them. The aircraft can do 5X as much as the old ones so we get mission creep (long range over water SAR / amphibious ops). I guarantee that the battlefield support expertise will lose to this as well.

Once again we are not a coast guard we are a military.

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

**This White Paper submission considers New Zealand's strategic interests and suggests that New Zealand should consider rebalancing its defence effort to reflect the interests we have in maritime security both locally and globally.**

#### **New Zealand's Geographic Position**

New Zealand is a small group of islands situated in the South Western Pacific 1200 nautical miles from its nearest neighbour Australia. **Our small size means we don't have the internal markets** required for a rich economy, and must therefore rely on international trade to support our desired first world lifestyle. The isolation though presents a problem for international trade as our markets are at the end of long thin sea lines of communication. The distance creates problems in terms of access, and gives nearer competitors an advantage both in freight costs and surety of supply.

New Zealand therefore faces a strategic conundrum in that being a small country it relies on trade with external markets which is complicated by distance.

Size and distance complicate our strategic position internationally, but when compared to regional neighbours, New Zealand is a major influence, second only to Australia, with the responsibilities that implies. Further, the distances that complicate our global interests, while still a factor to be considered, are a lesser complication in the Southwest Pacific.

#### **New Zealand's Strategic Interests**

**New Zealand's position, aspirations, and global outlook create a unique set of strategic interests;** global and domestic. Our global interests centre on the security of the international trading system and our ability to trade with the rest of the world. Domestically, we have security interests in our immediate region protecting our sovereignty and ensuring the Pacific retains its essentially Pacific nature. Ensuring the security of those nations for which we have obligations (Tokelau, Niue, and Cook Islands), as well as those Pacific neighbours for which we have close relationships such as Tonga and Samoa.

Our regional interests are not just centred on the Pacific. We have a territorial claim to the Ross Dependency which although in abeyance still needs to be secured in the interim. The Southern Ocean is also becoming an area where activities such as illegal fishing are increasingly becoming an issue.

#### **New Zealand's Global Interests**

**New Zealand's global strategic interests can be described as an international environment in which** the interests of small nations are protected by institutions which protect the international rule of law; an open trading system with free and open markets and free movement of goods between nations.

**The trading environment is one which receives little more than a 'once over lightly' approach in** strategic assessments, to some extent because its importance is so obvious it almost goes without saying. However, it needs a little more examination.

It is traditional for New Zealand to stress the volume of goods that move by sea. In 2013, 99.7% of **New Zealand's export tonnage was moved by sea, and 99.5%** of imports. But this is only part of the picture. The more interesting part, and the more vital from a defence and foreign policy perspective, is that New Zealand, like other advanced economies, depends for its prosperity on the seaborne part of international supply chains.

Containerisation is an important part of the picture. A modern container ship might move 15-18,000 containers in a single voyage, and more than 50% of containerised trade is now in components moving between parts of a highly disaggregated global manufacturing process rather than in final

goods heading towards a shelf in a retail outlet.

This, in a variety of ways, is the system under threat. The combination of current just-enough and just-in-time supply chain philosophies and the fact that most countries maintain extraordinarily low reserves of life essentials such as food and oil means that any disruption of trade is likely to have severe consequences. The great warehouses of the past, as Geoffrey Till has pointed out, are now at sea, meaning that the system has in-built fragilities that are probably not well understood by most policy makers.

#### **Threats to New Zealand's Global Interests**

New Zealand stands very high on world globalisation indexes that measure global connectivity, integration and interdependence. The most recent of these indexes (2013) ranks New Zealand at 28th in terms of its exposure to globalisation (by comparison, the United States ranks 34th, Australia 19th, Japan 56th and China 73rd). This means that while we are well connected globally, we are also unusually vulnerable to any disruption in trade and information flows.

We need to remember too that given our geographical isolation, we are at the end of a very long chain of ship and container movements and port transfers, which adds to our vulnerability from a trade disruption point of view. The implications of these developments can be seen in how US Maritime Strategy has been developing in recent years. The thrust is no longer on the Cold War need for navies to be able to fight and defeat each other at sea (except in the ultimate). The emphasis is increasingly on the use of navies to facilitate and keep open the sea lines of communication and commerce on which the economic prosperity of all countries depend.

The developing logic of seapower is increasingly centred on the role of navies in securing economic prosperity. This is less about the protection of shipping per se (New Zealand has no merchant fleet to protect, and neither does the US). Shipping must be protected because of the goods carried, but it is more useful to think of global commerce as a system, recognising the interdependency of all the elements that make up the global system of commerce, including resource extraction, manufacturing, assembly, consumption and transportation. It is the system as a whole that must be protected, including the flows of information, finance and goods that comprise the lifeblood of the system.

In an age of increasing globalisation and interconnectedness, the role of peacetime navies is less to defeat of an adversary at sea, but to work with other navies to defend all the elements of the global economic system on which the prosperity of nations depend. This requires navies to work together cooperatively rather than competitively, and it is this logic that, for the present at least, permeates US maritime strategy.

**'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower'** was published as the joint strategy of the US Defence Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in 2007. Though critically received in some quarters for its lack of specificity, including the difficulty of translating cooperative strategy into force structure, the joint strategy has survived reasonably intact, and has proved its utility in guiding US thinking on a range of matters including naval doctrine, exercise patterns and the need to work more closely with partner navies.

**The strategy is written for an age in which nations are neither 'fully at war nor fully at peace'.** The challenge is to apply seapower in a manner which instils greater collective security, stability and trust amongst nations. The underlying thought behind the strategy is that peace does not preserve itself. The focus is on building opportunities for cooperation rather than on defeating threats at sea.

US Maritime Strategy offers opportunities to those countries, New Zealand included, which maintain naval resources capable of working alongside others. We have been active in recent years in exploiting such opportunities, but there must be a significant contribution by New Zealand of naval forces to preserving the systems on which the free flow of seaborne trade depend.

One area of particular interest to the US in its approach to maritime strategy is in securing a commitment from its partners to significantly enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and an **expansion in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities** . This is in New Zealand's interests as well and is an area in which the Navy, working with other government agencies, arguably needs to do more.

The Possibility of a Breakdown in Cooperation and Good Order at Sea

New Zealand in general does not usually consider good order at sea to be an issue. However, the Prime Minister, in a recent public statement on New Zealand National Security, outlined the **government's belief that New Zealanders must accept that they no longer live in a benign security environment** . Although this statement was made in the context of the government's response to the rise of the Islamic State and an accompanying increase in the terrorist threat to New Zealand, there are wider implications for security agencies, including the Navy. Breakdowns in the international order can and do have implications for seaborne trade as is seen off the coast of Somalia, in the Arabian Gulf, and off the West Coast of Africa. The response to these threats has been the cooperative effort of navies working together to ensure seaborne trade is protected.

Cooperative strategies, including the US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century, recognise that mutuality has its limits and that the systems of cooperative security on which they are built can break down, sometimes with little or no warning.

A surprising number of states in the Asia Pacific region, though committed to cooperative strategies, are nonetheless investing in high end military capabilities including advanced submarines, surface combatants and 5th generation fighter aircraft. The investment of hundreds of billions of dollars for some states , suggests a willingness to wage war if peace should break down. China and India are amongst the lead players acquiring high end military capability, including aircraft carriers and anti-access ballistic and cruise missile systems and their space based components. Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are also investing significant sums in military capability.

Some of these investments are no doubt driven by national prestige. But this is unlikely to be the sole reason for acquiring military capability when it is considered that their use is mainly justifiable when security underpinned by the rule of international law breaks down.

The main concerns driving the acquisition of advanced military capability are well known. Territorial disputes are one source of concern, fuelled by the potential for competition over increasingly scarce natural resources including oil and gas, seabed minerals and fish protein. Disputes over fresh water resources are also a growing concern as nations in the region with growing populations (India being a prime example) compete with their neighbours (China in this case) over access to fresh water for irrigation as well as industrial and household use. The effects of climate change including mass refugee flows are another concern, as is the potential for public health issues spilling over national boundaries. Tensions over the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities are a further issue. Irregular threats such as those from terrorism and piracy are also an ever present concern.



Concerns such as these could boil over at any time, as we already see in the South China Sea and along the Chinese/Indian border. No one can predict the point at which a political miscalculation could lead to interstate war, but it is hard not to agree with the predictions of those who see the conditions for a perfect storm arising in our region at some point in the 2030s or sooner (including the noted maritime scholar Geoffrey Till, historian Niall Ferguson and strategist Colin Gray).

It is these concerns that suggest it would be prudent to think that an increased investment in the **Defence Force over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand's immediate security** as well as our wider regional concerns. We do not need to be thinking in terms of military capability in the same way as the Chinese and the Indians, or even the Australians for that matter. **But we do need to be contemplating a significant lift in New Zealand's maritime capability**, both in terms of numbers of hulls and the capability built into those hulls.

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**New Zealand is one of the world's most globalised states. The key enablers of globalisation and disaggregated manufacturing are the world's oceans.** Keeping the oceans and sea lines of communication open for trade is vital to New Zealand's security and economic prosperity. This is a task that requires a broad array of partners, and is not one that we can or should leave to others. Looking ahead over the period leading up to 2035 and beyond to 2050, it appears inevitable that the high seas, the deep oceans, and the sea floor will all be subject to increasing competition for resources in a region of the world of growing populations, growing wealth, growing militarisation and growing demand. This competition will not be confined to the northern hemisphere, but can be expected to flow into the South Pacific, the Southern Oceans and, quite possibly, the Antarctic region. The fight will come to us. Competition will be focused on fisheries, deep sea mining, oil and gas, and may also include fresh water. Efforts may intensify to close off areas of the high seas under the guise of internal waters.

Goods cannot flow at sea without the intelligence and communication enablers that help businesses design and run just-in-time supply lines and disaggregated manufacturing processes. Actionable intelligence on what is going on at sea is a prerequisite to doing anything constructive about it. New Zealand will need to do more on a whole of government basis to build a highly capable and truly joint maritime intelligence organisation that can link up with other regional intelligence centres monitoring the flow of ships and goods at sea. It is for discussion whether the Navy, working with other agencies, should take the lead on this as part of its strategy of working more closely with the USN. The recent review of the National Maritime Coordination Centre by the Maritime Security Oversight Committee may assist these discussions.

The US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century (2007) offers opportunities for engagement with the US to navies throughout the Asia Pacific. With the right ships and capabilities in place we will be well placed to take advantage of this strategy. But, as the US itself recognises, cooperative strategies can break down, sometimes with very little notice.

The Navy performs a variety of functions across the humanitarian, constabulary, presence and warfighting spectrum. All of these functions are necessary and, at times, individually vital. But at its heart the Navy is maintained by the Government as a fighting service. Warfighting is its core function, but cannot be sustained based on the size of the current fleet.

The trend in recent years for fewer combat platforms with greater capability (depth over breadth) has

gone further than it should. **In future the Navy's major combatants will need to grow significantly in number as well as capability.** To help achieve this growth the Navy needs to explore ways that will deliver to government more and better value for money and an expanded set of capability options. As David Cameron remarked to the House of Commons when introducing the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) **'A Royal Navy locked into a cycle of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive ships. Mr Speaker, we cannot go on like this'. An increased investment in the Navy over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand security.**

#### **New Zealand's regional interests**

As a major power in the Southwest Pacific, New Zealand has a range of interests. Protecting our security is first and foremost, followed by protecting the interests of the Realm States and those Pacific states with whom we have close relationships (Tonga, Western Samoa). Add to that our claim to the Ross Dependency, and more immediate interests in those waters in which we have sovereign rights. The total area for which New Zealand has either responsibility or interest amounts to close to **a quarter of the earth's oceans.**

#### **Implications of our interests**

**Even without our global interests, New Zealand's defence and security policy is challenged by our immediate and regional interests.** Although a small state internationally, New Zealand is a major state in the Southwest Pacific. Our constitutional responsibilities for the defence of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, as well as close relationships with other Pacific states such as Western Samoa and Tonga, create an area of interest that covers a significant portion of the Pacific Ocean. Add to that territorial claims in Antarctica and security interests in the Southern Ocean and our interests in our **own Territorial Sea, EEZ and Extended Continental Shelf and our domestic' security interests begin to compare with those of other, larger, better resourced states.**

#### **Conclusion**

New Zealand has both global and regional interests, and limited resources to protect them. These interests are maritime interests and need to be secured by maritime means. We have to be both global and regional players, and a local power. A well constructed Defence Force can be a major supporter of diplomatic efforts to ensure our interests are preserved. That Defence Force must be able to police the immediate region, protecting our security, sovereignty and resources. Equally, that defence force must be able to support international efforts to preserve the international trading environment on which we depend. This will require a re-balancing of the current defence force with increased focus on maritime surface and aerial capability.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

**This White Paper submission considers New Zealand's strategic interests and suggests that New Zealand should consider rebalancing its defence effort to reflect the interests we have in maritime security both locally and globally.**

#### **New Zealand's Geographic Position**

New Zealand is a small group of islands situated in the South Western Pacific 1200 nautical miles from its nearest neighbour Australia. **Our small size means we don't have the internal markets** required for a rich economy, and must therefore rely on international trade to support our desired

first world lifestyle. The isolation though presents a problem for international trade as our markets are at the end of long thin sea lines of communication. The distance creates problems in terms of access, and gives nearer competitors an advantage both in freight costs and surety of supply.

New Zealand therefore faces a strategic conundrum in that being a small country it relies on trade with external markets, which is complicated by distance.

Size and distance complicate our strategic position internationally, but when compared to regional neighbours, New Zealand is a major influence, second only to Australia, with the responsibilities that implies. Further, the distances that complicate our global interests, while still a factor to be considered, are a lesser complication in the Southwest Pacific.

#### **New Zealand's Strategic Interests**

**New Zealand's position, aspirations, and global outlook create a unique set of strategic interests:** global and domestic. Our global interests centre on the security of the international trading system and our ability to trade with the rest of the world. Domestically, we have security interests in our immediate region protecting our sovereignty and ensuring the Pacific retains its essentially pacific nature. Ensuring the security of those nations for which we have obligations (Tokelau, Niue, and Cook Islands), as well as those Pacific neighbours for which we have close relationships such as Tonga and Samoa.

Our regional interests are not just centred on the Pacific. We have a territorial claim to the Ross Dependency which although in abeyance still needs to be secured in the interim. The Southern Ocean is also becoming an area where activities such as illegal fishing are increasingly becoming an issue.

#### **New Zealand's Global Interests**

**New Zealand's global strategic interests can be described as an international environment in which** the interests of small nations are protected by institutions which protect the international rule of law; an open trading system with free and open markets and free movement of goods between nations. **The trading environment is one which receives little more than a 'once over lightly' approach** in strategic assessments, to some extent because its importance is so obvious, it almost goes without saying. However, it needs a little more examination.

It is traditional for New Zealand to stress the volume of goods that move by sea. In 2013, 99.7% of **New Zealand's export tonnage was moved by sea, and 99.5% of imports** . But this is only part of the picture. The more interesting part, and the more vital from a defence and foreign policy perspective, is that New Zealand, like other advanced economies, depends for its prosperity on the seaborne part of international supply chains .

Containerisation is an important part of the picture. A modern container ship might move 15-18,000 containers in a single voyage , and more than 50% of containerised trade is now in components moving between parts of a highly disaggregated global manufacturing process rather than in final goods heading towards a shelf in a retail outlet.

This, in a variety of ways, is the system under threat. The combination of current just-enough and just-in-time supply chain philosophies and the fact that most countries maintain extraordinarily low reserves of life essentials such as food and oil means that any disruption of trade is likely to have severe consequences . The great warehouses of the past, as Geoffrey Till has pointed out, are now at sea, meaning that the system has in-built fragilities that are probably not well understood by most

policy makers.

### **Threats to New Zealand's Global Interests**

New Zealand stands very high on world globalisation indexes that measure global connectivity, integration and interdependence . The most recent of these indexes (2013) ranks New Zealand at 28th in terms of its exposure to globalisation (by comparison, the United States ranks 34th, Australia 19th, Japan 56th and China 73rd). This means that while we are well connected globally, we are also unusually vulnerable to any disruption in trade and information flows.

We need to remember too that given our geographical isolation, we are at the end of a very long chain of ship and container movements and port transfers, which adds to our vulnerability from a trade disruption point of view. The implications of these developments can be seen in how US Maritime Strategy has been developing in recent years. The thrust is no longer on the Cold War need for navies to be able to fight and defeat each other at sea (except in the ultimate). The emphasis is increasingly on the use of navies to facilitate and keep open the sea lines of communication and commerce on which the economic prosperity of all countries depend.

The developing logic of seapower is increasingly centred on the role of navies in securing economic prosperity . This is less about the protection of shipping per se (New Zealand has no merchant fleet to protect, and neither does the US ). Shipping must be protected because of the goods carried, but it is more useful to think of global commerce as a system, recognising the interdependency of all the elements that make up the global system of commerce, including resource extraction, manufacturing, assembly, consumption and transportation. It is the system as a whole that must be protected, including the flows of information, finance and goods that comprise the lifeblood of the system.

In an age of increasing globalisation and interconnectedness, the role of peacetime navies is less to defeat of an adversary at sea, but to work with other navies to defend all the elements of the global economic system on which the prosperity of nations depend. This requires navies to work together cooperatively rather than competitively, and it is this logic that, for the present at least, permeates US maritime strategy.

**'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower'** was published as the joint strategy of the US Defence Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in 2007 . Though critically received in some quarters for its lack of specificity, including the difficulty of translating cooperative strategy into force structure , the joint strategy has survived reasonably intact , and has proved its utility in guiding US thinking on a range of matters including naval doctrine, exercise patterns and the need to work more closely with partner navies.

**The strategy is written for an age in which nations are neither 'fully at war nor fully at peace '.** The challenge is to apply seapower in a manner which instils greater collective security, stability and trust amongst nations. The underlying thought behind the strategy is that peace does not preserve itself . The focus is on building opportunities for cooperation rather than on defeating threats at sea.

US Maritime Strategy offers opportunities to those countries, New Zealand included, which maintain naval resources capable of working alongside others. We have been active in recent years in exploiting such opportunities, but there must be a significant contribution by New Zealand of naval forces to preserving the systems on which the free flow of seaborne trade depend.

One area of particular interest to the US in its approach to maritime strategy is in securing a commitment from its partners to significantly enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and an

expansion in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities . This is in New Zealand's interests as well and is an area in which the Navy, working with other government agencies, arguably needs to do more.

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New Zealand in general does not usually consider good order at sea to be an issue. However, the Prime Minister, in a recent public statement on New Zealand National Security, outlined the **government's belief that New Zealanders must accept that they no longer live in a benign security environment** . Although this statement was made in the context of the **government's response to the** rise of the Islamic State and an accompanying increase in the terrorist threat to New Zealand, there are wider implications for security agencies, including the Navy. Breakdowns in the international order can and do have implications for seaborne trade as is seen off the coast of Somalia, in the Arabian Gulf, and off the West Coast of Africa. The response to these threats has been the cooperative effort of navies working together to ensure seaborne trade is protected.

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A surprising number of states in the Asia Pacific region, though committed to cooperative strategies, are nonetheless investing in high end military capabilities including advanced submarines, surface combatants and 5th generation fighter aircraft. The investment of hundreds of billions of dollars for some states , suggests a willingness to wage war if peace should break down. China and India are amongst the lead players acquiring high end military capability, including aircraft carriers and anti-access ballistic and cruise missile systems and their space based components. Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are also investing significant sums in military capability.

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Concerns such as these could boil over at any time, as we already see in the South China Sea and along the Chinese/Indian border. No one can predict the point at which a political miscalculation could lead to interstate war, but it is hard not to agree with the predictions of those who see the conditions for a perfect storm arising in our region at some point in the 2030s or sooner (including the noted maritime scholar Geoffrey Till , historian Niall Ferguson and strategist Colin Gray ).

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Conclusion

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Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

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Goods cannot flow at sea without the intelligence and communication enablers that help businesses design and run just-in-time supply lines and disaggregated manufacturing processes. Actionable intelligence on what is going on at sea is a prerequisite to doing anything constructive about it. New Zealand will need to do more on a whole of government basis to build a highly capable and truly joint maritime intelligence organisation that can link up with other regional intelligence centres monitoring the flow of ships and goods at sea. It is for discussion whether the Navy, working with other agencies, should take the lead on this as part of its strategy of working more closely with the USN. The recent review of the National Maritime Coordination Centre by the Maritime Security Oversight Committee may assist these discussions.

The US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century (2007) offers opportunities for engagement with the US to navies throughout the Asia Pacific. With the right ships and capabilities in place we will be well placed to take advantage of this strategy. But, as the US itself recognises, cooperative strategies can break down, sometimes with very little notice.

The Navy performs a variety of functions across the humanitarian, constabulary, presence and warfighting spectrum. All of these functions are necessary and, at times, individually vital. But at its heart the Navy is maintained by the Government as a fighting service. Warfighting is its core function, but cannot be sustained based on the size of the current fleet.

The trend in recent years for fewer combat platforms with greater capability (depth over breadth) has gone further than it should. **In future the Navy's major combatants will need to grow significantly in number as well as capability.** To help achieve this growth the Navy needs to explore ways that will deliver to government more and better value for money and an expanded set of capability options. As David Cameron remarked to the House of Commons when introducing the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) 'A Royal Navy locked into a cycle of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive ships. Mr Speaker, we cannot go on like this'. An increased investment in the Navy over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand security.

#### **New Zealand's regional interests**

As a major power in the Southwest Pacific, New Zealand has a range of interests. Protecting our

security is first and foremost, followed by protecting the interests of the Realm States and those Pacific states with whom we have close relationships (Tonga, Western Samoa). Add to that our claim to the Ross Dependency, and more immediate interests in those waters in which we have sovereign rights. The total area for which New Zealand has either responsibility or interest amounts to close to **a quarter of the earth's oceans.**

Implications of our interests

**Even without our global interests, New Zealand's defence and security policy is challenged by our** immediate and regional interests. Although a small state internationally, New Zealand is a major state in the Southwest Pacific. Our constitutional responsibilities for the defence of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, as well as close relationships with other Pacific states such as Western Samoa and Tonga, create an area of interest that covers a significant portion of the Pacific Ocean. Add to that territorial claims in Antarctica and security interests in the Southern Ocean and our interests in our **own Territorial Sea, EEZ and Extended Continental Shelf and our 'domestic'** security interests begin to compare with those of other larger, better resourced states.

Conclusion

New Zealand has both global and regional interests, and limited resources to protect them. These interests are maritime interests and need to be secured by maritime means. We have to be both global and regional players, and a local power. A well constructed Defence Force can be a major supporter of diplomatic efforts to ensure our interests are preserved. That Defence Force must be able to police the immediate region, protecting our security, sovereignty and resources. Equally, that defence force must be able to support international efforts to preserve the international trading environment on which we depend. This will require a re-balancing of the current defence force with increased focus on maritime surface and aerial capability.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

**This White Paper submission considers New Zealand's strategic interests and** suggests that New Zealand should consider rebalancing its defence effort to reflect the interests we have in maritime security both locally and globally.

#### **New Zealand's Geographic Position**

New Zealand is a small group of islands situated in the South Western Pacific 1200 nautical miles from its nearest neighbour Australia. **Our small size means we don't have the internal markets** required for a rich economy, and must therefore rely on international trade to support our desired first world lifestyle. The isolation though presents a problem for international trade as our markets are at the end of long thin sea lines of communication. The distance creates problems in terms of access, and gives nearer competitors an advantage both in freight costs and surety of supply.

New Zealand therefore faces a strategic conundrum in that being a small country it relies on trade with external markets, which is complicated by distance.

Size and distance complicate our strategic position internationally, but when compared to regional neighbours, New Zealand is a major influence, second only to Australia, with the responsibilities that implies. Further, the distances that complicate our global interests, while still a factor to be considered, are a lesser complication in the Southwest Pacific.

### **New Zealand's Strategic Interests**

#### **New Zealand's position, aspirations, and global outlook create a unique set of strategic interests;**

global and domestic. Our global interests centre on the security of the international trading system and our ability to trade with the rest of the world. Domestically, we have security interests in our immediate region protecting our sovereignty and ensuring the Pacific retains its essentially pacific nature. Ensuring the security of those nations for which we have obligations (Tokelau, Niue, and Cook Islands), as well as those Pacific neighbours for which we have close relationships such as Tonga and Samoa.

Our regional interests are not just centred on the Pacific. We have a territorial claim to the Ross Dependency which although in abeyance still needs to be secured in the interim. The Southern Ocean is also becoming an area where activities such as illegal fishing are increasingly becoming an issue.

### **New Zealand's Global Interests**

**New Zealand's** global strategic interests can be described as an international environment in which the interests of small nations are protected by institutions which protect the international rule of law; an open trading system with free and open markets and free movement of goods between nations.

**The trading environment is one which receives little more than a 'once over lightly' approach in** strategic assessments, to some extent because its importance is so obvious it almost goes without saying. However, it needs a little more examination.

It is traditional for New Zealand to stress the volume of goods that move by sea. In 2013, 99.7% of **New Zealand's export tonnage was moved by sea, and 99.5% of imports** . But this is only part of the picture. The more interesting part, and the more vital from a defence and foreign policy perspective, is that New Zealand, like other advanced economies, depends for its prosperity on the seaborne part of international supply chains .

Containerisation is an important part of the picture. A modern container ship might move 15-18,000 containers in a single voyage , and more than 50% of containerised trade is now in components moving between parts of a highly disaggregated global manufacturing process rather than in final goods heading towards a shelf in a retail outlet.

This, in a variety of ways, is the system under threat. The combination of current just-enough and just-in-time supply chain philosophies and the fact that most countries maintain extraordinarily low reserves of life essentials such as food and oil means that any disruption of trade is likely to have severe consequences . The great warehouses of the past, as Geoffrey Till has pointed out, are now at sea, meaning that the system has in-built fragilities that are probably not well understood by most policy makers.

### **Threats to New Zealand's Global Interests**

New Zealand stands very high on world globalisation indexes that measure global connectivity, integration and interdependence . The most recent of these indexes (2013) ranks New Zealand at 28th in terms of its exposure to globalisation (by comparison, the United States ranks 34th, Australia 19th, Japan 56th and China 73rd). This means that while we are well connected globally, we are also unusually vulnerable to any disruption in trade and information flows.

We need to remember too that given our geographical isolation, we are at the end of a very long chain of ship and container movements and port transfers, which adds to our vulnerability from a

trade disruption point of view. The implications of these developments can be seen in how US Maritime Strategy has been developing in recent years. The thrust is no longer on the Cold War need for navies to be able to fight and defeat each other at sea (except in the ultimate). The emphasis is increasingly on the use of navies to facilitate and keep open the sea lines of communication and commerce on which the economic prosperity of all countries depend.

The developing logic of seapower is increasingly centred on the role of navies in securing economic prosperity. This is less about the protection of shipping per se (New Zealand has no merchant fleet to protect, and neither does the US). Shipping must be protected because of the goods carried, but it is more useful to think of global commerce as a system, recognising the interdependency of all the elements that make up the global system of commerce, including resource extraction, manufacturing, assembly, consumption and transportation. It is the system as a whole that must be protected, including the flows of information, finance and goods that comprise the lifeblood of the system. In an age of increasing globalisation and interconnectedness, the role of peacetime navies is less to defeat of an adversary at sea, but to work with other navies to defend all the elements of the global economic system on which the prosperity of nations depend. This requires navies to work together cooperatively rather than competitively, and it is this logic that, for the present at least, permeates US maritime strategy.

**'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower'** was published as the joint strategy of the US Defence Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in 2007. Though critically received in some quarters for its lack of specificity, including the difficulty of translating cooperative strategy into force structure, the joint strategy has survived reasonably intact, and has proved its utility in guiding US thinking on a range of matters including naval doctrine, exercise patterns and the need to work more closely with partner navies.

**The strategy is written for an age in which nations are neither 'fully at war nor fully at peace'.** The challenge is to apply seapower in a manner which instils greater collective security, stability and trust amongst nations. The underlying thought behind the strategy is that peace does not preserve itself. The focus is on building opportunities for cooperation rather than on defeating threats at sea. US Maritime Strategy offers opportunities to those countries, New Zealand included, which maintain naval resources capable of working alongside others. We have been active in recent years in exploiting such opportunities, but there must be a significant contribution by New Zealand of naval forces to preserving the systems on which the free flow of seaborne trade depend.

One area of particular interest to the US in its approach to maritime strategy is in securing a commitment from its partners to significantly enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and an expansion in **intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities**. This is in New Zealand's interests as well and is an area in which the Navy, working with other government agencies, arguably needs to do more.

The Possibility of a Breakdown in Cooperation and Good Order at Sea

New Zealand in general does not usually consider good order at sea to be an issue. However, the Prime Minister, in a recent public statement on New Zealand National Security, outlined the **government's belief that New Zealanders must accept that they no longer live in a benign security environment**. Although this statement was made in the context of the government's response to the rise of the Islamic State and an accompanying increase in the terrorist threat to New Zealand, there

are wider implications for security agencies, including the Navy. Breakdowns in the international order can and do have implications for seaborne trade as is seen off the coast of Somalia, in the Arabian Gulf, and off the West Coast of Africa. The response to these threats has been the cooperative effort of navies working together to ensure seaborne trade is protected.

Cooperative strategies, including the US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century, recognise that mutuality has its limits and that the systems of cooperative security on which they are built can break down, sometimes with little or no warning.

A surprising number of states in the Asia Pacific region, though committed to cooperative strategies, are nonetheless investing in high end military capabilities including advanced submarines, surface combatants and 5th generation fighter aircraft. The investment of hundreds of billions of dollars for some states, suggests a willingness to wage war if peace should break down. China and India are amongst the lead players acquiring high end military capability, including aircraft carriers and anti-access ballistic and cruise missile systems and their space based components. Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are also investing significant sums in military capability.

Some of these investments are no doubt driven by national prestige. But this is unlikely to be the sole reason for acquiring military capability when it is considered that their use is mainly justifiable when security underpinned by the rule of international law breaks down.

The main concerns driving the acquisition of advanced military capability are well known. Territorial disputes are one source of concern, fuelled by the potential for competition over increasingly scarce natural resources including oil and gas, seabed minerals and fish protein. Disputes over fresh water resources are also a growing concern as nations in the region with growing populations (India being a prime example) compete with their neighbours (China in this case) over access to fresh water for irrigation as well as industrial and household use. The effects of climate change including mass refugee flows are another concern, as is the potential for public health issues spilling over national boundaries. Tensions over the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities are a further issue. Irregular threats such as those from terrorism and piracy are also an ever present concern.

Concerns such as these could boil over at any time, as we already see in the South China Sea and along the Chinese/Indian border. No one can predict the point at which a political miscalculation could lead to interstate war, but it is hard not to agree with the predictions of those who see the conditions for a perfect storm arising in our region at some point in the 2030s or sooner (including the noted maritime scholar Geoffrey Till, historian Niall Ferguson and strategist Colin Gray).

It is these concerns that suggest it would be prudent to think that an increased investment in the **Defence Force over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand's immediate security as well as our wider regional concerns. We do not need to be thinking in terms of military capability in the same way as the Chinese and the Indians, or even the Australians for that matter. But we do need to be contemplating a significant lift in New Zealand's maritime capability, both in terms of numbers of hulls and the capability built into those hulls.**

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Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

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Conclusion

New Zealand has both global and regional interests, and limited resources to protect them. These interests are maritime interests and need to be secured by maritime means. We have to be both global and regional players, and a local power. A well constructed Defence Force can be a major supporter of diplomatic efforts to ensure our interests are preserved. That Defence Force must be able to police the immediate region, protecting our security, sovereignty and resources. Equally, that defence force must be able to support international efforts to preserve the international trading environment on which we depend. This will require a re-balancing of the current defence force with increased focus on maritime surface and aerial capability.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

**This White Paper submission considers New Zealand's strategic interests and suggests that New Zealand should consider rebalancing its defence effort to reflect the interests we have in maritime security both locally and globally.**

#### **New Zealand's Geographic Position**

New Zealand is a small group of islands situated in the South Western Pacific 1200 nautical miles from its nearest neighbour Australia. **Our small size means we don't have the internal markets** required for a rich economy, and must therefore rely on international trade to support our desired first world lifestyle. The isolation though presents a problem for international trade as our markets are at the end of long thin sea lines of communication. The distance creates problems in terms of access, and gives nearer competitors an advantage both in freight costs and surety of supply. New Zealand therefore faces a strategic conundrum in that being a small country it relies on trade with external markets, which is complicated by distance.

Size and distance complicate our strategic position internationally, but when compared to regional neighbours, New Zealand is a major influence, second only to Australia, with the responsibilities that implies. Further, the distances that complicate our global interests, while still a factor to be considered, are a lesser complication in the Southwest Pacific.

#### **New Zealand's Strategic Interests**

**New Zealand's position, aspirations, and global outlook create a unique set of strategic interests;** global and domestic. Our global interests centre on the security of the international trading system and our ability to trade with the rest of the world. Domestically, we have security interests in our immediate region protecting our sovereignty and ensuring the Pacific retains its essentially pacific nature. Ensuring the security of those nations for which we have obligations (Tokelau, Niue, and Cook Islands), as well as those Pacific neighbours for which we have close relationships such as Tonga and Samoa.

Our regional interests are not just centred on the Pacific. We have a territorial claim to the Ross Dependency which although in abeyance still needs to be secured in the interim. The Southern Ocean is also becoming an area where activities such as illegal fishing are increasingly becoming an issue.

#### **New Zealand's Global Interests**

**New Zealand's global strategic interests can be described as an international environment in which**

the interests of small nations are protected by institutions which protect the international rule of law; an open trading system with free and open markets and free movement of goods between nations.

**The trading environment is one which receives little more than a 'once over lightly' approach in strategic assessments, to some extent because its importance is so obvious it almost goes without saying. However, it needs a little more examination.**

It is traditional for New Zealand to stress the volume of goods that move by sea. In 2013, **99.7% of New Zealand's export tonnage was moved by sea, and 99.5% of imports**. But this is only part of the picture. The more interesting part, and the more vital from a defence and foreign policy perspective, is that New Zealand, like other advanced economies, depends for its prosperity on the seaborne part of international supply chains.

Containerisation is an important part of the picture. A modern container ship might move 15-18,000 containers in a single voyage, and more than 50% of containerised trade is now in components moving between parts of a highly disaggregated global manufacturing process rather than in final goods heading towards a shelf in a retail outlet.

This, in a variety of ways, is the system under threat. The combination of current just-enough and just-in-time supply chain philosophies and the fact that most countries maintain extraordinarily low reserves of life essentials such as food and oil means that any disruption of trade is likely to have severe consequences. The great warehouses of the past, as Geoffrey Till has pointed out, are now at sea, meaning that the system has in-built fragilities that are probably not well understood by most policy makers.

#### **Threats to New Zealand's Global Interests**

New Zealand stands very high on world globalisation indexes that measure global connectivity, integration and interdependence. The most recent of these indexes (2013) ranks New Zealand at 28th in terms of its exposure to globalisation (by comparison, the United States ranks 34th, Australia 19th, Japan 56th and China 73rd). This means that while we are well connected globally, we are also unusually vulnerable to any disruption in trade and information flows.

We need to remember too that given our geographical isolation, we are at the end of a very long chain of ship and container movements and port transfers, which adds to our vulnerability from a trade disruption point of view. The implications of these developments can be seen in how US Maritime Strategy has been developing in recent years. The thrust is no longer on the Cold War need for navies to be able to fight and defeat each other at sea (except in the ultimate). The emphasis is increasingly on the use of navies to facilitate and keep open the sea lines of communication and commerce on which the economic prosperity of all countries depend.

The developing logic of seapower is increasingly centred on the role of navies in securing economic prosperity. This is less about the protection of shipping per se (New Zealand has no merchant fleet to protect, and neither does the US). Shipping must be protected because of the goods carried, but it is more useful to think of global commerce as a system, recognising the interdependency of all the elements that make up the global system of commerce, including resource extraction, manufacturing, assembly, consumption and transportation. It is the system as a whole that must be protected, including the flows of information, finance and goods that comprise the lifeblood of the system.

In an age of increasing globalisation and interconnectedness, the role of peacetime navies is less to defeat of an adversary at sea, but to work with other navies to defend all the elements of the global

economic system on which the prosperity of nations depend. This requires navies to work together cooperatively rather than competitively, and it is this logic that, for the present at least, permeates US maritime strategy.

**'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower'** was published as the joint strategy of the US Defence Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in 2007 . Though critically received in some quarters for its lack of specificity, including the difficulty of translating cooperative strategy into force structure , the joint strategy has survived reasonably intact , and has proved its utility in guiding US thinking on a range of matters including naval doctrine, exercise patterns and the need to work more closely with partner navies.

The strategy is written for an age in which nations are neither 'fully at war nor fully at peace ' . The challenge is to apply seapower in a manner which instils greater collective security, stability and trust amongst nations. The underlying thought behind the strategy is that peace does not preserve itself . The focus is on building opportunities for cooperation rather than on defeating threats at sea.

US Maritime Strategy offers opportunities to those countries, New Zealand included, which maintain naval resources capable of working alongside others. We have been active in recent years in exploiting such opportunities, but there must be a significant contribution by New Zealand of naval forces to preserving the systems on which the free flow of seaborne trade depend.

One area of particular interest to the US in its approach to maritime strategy is in securing a commitment from its partners to significantly enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and an **expansion in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities** . This is in New Zealand's interests as well and is an area in which the Navy, working with other government agencies, arguably needs to do more.

The Possibility of a Breakdown in Cooperation and Good Order at Sea

New Zealand in general does not usually consider good order at sea to be an issue. However, the Prime Minister, in a recent public statement on New Zealand National Security, outlined the **government's belief that New Zealanders must accept that they no longer live in a benign security environment** . Although this statement was made in the context of the government's response to the rise of the Islamic State and an accompanying increase in the terrorist threat to New Zealand, there are wider implications for security agencies, including the Navy. Breakdowns in the international order can and do have implications for seaborne trade as is seen off the coast of Somalia, in the Arabian Gulf, and off the West Coast of Africa. The response to these threats has been the cooperative effort of navies working together to ensure seaborne trade is protected.

Cooperative strategies, including the US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century, recognise that mutuality has its limits and that the systems of cooperative security on which they are built can break down, sometimes with little or no warning.

A surprising number of states in the Asia Pacific region, though committed to cooperative strategies, are nonetheless investing in high end military capabilities including advanced submarines, surface combatants and 5th generation fighter aircraft. The investment of hundreds of billions of dollars for some states , suggests a willingness to wage war if peace should break down. China and India are amongst the lead players acquiring high end military capability, including aircraft carriers and anti-access ballistic and cruise missile systems and their space based components. Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are also investing significant sums in



military capability.

Some of these investments are no doubt driven by national prestige. But this is unlikely to be the sole reason for acquiring military capability when it is considered that their use is mainly justifiable when security underpinned by the rule of international law breaks down.

The main concerns driving the acquisition of advanced military capability are well known. Territorial disputes are one source of concern, fuelled by the potential for competition over increasingly scarce natural resources including oil and gas, seabed minerals and fish protein. Disputes over fresh water resources are also a growing concern as nations in the region with growing populations (India being a prime example) compete with their neighbours (China in this case) over access to fresh water for irrigation as well as industrial and household use. The effects of climate change including mass refugee flows are another concern, as is the potential for public health issues spilling over national boundaries. Tensions over the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities are a further issue. Irregular threats such as those from terrorism and piracy are also an ever present concern.

Concerns such as these could boil over at any time, as we already see in the South China Sea and along the Chinese/Indian border. No one can predict the point at which a political miscalculation could lead to interstate war, but it is hard not to agree with the predictions of those who see the conditions for a perfect storm arising in our region at some point in the 2030s or sooner (including the noted maritime scholar Geoffrey Till, historian Niall Ferguson and strategist Colin Gray).

It is these concerns that suggest it would be prudent to think that an increased investment in the **Defence Force over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand's immediate security as well as our wider regional concerns. We do not need to be thinking in terms of military capability in the same way as the Chinese and the Indians, or even the Australians for that matter. But we do need to be contemplating a significant lift in New Zealand's maritime capability, both in terms of numbers of hulls and the capability built into those hulls.**

Strategic Overview: Summary

**New Zealand is one of the world's most globalised states. The key enablers of globalisation and disaggregated manufacturing are the world's oceans.** Keeping the oceans and sea lines of communication open for trade is vital to New Zealand's security and economic prosperity. This is a task that requires a broad array of partners, and is not one that we can or should leave to others. Looking ahead over the period leading up to 2035 and beyond to 2050, it appears inevitable that the high seas, the deep oceans, and the sea floor will all be subject to increasing competition for resources in a region of the world of growing populations, growing wealth, growing militarisation and growing demand. This competition will not be confined to the northern hemisphere, but can be expected to flow into the South Pacific, the Southern Oceans and, quite possibly, the Antarctic region. The fight will come to us. Competition will be focused on fisheries, deep sea mining, oil and gas, and may also include fresh water. Efforts may intensify to close off areas of the high seas under the guise of internal waters.

Goods cannot flow at sea without the intelligence and communication enablers that help businesses design and run just-in-time supply lines and disaggregated manufacturing processes. Actionable intelligence on what is going on at sea is a prerequisite to doing anything constructive about it. New Zealand will need to do more on a whole of government basis to build a highly capable and truly joint maritime intelligence organisation that can link up with other regional intelligence centres monitoring

the flow of ships and goods at sea. It is for discussion whether the Navy, working with other agencies, should take the lead on this as part of its strategy of working more closely with the USN. The recent review of the National Maritime Coordination Centre by the Maritime Security Oversight Committee may assist these discussions.

The US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century (2007) offers opportunities for engagement with the US to navies throughout the Asia Pacific. With the right ships and capabilities in place we will be well placed to take advantage of this strategy. But, as the US itself recognises, cooperative strategies can break down, sometimes with very little notice.

The Navy performs a variety of functions across the humanitarian, constabulary, presence and warfighting spectrum. All of these functions are necessary and, at times, individually vital. But at its heart the Navy is maintained by the Government as a fighting service. Warfighting is its core function, but cannot be sustained based on the size of the current fleet.

The trend in recent years for fewer combat platforms with greater capability (depth over breadth) has gone further than it should. **In future the Navy's major combatants will need to grow significantly in number as well as capability.** To help achieve this growth the Navy needs to explore ways that will deliver to government more and better value for money and an expanded set of capability options. As David Cameron remarked to the House of Commons when introducing the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) **'A Royal Navy locked into a cycle of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive ships. Mr Speaker, we cannot go on like this'.** An increased investment in the Navy over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand security.

#### **New Zealand's regional interests**

As a major power in the Southwest Pacific, New Zealand has a range of interests. Protecting our security is first and foremost, followed by protecting the interests of the Realm States and those Pacific states with whom we have close relationships (Tonga, Western Samoa). Add to that our claim to the Ross Dependency, and more immediate interests in those waters in which we have sovereign rights. The total area for which New Zealand has either responsibility or interest amounts to close to **a quarter of the earth's oceans.**

Implications of our interests

**Even without our global interests, New Zealand's defence and security policy is challenged by our immediate and regional interests.** Although a small state internationally, New Zealand is a major state in the Southwest Pacific. Our constitutional responsibilities for the defence of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, as well as close relationships with other Pacific states such as Western Samoa and Tonga, create an area of interest that covers a significant portion of the Pacific Ocean. Add to that territorial claims in Antarctica and security interests in the Southern Ocean and our interests in our **own Territorial Sea, EEZ and Extended Continental Shelf and our 'domestic' security interests begin to compare with those of other, larger, better resourced states.**

Conclusion

New Zealand has both global and regional interests, and limited resources to protect them. These interests are maritime interests and need to be secured by maritime means. We have to be both global and regional players, and a local power. A well constructed Defence Force can be a major supporter of diplomatic efforts to ensure our interests are preserved. That Defence Force must be

able to police the immediate region, protecting our security, sovereignty and resources. Equally, that defence force must be able to support international efforts to preserve the international trading environment on which we depend. This will require a re-balancing of the current defence force with increased focus on maritime surface and aerial capability.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

**This White Paper submission considers New Zealand's strategic interests and** suggests that New Zealand should consider rebalancing its defence effort to reflect the interests we have in maritime security both locally and globally.

#### **New Zealand's Geographic Position**

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Size and distance complicate our strategic position internationally, but when compared to regional neighbours, New Zealand is a major influence, second only to Australia, with the responsibilities that implies. Further, the distances that complicate our global interests, while still a factor to be considered, are a lesser complication in the Southwest Pacific.

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We need to remember too that given our geographical isolation, we are at the end of a very long chain of ship and container movements and port transfers, which adds to our vulnerability from a trade disruption point of view. The implications of these developments can be seen in how US Maritime Strategy has been developing in recent years. The thrust is no longer on the Cold War need for navies to be able to fight and defeat each other at sea (except in the ultimate). The emphasis is increasingly on the use of navies to facilitate and keep open the sea lines of communication and commerce on which the economic prosperity of all countries depend.

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In an age of increasing globalisation and interconnectedness, the role of peacetime navies is less to defeat of an adversary at sea, but to work with other navies to defend all the elements of the global economic system on which the prosperity of nations depend. This requires navies to work together cooperatively rather than competitively, and it is this logic that, for the present at least, permeates US maritime strategy.

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on a range of matters including naval doctrine, exercise patterns and the need to work more closely with partner navies.

**The strategy is written for an age in which nations are neither 'fully at war nor fully at peace'.** The challenge is to apply seapower in a manner which instils greater collective security, stability and trust amongst nations. The underlying thought behind the strategy is that peace does not preserve itself. The focus is on building opportunities for cooperation rather than on defeating threats at sea. US Maritime Strategy offers opportunities to those countries, New Zealand included, which maintain naval resources capable of working alongside others. We have been active in recent years in exploiting such opportunities, but there must be a significant contribution by New Zealand of naval forces to preserving the systems on which the free flow of seaborne trade depend.

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The Possibility of a Breakdown in Cooperation and Good Order at Sea

New Zealand in general does not usually consider good order at sea to be an issue. However, the Prime Minister, in a recent public statement on New Zealand National Security, outlined the **government's belief that New Zealanders must accept that they no longer live in a benign security environment**. Although this statement was made in the context of the government's response to the rise of the Islamic State and an accompanying increase in the terrorist threat to New Zealand, there are wider implications for security agencies, including the Navy. Breakdowns in the international order can and do have implications for seaborne trade as is seen off the coast of Somalia, in the Arabian Gulf, and off the West Coast of Africa. The response to these threats has been the cooperative effort of navies working together to ensure seaborne trade is protected.

Cooperative strategies, including the US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century, recognise that mutuality has its limits and that the systems of cooperative security on which they are built can break down, sometimes with little or no warning.

A surprising number of states in the Asia Pacific region, though committed to cooperative strategies, are nonetheless investing in high end military capabilities including advanced submarines, surface combatants and 5th generation fighter aircraft. The investment of hundreds of billions of dollars for some states, suggests a willingness to wage war if peace should break down. China and India are amongst the lead players acquiring high end military capability, including aircraft carriers and anti access ballistic and cruise missile systems and their space based components. Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are also investing significant sums in military capability.

Some of these investments are no doubt driven by national prestige. But this is unlikely to be the sole reason for acquiring military capability when it is considered that their use is mainly justifiable when security underpinned by the rule of international law breaks down.

The main concerns driving the acquisition of advanced military capability are well known. Territorial disputes are one source of concern, fuelled by the potential for competition over increasingly scarce natural resources including oil and gas, seabed minerals and fish protein. Disputes over fresh water

resources are also a growing concern as nations in the region with growing populations (India being a prime example) compete with their neighbours (China in this case) over access to fresh water for irrigation as well as industrial and household use. The effects of climate change including mass refugee flows are another concern, as is the potential for public health issues spilling over national boundaries. Tensions over the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities are a further issue. Irregular threats such as those from terrorism and piracy are also an ever present concern. Concerns such as these could boil over at any time, as we already see in the South China Sea and along the Chinese/Indian border. No one can predict the point at which a political miscalculation could lead to interstate war, but it is hard not to agree with the predictions of those who see the conditions for a perfect storm arising in our region at some point in the 2030s or sooner (including the noted maritime scholar Geoffrey Till, historian Niall Ferguson and strategist Colin Gray). It is these concerns that suggest it would be prudent to think that an increased investment in the **Defence Force over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand's immediate security as well as our wider regional concerns.** We do not need to be thinking in terms of military capability in the same way as the Chinese and the Indians, or even the Australians for that matter. **But we do need to be contemplating a significant lift in New Zealand's maritime capability, both in terms of numbers of hulls and the capability built into those hulls.**

Strategic Overview: Summary

**New Zealand is one of the world's most globalised states. The key enablers of globalisation and disaggregated manufacturing are the world's oceans.** Keeping the oceans and sea lines of communication open for trade is vital **to New Zealand's security and economic prosperity. This is a task that requires a broad array of partners, and is not one that we can or should leave to others.** Looking ahead over the period leading up to 2035 and beyond to 2050, it appears inevitable that the high seas, the deep oceans, and the sea floor will all be subject to increasing competition for resources in a region of the world of growing populations, growing wealth, growing militarisation and growing demand. This competition will not be confined to the northern hemisphere, but can be expected to flow into the South Pacific, the Southern Oceans and, quite possibly, the Antarctic region. The fight will come to us. Competition will be focused on fisheries, deep sea mining, oil and gas, and may also include fresh water. Efforts may intensify to close off areas of the high seas under the guise of internal waters.

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The US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century (2007) offers opportunities for engagement with the US to navies throughout the Asia Pacific. With the right ships and capabilities in place we will be well placed to take advantage of this strategy. But, as the US itself

recognises, cooperative strategies can break down, sometimes with very little notice.

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The trend in recent years for fewer combat platforms with greater capability (depth over breadth) has gone further than it should. **In future the Navy's major combatants will need to grow significantly in number as well as capability.** To help achieve this growth the Navy needs to explore ways that will deliver to government more and better value for money and an expanded set of capability options. As David Cameron remarked to the House of Commons when introducing the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) 'A Royal Navy locked into a cycle of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive ships. Mr Speaker, we cannot go on like this'. **An increased investment in the Navy over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand security.**

#### **New Zealand's regional interests**

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Implications of our interests

Even without our **global interests, New Zealand's defence and security policy is challenged by our immediate and regional interests.** Although a small state internationally, New Zealand is a major state in the Southwest Pacific. Our constitutional responsibilities for the defence of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, as well as close relationships with other Pacific states such as Western Samoa and Tonga, create an area of interest that covers a significant portion of the Pacific Ocean. Add to that territorial claims in Antarctica and security interests in the Southern Ocean and our interests in our **own Territorial Sea, EEZ and Extended Continental Shelf and our 'domestic' security interests begin to compare with those of other, larger, better resourced states.**

Conclusion

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Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

**This White Paper submission considers New Zealand's strategic interests and suggests that New Zealand should consider rebalancing its defence effort to reflect the interests we have in maritime**

security both locally and globally.

#### **New Zealand's Geographic Position**

New Zealand is a small group of islands situated in the South Western Pacific 1200 nautical miles from its nearest neighbour Australia. **Our small size means we don't have the internal markets** required for a rich economy, and must therefore rely on international trade to support our desired first world lifestyle. The isolation though presents a problem for international trade as our markets are at the end of long thin sea lines of communication. The distance creates problems in terms of access, and gives nearer competitors an advantage both in freight costs and surety of supply.

New Zealand therefore faces a strategic conundrum in that being a small country it relies on trade with external markets, which is complicated by distance.

Size and distance complicate our strategic position internationally, but when compared to regional neighbours, New Zealand is a major influence, second only to Australia, with the responsibilities that implies. Further, the distances that complicate our global interests, while still a factor to be considered, are a lesser complication in the Southwest Pacific.

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Our regional interests are not just centred on the Pacific. We have a territorial claim to the Ross Dependency which although in abeyance still needs to be secured in the interim. The Southern Ocean is also becoming an area where activities such as illegal fishing are increasingly becoming an issue.

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**The trading environment is one which receives little more than a 'once over lightly' approach in** strategic assessments, to some extent because its importance is so obvious it almost goes without saying. However, it needs a little more examination.

It is traditional for New Zealand to stress the volume of goods that move by sea. In 2013, 99.7% of **New Zealand's export tonnage was moved by sea, and 99.5% of imports** . But this is only part of the picture. The more interesting part, and the more vital from a defence and foreign policy perspective, is that New Zealand, like other advanced economies, depends for its prosperity on the seaborne part of international supply chains .

Containerisation is an important part of the picture. A modern container ship might move 15-18,000 containers in a single voyage , and more than 50% of containerised trade is now in components moving between parts of a highly disaggregated global manufacturing process rather than in final goods heading towards a shelf in a retail outlet.



This, in a variety of ways, is the system under threat. The combination of current just-enough and just-in-time supply chain philosophies and the fact that most countries maintain extraordinarily low reserves of life essentials such as food and oil means that any disruption of trade is likely to have severe consequences. The great warehouses of the past, as Geoffrey Till has pointed out, are now at sea, meaning that the system has in-built fragilities that are probably not well understood by most policy makers.

#### **Threats to New Zealand's Global Interests**

New Zealand stands very high on world globalisation indexes that measure global connectivity, integration and interdependence. The most recent of these indexes (2013) ranks New Zealand at 28th in terms of its exposure to globalisation (by comparison, the United States ranks 34th, Australia 19th, Japan 56th and China 73rd). This means that while we are well connected globally, we are also unusually vulnerable to any disruption in trade and information flows.

We need to remember too that given our geographical isolation, we are at the end of a very long chain of ship and container movements and port transfers, which adds to our vulnerability from a trade disruption point of view. The implications of these developments can be seen in how US Maritime Strategy has been developing in recent years. The thrust is no longer on the Cold War need for navies to be able to fight and defeat each other at sea (except in the ultimate). The emphasis is increasingly on the use of navies to facilitate and keep open the sea lines of communication and commerce on which the economic prosperity of all countries depend.

The developing logic of seapower is increasingly centred on the role of navies in securing economic prosperity. This is less about the protection of shipping per se (New Zealand has no merchant fleet to protect, and neither does the US). Shipping must be protected because of the goods carried, but it is more useful to think of global commerce as a system, recognising the interdependency of all the elements that make up the global system of commerce, including resource extraction, manufacturing, assembly, consumption and transportation. It is the system as a whole that must be protected, including the flows of information, finance and goods that comprise the lifeblood of the system.

In an age of increasing globalisation and interconnectedness, the role of peacetime navies is less to defeat of an adversary at sea, but to work with other navies to defend all the elements of the global economic system on which the prosperity of nations depend. This requires navies to work together cooperatively rather than competitively, and it is this logic that, for the present at least, permeates US maritime strategy.

'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower' was published as the joint strategy of the US Defence Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in 2007. Though critically received in some quarters for its lack of specificity, including the difficulty of translating cooperative strategy into force structure, the joint strategy has survived reasonably intact, and has proved its utility in guiding US thinking on a range of matters including naval doctrine, exercise patterns and the need to work more closely with partner navies.

The strategy is written for an age in which nations are neither 'fully at war nor fully at peace'. The challenge is to apply seapower in a manner which instils greater collective security, stability and trust amongst nations. The underlying thought behind the strategy is that peace does not preserve itself. The focus is on building opportunities for cooperation rather than on defeating threats at sea. US Maritime Strategy offers opportunities to those countries, New Zealand included, which maintain

naval resources capable of working alongside others. We have been active in recent years in exploiting such opportunities, but there must be a significant contribution by New Zealand of naval forces to preserving the systems on which the free flow of seaborne trade depend.

One area of particular interest to the US in its approach to maritime strategy is in securing a commitment from its partners to significantly enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and an expansion in **intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities**. This is in New Zealand's interests as well and is an area in which the Navy, working with other government agencies, arguably needs to do more.

The Possibility of a Breakdown in Cooperation and Good Order at Sea

New Zealand in general does not usually consider good order at sea to be an issue. However, the Prime Minister, in a recent public statement on New Zealand National Security, outlined the **government's belief that New Zealanders must accept that they no longer live in a benign security environment**. Although this statement was made in the context of the government's response to the rise of the Islamic State and an accompanying increase in the terrorist threat to New Zealand, there are wider implications for security agencies, including the Navy. Breakdowns in the international order can and do have implications for seaborne trade as is seen off the coast of Somalia, in the Arabian Gulf, and off the West Coast of Africa. The response to these threats has been the cooperative effort of navies working together to ensure seaborne trade is protected.

Cooperative strategies, including the US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century, recognise that mutuality has its limits and that the systems of cooperative security on which they are built can break down, sometimes with little or no warning.

A surprising number of states in the Asia Pacific region, though committed to cooperative strategies, are nonetheless investing in high end military capabilities including advanced submarines, surface combatants and 5th generation fighter aircraft. The investment of hundreds of billions of dollars for some states, suggests a willingness to wage war if peace should break down. China and India are amongst the lead players acquiring high end military capability, including aircraft carriers and anti-access ballistic and cruise missile systems and their space based components. Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are also investing significant sums in military capability.

Some of these investments are no doubt driven by national prestige. But this is unlikely to be the sole reason for acquiring military capability when it is considered that their use is mainly justifiable when security underpinned by the rule of international law breaks down.

The main concerns driving the acquisition of advanced military capability are well known. Territorial disputes are one source of concern, fuelled by the potential for competition over increasingly scarce natural resources including oil and gas, seabed minerals and fish protein. Disputes over fresh water resources are also a growing concern as nations in the region with growing populations (India being a prime example) compete with their neighbours (China in this case) over access to fresh water for irrigation as well as industrial and household use. The effects of climate change including mass refugee flows are another concern, as is the potential for public health issues spilling over national boundaries. Tensions over the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities are a further issue.

Irregular threats such as those from terrorism and piracy are also an ever present concern.

Concerns such as these could boil over at any time, as we already see in the South China Sea and

along the Chinese/Indian border. No one can predict the point at which a political miscalculation could lead to interstate war, but it is hard not to agree with the predictions of those who see the conditions for a perfect storm arising in our region at some point in the 2030s or sooner (including the noted maritime scholar Geoffrey Till, historian Niall Ferguson and strategist Colin Gray). It is these concerns that suggest it would be prudent to think that an increased investment in the **Defence Force over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand's immediate** security as well as our wider regional concerns. We do not need to be thinking in terms of military capability in the same way as the Chinese and the Indians, or even the Australians for that matter. **But we do need to be contemplating a significant lift in New Zealand's maritime capability, both in** terms of numbers of hulls and the capability built into those hulls.

Strategic Overview, Summary

**New Zealand is one of the world's most globalised states. The key enablers of globalisation and disaggregated manufacturing are the world's oceans.** Keeping the oceans and sea lines of communication open for trade is vital to **New Zealand's security and economic prosperity. This is a** task that requires a broad array of partners, and is not one that we can or should leave to others. Looking ahead over the period leading up to 2035 and beyond to 2050, it appears inevitable that the high seas, the deep oceans, and the sea floor will all be subject to increasing competition for resources in a region of the world of growing populations, growing wealth, growing militarisation and growing demand. This competition will not be confined to the northern hemisphere, but can be expected to flow into the South Pacific, the Southern Oceans and, quite possibly, the Antarctic region. The fight will come to us. Competition will be focused on fisheries, deep sea mining, oil and gas, and may also include fresh water. Efforts may intensify to close off areas of the high seas under the guise of internal waters.

Goods cannot flow at sea without the intelligence and communication enablers that help businesses design and run just-in-time supply lines and disaggregated manufacturing processes. Actionable intelligence on what is going on at sea is a prerequisite to doing anything constructive about it. New Zealand will need to do more on a whole of government basis to build a highly capable and truly joint maritime intelligence organisation that can link up with other regional intelligence centres monitoring the flow of ships and goods at sea. It is for discussion whether the Navy, working with other agencies, should take the lead on this as part of its strategy of working more closely with the USN. The recent review of the National Maritime Coordination Centre by the Maritime Security Oversight Committee may assist these discussions.

The US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century (2007) offers opportunities for engagement with the US to navies throughout the Asia Pacific. With the right ships and capabilities in place we will be well placed to take advantage of this strategy. But, as the US itself recognises, cooperative strategies can break down, sometimes with very little notice.

The Navy performs a variety of functions across the humanitarian, constabulary, presence and warfighting spectrum. All of these functions are necessary and, at times, individually vital. But at its heart the Navy is maintained by the Government as a fighting service. Warfighting is its core function, but cannot be sustained based on the size of the current fleet.

The trend in recent years for fewer combat platforms with greater capability (depth over breadth) has gone further than it should. **In future the Navy's major combatants will need to grow significantly in**

number as well as capability. To help achieve this growth the Navy needs to explore ways that will deliver to government more and better value for money and an expanded set of capability options. As David Cameron remarked to the House of Commons when introducing the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) 'A Royal Navy locked into a cycle of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive ships. Mr Speaker, we cannot go on like this'. An increased investment in the Navy over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand security.

#### **New Zealand's regional interests**

As a major power in the Southwest Pacific, New Zealand has a range of interests. Protecting our security is first and foremost, followed by protecting the interests of the Realm States and those Pacific states with whom we have close relationships (Tonga, Western Samoa). Add to that our claim to the Ross Dependency and more immediate interests in those waters in which we have sovereign rights. The total area for which New Zealand has either responsibility or interest amounts to close to a quarter of the earth's oceans.

#### **Implications of our interests**

Even without our global interests, New Zealand's defence and security policy is challenged by our immediate and regional interests. Although a small state internationally, New Zealand is a major state in the Southwest Pacific. Our constitutional responsibilities for the defence of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, as well as close relationships with other Pacific states such as Western Samoa and Tonga, create an area of interest that covers a significant portion of the Pacific Ocean. Add to that territorial claims in Antarctica and security interests in the Southern Ocean and our interests in our own Territorial Sea, EEZ and Extended Continental Shelf and our 'domestic' security interests begin to compare with those of other, larger, better resourced states.

#### **Conclusion**

New Zealand has both global and regional interests, and limited resources to protect them. These interests are maritime interests and need to be secured by maritime means. We have to be both global and regional players, and a local power. A well constructed Defence Force can be a major supporter of diplomatic efforts to ensure our interests are preserved. That Defence Force must be able to police the immediate region, protecting our security, sovereignty and resources. Equally, that defence force must be able to support international efforts to preserve the international trading environment on which we depend. This will require a re-balancing of the current defence force with increased focus on maritime surface and aerial capability.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

**This White Paper submission considers New Zealand's strategic interests and suggests that New Zealand should consider rebalancing its defence effort to reflect the interests we have in maritime security both locally and globally.**

#### **New Zealand's Geographic Position**

New Zealand is a small group of islands situated in the South Western Pacific 1200 nautical miles from its nearest neighbour Australia. **Our small size means we don't have the internal markets** required for a rich economy, and must therefore rely on international trade to support our desired first world lifestyle. The isolation though presents a problem for international trade as our markets

are at the end of long thin sea lines of communication. The distance creates problems in terms of access, and gives nearer competitors an advantage both in freight costs and surety of supply. New Zealand therefore faces a strategic conundrum in that being a small country it relies on trade with external markets, which is complicated by distance.

Size and distance complicate our strategic position internationally, but when compared to regional neighbours, New Zealand is a major influence, second only to Australia, with the responsibilities that implies. Further, the distances that complicate our global interests, while still a factor to be considered, are a lesser complication in the Southwest Pacific.

#### **New Zealand's Strategic Interests**

**New Zealand's position, aspirations, and global outlook create a unique set of strategic interests;** global and domestic. Our global interests centre on the security of the international trading system and our ability to trade with the rest of the world. Domestically, we have security interests in our immediate region protecting our sovereignty and ensuring the Pacific retains its essentially pacific nature. Ensuring the security of those nations for which we have obligations (Tokelau, Niue, and Cook Islands), as well as those Pacific neighbours for which we have close relationships such as Tonga and Samoa.

Our regional interests are not just centred on the Pacific. We have a territorial claim to the Ross Dependency which although in abeyance still needs to be secured in the interim. The Southern Ocean is also becoming an area where activities such as illegal fishing are increasingly becoming an issue.

#### **New Zealand's Global Interests**

**New Zealand's global strategic interests can be described as an international environment in which** the interests of small nations are protected by institutions which protect the international rule of law; an open trading system with free and open markets and free movement of goods between nations.

**The trading environment is one which receives little more than a 'once over lightly' approach in** strategic assessments, to some extent because its importance is so obvious it almost goes without saying. However, it needs a little more examination.

It is traditional for New Zealand to stress the volume of goods that move by sea. In 2013, 99.7% of **New Zealand's export tonnage was moved by sea, and 99.5% of imports**. But this is only part of the picture. The more interesting part, and the more vital from a defence and foreign policy perspective, is that New Zealand, like other advanced economies, depends for its prosperity on the seaborne part of international supply chains.

Containerisation is an important part of the picture. A modern container ship might move 15-18,000 containers in a single voyage, and more than 50% of containerised trade is now in components moving between parts of a highly disaggregated global manufacturing process rather than in final goods heading towards a shelf in a retail outlet.

This, in a variety of ways, is the system under threat. The combination of current just-enough and just-in-time supply chain philosophies and the fact that most countries maintain extraordinarily low reserves of life essentials such as food and oil means that any disruption of trade is likely to have severe consequences. The great warehouses of the past, as Geoffrey Till has pointed out, are now at sea, meaning that the system has in-built fragilities that are probably not well understood by most policy makers.

### Threats to New Zealand's Global Interests

New Zealand stands very high on world globalisation indexes that measure global connectivity, integration and interdependence . The most recent of these indexes (2013) ranks New Zealand at 28th in terms of its exposure to globalisation (by comparison, the United States ranks 34th, Australia 19th, Japan 56th and China 73rd). This means that while we are well connected globally, we are also unusually vulnerable to any disruption in trade and information flows.

We need to remember too that given our geographical isolation, we are at the end of a very long chain of ship and container movements and port transfers, which adds to our vulnerability from a trade disruption point of view. The implications of these developments can be seen in how US Maritime Strategy has been developing in recent years. The thrust is no longer on the Cold War need for navies to be able to fight and defeat each other at sea (except in the ultimate). The emphasis is increasingly on the use of navies to facilitate and keep open the sea lines of communication and commerce on which the economic prosperity of all countries depend.

The developing logic of seapower is increasingly centred on the role of navies in securing economic prosperity . This is less about the protection of shipping per se (New Zealand has no merchant fleet to protect, and neither does the US ). Shipping must be protected because of the goods carried, but it is more useful to think of global commerce as a system, recognising the interdependency of all the elements that make up the global system of commerce, including resource extraction, manufacturing, assembly, consumption and transportation. It is the system as a whole that must be protected, including the flows of information, finance and goods that comprise the lifeblood of the system.

In an age of increasing globalisation and interconnectedness, the role of peacetime navies is less to defeat of an adversary at sea, but to work with other navies to defend all the elements of the global economic system on which the prosperity of nations depend. This requires navies to work together cooperatively rather than competitively, and it is this logic that, for the present at least, permeates US maritime strategy.

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**The strategy is written for an age in which nations are neither 'fully at war nor fully at peace'** . The challenge is to apply seapower in a manner which instills greater collective security, stability and trust amongst nations. The underlying thought behind the strategy is that peace does not preserve itself . The focus is on building opportunities for cooperation rather than on defeating threats at sea.

US Maritime Strategy offers opportunities to those countries, New Zealand included, which maintain naval resources capable of working alongside others. We have been active in recent years in exploiting such opportunities, but there must be a significant contribution by New Zealand of naval forces to preserving the systems on which the free flow of seaborne trade depend.

One area of particular interest to the US in its approach to maritime strategy is in securing a commitment from its partners to significantly enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and an **expansion in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities** . This is in New Zealand's

interests as well and is an area in which the Navy, working with other government agencies, arguably needs to do more.

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Cooperative strategies, including the US Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Seapower in the 21st Century, recognise that mutuality has its limits and that the systems of cooperative security on which they are built can break down, sometimes with little or no warning.

A surprising number of states in the Asia Pacific region, though committed to cooperative strategies, are nonetheless investing in high end military capabilities including advanced submarines, surface combatants and 5th generation fighter aircraft. The investment of hundreds of billions of dollars for some states, suggests a willingness to wage war if peace should break down. China and India are amongst the lead players acquiring high end military capability, including aircraft carriers and anti-access ballistic and cruise missile systems and their space based components. Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are also investing significant sums in military capability.

Some of these investments are no doubt driven by national prestige. But this is unlikely to be the sole reason for acquiring military capability when it is considered that their use is mainly justifiable when security underpinned by the rule of international law breaks down.

The main concerns driving the acquisition of advanced military capability are well known. Territorial disputes are one source of concern, fuelled by the potential for competition over increasingly scarce natural resources including oil and gas, seabed minerals and fish protein. Disputes over fresh water resources are also a growing concern as nations in the region with growing populations (India being a prime example) compete with their neighbours (China in this case) over access to fresh water for irrigation as well as industrial and household use. The effects of climate change including mass refugee flows are another concern, as is the potential for public health issues spilling over national boundaries. Tensions over the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities are a further issue.

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Concerns such as these could boil over at any time, as we already see in the South China Sea and along the Chinese/Indian border. No one can predict the point at which a political miscalculation could lead to interstate war, but it is hard not to agree with the predictions of those who see the conditions for a perfect storm arising in our region at some point in the 2030s or sooner (including the noted maritime scholar Geoffrey Till, historian Niall Ferguson and strategist Colin Gray).

It is these concerns that suggest it would be prudent to think that an increased investment in the Defence Force over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand's immediate

security as well as our wider regional concerns. We do not need to be thinking in terms of military capability in the same way as the Chinese and the Indians, or even the Australians for that matter.

**But we do need to be contemplating a significant lift in New Zealand's maritime capability, both in terms of numbers of hulls and the capability built into those hulls.**

Strategic Overview: Summary

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The trend in recent years for fewer combat platforms with greater capability (depth over breadth) has gone further than it should. **In future the Navy's major combatants will need to grow significantly in number as well as capability.** To help achieve this growth the Navy needs to explore ways that will deliver to government more and better value for money and an expanded set of capability options. As David Cameron remarked to the House of Commons when introducing the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) 'A Royal Navy locked into a cycle of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive ships. Mr Speaker, we cannot go on like this'. An increased investment in the Navy over the next few years would be prudent in terms of New Zealand security.



### **New Zealand's regional interests**

As a major power in the Southwest Pacific, New Zealand has a range of interests. Protecting our security is first and foremost, followed by protecting the interests of the Realm States and those Pacific states with whom we have close relationships (Tonga, Western Samoa). Add to that our claim to the Ross Dependency, and more immediate interests in those waters in which we have sovereign rights. The total area for which New Zealand has either responsibility or interest amounts to close to **a quarter of the earth's oceans.**

Implications of our interests

**Even without our global interests, New Zealand's defence and security policy is challenged by our** immediate and regional interests. Although a small state internationally, New Zealand is a major state in the Southwest Pacific. Our constitutional responsibilities for the defence of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, as well as close relationships with other Pacific states such as Western Samoa and Tonga, create an area of interest that covers a significant portion of the Pacific Ocean. Add to that territorial claims in Antarctica and security interests in the Southern Ocean and our interests in our **own Territorial Sea, EEZ and Extended Continental Shelf and our 'domestic' security interests begin to** compare with those of other, larger, better resourced states.

Conclusion

New Zealand has both global and regional interests, and limited resources to protect them. These interests are maritime interests and need to be secured by maritime means. We have to be both global and regional players, and a local power. A well constructed Defence Force can be a major supporter of diplomatic efforts to ensure our interests are preserved. That Defence Force must be able to police the immediate region, protecting our security, sovereignty and resources. Equally, that defence force must be able to support international efforts to preserve the international trading environment on which we depend. This will require a re-balancing of the current defence force with increased focus on maritime surface and aerial capability.

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

isis and extremists

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

More combat orientated

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

n/a

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

n/a

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

n/a

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

we need better air support and a bigger budget

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

n/a

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Increasing national and international pressure for resources.

Terrorism.

Economic stress.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Resource scarcity, religious terrorism - increasing impacts on NZ economy and public perception of security - increased debate on taking part in international operations.

Trade agreements - increased government desire to work with potential and actual trade allies including defence involvement.

Overfishing - increasing pressure on NZ's exclusive economic zone by trespassing boats/nations - calls for increased patrolling by Navy, and may affect international relations (flow on effects - if we patrol our waters more rigorously, we will need increased resourcing to navy and may require increased NZDF operations to help keep overall international relations with offending nations in a positive state.

Increasing requirements for sustainability and reduced carbon emissions e.g. from trade partners, resulting in need for reduced waste, improved land management, increased focus on contamination and pollution affecting operations and day to day activities.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Increased patrolling and enforcement of NZ's EEZ - to secure our fisheries into the future.

Maintain role in training, peace keeping etc rather than brute strength in international operations.

Support Australia in maintaining national security from invasion.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Increasing trespass, poaching, international pressure to allow other nations access for fishing and mineral exploitation, and/or to go easy on offending vessels. Risks of major pollution events associated with shipwreck, oil/mineral exploration.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

I'm not knowledgeable enough to determine this, beyond thinking an international presence and working with international allies is important, but probably the main effort is most appropriate at home and with Australia.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Maintain and/or strengthen capacity to respond to natural disaster/civil emergency.

Increased Navy patrols and enforcement of EEZ.

Emphasise sustainable development, reduced environmental impact, of NZDF facilities.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Working closely with civil defence - valuable due to readiness, experience/practice, and outfitting to support communication, evacuations (transport/rations/etc), transport, setting up camps/shelter, emergency earthworks (depending on access by engineers/heavy machinery), possibly traffic control and first aid.

Ensuring activities and land management are sustainable.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Not sure. Optional one year service for school leavers (if logistically possible for NZDF) could have major benefits for some young people, and would probably improve numbers of potential recruits and engage the wider public with NZDF.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Increased naval capacity, specifically WRT EEZ.

Resourcefulness, resilience, physical and mental fitness among military pers.

Dedication among all staff, civilian as well as military.

Improved oversight, development, and if necessary, replacement of managers that are not performing to required standards.

Improved asset planning and site development on the ground with a view to capacity, logistics, flexibility, and setting within the wider community.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

The current situation with NZDF in Iraq is difficult, but absolutely the right thing to do. I'm proud of NZDF and the serving members for taking part.

I get feedback on land management on NZDF training areas from colleagues in DOC, regional councils, and various ecologists. Most is positive feedback about our pest control programmes, some is not so positive about our progress on programmes to protect endangered species. We have some way to go with biodiversity to meet our obligations. Overall it is an area where NZDF can gain a lot of

good PR and enhance community relations.

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Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

NZDF has unique knowledge, skills and culture that can provide a great deal to the development of sections of NZ youth. This is as a clear alternative for those youth who have not necessarily been well served in mainstream areas such as education. One of the most powerful assets NZDF provides on current youth schemes is the positive role models offered by staff that many of these young people have previously lacked.

NZDF should continue to provide courses and activities for youth to develop pro social attitudes and behaviours such a motivation, self discipline, cooperation, confidence, and respect. Nothing can be more important to NZ than the future generations and ensuring the maximum success in young people taking a full part in, and contributing to, NZ society.

Provision of support to NZ youth development may well also have other benefits to NZ and NZDF. The additional soft skills learned by NZDF staff in these youth programmes may well be transferable for example on operations in dealing with local communities and in assisting Pacific neighbours with their youth challenges. These soft skills and experiences may also be very useful post conflict for the UN in rehabilitation of child soldiers.

Providing assistance to youth should not impinge on other NZDF outputs. Resourcing for such courses and activities should therefore be in addition to those for operational outputs involved in the defence of NZ.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Interest in Fiji and Pacific Islands by China, Russia, India.

UAV and Submarine procurement and development by ASEAN nations.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Investment in Fiji by outside of region actors will come with some influence interests and riders

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Increased presence in the South West Pacific, surveillance and patrolling, air and maritime.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory (including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency)?:

Resource protection and perhaps Nav Area 14 being used by Foreign Govts for undeclared transits

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Become more active internationally and provide my utility to our partners. No more using "per capita" and "punch above" to describe the limited work we are doing.

Build an understanding among the NZ Public that we are here to keep people safe and that there are times when that will take trust on their part and resilience of mind for all of us.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Internal and External Messaging that we are a Defence Force, a military and that we are War-Fighters that have logistics that support Govt and NZ Public. Not disaster relief, cordon standing, beach cleaning organisation with a few rifles.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Be there when needed. Jump the gun at the startline and get to where we are likely to be needed ahead of time.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Clean slate open door to any NZ citizen who wants a fresh start. Tied into, misbehave and you're gone.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

UAV based Close Air Support?

Vertical Based Manoeuvre that can operate in Austere environments. Bell 412s, save the NH90s for a specific Combat Search and Rescue role for our International Deployments.

Maritime platforms that can land and refuel any of our Allies rotary wing assets that are likely to be deployed to the SWP.

Extensive working relationship with USMC 1 and 3 MEF.

Blue Force Tracker.

Maritime Global Hawk for Maritime Patrolling.

Base an OPV in Samoa.

Work towards increasing the RNZIR as feeder units to NZSOF.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

I would like to see a revolutionary NZDF structure. Something that isn't a throw back to history. Flatter hierarchy, less Officer Corps. More autonomy to leaders on the ground so we can conduct fast agile operations and using technology concentrate our forces when necessary to deliver a devastatingly effective combined arms operation when necessary before splitting back to autonomous tasks.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982



Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

New Zealand's societies general belief that their is no threat.

Immigration policies that allow for the ease of terrorist organisations to infiltrate New Zealand.

Spread of other nations influence over countries within the New Zealand sphere of influence e.g.

China's aid to pacific nations and Indonesia activities in West Papua.

Any threats to Australia are a threat to us as they are the closest main land mass to our country.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Spread of international terrorism.

Continued use of illegal organisations to conduct their activities under the premises of religious beliefs.

Personnel with skills gained from being part of terrorist organisations employing those skills to support other "non-terrorist" but illegal causes e.g. drug and people smuggling.

Spreading of non western society influence to secure resources that are demonising in their own countries.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Maintain a physical military presence within the coalition environment as part of our international responsibility and ensure we are seen as a contributing nation. Including conventional and SF capabilities.

Assist with securing international shipping lanes i.e. anti piracy and smuggling (Navy).

Maintain Military presence in Antarctica waters (Navy)

Assist Australia with blocking illegal people trafficking around the South West Pacific region i.e. the most likely direction from which boat people are to approach NZ. (Navy)

Maintain a maritime force capable of self sustained deployment into up to medium threat levels within the south pacific region. (Joint Force)

Maintain a pacific relief capability for civil emergencies within the pacific region. (Joint Force)

Develop an air deployable capability (parachuting) for rapid response to bridge the gap until the maritime capability can arrive. This is for both medium threat and pacific relief scenarios. (Joint Force)

Form a Coastal Defence capability for protection of national economic zone i.e. transfer smaller Navy assets to form a Coast Guard and arm them.

Maintain domestic and pacific region CT response. (NZSOF)

Maintain national civil defence response. (Joint Force)

Improve the domestic and regional CBR threat response capability.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

People Smuggling

Illegal Fishing

Terrorist threats throughout the region from international threat organisations.

Terrorist threats in host nations requiring an international response.

Protecting friendly nations from hostile threats e.g. the genocide occurring in West Papua spreading to PNG.

Domestic terrorist threats

Intelligence gathering activities

Domestic civil disturbance following a disaster.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Order of priority

Domestic terrorist threats.

Security within exclusion economic zone.

Assisting Australia with security in South West Pacific region.

Enhancing Military aid to PNG and other pacific nations.

Protecting international waters and sea lanes including Antarctica.

Military presence on the international scene as part of a coalition.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

On the international scene we are a small nation with limited resources. Serious consideration should be placed into the requirement for us to have three separate services. It could be argued the time is right to consider moving to 'One Force' with a Land, Sea and Air capabilities.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

NZDF has an important role to play in supporting the domestic emergency response. The main contribution the NZDF should provide is in the form of extra manpower and transferable skills their primary roles provide including planning, co-ordination and specialist equipment/skills such as communications, water purification and security.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Whilst it is important to develop our youth within New Zealand, in the current economic environment

it should be questioned if this is a NZDF output, especially if we are to maintain an operationally focused force. Unless independently funded this should not take any priority over developing and maintaining our defence capability. The NZDF is already stretched with respect to manning and financial restraints.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Long range projection by sea. (already have with current navy assets).

Long range air lift capabilities. (replace current C130 fleet), work more closely with Australian and US airlift capabilities. This should include the ability to insert a min of a company via parachute.

Give our air force some teeth, e.g. close ground support in the form of a small fleet of attack helicopters.

Strike an alliance with a larger friendly nation and allow them to maintain a presence within New Zealand of a flight of fighter aircraft. This would enable them to have reach into our areas of influence and provide us with closer training with NZDF and provide us with a strike capability for the likes of reacting to a Sep11 type scenario.

Reorganise 1NZ Bde so it has 3 x deployable forces based around an enhanced infantry battalion with direct supporting elements embedded.

This would enable sustainability for long term commitments via rotation of the deployable force i.e. One deployed, one ready to deploy and the other reconstituting (individual training etc. To achieve this under current manning restraints would require the transformation of some units (e.g. Artillery to infantry) and the dispersion of others (e.g. RNZE) into the deployable units.

Reserve units could be used to supplement the RF deployable units, however Mf being BPT conduct domestic civil disaster relief.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

We are a small nation at the bottom of the world, geographically isolated by large expanses of ocean. In order to adequately protect our shores from any threat we need to be able to project our forces out into those countries at the edge of our areas of influence. At the same time we need to maintain demonstrating a willingness to be good international citizens and fostering strong collations with our international allies and BPT deal with any threats or emergencies arising domestically.

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Major threats in the future include:

- Interstate rivalry in Asia, especially PRC vs Taiwan, Japan, and SE Asian states in South China Sea; and North Korea vs South Korea.

- Ongoing instability in Middle East and South Asia, within and between Muslim states.

- Increase in likelihood of use of WMD including nuclear weapons.

- Cumulative effect globally of rising sea levels, reduced availability of fresh water and increasing population growth creating significant pressure on coastal living spaces and natural resources.

Consequences include inter and intra state conflict. Third order consequences include increased threat of mass arrivals of illegal immigrants into other countries including New Zealand.

Increased access of Internet / social media technologies globally, which has both positive and negative outcomes. Positive includes increased education and awareness of issues and opportunities.

Negative effects include increased cyber crime, and influence of non-state actors on local populations, leading to increase of instability in many third world countries.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The outlook for the global economy is likely to poor, impacting on New Zealand's markets. Other countries will overtake NZ agriculture (especially dairy) in terms of efficiency and capacity, with consequent loss of NZ export income. Funding for NZDF will be reduced.

Increased stress on the UN system due to reduced income and increased self-interest of members States may result in fewer "UN-sanctioned" missions. Conversely, some UN missions may be in conflict with NZ values (remote possibility).

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Assist other NZ agencies to secure NZ borders and resources.

Assist neighbours (Australia, Pacific Islands, SE Asia) with HADR and SASO.

Contribute to coalition operations to keep sea and air routes open for commerce (including combat roles)

Contribute to coalition operations to counter violent extremism and territorial expansionism by military means (including combat roles)

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Increase in request to NZDF for aid to NZ civil powers, especially assisting with weather and tidal events, and mass arrivals of illegal immigrants.

Pacific Island territories will face fresh water scarcity and impact of bigger storms (HADR requests).

There is a likelihood that NZDF receives requests to assist with illegal immigrants who arrive in these areas too.

The Ross Dependency will continue to face illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing threats, and the wider Antarctic space will become more tense as the end of the Antarctic Treaty looms. NZ

may face more countries wanting to build "scientific" bases within the land area of the Ross Dependency.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New

Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

NZDF's first priority is the security of the nation, albeit in a support role to other government agencies.

Second priority is supporting our neighbours, friends and allies.

Third priority is contributing to international peace and security efforts globally.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

NZDF should promote, encourage and support the role of Central Agencies (especially DPMC) to coordinate all-of-government efforts. NZDF can uniquely contribute by opening its training and planning to other agencies.

NZDF can contribute to cooperative efforts by seconding staff to organisations such as the NMCC.

NZDF can also contribute by enabling its networks to be the backbone of all-of-government secure networks.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Support role, providing personnel, equipment, communications, and networks as required.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

This should be a low priority and a minor role. NZDF could provide youth training amongst a range of options managed by other government agencies.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

NZDF needs highly effective leadership, which enables a culture change to include accountability, honesty and selflessness.

NZDF needs to better manage its information and its sharing within itself, with other government agencies and foreign partners.

Conventional land and maritime combat capabilities need to be maintained but also able to operate in contemporary environments.

Current air capability is about right. Air combat capability is desirable but unrealistic due to cost.

NZDF needs an awareness of the space domain.

NZDF needs to be involved in the cyber domain but in coordination with other agencies.

NZDF needs to have its Special Forces with sufficient appropriate support elements.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

New Zealanders need to better understand that we are a maritime nation, with the advantages and disadvantages of our location.

NZDF needs to decide and prioritise its capability options, including which has depth versus breadth.

NZDF also needs to decide what capabilities it won't have and develop mitigation measures.

Priority of effort needs to go into phase zero operations in the relevant operational spaces, to minimise potential negative outcomes before they manifest themselves. This almost certainly requires a whole-of-government approach.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Cyber Attacks from outside and inside New Zealand.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

New Zealand involvement in Iraq may or will cause problems with New Zealand with regards to terror attacks.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Security and Peace keeping in the Pacific.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

China's involvement in the pacific may cause problems for New Zealand in the near future.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

The Government should remove New Zealand Personnel from UN operators and prioritise our efforts in the Pacific only.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Combine the Navy, Air Force and Army services as Defence Force wearing the same uniform, and sharing resources without the service fighting which is causing problems.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Defence Force's role should be backup to the other agencies.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Regarding Youth Development Unit, yes as this is a very successful unit that has been giving Youth good life skills.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Defence Force needs develop better training methods, especially with Live Firing to achieve good results with overseas roles, now and in the future.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

New Zealand Defence Force needs to be reorganise as there are too many departments and staff doing the same job.

For example JHFNZ is in charge of overseas operations using ITC and CIS does the same job! We need to have one department in charge of overseas operations ICT only.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

As enunciated in the Defence White Paper 2010, with some increase in the likelihood and impact of non-conventional threats to cyber and boarder security.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Balance of power and influence on the wane in North America, and dis-unity in EC/Europe, leaving a vacuum for the rise of economic and military power in the non-Western world, and failed states world-wide.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Maritime forces to protect natural maritime resources above and below the seabed. Boarder security from threats via maritime and air transport. Close defence and security cooperation with Australia. Engagement with SW Pacific island nations states (of which NZ is one); engagement with regional partners; contribution with like-minded states to secure sea lines of communication which underpin NZ's primary produce-based export economy.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Lack of maritime surface and air military capabilities to deter, detect, and confront challenges to NZ's international claims under law. We need to be capable of using force if other non-military strategies fail.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Step 1. Funding. increase gross defence spending by 5% per annum until the cash investment in "insurance" is equal to the same per head of population as Australian taxpayers invest. This would make our contribution credible and "mateship" in defence more than jus rhetoric.

Step 2. Capabilities funded to reflect future defence and security needs, based on maritime surface and air weapons platforms.

Step 3. Reduction in funding of activities not contributing to Step 2.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

About the same as currently.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

As support to civil authorities, as a secondary role for funded defence capabilities.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Separately funded; to the extent in enhances the leadership experience and quality of military leaders at all levels. No a core output.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

1. Funding tied to AS taxpayer commitment (see Q5).
2. Maritime surface, blue water, combat platforms.
3. Air assets for maritime surveillance and response.



4. Limited land capabilities; more suited to regional contingencies than those on the other side of the globe.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Defence and security matters should be apolitical if we are to be responsible to future generations of New Zealanders. Currently, this is not the case, and arguably has not been the case since 1945. Our sovereignty is at stake, as are our values of democracy and equality before the law. Surely, we need to be putting the main ideas in the Defence White Paper 2010 into effect by means other than trying to pull large sums of money out of current business for capital injection. This is not a business model that works in capitalism! NZ Leaders have said we need to be more independent. No one has said how.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

I think the major direct challenges to NZ security now and in the future are 'non-traditional ones'. Pressures arising out of global demographic changes, population growth, food supply, access to resources, and so on will manifest itself in security challenges for NZ. Matters such as illegal fishing, illegal extraction of resources within the EEZ, and so on are examples. These pressures will be both within NZ's EEZ and the EEZ's of smaller Pacific Island nations. I expect the island nations will look to NZ and others for help in dealing with illegal activity within their EEZs. The less direct impact on NZ security will arise out of unrest in other parts of the globe. NZ's prosperity is dependent upon open trade and open trade routes. Unrest will create risks to NZ's economic security.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

The increased unrest in other parts of the globe noted in Q1 may require NZ to take part in a greater number of security events further afield. This will not necessarily require NZDF to have a greater range of military options available, but perhaps greater ability to do more on the global stage where we have particular expertise.

The likely increase in direct threats to our EEZ from illegal activity will require us to have greater maritime capability - whether that is on the surface (ie Navy) or over the surface (ie Air Force) is not clear to me. But it is probably both.

Pressure on resources will also increase focus on the Antarctic. As a nation, we will likely need to increase our ability to operate in the Southern Ocean and on the ice.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Anti-piracy patrols.

Contributing to UN and other coalition peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts.

Assisting Pacific Island nations with their security (as requested by them).

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

I think I have already covered this in my answers to Q1 and Q2. Bottom line - I think there is likely to be an increase in illegal activity requiring capability for maritime surveillance and intervention from the tropics to the Antarctic.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

This is a difficult one. However, I would say, having the ability to project our maritime forces throughout the South Pacific and to global areas where open trade routes are vital is very important. Dealing with security issues further afield now will help keep them from being closer to home. My sense is that a greater commitment to operating further afield more frequently will require a greater investment by the Government than is currently the case.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and

advance the nation's interests?:

Obviously, NZDF needs to work with other government agencies who also protect NZ security. However, the government does need to ask itself whether or not it is appropriate to use high-end military platforms (for example, and ANZAC frigate or a P3K Orion) for some other agency activities. The opportunity cost of doing so is high.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

As far as I can see, the NZDF is the only organisation with people and equipment capable of responding quickly to unforeseen events and natural disasters. However, the Government must prioritise. As it is currently resources, the Government cannot have the NZDF operating on security events elsewhere in the SWP or globally and expect to have a rapid response force for natural disasters. Furthermore, maintaining military readiness to respond to natural disasters actually erodes readiness for other higher-end military activities. I would therefore suggest the Government should seek to find a way to respond to natural disasters which does not rely so heavily on the NZDF.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

In my view, this should be the lowest on the list of priorities. It is important work, but should only be resources to the extent that it does not reduce our capability in other areas. That being said, it is one of the few concrete connections with have with a broad cross-section of the population, which is important. It also appears to be a good source of recruits (both from Cadet Forces and the LSV programme). So if we look at it holistically, it may be an important part of our staffing system. My apologies for being a fence sitter in this area. I can see positives and negatives in this area of activity. I haven't decided which side of the ledger my final answer sits.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Our highest priority should be strong maritime surveillance and intervention capability which can be projected into the South West Pacific as well as further in order to ensure open trade routes globally. By that I mean true warships (like the frigates), tanker, surveillance aircraft, and so on. Capability across the air, surface and sub-surface domains is important.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

I haven't mentioned cyber capabilities. I'm far from an expert on such matters, which is likely why they haven't featured in my answers. However, it is very important. Nevertheless, it seems to me there needs to be an all-of-government approach to cyber security. The recent denial of service attack on the Canadian Government is a reminder that smaller, moderate states can be targets.

Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

Global terrorism exporting it's self around the world and home grown fundamentalists.

Interstate conflicts.

ISIS and it's growing popularity.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

With heightened tensions in the Pacific between China and USA the Southwest Pacific may become more closely contested at the Political level.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

To maintain a robust patrol and RESPONSE to any incursions into our EEZ. A contemporary COMBAT force (Air/Land/Sea) to be deployed when required. NOT a peace keeping force, that is for police, soldiers fight.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Incursions by unwanted migrants and illegal fishing. Global terrorism can easily end up on our shores as it is as close as Australia.

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Actually charge the Airforce and Navy with realtime outputs, support and have them as credible forces. Hold them too account for their actions or lack of.

Have the Army equipped and trained for war, the worst case not the politically palatable one.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Be a tool ready for deployment at all times to further the nations interests. Whether that is through presence or fighting.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

Where possible in emergency situations all assets should be used that do not detract from New Zealand's overall security to help the populace.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

LSV and YDU programmes are good but perhaps not the NZDF's purview.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

Upgraded communications. Better weapons. A useable uniform. More training with international partners.

A combat air and sea capability, not the coast guard we currently have.

The Airforce actually act like an Airforce, not Air New Zealand staying in hotels and sinking millions of dollars into accommodation.

An Army prepared for the worst case, war.

NZDF should be a modern international partner that is integrating with our allies and not seen as the backwater burden we currently are.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

We need strategic and tactical airlift with close air support platforms. A reliable drone for reporting, not NZ made as we are too small to produce and test the types a Defence force needs.

Increase Defence spending.

Increase Army funding, not just the platforms in the Airforce and Navy.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

- ISIS and Taliban threatening NZ interests, Kiwis abroad and eventually Kiwis at home.
- threats to NZ interests overseas
- threats to NZ trade
- cyber threat to Kiwis from extremist groups
- threats to NZ natural resources and fisheries

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

while we may operate within a clearly defined coalition, our threats or enemies are less likely to be part of a nation state.

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

protect New Zealanders and our interests. This may be alone or more likely in conjunction with our friends.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

illegal fishing

illegal plundering of seabed and sub sea bed resources

food and freshwater security for low lying Islands such as the Tokelaus and Kiribati - we should have a plan for their eventual abandonment

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

Priority as follows:

- ensure NZ is secure - this should be achieved as far away as it need to be done.
- support partners with priority to Australia.
- contribute to international peace globally.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

in support of other government agencies, in the lead if NZ directly threatened.

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

provide everything reasonably available at the time without compromising operations.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

NZDF should continue to provide the best practice youth development it currently runs. We have a role in helping NZ at home.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in

the future?:

no less than it has no but with enhanced strategic airlift, maritime/space surveillance

the ability to deploy two concurrent land deployments -1 battalion strength, one combat team strength.

the ability to operate in combat, on land, with ABCA and FPDA partners.

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

NZ is under the threat of globalisation, this is not new but it is not conquered either. Porous borders and large sea accesses are enticing to those that wish to access our lifestyle for their own gains. The challenge to AOG agencies is to reduce the risk of breaches over our borders to ensure both the safety of our people and the economic stability of our nation.

Question 2: What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?:

Question 3: What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?:

Maintaining security of our borders both physically and through intelligence gathering. By maintaining our support role with like minded countries ensures our credibility as a nation and good international citizen and allows early warning or advice on high risks to NZ. Imbedding NZDF personnel in all areas of those like minded nations will grow their belief in our capabilities raising our profile and their obligation to look out for our interest.

Question 4: What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?:

Question 5: How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?:

I don't believe we can apply a fixed priority list and it should be up to the Government of the day to determine where each priority lies providing our efforts, no matter where the are, contribute to overall stability and security.

Question 6: How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?:

Question 7: What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?:

There is no doubt that the NZDF is considered the leading organisation for providing disaster relief. Civil Defence groups conduct initial responses to disasters but everyone knows that when the Army, Navy or Air Force step in then things get done and people feel safer. NZDF must remain a leader in both organisational capability and trained responses to unforeseen events and natural disasters.

Question 8: What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?:

Under the Defence Act 1990 Part VI, NZDF are mandated through the Minister of Defence to provide support to New Zealand Cadet Forces. This is on a partnership deal where NZDF provide military type environments and skillsets and the community provide the resources and facilities for community activities. Whilst this has been the way it works for the last 45 years it is restrictive in that it relies on the community to progress their local unit and members. NZDF are more and more requested to support these local units to ensure they remain viable and active but with less to do it with. NZDF also support the YDU programme where young adults who struggle in society gain an injection of discipline and sense of belief which is a ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. If NZDF were to apply more resources into Cadet Forces then those who go through the programme become better equipped to exist in society as young adults removing the need for the YDU programme. Cadet Forces provides the same military training and benefits as the YDU programme but it is conducted over 5 years and not 6 weeks ensuring the culture of discipline and self belief is engrained for life. Grow Cadet Forces and you grow positive and long term development of NZ's



youth. These developed young people will contribute positively both domestically and internationally. They also become proponents of NZDF no matter where their lives take them.

Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

No matter what capability is required the best resource to carry out the roles given to us is the people. Invest in our people and you invest in our capability. Investing in our youth programmes will provide the will and trust of the NZDF enabling us to recruit and retain those that believe in what we do.

In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.:

Please return to the top of the page and click 'Save and Close' to make your submission.:

Please Leave this field blank

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Question 1: What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?:

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Question 9: What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?:

As a country New Zealand is facing major demographic changes that will be a significant factor in driving personnel capability in the NZDF.

The ethnic make up of the country is becoming more diverse and the population is ageing. The NZDF **must recruit for and embrace the diversity of New Zealand's changing workforce to ensure it remains a 'Force for New Zealand'**.

The European ethnic group is older than other major ethnic groups – according to the 2013 Census the median age for people who identified as being in each of the major ethnic groups was:

- European or Other- 41.0 years ( 38.1 in 2006 )
- Maori - 23.9 years ( 22.7 in 2006 )
- Pacific peoples – 22.1 years ( 21.1 in 2006 )
- Asian - 30.6 years ( 28.3 in 2006 ) \* (1)

Maori, Asian and Pacific populations will continue to grow at a **faster rate than 'European and Other'** populations. Projections from Statistics New Zealand favour increases in the number of Maori, Asian and Pacific children (aged 0-14) **in contrast to 'European or Other' children, reflecting current and future assumed fertility rates.** \*(2)

The youthful age structures within the Maori, Asian and Pacific populations will provide the momentum for growth in their numbers in the working-aged population from whom organisations like the NZDF will recruit their future workforce. The median projection indicates that by 2038 of all New Zealand children (aged 0-14):

- European or Other children will make up 63.2% (compared with 71.6% in 2013)
- Maori children will make up 32.6% (compared with 25.6% in 2013)
- Asian children will make up 21.6% (compared with 11.9% in 2013)
- Pacific children will make up 19.6% (compared with 13.4% in 2013) \*(3)

As well as their familial and ethnic cultural perspectives, the young people from the increasing youthful populations of Maori, Asian and Pacific peoples will bring with them a culture overlaid with New Zealand

experience, and many have competency in languages such as Samoan, Hindi and Northern Chinese including Mandarin. Their unique perspectives will make them extremely valuable to any organisation they join. It is this diversity of thought and experience that NZDF must harness and deploy effectively. By focusing on creating truly inclusive workplaces we will enhance our operational effectiveness in the rapidly changing arena of international relations. In fact increasing diversity and inclusion are not only necessary for operational and organisation effectiveness, but are necessary for the future survival of the NZDF.

\* (1) <http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/quickstats> retrieved 22/06/15

\* (2) [http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse\\_for\\_stats/population/estimates\\_and\\_projections/NationalEthnicPopulationProjections](http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/estimates_and_projections/NationalEthnicPopulationProjections); retrieved 22/06/15

\* (3)

[http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse\\_for\\_stats/population/estimates\\_and\\_projections/NationalEthnicPopulationProjections](http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/estimates_and_projections/NationalEthnicPopulationProjections) retrieved 22/06

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Eamonn I really think defence needs to think long and hard about service housing and more importantly, service communities, which service housing often forms the basis or foundation of. There aren't to many groups in existence made up of people who are asked to regularly leave home and go to strange and often dangerous locations and put their lives on the line for queen and country. And many of our people are asked to do it time after time, not just once. Research shows (I wrote an essay on this quite recently) that those servicemen perform better and come home healthier when they know that their families are being well supported while they are away. And the very best way to offer that support is to provide safe housing where our service families live in close community with other service housing, where they can share fears and support.

CDF just launched 2020 READY. One of the planks is "better support." The best support we can give our people is the security of knowing that their love ones are safe and secure.

So I am asking if it isn't too late for the value of Defence Housing supporting our Defence Community to be discussed and acknowledged as part of the White Paper?

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Dear Secretary of  
Defence Helene  
Quiter

Some topics of security  
that are in the news  
now and again

1, civil defence issues  
eg chemical spills  
into waterways.

2, dangerous chemicals  
eg Tanahere near  
Hamilton some years  
ago.

3, overcrowding of  
passenger vehicles  
eg boats.

4, People getting lost  
in forests  
eg Wairarapa  
search and rescue  
recently.

These seem to  
have come up  
occasionally in news  
or similar topics.  
Hope this is a  
similar idea of some  
of the security  
topics of white paper  
that ~~is~~ discussed.  
may be

Yours

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EDMS ID.	CE-014
Date	03/08/15
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File	Yes / No
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